

〈論文〉

Personal Identity and Passions in the *Treatise*:

The Connection between Book I and Book II (Part 5)

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(3) How a present concern for our past or future pains and pleasures arises

I have agreed with McIntyre in holding that “Hume recognised questions about personal identity not addressed in Book I”(Mc 556) and that “Book 2 makes an important contribution to our understanding of Hume’s account of the self and its identity”(Mc 556/7). In the rest of my discussion, I shall mainly be concerned with the problem, which argument in Book II is actually intended by Hume for the discussion of the theory of personal identity regarding passions, and try to see how “a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261) is claimed to arise, and to “corroborate” the other aspect of our identity regarding the imagination. The key to these questions must certainly lie, if any at all, in the concluding chapter of Book II, titled “The will and direct passions”.

We have noted that, after having completed the discussion of the indirect passions, Hume begins his last chapter assigned for the discussion of the other half of passions directly with a seemingly alien subject, viz. the will, and tries to establish that we have a good reason to “believe the actions of the will to arise from necessity”(T 405). The clue to our present problems seems to be found in solving these puzzles: What made him choose the will as the main and initial subject in the last chapter? Why is it so important for him to establish “all actions of the will have particular causes”(T 412)?

In order to solve these questions, it seems useful to mark that why Hume specifically emphasises his former issue that “the necessary connection” between the cause and the effect is not “a conclusion of the understanding, but is merely a perception of the mind”(T 405), and asks us to remember this basic position he has established in Book I: it is from the constant union between objects that the mind “*forms* the idea of cause and effect, and by its influence *feels* the necessity”(ibid.). Reasoning that it may “be sufficient, if we prove a constant union in the actions of the mind, in order to establish the inference along with the necessity of these actions”(T 401), he establishes that “in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxims, as when we reason concerning external object”(T 403) on the ground that “there is a general course of nature in human actions, as well as in the operations of the sun and the

climate”(ibid.).

If “the same experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volitions, and actions, or figure and motion”(T 406/7) and if “its influence on the understanding is also the same in *determining* us to infer the existence of one from that of another”(T 404) as Hume maintains, we may have a good reason to suppose that the mind feels the same “necessity”(T 406) when we “are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414). But it is exactly this feeling of “the necessity” that the prevalent “doctrine of liberty”(T 407) tries to reject, supposing mistakenly that “liberty or chance” “is nothing but the want of that determination”(T 408), and asserts instead as “an argument for its real existence” “a false sensation or experience” of “a certain looseness which we feel in passing or not passing from the idea of one to that of the other”(ibid.), according to him. We are apt to subscribe to this doctrine, feeling “that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions, and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject to nothing”(T 408), because, he explains, “though reflecting on human actions, we seldom feel a looseness or indifference, yet it very commonly happens, that in performing the actions we are sensible of something like it”(T 408).

In order to avoid the commitment to this doctrine, Hume finds it necessary to distinguish between “the liberty of spontaneity” from “the liberty of indifference”(T 407): the first is the liberty “which is opposed to violence”(ibid.) whereas the second “means a negation of necessity and causes”(ibid.). Our common misunderstanding regarding liberty is derived from the confusion of these two kinds of liberties, according to him. It is only the first that “the most common sense of the word ... concerns us to preserve”(T 407/8), but we have “almost universally confounded the former with the latter”(T 408), taking “a false sensation or experience even of the liberty of indifference”(ibid.) as “a demonstrative, or even an intuitive proof of human liberty”(ibid.).

This confusion can easily be avoided only by recalling that for Hume “the necessity of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not properly a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being who may consider the actions, and consists in the determination of his thought to infer its existence from some preceding objects”(T 408). In Hume’s system, “the very essence of necessity”(T 409) regarding our actions lies not in what we may feel within ourselves in passing or not passing from the idea of one to that of the other, but in that “a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character”(T 408) or from our situa-

tion and temper. In so far as “no one has ever pretended to deny, that we can draw inferences concerning human actions” and “that those inferences are founded on the experienced union of like actions with like motives and circumstances”(T 409), we have a good reason to “believe the actions of the will to arise from necessity”(T 405).

But if, we may then ask, the human “actions have a constant union and connection with the situation and temper of the agent”(T 403), or if “there is no known circumstance that enters into the connection and production of the actions of matter that is not to be found in all the operations of the mind”(T 404), how is the will supposed to contribute to the determination of our actions? This question may be restated like this: if the will is “nothing but the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind”(T 399) as Hume defines, what does he mean by this “internal impression”? We may naturally wonder what this “internal impression” could be, as it cannot evidently be a bodily sensation produced by the motion of our body in so far as it is treated by Hume as something very much like passions, though not, properly speaking, to be “comprehended among the passions”(T 399).

The key to this question seems to be given by asking another problem, why is it so important for Hume to establish “the necessity of human actions, and [to] place them on the same footing with the operations of senseless matter”(T 410)? We have seen in our foregoing chapters that his main concern in his discussion of passions lies in establishing the analogy between the two systems of the mind, viz. the understanding and the passions, through the demonstration that the same method of reasoning is applicable to both operations of the mind. What is now needed in this last part of his discussion of passions is to complete this analogy by showing “how aptly natural and moral evidence cement together, and form only one chain of argument betwixt them”(T 406). In other words, if “moral evidence is nothing but a conclusion concerning the actions of men, derived from the consideration of their motives, temper, and situation”(T 404), his main concern must lie in proving “the necessity of human actions”(T410): that “in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxims, as when we reason concerning external objects”(T 403).

If so, it seems not entirely fanciful to suggest that, when Hume places “necessity either in the constant union and conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the mind from the one to the other”(T 409) and insists that “necessity, in both senses, ... has universally been allowed to belong to the will of man”(ibid.), what is in Hume’s mind in mentioning the will as “the inter-

nal impression” is this “necessity”(T 406) which the mind is claimed to “feel” when it forms the idea of cause and effect. For, if “our actions have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances”(T 401) as he holds, it must follow, according to his reasoning, that the mind “feels the necessity”(T 406) when we “are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414) while “the emotions [of aversion or propensity] extends themselves to the causes and effects of that objects, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience”(T 414).

And if the will depends thus on the easy transition of the imagination along the related ideas, there must be such “a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions”(T 406) as to make it feel “no difference betwixt them in passing from one link to another”(T 406). Without this causal chain, how could the mind be “certain of the future event than if it were connected with the present impressions of the memory and senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a physical necessity”(T 406)? Here lies a hint to our question regarding Hume’s strategy for the problem, how “a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures” is claimed to arise in Hume’s system.

Having proved with “an entire victory” that “all actions of the will have particular causes”(T 412), Hume now proceeds “to explain what these causes are, and how they operate” (T 412). It is here in this part of his discussion in which he is devoted to the examination of “the combat of passion and reason”(T 413) that he enters at last upon the subject of “a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261). What he marks as the clue to the problem how our concern with ourselves in the past or future is possible at all is the circumstance in which, “when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414). We need to mark that this circumstance consists of these two processes: “the aversion or propensity” arises from “the prospect of pain or pleasure towards any object”, and “these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience”(T 414).

What is mainly relevant to the origin of the direct passions is the former process in which impressions “arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure”(T 399). Assuming that “it is from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object”(T 414), Hume tries to explain in the last two sections the origin of those “principal” (T 448) direct passions, viz. hope and fear, and curiosity or the love of truth, by his basic princi-

ples, viz. the association of ideas and the association of impressions. He claims, for instance, “when good is certain or probable, it produces joy”(T 439) whereas “when evil is in the same situation, there arises grief or sorrow”(ibid.). Or, again, “when either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to fear or hope, according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other”(T 439).

But Hume’s purpose in these two short sections seems to lie not in establishing the system of the production of a direct passion, but rather in the demonstration of the analogy between the two systems relevant to the understanding and passions. It is true that the double association of ideas and impressions is not mentioned in the discussion of the direct passions. But it is easily observable how consistently insistent he is on the analogy through the illustration of “hope and fear” in terms of “the nature of probability”(T 440) and “the love of knowledge, or curiosity” in terms “the influence of belief ... to enliven and infix any idea in the imagination”(T 453), both of which are his basic maxims he has established in Book II.

What makes him more concerned than the origin of a direct passion is the second process in which the emotion of aversion or propensity caused by the prospect of pain or pleasure carries us “to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414). It is in this circumstance in which “this emotion rests not here, but, making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect”(T 414) that Hume directly enters upon his final subject, viz. how the emotion of aversion or propensity changes into our concern with ourselves in the past or in the future by involving “the impulse”(T 414) for actions. Although Hume does not make it explicitly clear whether this “emotion of aversion or propensity” is distinguished from “a present concern in our past or in our future”, he seems to recognise a difference between them by mentioning the latter as something more than a mere experience of a passion or emotion: “the consequent emotions of aversion or propensity” produced from “the prospect of pain or pleasure” becomes “a present concern for our future pains or pleasures”, when they “extends themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience” (T 414).

It is observable how Hume’s discussion in the last chapter develops steadily toward his final problem, how “a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261) is possible at all, which is now to be illustrated in terms of the connection between the passion and our actions. After having proved that “all actions of the will have particular causes”(T 412), he is

now seeking the cause of our actions in the circumstance in which the direct passions, viz. “desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear”(T 399), produced by “the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object” involves the impulse for actions. What may be suggested at first as the cause of our actions may be “reason”, as we know that “according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation”(T 414). But Hume denies this possibility, holding that “the impulse [for actions] arises not from reason, but is only directed by it”(T 414). The so-called “combat of passion and reason” is nothing but the dispute between the violent and the passions, and “reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition”(T 414), according to him.

Hume seems to have no doubt about the influence of passions over the will and actions, observing, for instance, that a passion, when once “become a settled principle of action, and the predominant inclination of the soul”(T 419), “directs the actions and conduct without that opposition and emotion which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passions”(ibid.). His problem, therefore, lies not in that there is something unrealisable in the causation between the passion and our actions, but in that this connection is not a direct but an oblique causation intermediated by the operation of the imagination: the impulse for actions depends on “the situations of the object ... [whose] variation will be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other”(T 419). While admitting that “passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence”(T 418), he holds it “certain” nevertheless that, “when we would govern a man, and push him to any action”, “we ought to place the object in such particular situations as are proper to increase the violence of the passion”(T 419). He thus seeks the cause of our actions in the correspondence between the violence of the passion and the “impulse”(T 414) for actions, and suggests us to examine to the bottom “those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(T 419).

