

〈論文〉

Personal Identity and Passions in the *Treatise*:

The Connection between Book I and Book II (Part 4)

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Those pages marked with *, **, and *** are referred to the pages of *Sapporo Daigaku Ronsou*, No. 13, No. 14, and No. 15, published in March and in October, 2002, and in March, 2003, respectively.

References cited in my paper as (T--), (B--), and (Mc--), are all made respectively to the following three books:

David Hume : *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. Selby Bigge, second edition, rev. by P. H. Nidditch (Clarendon Press 1922)

Annette C. Baier : *A Progress of Sentiments* (Harvard Univ. Press 1994)

Jane McIntyre : “Personal Identity and the Passions”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy* (October 1989)

Chapter VIII: The Will and the Direct Passions

(1) The intention in the last chapter

In the last chapter, titled “The will and Direct Passions”, Hume is now entering into the discussion of the other half of the passions, viz. the direct passions. In his preceding chapters, he has devoted so far to the inquiry into the origin of the indirect passions, and was successful in proving the “exact correspondence” between the two systems of the understanding and the passions by the demonstration of “the true system”(T 286) from which a passion is derived. We may then have a good ground to suppose that in the rest of Book II he accomplishing the system of passions as well as the theory of personal identity through the illustration of the nature and origin of the direct passions. For, at the end of Book I we were invited by him to expect to see in the succeeding discussion of passions how “our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261). Let us try to see in the follow examination of the last chapter if he really succeeds in satisfying our expectations in these two respects.

Before entering into the discussion, it may be useful to give a brief survey of Hume’s strategy for the illustration of this new aspect of our affective experience, and to see what role is assigned to the direct passions in the system of passions. In his preceding discussions on the indirect passions, Hume’s utmost concern was directed to the cause and origin of a passion. But it is certain, in our present chapter, that there is not much room to inquire into the origin of the passions itself, because the direct passions “arise immediately from good or evil, from pain and pleasure”(T 399), and “frequently” “from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable”(T 439).

In other words, although the direct passions are “impressions of reflections”, which are

distinct from “impressions of sensations”, they are different from the indirect passions in that they are not always derived from ideas. These direct passions which “arise from a natural impulse, or instinct”(T 439), “properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections”(ibid.), according to him. The direct passions are not “endowed by nature” such a peculiar object as the idea of self or other self, “determined by an original and natural instinct”(T 286). They are therefore specifically “simple and uniform impressions”(T 277), and not ‘hybrid’ just like other reflective impressions or affections. [We have seen that, although the indirect passions are claimed to be “simple and uniform impressions”(T 277), they are virtually a “complex” or “hybrid” impressions, in the sense in which they consists both in a pleasurable or painful sensation and an idea of the self or the other self.] We need to remember that Hume’s division between the impressions of sensation and the impressions of the reflection does not correspond to the distinction between the bodily and the non-bodily impressions. The former division is important for Hume, making the basis of his system of passions, but the latter distinction has almost no bearing: the direct passions include not only the non-bodily impressions, e.g. desire, anger, benevolence, but also the bodily impressions, e.g. hunger, lust, some bodily appetites. It is the feature of the direct passions, which chiefly distinguishes them from the indirect passions, that the direct passions have no “peculiar object” “determined by an original and natural instinct”(T 286): “When I am angry, I am actually possessed with the passion, and in that emotion I have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five feet high”(T 415).

But, we may here suspect that, if the direct passion has no inherent object, e.g. the self, or the other self, “the true system”(T 286) he has established in his preceding discussion must be irrelevant to the direct passions, as it is a hypothesis from which a passion is derived from the double relation of ideas and impressions. It is on this double association, as we remember, that the analogy between the two operation of the understanding and the one of the passions have been claimed to be dependent. How is it possible for him to explain the nature or origin of the direct passions consistently by the same method of reasoning, and to show the analogy between the two operation of the mind without involving the double association?

It is instead the circumstance in which the direct passions carry us to actions that is marked by Hume as “the close union between the imagination and affections”(T 424). Hume’s hypothesis regarding passions are originally intended to have both aspects relevant to the indirect and the direct. The former aspect is illustrated in terms of the double association of

impressions and ideas whereas the latter in terms of the circumstance in which “the impulse”(T 415) of passion for actions arises in such a way as is directed by reason and experience. His main concern in his final chapter lies thus in accounting for the problem how “the emotion of aversion or propensity” produced by “the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object” would carry us “to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”. He finds the key to this problem in “the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions”(T 418), or “those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(T 419). For, “it is certain that, when we would govern a man, and push him to any action, it will commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions”(T 419), so that “we ought to place the object in such particular situations as are proper to increase the violence of the passion”(ibid.).