Hume’s strategy for the problem regarding “a present concern for our future or past pains or pleasures”(T 261) is to explain, instead of the influence of passions over the will and actions, the influence of the imagination over the violence of passions, on the supposition that our actions depends, in a great measure, on the violence, though not on the strength, of passions. And in accounting for “the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions”(T 418), he marks the “situation of the object”(T 419) whose variation will be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other, and tries to explain it in terms of these three main principles: effects of custom, the contiguity and distance in space and time, and the maxim that

“lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination”(T 427). He argues, for instance, that any new or unaccustomed object is more affecting to the mind, as there is “a certain unpliableness” (T 422) in the transition of the imagination, whereas custom and repetition produce “facility” in the performance of any action, which often convert pain into pleasure, or vice versa. An object placed contiguous or remote to ourselves has a strong or weak effect on the imagination respectively, so that it causes “a proportionable effect on the will and passions”(T 428) by means of its relation to ourselves, according to him.

What is here mentioned as “the situation of the object” is nothing but the situation in which the imagination makes the transition, and conveys to the related idea the vivacity of the present impression. If so, why is it necessary for Hume to call our attention to this situation, and to spare so much space for the illustration of this old issue in this last part of his discussion? It is because, he may answer, this situation has a special importance for his system in that the present impression in question is no other impression than “the impression or consciousness of our own person”(T 318). “The situation of the object” then turns out to be the situation in which a passion becomes violent according as its related idea acquires “the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person”(T 318) by its relation to ourselves: “everything contiguous to us, either in space or time, should be conceived with a **peculiar** force and vivacity, and excel every other object in its influence on the imagination”(T 427).

In his foregoing discussion of the indirect passions, as we remember, “the idea, or rather impression of ourselves”(T 317) is claimed to be so distinct from any other impressions as to produce this remarkable consequence: not only that “whatever is related to us is conceived in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object”(T 353), but also that the related idea may in some cases “acquires such a degree of force and vivacity as to become the very passion itself”(T 317). Now, Hume’s object in his discussion of the direct passions lies, it seems to me, in establishing this issue: it is only when the idea of our past or future pains or pleasures is converted into an impression, viz. a present concern, by acquiring such a degree of vivacity from the impression of ourselves that it could have any influence over the will or actions. For, in Hume’s system, as it is only an impression, but not an idea, that could have any influence over our actions: “where the objects themselves do not **affect** us, their connection can never give them any influence; and it is plain that, as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connection, it cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect us”(T 414).

It is now clear why it was so important for Hume to establish that “all actions of the will

have particular causes”(T 412) and to prove that “in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxims, as when we reason concerning external objects”(T 403): he intends to explain the causation between the passion and actions by the analogy with “the belief attending the judgments which we form from causation”(T 289). He rehearses his basic maxim that “belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression”(T 427), he tries to account for the impulse for actions in terms of the violence of an emotion of aversion or propensity by the same method of reasoning he has established regarding “the belief attending the judgments which we form from causation”(T 289): “wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations”(T 424).

An emotion of aversion or propensity produced by the idea of good or evil is converted into a present concern while increasing its violence according as the relevant idea is enlivened with the vivacity conveyed from the impression of ourselves, because, “any emotion which attends a passion is easily converted into it”(T 419) and increases its violence by the “principle of a parallel direction”(T 384). Two passions “both present in the mind, readily mingle and unite”(T 420), and transfuse each other “when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent” (T 381), according to him. It is evident not only that the original affection, thus converted into a present concern, is something more than a mere passion in that it involves an impulse for actions, but also that the idea of good or evil, or rather the prospect of pain or pleasure, is converted into a belief, when conceived “in the strongest and most lively manner”(T 318) by its relation to ourselves.

It is observable how all his argument given in his preceding discussion of passions in Book II now converges to this issue: “This vivacity [conveyed from the present impression of ourselves] is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our actions, the calm as well as the violent; nor has a mere fiction of the imagination any considerable influence upon either of them”(T 427). For, without this vivacity, as he maintains, “it is too weak to take any hold of the mind, or be attended with emotion”(T 427). In his discussion of the indirect passions, sympathy is intended to be a typical instance in which “the conversion of an idea into an impression [happens] by the force of imagination”(T 427) which conveys “the impression or the consciousness of our own person”(T 318). Now in his discussion of the direct passions, he argues that “any satisfaction which we lately enjoyed, and of which the memory is fresh and recent, operate on the will with more violence than another of which the traces decayed”(T 426), just because

“the memory in the first case assists the fancy, and gives an additional force and vigour to its conceptions”(ibid.). This is how the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object gives rise to a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures, involving the impulse for actions: “the image of the past pleasure being strong and violent, bestows these qualities on the idea of the future pleasure, which is connected with it by the relation of resemblance”(T 426), carrying us “to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414).

(4) Personal identity regarding passions

In order to see what is actually intended by Hume as our identity regarding passions, it may be useful to give a rough survey over the structure of his theory of passions in the following way.

Hume’s discussion of passions is divided into four sections relevant to the four different subjects, viz. pride and humility, love and hatred, the will and actions, the direct passions, to each of which a different role is assigned for the establishment of the system of passions. It is in the discussion of the first subject that the basis of his hypothesis regarding passions is founded as the productive system of the double association of impressions and ideas. In the discussion of the second subject, this hypothesis is confirmed with “a sensible proof”(T 396) as “the true system”(T 286) from which a passion is derived. It is only in the discussion of the third subject that Hume is committed with the problem how “a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures” arises. What he discusses as the last subject in Book II is the cause of those “principal” direct passions, viz. hope, fear, and curiosity. The aim in these last sections of Book II lies to propound the plain proof of the “close union”(T 424) between the imagination and affections and to observe that “the influence of the relation of ideas is plainly seen in this whole affair”(T 443). The system of passions, once completed as an analogous system of the understanding, is designed as the confirmation of the latter system as well as the basis of the system of morality to be discussed in his succeeding book.

In Book I, Hume has shown how our identity regarding the imagination owes mainly to the two relations of resemblance and causation, which unite the successive perceptions of the mind with each other, and give rise to the propensity to take the mind to be identical through time. Among these two relations, it is resemblance, according to him, that is “the cause of the confusion and mistake”(T 254), which makes us “substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of related objects”(ibid.). This resemblance, when assisted by causation, makes us “feign the con-

tinued existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove interruption; and run into the notion of a soul, self, and substance, to disguise the variation”(T 254). The identity which we ascribe to the mind of man in this way is “only a fictitious one, and of a like kind which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies”(T 259).

This basic aspect of our identity reflects “the true idea of the human mind”(T 261), however, when the other relation, viz. causation, involves the other aspect of our identity regarding passions, and produces such a dynamic unity among those different perceptions which constitutes the mind: “the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity”(T 261). The peculiarity of the human mind thus depends on the corroboration between the two aspects of our identity: “our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261).

It seems not entirely pointless to suggest here that what Hume tries to establish in Book II as the theory of personal identity regarding passions consists not only in the physical-mental but also in the mental-physical causation. It is indeed the first causation that he tries to establish through the account of the cause or origin of a passion: how a beautiful or shabby house belonging to me, for instance, may cause pride or humility. He has shown how the passion of pride or humility is caused when those special “organs ... which are naturally fitted to produce that emotion”(T 288) are excited by some external or “foreign”(ibid.) object, e.g. a beautiful or shabby house. The only business required for the account of the production of the passion, therefore, is “to discover this cause, and find what it is that gives the first motion to pride, and sets those organs in action which are naturally fitted to produce that emotion”(T 288).

What is special with this causation is that the cause, e.g. the house, and the effect, e.g. my pride, are not related directly, but only ‘obliquely’, in the sense in which the former is an idea and the latter an impression. In other words, this causation depends on the influence between “our distant perceptions”(T 261): what produces the passions is not the sensation or impression of the object but the idea of it, once copied or reflected in the mind so as to be combined with another idea, viz. the idea of the self or the other self. In Hume’s system, a passion or “the impression of reflection” is distinct from “the impression of sensation”: the latter is caused immediately by the perception of an object whereas the former “is derived, in a great measure, from our ideas”(T 7). It is this physical-mental causation that Hume has established as “the

true system”(T 286) of the double association of impressions and ideas in his discussion of the indirect passions.

The importance of this affective causation between a physical object, e.g. my beautiful house, and the passion, e.g. pride, lies in that it gives rise to the idea of the self as its additional or subsidiary effect. It is “the contrivance of nature”, according to Hume that “nature has given to the organs of the human mind a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion, which we call pride: to this emotion she has assigned a certain idea, viz. that of self, which it never fails to produce”(T 287). “This contrivance of nature” is nothing special or peculiar to the impression of reflection or the passion, according to Hume, as this is simply a case in which these two familiar “circumstances are united in pride”(T 287): “the nerves of the nose and palate are so disposed as in certain circumstances to convey such peculiar sensations to the mind: the sensations of lust and hunger always produce in us the idea of those peculiar object, which are suitable to each appetite”(ibid.). It is easily conceivable, therefore, how the passion produced by this causation may contribute to the corroboration of the “fictitious” aspect of our identity: “the passion always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances”(T 287).

Now, the second causation between the mental and the physical is mentioned as the last subject of his discussion of passions in the following remark delivered regarding the will and action: that “when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414). The circumstance asserted in this observation consists of these two causal relations we have noted above: the relation between an “emotion of aversion or propensity” and “the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object” on the other hand, and the relation between the “emotion of aversion or propensity” and our actions for avoiding or embracing what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction, on the other. It is by means of the former causation between “the distant perceptions” derived from ideas that he intends to account for the origin of the “principal”(T 448) direct passions, e.g. joy and grief, fear and hope, by claiming that “when good is certain or probable, it produces joy”(T 439) whereas “when evil is in the same situation, there arises grief or sorrow”(ibid.). But he shows only a limited concern with this causation by which the direct passion is produced, partly because “the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable” (T 439).

It is the latter causation between the passion and actions that mainly occupies his mind in the last part of Book II, which is mentioned as “a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261): “a concern” involves, for Hume, something more than a mere affective experience, viz. our actions. Every argument established in his preceding discussion on passions seems to converge into this final issue, how a passion carries us to actions, which is the issue that makes the core of our identity regarding passions in the following two ways.

In one way, the theory of our identity must explain not only “why we attribute identity to the mind”, but also “why we are concerned with our past or future actions”, as McIntyre points out (Mc 557). And having accounted for the first problem as the aspect of our identity regarding the imagination in Book I, Hume tries to illustrate the second problem as the aspect of our identity regarding passions through the depiction “how the Humean self can be affected by its past and concerned with its future”(Mc 557). It is evident, as McIntyre suggests, that “an account of personal identity must justify concern with our past and future actions — that it must explain the effect of the past on our present feelings, and thereby provide a foundation for considering the future in choosing our present actions”(Mc 549). And, each of his theories addresses, as she plausibly suggests, the question of “what makes past and future actions the actions of one person”(Mc 547).

In the other, it is principally to this causation between the passions and actions that Hume’s system of the mind constituted “of different perceptions or different existence”(T 261) owes its tie with the material world. Without the tie, how could the closed system be anchored unto the external world so as to be one of the items of its constituents along with animals, vegetables, and other material objects? In Book I Hume has described the human mind in terms of a unity among “different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effects, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other” (T 261). This asserted system, though active or dynamic within the unity itself, is still short of “the true idea of the human mind”(T 261), as it reflects only such a “fictitious”(T 259) aspect of the mind as is common to “the identity of plants and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature”(ibid.). The human mind thus pictured is a sort of closed system, floating, as it were, without connection to the outside world. But how could a system be identified as an unified existence without being distinct from other existences? A system cannot be identified as an individual until it is related to other items in one way or other so as to be distinguished from any of them. What we expect as the other

aspect of our identity in his discussion of passions is, therefore, such an aspect of our identity that may reflect the peculiarity or distinctness of our identity from that which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies.

What Hume finds as his last business in Book II is therefore to explain by means of the causal connection between the emotion or “volition”(T 439) and actions why and how only those motions of our body which are supposed to be caused by the operation of our mind are called “actions”. In order to explain how the mind makes these “distant perceptions”(T 261), viz. an emotion and actions, influence each other, he involves “the will” as a medium process which combines these two different kinds of perceptions with each other. Or rather, he tries to show in terms of the will “how aptly natural and moral evidence cement together, and form only one chain of argument betwixt them”(T 406), as we have seen above.

Hume’s main object in his discussion of the direct passion lies thus in illustrating the connection between the passion and actions in terms of the circumstance in which the direct passions, viz. “desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear”(T 399), produced by “the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object” causes the impulse for actions. This is plainly the issue which belongs to the core of personal identity regarding passions, as it is evident that, in order to explain “how the self can be affected by its past and concerned with its future”(Mc 557), he needs to account for “the role of the passions in the creation of a self which is unified through time”(ibid.), as McIntyre points out.

When Hume succeeded in proving that “all actions of the will have particular causes” (T 412), he was convinced of his “entire victory”(T 412). But after having gone through the account for his next problem, “what these causes are, and how they operate”(ibid.), in terms of “the circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(T 419), he was obliged to accept that he failed in attaining his desired effect. His strategy turns out inadequate for his task, just because “the causes and effects of these violent and calm passions are pretty variable, and depend, in a great measure, on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual”(T 437).

We seem to have a good reason to suppose that he could have resumed his theory of passions with the full account of our identity regarding passions, only if he had succeeded in explaining “the different causes and effects of the calm and the violent passions”(T 418) **perfectly** by means of “the borrowing of force from any attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination”(T 438). If the nature and origin of passions as well as the problem con-

cerning the will and actions had been accounted by the same method of reasoning he had established for illustration the operation of understanding, we might well have expected another chapter or colluding discussion in the second book of the *Treatise*, in which he had tried to give a unity not only to what had been so far discussed separately concerning the indirect and the direct passions into the integrated system of personal identity regarding passions at the end of Book II, but also to the separate discussions of the two aspects of our identity relevant to the imagination and relevant to passions into the integrated theory of personal identity. Needless to say, this is merely an anti-factual supposition, for which no justification is available. Such a guess-making might allow us, however, to find a clue to the puzzle concerning Hume's recantation of his theory claimed in the Appendix, which is published together with Book I and Book II. In the succeeding section, let us try to make a guess of the cause of his recantation in the Appendix through the discussion of what is missing in his picture of "the true idea of the human mind".

(5) The structure of "the true idea of the human mind"

Hume's problem of personal identity originates from his basic supposition that "they are the successive perceptions only, that constitutes the mind"(T 263). This original position leads him naturally to deny "the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being" (T 633). But, if the minds "are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions" (T 252) as he so definitely assures us, how could he explain this solid fact that a person is a single unified being persisting through time? Here arises this question: "What then gives us so great a propensity to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possessed of an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives?"(T 253). And it is for the explanation of this problem, as we remember, that Hume introduces the distinction between "personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves"(T 253). It is indeed this distinction, as we have seen, that attributes to "the true idea of the human mind"(T 261) a peculiarity as to make our identity distinct from the identity of any other "compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature"(T 258).

But why was it necessary for Hume to distinguish these two aspects of our identity? The answer is found, as we have suggested, in that his discussion of personal identity consists of these two issues: the one relevant to the unification of the components of the mind, and the

other relevant to the natural propensity of the mind of attributing identity to the unified perceptions on the other.

The first issue concerning the unity of a mind makes the core of both aspects of our identity: our identity regarding the imagination is claimed to be dependent on the unity of a mind produced by the connection of ideas, whereas our identity regarding passions on the double connection of ideas and impressions. In both cases alike, what supplies the source of our identity is proved to be the association of the components of the mind in the imagination, which cannot produce any “real bond”(T 259) for the connection.

A diversion of discussion between the two aspects of our identity is prepared, however, in his treatment of the second issue concerning the natural propensity which makes us attribute identity to the unity of perceptions. It is the propensity to confound identity with the related objects that our identity regarding the imagination depends upon, according to Hume. Our identity regarding passions, on the other hand, owes its origin primarily to the natural propensity, or rather “the impulse”, which carries us to avoid or embrace our future pains or pleasures.

Here arises the following contrast between the two aspects of our identity. The former aspect of our identity is “fictitious”(T 259), as it is derived from the propensity to make us “**feign** the continued existence of the perception of our senses, to remove the interruption; and run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to **disguise** the variation”(T 254). The latter, on the other hand, may reflect something real in the sense in which the unity of a mind, though dependent on the association in the imagination, could bring us this **real** consequences: it not only gives rise to a new impression, viz. a present concern for our past or future pains and pleasures, but also carries us to actions. It is the former that constitutes the basis of our identity, as it is common to “that identity, which we ascribe to plants and animals”(T 253) whereas it is the latter that the peculiarity of the human mind depends upon.

To put it the other way round, it is only when the former aspect is assisted or “corroborated” by the latter that our identity acquires such a peculiar dynamism as to generate not only a belief in a self that is identical through time but also “a present concern” for our past or future actions. In short, Hume’s theory of personal identity is incomplete until it explains how the mind’s unity relevant to the first basic aspect of our identity would carry us “to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414).

What is specifically important for Hume in pursuing this business is to account for the two main issues by the same method of reasoning, viz. the easy transition of the imagination. It is

because his basic strategy in the *Treatise* is, as we have noted, to hold the analogy between the two operations of the mind, viz. the imagination and passions, and to regard the analogy “to be no despicable proof of both hypotheses”(T 290). The last business he assigns to himself in establishing the theory of personal identity is thus to explain by his basic principles how the unity of a mind necessarily leads us to actions. It is this double-fold structure that Hume’s theory of personal identity depends on, as we have seen in the preceding chapters.

There is another double-fold structure that constitutes Hume’s theory of personal identity: our identity regarding passions depends on the distinction between the indirect and the direct passions, each of which is supposed to play a different role in accomplishing our identity as it is.

The first half of Book II is spent for the demonstration how the mind’s unity is strengthened by the two-fold tie, or the double association, of ideas and impressions. Hume’s concern in his discussion of the indirect passions is thus again with this question, ‘what holds a single mind together?’, and with the reinforcement of his former issue he has established in Book I. It may be certain that the unity of a mind increases its firmness when the succeeding perceptions which constitute a mind are combined together not only by the transition of ideas as he has shown in Book I, but also by the transition of impressions. His object in his discussion of the indirect passions is thus to illustrate this two-fold tie in terms of “the true system”(T 286) of the double association of ideas and impressions, and to show how “those principles which forward the transition of ideas here concur with those which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse”(T 284).

But it is still plain that, however tightly the successive perceptions which constitute the mind are united together, it can never attain “an entire union”(T 366), nor remove the interruption. Because, in so far as it is evident that “the understanding never observes any real connection among objects”(T 259), “in pronouncing concerning the identity of a person”, we can never observe any “real bond” among his perceptions; we “only feel one among the ideas we form of them”(ibid.). This is what made Hume assert our identity to be “fictitious”(T 259), being entirely dependent on the operation of the imagination to confound identity with the unity, and “to remove the interruption”(T 254).

Hume’s intention in the first half of Book II lies, therefore, not only in showing how the mind’s unity increases its firmness by the double connection of ideas and impressions, but also in attributing the unity “a total union”(T 366) on the ground that the latter connection involves

the “transfusion” of a perception into another. The connection of impressions can contribute to a “total” unity, just because “impressions are susceptible of an entire union, and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression which arises from the whole”(T 366). This peculiar property of impressions makes an important contrast with the property of ideas, which are claimed to admit of no “total union, but are endowed with a kind of impenetrability by which they exclude each other, and are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction, not by their mixture”(T 366).

Hume’s intention in the first half of Book II does not rest here, however, in attributing an “entire” union to the related components of a mind. He takes a further step, and suggests that, when “these two attractions or associations of impressions and ideas concur on the same object, they mutually assist each other, and the transition of the affections and of the imagination is made with the greatest ease and facility”(T 289). But what would happen when these two kinds of association “both uniting in one action”(T 284) “assist and forward each other”(ibid.)? He answers: “the new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater violence”(T 284). The production of a new passion happens, according to him, when the “transfusion”(T 290) of one impression into another is proceeded by the connection of correspondent ideas. These “most curious phenomena of the human mind”(T 366), viz. new passions, have a peculiar importance in Hume’s system, just because it is the ‘proof’ of the mind’s unity, which is derived from this peculiar property of impressions: “impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union”(ibid.) with each other.

But how is “the new passion” as the consequence of this reinforced unity of the components of a mind is supposed to contribute to the production of our identity? Our identity regarding the imagination is derived from “the confusion and mistake”(T 254), according to Hume, of substituting “the notion of identity, instead of related ideas”(ibid.), which happens owing to the resembling “feeling” produced by both the perception of an invariable object and the succession of related objects. Our identity regarding passions, on the other hand, depends on the production of the new passion in this manner: the unity of the perceptions gives rise to a passion, and the passion, when produced, “always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances”(T 287).

The indirect passion, viz. “pride and humility, being once raised, immediately turn our attention to ourself, and regard that as their ultimate and final object”(T 278). It is because, the

mind has “certain organs naturally fitted to produce a passion; that passion, when produced, naturally turns the view to a certain object”(T 396). This “peculiar direction of the thought” (T 286) “determined by an original and natural instinct”(ibid.) is nothing special nor peculiar, according to him, as “this contrivance of nature”(T 287) may be understood to be the combination of these two familiar circumstances: “the nerves of nose and palate are so disposed as in certain circumstances to convey such peculiar sensations to the mind: the sensations of lust and hunger always produce in us the idea of those peculiar objects, which are suitable to each appetite”(T 287). In so far as no internal impression of a separate self as such is here asserted, Hume is not inconsistent with his basic position of denying “the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being”(T 633) so definitely pronounced in Book I.

If the opening theme of Book II is the circumstance in which the idea of the self arises, there may be no puzzle concerning Hume’s choice of pride and humility as the initial subject of his new discussion, nor any mystery concerning his exclusive concern with the origin of the passions. It clearly shows the connection with the closing discussion delivered in Book I, as well as Hume’s serious interest in pursuing the same theme, viz. the unity of a mind, he has carried from the previous work. His main business in his discussion of the indirect passions is to illustrate the unity of a mind in terms of “the true system”(T 286) of the double association of ideas and impressions, and to prove the unity by means of the production of a passion, and to show the circumstance in which we turn our view to ourselves, and “think of our own qualities and circumstances”. This is the one half of what is intended as personal identity regarding passions.

While assimilating the origin of the indirect passion to that of lust or hunger, and holding that we have such “organs [which] are so disposed as to produce the passion; and the passion, after its production, naturally produces a certain idea”(T 287), viz. the idea of the self, Hume warns us not to exaggerate the analogy. For, as he explains, relish or hunger “arises internally, without the concurrence of any internal object”(T 287), whereas pride or humility “requires the assistance of some foreign object”(ibid.) for the excitement of the organs, as the organs which produce the latter “exert not themselves like the heart and arteries, by an original internal movement”(ibid.). This is indeed the difference between the two kinds of passions, viz. the indirect and the direct: in Hume system, such bodily sensations as lust and hunger are counted as the direct passions. And in examining the cause of the first passion, he finds out that “anything that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is

also agreeable, and has self for its object”(T 288). For, what is required is “**some other emotion**, which, by a double relation of impressions and ideas, may set these principles in action, and bestow on them their first impulse”(T 396). Hence comes his conclusion “that it is the very principle [of the double relation] which gives rise to pride, and bestows motion on those organs”(T 288).

But a problem still remains: what could this “some other emotion” be, or how is it supposed to give to the organs the “first impulse or beginning to their action”(T 288)? It is here that Hume calls for the direct passion, and prepares a separate discussion in the second half of Book II for the illustration how the direct passion plays the role of pulling the trigger of the system of the double association of impressions and ideas from which the passion is derived. Here is the answer of Baier’s question, “why Hume begins Book Two with pride”(Baier 135), or why he “begins with the direct, not the indirect, passions”(Baier 133). The structure of the system from which a passion arises needs to be illustrated before the problem what it is that gives the first motion to the system: the former is the subject for the indirect passion whereas the latter for the direct.

Hume assigns the role of pulling the trigger of the system of the double association to the direct passion, e.g. desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear. The direct passion can pursue this crucial role, because it arises “immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure” (T 399), or even “from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable”(T 439). The direct passion thus includes such a bodily appetite, e.g. hunger, lust, the appetite of generation, which “arises internally, without the concurrence of any internal object”(T 287), as we have noted above. Although both the two kinds of passions “proceed from the same principle”(T 276), they are distinct from each other in that the direct passions may, “properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections”(T 439).

How could the direct passion give “the first motion”(T 288) to the productive system of the double association? To our distress, no systematic answer is prepared by Hume for this question, nor for the connection between these two kinds of passions. It may probably be because he regards it merely as the problem how the transition of impressions happens, or because he is more occupied with another but more serious problem, how the direct passion carries us to actions. A clue to the question seems to be available in the illustration of the two ways by which “the transition of passion may arise, viz. a double relation of ideas and impressions, and what is similar to it, a conformity in the tendency and direction of any two desires

which arise from different principles”(T 385).

Among the two principles by which the transition of passion arises, the first is plainly relevant to the indirect, but not to the direct, passions, as in its origin the former necessarily involves a certain idea, but no idea may be involved in the production of the latter. There is, however, a good reason to expect that every perception of an object involves a transition of an impression by the first principle. It is because an object, even “part of extension or unit of number”, can never be “conceived by the mind”, according to Hume, without the involvement of an emotion. If “almost every kind of ideas is attended with some emotion, even the ideas of number and extension”(T 393) as he assures us, it may follow that whenever any ideas are united together by some relation, the relation “may cause an easy transition of the ideas, and consequently of the emotions or impressions attending the ideas”(T 380). We may reasonably suppose that a “new passion must arise”(T 284) owing to “a double impulse”(ibid.) bestowed on the mind by the concurrence of the two kinds of transition.

Hume’s object in his discussion of the indirect passions is, as we have seen, to establish this system of the double association of ideas and impressions on the basis of his hypothesis he has developed regarding ideas in Book I. A new passion derived from “the true system” of the double association is meant to be the proof of the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and of passions, and the analogy in turn is taken to be the proof of the consistency of his hypothesis he has developed regarding ideas in Book I. In other words, it is necessary for him to show first in terms of the system of the double association that “the relation of ideas must forward the transition of impressions”(T 380), because in this second book he is building the system of the passions upon the basis of the system of ideas which he has just illustrated in the preceding book by means of the transition of the imagination along the related ideas. This is how the first half of Book II depends upon the method of reasoning he has developed in Book I.

It may merit our attention here that what is asserted as the double association of impressions and ideas is not only the dependence of the transition of impressions upon the transition of ideas, but also the dependence of the latter upon the former: “no ideas can affect each other ... unless they be united together by some relation which may cause an easy transition of the idea, and consequently of the emotions or impressions attending the ideas, and may preserve the one impression in the passage of the imagination to the object of the other”(T 380). This mutual dependence of the two kinds of transition has a special importance for his system, because what is required for the completion of his system is the illustration that only such a relation of

ideas which involves the connection of impressions could carry us to actions.

The main object in his discussion of the direct passions, on the other hand, is to give “proper limitations”(T 419) to this universal rule, and to hold that, although “there is always required a double relation of impressions and ideas; nor is one relation sufficient for that purpose” (T 419), the transition of passions may happen, though there is “but one relation, and sometimes without any”(T 420). It is because “one impression may be related to another, not only when their sensation are resembling, as we have all along supposed in the preceding cases, but also when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent”(T 381).

This cause of the transition of passion, viz. the “principle of a parallel direction”(T 384), is relevant to the direct passions, because it is only the direct passion, Hume seems to assume, whose character is determined by “the whole bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end”(T 382). He thus maintains: “This [parallel direction] cannot take place with regard to pride and humility, because these are only pure sensations, without any direction or tendency to action. We are, therefore, to look for instances of this peculiar relation of impressions only in such affections as are attended with a certain appetite or desire, such as those of love and hatred”(T 381/2).

We may here remember this difference between the two sets of indirect passions pointed out by Hume in the preceding discussion: “the passions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoined with, benevolence and anger”(T 367) whereas “pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action”(ibid.). Love and hatred, though being the indirect passions, “are not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion which they produce, but carry the mind to something further”(T 367), just because benevolence and anger are “conjoined with them by the original constitution of the mind”(T 368). As “nature has given to the body certain appetites and inclinations, which she increases, diminishes, or changes according to the situation of the fluids or solids, she has proceeded in the same manner in the mind”(T 368): “according as we are possessed with love or hatred, the correspondent desire of the happiness or misery of the person who is the object of these passions, arises in the mind, and varies with each variation of these opposite passions”(ibid.). Here is one of the answers to our question how the direct passion gives “the first motion”(T 288) to the indirect passion: it is this natural connection with the indirect passions that sets the system of the double association in action. The second half of his theory of passions thus depends on his supposition that it is by means of the “impulses or

directions”(T 381) involved by the direct passions which carry us to actions.

But why is it in Hume’s system that the indirect passion is “pure emotions in the soul”(T 367) without any specific “impulses or directions”? Hume answers this question through his eight experiments he has given concerning the four “principal” indirect passions. In the experiments, he calls our attention to “the situation of the mind”(T 396) determined by the two kinds of transition of the mind which connect the two sets of the indirect passions in a form of “a square”: pride is connected with humility, love with hatred owing to the transition of ideas caused by the identity of their objects or ideas whereas pride with love, humility with hatred owing to the transition of impressions caused by the identity of their sensations or impressions. He spares one whole section for the eight different examples in which the imagination “wheels about”(T 336) along the square according as the change of the relation of the object in question to ourselves.

But what would happen when the imagination “runs the circle”(T 337) according to “these complicated attractions and relations”(T 337) determined by each “situation of affairs”(T 338)? We “should not expect”, Hume explains, “that the affections would rest there, and never transfuse themselves into any other impression”(T 338) as the imagination “returns back again” to the former passion, “attended with the related passions”(T 346). This is why esteem and contempt arise, for instance, as the variations of love and hatred, according to him. We may here see clearly how “love may show itself in the shape of tenderness, friendship, intimacy, esteem, good-will, and in many other appearances; which at the bottom are the same affections, and rise from the same causes, though with a small variation”(T 448). Here lies the reason why in his preceding discussion he has all along confined himself to the principal passion (T 448), as he explains.

What is marked by “the four affections, placed as it were in a square”(T 333) is this peculiarity of the indirect passions: no indirect passion arises alone without bearing it the relation to the rest of the three indirect passions. When I am proud of my beautiful house, for instance, pride evidently depends on love or admiration which the house is supposed to produce in the breast of my friends; pride, at the same time, depends on either humility or respect which is likely to arise when the house belongs to others.

If “the situation of the mind”(T 396) is adequately characterised as such a network system in which none of the four indirect passions can arise without involving the rest of them, we may understand how even “an ordinary stone”(T 333) could have an widespread influence over the

system, just as a stone thrown into the pond gives rise to a rimple which gradually grows and covers the entire surface of the pond. At the same time, we may also understand that, in so far as the system is entirely dependent on the transition of the imagination which “wheels about” (T 336) along the four sides of the “square” constituted of the four indirect passions, what is suggested as “the situation of the mind” is such a closed system in which there is no immediate means available for the connection with the outside world. Here is prepared Hume’s answer of our question, why the indirect passions, unless attended by any direct passions, cannot immediately excite us to actions: This “situation of the mind” “not being sufficient to produce the passion, there required **some other emotion**, which, by a double relation of impressions and ideas, may set these principles in action, and bestow on them their first impulse”(T 396).

It is evident that a closed system isolated from the external world is far from what is pictured by Hume as “the true idea of the human mind”(T 261). After having built the basic structure of our affective system as “the situation of the mind” in terms of the four indirect passions, he is ready to explain how it is possible for this blind system to be connected with the external world. The rest of Book II is spent for the inquiry into the question what makes the system safely anchored among the items which constitutes the physical world. This final problem is to be solved, he seems to assume, through the illustration that the direct passion, produced by “a close union”(T 424) between the imagination and affections, naturally carries us to actions. It may not be an exaggeration to suggest that Hume’s system of passions depends on this last problem, because a theory of personal identity must explain not only “what makes us ascribe identity to the self through time, but also what makes past and future actions the actions of one person”(Mc 547), as McIntyre points out. The latter aspect, though dependent on the former “fictitious” aspect derived from the connection in the imagination, may reflect nevertheless some “real” bond among the different perceptions which constitute the mind, in so far as the unity gives us a new impression, which, once raised, necessarily carries us in contact with other items occupying the space and time location in the external world.

This is what Hume assigns to himself as the final task necessary for the completion of his theory of personal identity which he has envisaged when he maintained at the end of his discussion of the aspect of our identity regarding the imagination: “our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261). In pursuing this last business, there are two different but relevant

conditions which must be satisfied in order to make his theory complete. Firstly, what is to be illustrated as the second aspect of our identity must be not only peculiar but also distinct from the identity that we attribute to “plants and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature”(T 259). Secondly, this new aspect must be explained by means of the same method of reasoning he has employed for the illustration of the system of the understanding. In other words, it must be illustrated in terms of the natural propensities of the mind which is naturally excited by the unity of perceptions which constitute the mind.

Concerning the second point, we may remember that our identity regarding the imagination illustrated in Book I depends on the unity of a mind which involves the natural propensity to confound identity with related succession each other derived from their resemblance. In so far as it is Hume’s basic strategy in the *Treatise* to hold the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and passions, our identity regarding the passions must be illustrated therefore in terms of the unity of a mind: the connection of the constituents of a mind, when reinforced by the double relation of impressions and ideas, gives rise to a new impression or emotion, which invites the natural propensity or “impulse” for actions. In order to explain the latter aspect, he finds it necessary to show how “when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414).

Concerning the first point, David Pears calls our attention to that, in so far as the word ‘mind’ treated as a count-noun, the unity of a mind involves two distinct questions of “not only what holds a single mind together, but also what holds it apart from other minds”(Hume Studies 292). It is evident that the individuation of an individual depend not only on the unification of its constituents but also on the distinction of the unity from what constitutes its background unless it belongs to “a self-aggrandizing unit”(Hume Studies 292), as Pears points out. Our last business is to see if Hume is successful in illustrating this aspect of our identity regarding passions upon the basis of the aspect of our identity regarding the imagination in such a way as it fulfills these two conditions.

(6) What is intended as “the situation of the object”

What is prepared by Hume as a trump card for this last problem is the subject of the will or “*the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new*

motion of our body, or new perception of our mind"(T 399), with which he begins the last chapter of Book II on the direct passions. He seems to have a good prospect of success in explaining not only the peculiarity but also the distinctness of our identity in terms of the will as an "internal impression" as such through the illustration of the "cement" between "*natural and moral evidence*"(T 406). He spares indeed ten sections for the discussion of the "subject of the will"(T 437), leaving only the last two for the direct passions which is the proper subject for this last chapter. In order to understand what is intended by the will and how he is solving his final problem by means of this trump, we need to mark that his primary concern in his treatment of the will is directed to establish "the necessity of human actions, and [to] place them on the same footing with the operations of senseless matter"(T 410). But, why was it so important for him to prove that "the same experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volitions, and actions, or figure and motion"(T 406)?

The answer of this question is prepared in that, as we have suggested, what is intended by Hume as the will is an affective version of "the belief attending the judgments which we form from causation". In other words, he needs to prove "the actions of the will to arise from necessity"(T 405), in order to explain the will by the analogy with the belief in terms of "the firm conception"(T 627). This explains why he asks us to recall what he had contended regarding "the necessary connection"(T 405) by rehearsing this former issue in his discussion of the will and actions: "Wherever, therefore, we observe the same union, and wherever the union operates in the same manner upon the belief and opinion, we have the idea of cause and necessity"(T 406), and "from this constant union it forms the idea of cause and effect, and by its influence feels the necessity"(ibid.).

It is because his intention lies in establishing the will by the analogy with the belief that he is so emphatic on the "uniformity of human actions"(T 403) and holds that "in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxims, as when we reason concerning external objects"(T 403). This also explains why it is important for him to establish that "the union betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy as that in any natural operations, so its influence on the understanding is also the same in *determining* us to infer the existence of one from that of another"(T 404). Owing to "a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions"(T 406), "the mind feels no difference betwixt them in passing from one link to another; nor is less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the present impressions of the memory and senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a

physical necessity”(T 406). “As long as actions have a constant union and connection with the situation and temper of the agent”(T 403), he has a good ground to assert that “when any phenomena are constantly and invariably conjoined together, they acquire such a connection in the imagination, that it passes from one to the other without any doubt or hesitation”(T 403).

Hume’s intention of defining the will as “the internal impression”(T 399) lies, therefore, in that the impression is derived from “the experience and the observation of the constant union of objects”, which is “not discovered by a conclusion of the understanding, but is merely a perception of the mind”(T 405/6). He asserts regarding the belief that “the belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect is not some new idea, such as that of reality or existence, which we join to the simple conception of an object”(T 623) but is “nothing but a peculiar feeling, different from the simple conception”(T 625) which is “analogous to any other sentiment of the human mind”(ibid.). And if there is an analogy between the belief and the will as he holds, it is obviously a mistake to take the will as a separate impression annexed to particular perceptions of good or pleasure, or to suppose that it consists in some impression or feeling, distinguishable from the perception. And the same thing holds good with “volition”(T 414, 438), though in Hume’s system it is treated along with “desire” as the direct passions.

This interpretation suggested above may solve another puzzle concerning the Appendix published together with Book I and Book II. One of our puzzles which make the Appendix the source of dispute and confusion is that, immediately after the confession of his “error”, Hume enters upon the subject of belief, and goes on repeating his former issues apparently without any correction or addition. We may naturally wonder what made him spend for the same contention regarding belief such a big space as a half of the Appendix, when he admits it is in “the section concerning personal identity”(T 633), and not in his discussion of the belief, that he found himself “involved in such a labyrinth”(ibid.). This puzzle may be solved in the following way.

He found it necessary to call our attention in the form of the three considerations to that “belief only modifies the idea or conception; and renders it different to the feeling, without producing any distinct impression”(T 627), in order to prepare the basis from which he makes a departure to his “next business”(T 627) in the form of this “fourth consideration”: “the next business is to examine the analogy which there is betwixt belief and other acts of the mind, and find the cause of the firmness and strength of conception”(ibid.).

This “next business” asserted as the fourth consideration has a special importance for our

present discussion, because it is the will what is in Hume's mind when he mentions "other acts of the mind" as the next subject to be discussed by the analogy with the belief. We need to see that the will is for Hume one of "the effects of belief, in influencing the passions and imagination"(T 626), and that it must therefore "be explained from the firm conception"(T 626). It may be worth remembering that what makes the core of Hume's system in Book II is this principle: "The *effects* of belief, in influencing the passions and imagination, can all be explained from the firm conception; and there is no occasion to have recourse to any other principle"(ibid.). Hume's strategy for explaining the will and actions by the analogy with belief consists of these two processes: the prospect of pain or pleasure, when enlivened with the vivacity of belief, gives rise to the emotion of aversion or propensity, and these emotions carries us to actions as it increases its violence.

It is important to distinguish these two seemingly analogical processes the will consists in, because it is only the first process that is intended for the exact analogy with belief. In other words, so long as a mere idea of pain or pleasure, or good or evil, may excite the passion of desire or aversion, when enlivened by the vivacity of belief. "A suit of fine clothes", for instance, "produces pleasure from their beauty; and this pleasure produces the direct passions, or the impressions of volition or desire"(T 439). It is this first process that is marked by him when he asserts: although "belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression" (T 427), "this vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions"(ibid.). For, as he explains, "a mere fiction of the imagination" cannot have "any considerable influence upon"(T 427) our passions, as "it is too weak to take any hold of the mind, or be attended with emotion"(ibid.). This circumstance is explained at the end of Book II through his investigation of the origin of hope and fear, and curiosity. The former passions are regarded as "a convincing proof of the present hypothesis"(T 444) he has proposed by the analogy with the theory of probability, and the latter as a proof how "the influence of belief is at once to enliven and infix any idea in the imagination"(T 453). This part of discussion concerning these direct passions is prepared at the very end of Book II, just because he is closing his discussion of passions with the decisive confirmation of his hypotheses he has established in Book I and Book II: the latter is meant to be the proof of the consistency of the former.

It is also important to remember that Hume's point in his discussion of the first process lies in that so long as we rest in this process which is dependent on the vivacity of belief, we are not carried to actions, as we still remain in the province of ideas. His primary concern lies,

therefore, with the second process in which, when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object and feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, we “are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414). It is only in the second process in which the impulse for action is involved that the emotion of aversion or propensity is entitled to get the name of a “concern”. Hume’s last business is to thus discover the cause of this impulse for actions by the analogy with “the firmness and strength of conception”(T 627), and to explain how it happens that “the emotions extends themselves to the causes and effects of that objects, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience”(T 414).

What he prepares as a master key to this last problem is the “impression of ourselves”. In order to understand his strategy, we need to recall this basic maxim, “whatever is related to us is conceived in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object“ (T 353). He has asserted regarding sympathy in his discussion of the indirect passions that “The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person”(T 318). He is now holding in his present discussion of the will and actions that, while assuming that the impulse for actions depends in a great measure on the vivacity of desire or aversion, the violence of the emotions, being entirely dependent upon the present impressions of ourselves, varies according to the strongness of the relation between ourselves and the object in question. It is observable how this peculiarly affective process depends on the analogy with belief or rather on “the transition from a present impression, [which] always enlivens and strengthens any idea”(T 627). We need to remember how he establish the hypothesis regarding sympathy on the exact “correspondence”(T 320) between the operations of our understanding and of passions, by holding: since these relations [between ourselves and the object] can entirely convert an idea into an impression, and convey the vivacity of the latter into the former, so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition, we may easily conceive how the relation of cause and effect alone may serve to strengthen and enliven an idea”(T 320). Hume’s last business is thus to show how and when it happens that “this emotion rests not here”(T 414), but carries us to actions.

These two processes the will consists in may also be explained in terms of the analogy and distinction between the will and belief in the following way. What is intended as the first process is to prove that the former like the latter “consists in the determination”(T 408) of our thought to infer its existence from some preceding objects, whereas the second process is

intended for the illustration that, although “belief is nothing but a peculiar feeling, different from the simple conception”(T 624), the will cannot remain a private feeling but necessarily expresses itself as actions, because it is “the internal impression we feel, or are conscious of”, only in so far as “we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind”(T 399). When the mind “*forms* the idea of cause and effect and, by its influence *feels* the necessity”(T 406), belief as the product of reasoning remains this private “peculiar feeling”(T 624) if any, just because “as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connection, it cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect us”(T 414). The transition of the imagination, even along customary conjoined ideas, may give rise to the feeling of “the necessity” (T 406), but not the “impulse” for actions nor the connection with “realities”, unless it is accompanied by the transition of affections: “It can never in the least concern to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects, if both the causes and effects be **indifferent** to us”(T 414). In his discussion of the origin of both the indirect and the direct passions, he has proved that, although “belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression”(T 427), “this vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting of all our passions”(T 427). Hume’s last business is to establish this distinction as well as the analogy that the “proper province” of belief is “the world of ideas”, whereas “the will always places us in that of realities”(T 413), as the latter expresses itself eventually as a “motion of our body” or action in some way or other.

What is left to be examined for the completion of the theory of passions is the explanation of the second process, viz. the origin of the impulse for actions. He finds the key to the problem in this common belief: “it is certain that, when we would govern a man, and push him to any action, it will commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions, and take him by his inclination, than what is vulgarly called his reason”(T 419). Insisting upon the necessity of distinction betwixt a calm and a weak passion, and betwixt a violent and a strong one, he first establishes the correspondence between the impulse for actions and the violence of passions, and suggests that “all [questions regarding the will and actions] depends upon the situation of object”(T 419) which is “proper to increase the violence of the passion”(ibid.).

He then calls our attention to that, although both the calm and the violent “passions pursue good, and avoid evil”(T 419), “the same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a clam one”(ibid.). It is this difference, he claims, that belongs “very properly to the present question concerning the will”(T 419), so that “we shall here examine it to the bottom, and shall consider some of those circumstances and situations of

objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(T 419). He thus enters into the examination “the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions”(T 418).

Hume’s object in his discussion of “the situation of the object” is to demonstrate after all “the influence of the imagination upon the passions”(T 424) through the illustration that “whenever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations”(T 424). But how could he make such an obviously implausible assertion that the mere increase of the vivacity in the former can increase the violence in the latter? We often remain unaffected or indifferent indeed even at a most violent idea in so far as we know that no one is involved in it. There must be some hidden premise, as we reasonably expect, which would make his assertion plausible.

It is in the examination of “the situation of the object”, as he suggests, that the key to this question is available. He thus asks us to inquire whence this difference arises: the idea of good or evil, when near, will increase the violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one. This difference can be explained, according to him, in terms of “the contiguity and distance in space and time”(T 427): “everything contiguous to us, either in space or time, should be conceived with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other object in its influence on the imagination”(ibid.). In other words, the ideas of contiguous objects “by means of their relation to ourselves, approach an impression in force and vivacity”(T 428) whereas that of remote ones “by reason of the interruption in our manner of conceiving them, appear in a weaker and more imperfect light”(ibid.). He then proceeds to argue that this “effect [of the distance] on the imagination”(T 428) “must have a proporsionable effect on the will and passions”(ibid.). In short, “distance, both in space and time, has a considerable effect on the imagination, and by that means on the will and passions”(T 429), as he concludes.

We may here see what is presupposed as the premise upon which the above quoted assertion regarding the “close union”(T 424) between the imagination and passions is dependent. It is only those ideas of good or evil which are enlivened with the vivacity of the present impression of ourselves that have an influence over passions in increasing or diminishing their violence. In other words, the violence of a passion depends on the impression of ourselves, which is conveyed by the easy transition of the imagination along related ideas. But, why is it only the present impression of ourselves, and not any other kinds of present impressions, that is supposed to have an influence as such over passions?

Hume answers this question in the following example, which is quoted with identifying

numbers for the sake of discussion: (1) “a suit of fine clothes produces pleasure from their beauty; and (2) this pleasure produces the direct passions, or the impressions of volition or desire. Again, (3) when these clothes are considered as belonging to ourself, the double relation conveys to us the sentiment of pride, which is an indirect passion; and (4) the pleasure, which attends that passion returns back to the direct affections, and gives new force to our desire or volition, joy or hope”(T 439).

The first two processes provide the source of the impulse for actions, by giving rise to “the direct passions, or the impressions of volition or desire”. Hume does not find much room to comment on these two processes, only observing: “It is obvious that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a cosequent emotion of aversion or propensity”(T 414). These process is too “obvious” for him to be examined, simply because they are in a great measure dependent on “a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable”(T 439).

In the third process, the idea of the clothes becomes vivacious when they are considered to belong to ourselves, owing to the vivacity conveyed from the present impression of ourselves. There is nothing special in this enlivenment of the idea itself, not only because “whatever is related to us is conceived in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object”(T 353) but also because “the transition of vivacity from a present impression always enlivens and strengthens any idea”(T 627). What is peculiar in this process is, however, that those ideas which are enlivened with the present impression of ourselves are supposed to have an influence over “the will and actions”(T 428). And Hume’s object in his discussion of the will and direct passions lies in establishing this new issue that only those objects which, “by means of their relation to ourselves, approach an impression in force and vivacity”(T 428) have “a considerable effect on the imagination, and by that means on the will and passions”(T 429).

We may well remember that Hume’s theory of sympathy depends on this principle: “the stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person”(T 318). It is indeed this same hypothesis that is in his mind when he tries to account for “the situation of the object” by holding that a strong relation to ourselves “has a considerable effect on the imagination, and by that means on the will and passions”(T 429). In other words, what he endeavours to show through the examination of “the situation of the object” which renders a passion calm or violent is “this influence of the imagi-

nation upon the passions”(T 424) that “wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity [from the present impression of ourselves], the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations”(ibid.). It is indeed in the final confirmation of the analogy of the two systems of the understanding and of passions that is asserted by Hume when he claims that, “if my reasoning be just, they [= what has a considerable effect on the imagination] must have a proportionable effect on the will and passions”(T 428). He seems to have a good prospect for his success in this confirmation as he begins his discussion with this observation: “there is not in philosophy a subject of more nice speculation than this, of the different *causes* and *effects* of the calm and violent passions”(T 418).

His inquiry into causes which render the direct passion calm or violent depends on what he has asserted as “the situation of the mind”(T 396) or the network-system composed of the two sets of the indirect passions, viz. pride and humility, and love and hatred. In this system, the mind is supposed to have “certain organs naturally fitted to produce a passion”(T 396), to which “nature has assigned a certain idea, viz. that of *self* [or the *other self*], which it never fails to produce”(T 287). If “anything that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object”(T 288), we may have a good reason to expect that, once the idea of the self joins the pleasant sensation caused by the beauty of the clothes, pride immediately arises from the double association of impressions and ideas, as pride is a pleasant sensation determined to have self as its object. It is by means of the same strategy, as we may here see, that Hume tries to account for the first half of the mechanism by which the direct passion, such as volition or desire, increases its violence: “there is an easy reason why everything contiguous to us, either in space or time, should be conceived with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other object in its influence on the imagination”(T 427). This explains, however, only a half of the mechanism by which the violence of a passion is increased.

In the next fourth process, when the pleasant sensation which constitutes “the very being and essence”(T 286) of pride “returns back” to the original impression of volition or desire, we may find the direct and the indirect passion, which “are already produced by their separate causes, ... are both present in the mind”(T 420). But, what is supposed to happen when “they are both present at the same time”(T 421)? Hume answers: “They readily mingle and unite, though they have but one relation, and sometimes without any”(T 420). It is this peculiar property of passions, according to him, that is supposed to contribute to the increase of the violence

of passions: “Since passions; however independent, are naturally transfused into each other, if they are both present at the same time, it follows, that when good or evil is placed in **such a situation as to cause any particular emotion besides its direct passion of desire or aversion**, that latter passion must acquire new force and violence”(T 421).

We may here see the reason why he is so exclusively concerned with such a “situation” which causes the indirect passion **besides** the direct one, or rather with a situation in which “an immediate impression of pain or pleasure ... arising from an object related to ourselves or others”(T 438) “excites the new impressions of pride or humility, love or hatred”(ibid.). It is because, in such a situation, these two passions “readily mingle or unite” by the “principle of a parallel direction”(T 381, 384, 385) so that “the predominant passion swallows up the inferior, and converts it into itself”(T 420). This is the way in which the direct passion of desire or aversion increases its violence as the indirect one “returns back to the direct affections”(T 439), and “gives new force to our desire or volition, joy or hope”(T 439) to such a degree as to carry us to actions. “It is evident”, as he observes, “in this case, that the impulse [for actions] arises not from reason but is only directed by it”(T 414). While commenting that “passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence”(T 418), he nevertheless takes it certain that when we would govern a man, “we ought to place the object in such particular situations as are proper to increase the violence of the passion”(T 419). He assumes simply that the illustration of “the influence of the imagination upon the passions”(T 424) exhausts his last problem regarding the will and actions, simply equating a “new force to our desire or volition, joy or hope”(T 439) with the impulse for action.

But does he succeed in attaining the desired result in his examination of “the situation of the object”? His real object in the discussion of “the different *causes* and *effects* of the calm and the violent passions”(T 418) is, after all, to demonstrate that although “belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression”(T 427), “this vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the calm as well as the violent”(ibid.). This object is attained, as he assumes, if he succeeds in showing that the emotions of aversion or propensity grow violent as they “extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience”(T 414). For, if the mind “feels the necessity”(T 406) or “determination”(T 408) in passing from the causes to the effects, as he reasons, there must be some effect of “the determination” upon the emotion while it, “making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause

and effect”(T 414), as it is evident that “our actions receive a subsequent variation”(T 414) according as our reasoning varies. This is the issue that he tries to establish by asserting: “Wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations”(T 424).

But, was he successful in accounting for the will and actions according to this strategy? In so far as we have examined in the preceding chapters, the answer to this question was in the negative. Let us summarise briefly in the following section what is the cause of this failure, and what is entailed by this failure.

(7) Hume’s difficulty in the Appendix

Hume’s object in the *Treatise* is to account for the operations of the human mind in terms of these two maxims: “that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceive any real connection among distinct existence”(T 636). It is on the basis of these maxims that he has illustrated the mind as the system dependent on “the principle of connection, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity”(T 635). In Book I, he has shown “the firm conception”(T 626) to be the almighty principle of connection by establishing the theory of ideas in terms of the belief attending the judgments which we form from causation. His task in Book II is to prove the efficacy of this principle through the demonstration of the affective aspect of the mind by the same method of reasoning which has been proved successful for the illustration of the aspect relevant to the understanding. Hume was sure that “the analogy which there is betwixt belief and other acts of the mind”(T 627) “must pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind”(T 635). Hume’s primary concern in his treatment of passions is persistently with the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and of passions. This analogy is important, because it is for him the proof of the solidity of his hypothesis he is establishing as an integrated system of the human mind.

Being “attended with sufficient evidence”(T 635), he was proud of his “entire victory”(T 412) in attaining the desired result till he came to explain the last subject of the will and actions. The will is for him one of the typical “effects of belief, in influencing the passions and imagination”(T 626), so that it must be “explained from the firm conception”(ibid.). What was needed for the completion of his hypothesis in this concluding part of his discussion in Book II is therefore the confirmation of this core issue: “the effects of belief, in influencing the passions

and imagination, can all be explained from the firm conception; and there is no occasion to have recourse to any other principle”(T 626). But in explaining the will by the analogy with the belief attending the judgments we form from causation, he seems to have realised the inadequacy of his strategy. This is the course of my argument developed so far in my preceding chapters.

The object in the rest of this section is to see, supposing that I am right in my interpretation, what was Hume’s reaction when he recognised the inadequacy of his basic strategy in this last part of his discussion. In order to see what is supposed to happen with his treatment of passions when he found his strategy inadequate, we need to recall what role is assigned by Hume to the subject of the will and actions in his system of passions. There seems a good reason to suggest, as we have seen, that Hume’s main object in his treatment of this last subject for the discussion of passions lies in the completion of the theory of our identity. At the end of Book II, he planned to show in terms of the corroboration of the two aspects of our identity regarding the imagination and regarding passions that, although “it is the composition of these [different perceptions] ... which forms the self”(T 634), our identity still reflects something peculiar, or something more than merely “fictitious”(T 259) which is distinct from any other identity we attribute to plants or animals.

If so, the failure in holding the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and of passions would entail the failure in establishing the theory of our identity regarding passions. In other words, it might mean that, against Hume’s original intention, Book II could not include the account of the corroboration between personal identity regarding the imagination and personal identity regarding passions, because he could not establish the latter aspect of our identity. This interpretation may explain why Book II stops in such an obviously incomplete manner as we have noted in the preceding chapters. If he really gave up completing the theory of our identity regarding passions, there is no wonder why this aspect of our identity is not mentioned in spite of his former acknowledgement that the complete theory of our identity depends on the corroboration of this aspect with the other.

This interpretation may also imply that “the section concerning personal identity”(T 633) specified by Hume as defective in the Appendix is the account relevant not to our identity regarding the imagination, but the account relevant to our identity regarding passions. He indeed had a good prospect of accounting for our identity regarding passions in terms of “a present concern with our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261). But he was obliged to admit that his theory of personal identity was inconsistent, just because he could not explain the will

in terms of “a present concern” which is something more than “the firm conception” in that it involves the “impulse” for actions. It is from this failure, it seems to me, that his complaint expressed in the Appendix is derived.

In his original intention, “a present concern” consists in these two intimately connected processes in which “the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object” gives rise to an “emotion of aversion or propensity”, and in which we “are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414). He succeeded in the illustration of the first process in which a mere idea of pain or pleasure produces a new impression. But he failed in the account of the second process, as he failed in accounting for the “impulse” for actions in terms of the “violence” of the emotion which increases according to the increase of the vivacity of the relevant idea. In this last part of his discussion of the will and direct passions, he intended in vain to explain the will by the analogy with belief through the demonstration how “the will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body”(T 439). Here seems to be the main reason that led him to this confession in the Appendix: “upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent”(T 633).

The main source of Hume’s complaint in the Appendix lies, according to him, in that he could not “explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness”(T 636). That is to say, the immediate cause of his dissatisfaction is this structural difficulty in explaining the will “from the firm conception”(T 626), which is the only possible candidate proved to have been so far perfectly competent for the illustration of all “acts of the mind”(T 627).

But, our puzzle still remains: why is this failure so serious for him as to recant the whole theory? If he failed in the illustration of the will, why couldn’t it be an exception to his hypothesis? We may indeed wonder what makes him so dissatisfied with his account of personal identity, when he had already attained a great success in illustrating not only a basic aspect of our identity which is common to the identity of plants, animals, and ships, etc. in Book I, but also a peculiar aspect which makes our identity distinct from the identity of plants and animal bodies in Book II. In the first book, our identity regarding the imagination was shown to be dependent on “the relation of ideas”(T 262) which “produce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion”(ibid.). And in the second book, our identity regarding passions was illustrated suc-

cessfully in terms of the origin of indirect passions by the analogy with the belief attending the judgment which we form from causation. It is with a considerable pride, as we remember, that he called our attention to the “great analogy betwixt that hypothesis, and our present one of an impression and idea, that transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation”(T 290). He was obviously satisfied with his achievement when he claimed that this “analogy must be allowed to be no despicable proof of both hypotheses” (T 290).

Hume had nevertheless “a good general reason for scepticism”(T 633), it seems to me, derived from his failure in his discussion of the will and actions, because the will is for him an affective version of belief which makes our identity regarding passions as it is. When he defines as “the internal impression”(T 399) which we “feel” as it “exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body”(T 439), the will is asserted to be a parallel of “the necessary connection”(T 405) dependent on “a connection or determination of thought to pass from one object to another”(T 635). If he fails in justifying this “internal impression”, therefore, this failure may threaten the foundation of his hypothesis that there can be nothing to distinguish belief from the simple conception beside the feeling or sentiment (T 627), or that this feeling can be nothing but a firmer conception or a faster hold that we take of the object (*ibid.*). There seems to be a good reason to suppose that Hume failed in holding the consistency of his basic hypothesis by showing that “how aptly natural and moral evidence cement together, and forms only one chain of argument betwixt them”(T 406), because he could not attain his desired result in the last part of his discussion in which he intended to demonstrate the will by the analogy with belief in which the mind “forms the idea of cause and effect, and by its influence feels the necessity”(T 406). Here is the structural cause, it seems to me, which made Hume led to his confession in the Appendix: “my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the preceding reasoning could have induced me to receive it”(T 635).

But, this structural cause seems still insufficient as the explanation of Hume’s dissatisfaction unless the following conceptual cause involved by the failure is duly taken into consideration. It is evident that, although our identity depends on such a basic aspect common to the identity of plants and animals as he has shown in Book I, it is distinct from the identity which we attribute to plants or animal bodies in that it involves a new passion, as he has illustrated in Book II. It is also plain that, besides these two aspects of our identity called personal identity

regarding the imagination and personal identity regarding passions, there still remains the third aspect which makes our identity as it is: my identity is distinct from the identity which I attribute to others. Is this peculiarity included within the scope of Hume's discussion?

The third but last aspect of our identity is not, it seems to me, entirely overlooked by him in his discussion of personal identity, though not recognised as a crucial subject which requires a separate discussion. For, after having been concentrated in the unity of perceptions which compose a mind in his discussion of other aspects of our identity, Hume tries to explain the uniqueness of the unity by means of the connection between the unity and a particular human body. In other words, he seems to assume that the uniqueness of the unity is guaranteed by the uniqueness of the human body to which it is connected owing to the intimate relation between an emotion and an action. All he needs to do is, therefore, to explain how an emotion of aversion or propensity produced from the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object carries us "to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction"(T 414). If the so-called problem of the necessary ownership of perceptions were recognised by Hume as his own problem, he would have answered simply, therefore, that once the "impulse" for actions is established as an anchor which fixes the unity onto the outside world, there is no need to be worried about "the necessity that binds it to the series in which it has occurred"(David Pears: *Hume Studies* 290), because there is no room for my desire to have occurred in any other unity of perceptions than mine so long as the connection between the unity and my body is guaranteed.

When Hume maintains that our identity regarding passions corroborates our identity regarding the imagination by "giving a present concern with our past or future pains or pleasures"(T 261), he seems to suppose that the third aspect dependent on the distinction between my identity from yours can be explained in terms of the second aspect of our identity which is distinct from the identity of plants and animal bodies: A present concern derived from the prospect of pain or pleasure is proved to be mine in so far as it eventually carries me to actions, whose peculiarity is guaranteed by the uniqueness of my body, which is a particular item existing among physical objects. Since a concern is for Hume distinct from the mere prospect of pain or pleasure, or even from the emotion of aversion or propensity in that it necessarily involves the "impulse" for actions, he has a good reason to contend that my identity as a simple self persistent in the past, present, and future can be explained in terms of "a present concern for my past or future pains or pleasures", whose uniqueness is guaranteed by its dependence upon my past experiences as well as by its possible involvement of my body.

The involvement of our body as the criterion of our concern is certainly useful for me to identify your affection as yours, because the only available way for me to see if you are affected by any concern or emotion is to observe your actions, behaviour, external signs or symptoms. It does not follow, however, that my external signs or bodily movements are the criteria by which I generally identify my affections as mine. It must rather be put the other way round: your external signs or behaviour can serve as a criterion of your affection, as I know in my own case the intimate connection of the former with the latter. But how is it possible for me to establish this inseparable connection in my own case?

Hume assigns to the will the important role of connecting behaviour with affection when he defined it as “the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind”(T 399). Their intimate connection is guaranteed, he seems to assume, by this “internal impression” which we “feel” when we give rise to any new motion of our body, because this impression is the outcome of the correspondence or conjoinment of these two processes: “a connection or determination of the thought to pass from one object to another”(T 635) in making judgment regarding “moral evidence”(T 404) on the one hand, and “the impulse of passions”(T 415) to “extend themselves to the cause and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience” (ibid.) on the other. In other words, so long as we “feel” this “internal impression”, it is guaranteed, as he assures us, that there is some emotion of aversion or propensity towards any object which “rests not here, but, making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect”(T 414).

It is obvious that Hume’s intention lies in illustrating the will as an affective version of belief, dependent upon “the necessity of human actions”(T 410). The will is for him nothing but “the effects of belief, in influencing the passions and imagination”(T 626), so that it must be “explained from the firm conception”(ibid.). Here lies the reason why he is so concerned to establish “a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions”(T 406), and to show that “the mind feels no difference betwixt them in passing from one link to another; nor less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the present impressions of the memory and senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a physical necessity”(ibid.). In order to claim that “the same experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volitions, and actions, or figure and motion” (T 406/7), it was necessary for him to prove that “in judging of the actions of men we must pro-

ceed upon the same maxims, as when we reason concerning external object”(T 403). Here comes this assertion: “the necessity of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not properly a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being who may consider the action, and consists in the determination of his thought to infer its existence from some preceding objects”(T 408).

But, if the will is “the internal impression” dependent upon a connection or determination of the thought to pass from one object to another, and if “the very essence of necessity”(T 409) lies in that “a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character”(T 408) as he assures us, how could we distinguish between the case in which I “feel” “the internal impression” when my desire for a fine dress, for instance, carries me to get it, and the case in which a spectator “feels” “the internal impression” when he infers my action from my motives and character?

Hume may answer this question by resorting to his almighty principle of “the firm conception”(T 626) in the following way. Although the internal impression involved in both cases may be called ‘my will’ in so far as it is connected with the movements of my body, they are different in their firmness with which they appear in each mind: the former is the impression whereas the latter the idea. Since “these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity”(T 354), their difference must be explained by “the analogy which there is betwixt belief and other acts of the mind”(T 627)”, or in terms of the modification of the idea or conception which “renders it different to the feeling, without producing any distinct impression”(ibid.).

The alternative way to answer our question may be to contend that my will in my own case is distinct from my will inferred by the spectator, as it is only in the former that the intimate connection with my body is guaranteed by the bodily sensation caused by the motion of my body. This alternative answer, however, is not acceptable for Hume. In spite of his definition that the will is “the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body”(T 399), he indeed had a reason for avoiding the involvement of the bodily sensations as the criterion of the will: in so far as the will is for him the affective version of belief, it “only modifies the idea or conception; and renders it different to the feeling, without producing any distinct impression”(T 627). If he is to seek in the bodily sensation the criterion for the distinction between my will in my own case and my will inferred by others, he is plainly guilty of being in a circular, because the connection between the bodily

sensation and the desire is intended to be dependent upon the will, and not in the other way round, as we have seen above.

If so, it may be quite natural that Hume “turns his back on the human body”(David Pears: *Questions* 210) as the criterion of our identity. Baier perhaps cannot be too insistent upon that “One’s body, which Book One’s discussion of personal identity ignored, but which Book Two treats as either parts of ourselves’ or ‘near enough connected with us’, supplies plenty of perceptions of itself, and presents itself to us as anything but simple and unchanging”(Baier 131), or that “In Book Two they are treated as ordinary persons of flesh and blood”(ibid.). She is certainly justified in arguing that “Since our conceptions of a fellow is of a flesh-and-blood person, then whatever conception we have of the identity over time of a living expressive body will be the core of our notion of a person’s identity”(Baier 136) so long as Hume’s theory of passions depends on “a great resemblance among all human creatures”(T 318), but is not so in her assertion that “so [it is in Hume] of our own identities”(ibid.). It is remarkable how Hume is emphatic about the importance of the physical aspect of persons as the foundation of the system of passions, while avoiding the reference to one’s own body. We need to mark that what is essential for his system is not one’s own body, but the human body belonging to others: only the latter can pull the trigger of “our natural temper [that] gives us a propensity to the same impression which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion”(T 354).

Now, returning back to our former question, we may ask again, is it really possible for Hume to dispense with the involvement of the human body in explaining the difference between my will in my own case and my will inferred by the spectator? This problem belongs to the core of the question often called “the necessary ownership of perceptions”, which inquires into the necessity that binds a particular impression to the series in which it has occurred. What is needed for the distinction between the two cases in which my will is supposed to occur is indeed the account of “the origin of a person’s sense of his own identity, without which there would not be any self-ascription of perceptions”(David Pears: *Hume Studies* 293). But, is it possible for him to explain “the origin of a person’s sense of his own identity” as such without the reference to a particular body, viz. my own body?

As it is plainly because “we can see the separateness of human bodies ... [that] we know what makes one person different from another”(Baier 136), Hume must discover the substitute for the human body as the criterion of the distinction between my will in my own case and my will inferred by others’. His examination of “the situation of the object”(T 419) which renders a

passion either calm or violent may be taken to be the trial of seeking this substitute in the relation between two physical items, viz. my body and the object in question, along which the imagination makes an easy transition. In the two sections titled “of contiguity and distance in space and time”(T 427), he tries to show that “there is an easy reason why everything contiguous to us, either in space and time, should be conceived with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other object in its influence on the imagination”(ibid.). What is conceived by him as “an easy reason” is the present impression of ourselves as “the cause of the firmness and strength of conception”(T 627) guaranteed by “the analogy which there is betwixt belief and other acts of the mind”(ibid.). He seems to have vaguely realised the difficulty, however, of explaining without the reference to my own body how “the imagination can never totally forget the points of space and time in which we are existent; but receives such frequent advertisements of them from the passions and senses, that, however it may turn its attention to foreign and remote objects, it is necessitated every moment to reflect on the present”(T 427).

It is obvious that so long as “he took the identity of mind to be only analogous to, not intimately linked to, the identity of a human body”(Baier 136), his account of our identity remains nothing different from the identity of animals, because the human body in the case of others is virtually nothing different from “animal bodies”(T 259). Throughout his treatment of this aspect of our identity delivered in his discussion of the indirect passions, he seems to see nothing peculiar to the connection between my affection and my body to be distinct from the connection between our affection and our body, supposing that the former can be explained in terms of the latter.

In his discussion of the will and direct passions, however, Hume seems to have realised, though vaguely, that the relations or peculiar order among the contents of a single mind nor the Wittgensteinian answer that “the mere fact that I have them” are not sufficient in themselves to account for “the origin of a person’s sense of his own identity”, as David Pears points out. Pears seems quite plausible in suggesting the whereabouts of Hume’s difficulty in that, “if he succeeded in giving a naturalistic description of the origin of a single mind’s sense of its own unity, ... the same naturalistic description would [never] serve to show what holds one mind apart from another”(David Pears: *Hume Studies* 293).

This is not, however, the whole story about Hume’s problem. More serious difficulty is asserted by Pears in the following way: “even if he improved his theory and succeeded in giving a list of relations which always hold between the contents of a single mind and never

between the contents of two distinct mind, that still would not put him in a position to explain the strong modal statement that none of my perceptions could have conceivably belongs to anyone else”(David Pears: *Hume Studies* 293). David Pears suggests that the main source of his misgiving expressed in the Appendix lies in this “difficulty of accounting for the necessary ownership of perceptions within the framework of his system”(Pears: *Hume Studies* 290), for which Hume could “not give us a precise formulation of the problem”(Pears: *Hume Studies* 291). I entirely agree with this interpretation. For, it is only through “that association [with the human body that] provides a line of escape from solipsism; and ... from the dilemma which Hume faced, or, at least, thought that he faced in the Appendix to the *Treatise*”(Pears: *Hume Studies* 291).

Conclusion

In the Advertisement of the *Treatise*, Hume made it clear that his object lies in showing that “the subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves”(T xii). No one would deny that he intended to illustrate the human mind as an integrated system dependent upon the both operations of the understanding and of passions which are discussed in Book I and in Book II respectively. It may also be agreed unanimously that, in order to understand what is intended by Hume as the “true system of the human mind”, we need to see the relation by which these two aspects of the mind are connected with each other. I tried to show that these two books are originally planned to have not only a connection but also such a systematic unity as to show “a great analogy”(T 290) between the two systems of the understanding and of passions, which is conceived by him as the proof of the consistency of both systems.

In order to understand Hume’s intention in the *Treatise*, we need to see that his primary concern in Book II lies in explaining passions by the same method of reasoning which has proved so successful in illustrating the operation of the understanding in Book I. This analogy between the two systems of the mind is important for him, because he thinks that the “analogy must be allowed to be no despicable proof of both hypotheses”(T 290). Hume could not “doubt of an entire victory”(T 412) in pursuing this basic strategy of holding the analogy between the two systems of the mind until he came to explain the last subject relevant to our affective aspect of the mind, viz. the will. There seems a good reason to suppose, as we have seen, that

this failure in pursuing his basic strategy made Hume leave his discussion of passions as well as his treatment of our identity regarding passions incomplete.

It does not follow that Book II is not worth our serious investigation. Rather, a key to the puzzle concerning Hume's recantation of his theory in the Appendix seems available through the inquiry into what is intended as the system of passions, because it is evidently during the course of the discussion of passions, and not of the discussion of ideas, that he found something wrong with his method of reasoning. In the preceding discussion, I tried to show the connection between the two causes: the cause that made him abandon the theory of passions in the last part of Book II, and the cause that led him to the confession about the defectiveness of his theory in the Appendix. I have suggested that, if the former is the structural cause derived from his recognition of the inadequacy of his basic strategy of holding the analogy between the two systems of the mind, the latter must be the conceptual cause derived from the failure in demonstrating "the analogy which there is betwixt belief and other acts of the mind"(T 627), viz. the will.

If Hume's basic strategy lies in holding the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and of passions, nothing is more natural for him to claim that personal identity is dependent on the "corroboration" between these two aspects of our identity "as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves" (T 253). The former aspect of our identity is illustrated successfully in Book I as the basic aspect which is common to the identity of vegetables and animal bodies. He has also succeeded in the illustration of the second aspects of our identity through the discussion of origin of the indirect passions, and in showing the peculiarity of our identity which makes it distinct from the identity of plants, and ships, etc.

In so far as the first and the second aspect of our identity are concerned, however, there is nothing peculiar which makes our identity distinct from the identity of animals. The last business that Hume assigned to himself is, therefore, to complete the theory of personal identity by demonstrating the third but last aspect of our identity which makes my identity distinct from the identity of animal bodies, or even of the human body belonging to others. He had a good prospect of explaining the last aspect in terms of "a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures"(T 261). But, this prospect turned out unfounded at the end of Book II when he could not explain the will and actions by the analogy with belief, so that he failed, as he admits, in explaining our identity in terms of the corroboration of the two operations of the understand-

ing and of passions. Here lies the reason, it seems to me, not only why the last chapter of Book II assigned for the discussion of the direct passions looks so out of order or even inconsistent in some assertions, but also why not a word is mentioned about personal identity regarding passions through the course of the treatment of passions, in spite of that Book II is intended principally for the illustration of this aspect of our identity.

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All italics contained in the quotations are original.

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