Hume has asserted at the end of Book I that our identity regarding passions is to be demonstrated in terms of “a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261). In this final chapter, he is showing how “our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination”(T 261) through the demonstration of “a connect-chain of natural causes and voluntary actions”(T 406): “the mind feels no difference betwixt them in passing from one link to another; nor is less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the present impressions of the memory and senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a *physical necessity*”(T 406).

In this respect, McIntyre seems plausible in her assertion that “the task of a theory of ‘personal identity as it regards the imagination’ is to explain why we attribute identity to the mind”(Mc 547) whereas “the task of a theory of ‘personal identity as it regards our passions’ is to explain why we are concerned with our past or future actions”(ibid.). As she assures us, “in different ways, each of these theories addresses the question of what makes past and future actions the actions of one person”(Mc 547). But she is not entirely to the point in observing that “Hume’s account of the indirect passions provides the framework for explaining concern with the past”(Mc 551) as well as “our concern with ourselves in the future results from the operation of sympathy”(Mc 556). In other words, her suggestion that “a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures” is treated mainly in his discussion of the indirect passions is rather misleading, because it is in the discussion of the direct passions, and not in the discussion of the indirect passions that Hume intends to demonstrate how the emotion of aversion or propensity, produced from the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, carries us “to avoid

or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414), and makes “us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect”(ibid.), as we shall see in our later discussions.

In his discussion of the indirect passions, Hume’s concern was directed mainly to the illustration of the system from which a passion arises, just because a new passion is the proof of “the double impulse”(T 284) bestowed by the “concurrence” of the two principles which forward the transition of ideas and which operate on the passions (T 284). He is quite proud of his success in showing “a great analogy betwixt that hypothesis [regarding the understanding], and our present one of an impression and idea, that transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation”(T 290).

In his present discussion of the direct passions, the subject of his inquiry is not the cause of a new passion, but the cause of “the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind”(T 399), viz. the will. The “close union”(T 424) between the imagination and affections is illustrated, not in the circumstance in which a passion arises, but in “the situation of object”(T 419, 438) in which “emotions of aversion or propensity” carry us “to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414), as “they are pointed out to us by reason and experience”(ibid.). Although it is certainly within the scope of Hume’s business in his discussion of the direct passions to explain how a present concern arises from the prospect of good or evil, his main business lies in showing how “the will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body”(T 439). He takes the latter subject first, and begins with the discussion that “all actions of the will have particular causes”(T 412). The former subject on the other hand is treated as the origin of fear or hope, curiosity or the love of truth, in the last two sections of Book II through the discussion why, “when either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to fear or hope, according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other”(T 439).

We may here see that Hume’s system of passions is intended to have two aspects: the aspect relevant to the indirect passions and the one relevant to the direct passions. The former aspect depends on “the situations of the mind”(T 387) which consists in the four basic indirect passions “placed as it were in a square”(T 333): “nothing can produce any of these passions without bearing it a double relation, viz. of ideas to the object of the passion, and of sensation to the relation itself”(T 333). A new passion is the result of the concurrence of the two impulses

which render the whole transition of the imagination more smooth and easy. “The minds of men” may certainly have such an aspect as “mirrors to one another”, “not only because they reflect each other’s emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments, and opinions, may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees”(T 365). But, if it were our destiny to be kept in such a world filled with our own mirror images, and only to enjoy our own reverberations and reflections which “wheels about”(T 336) within “the situations of the mind”, the asserted “true idea of the human mind” could never acquire such a dynamism assured by Hume at the end of Book I: “Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas, in their turn, produce other impressions”(T 261). A solitary and ghostly world filled with self-images and self-reflections seems incompatible or alien to Hume’s sympathy by which we are guaranteed to “enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them”(T 319).

The latter aspect, on the other hand, depends on “the situation of the object”(T 419, 438) according to which the emotions of aversion or propensity towards any object “extend themselves to the causes and effects”(T 414) of the object, carrying us to actions. It is “the impulse of passion”(T 414) invoked by this aspect that immediately excites us to get out of the closed system constituted by the other aspect of the mind, viz. “the situation of mind”, to something further. All this depends on the “principle of a parallel direction”(T 384) among those “two different causes from which a transition of passion may arise, viz. a double relation of ideas and impressions, and, what is similar to it, a conformity in the tendency and direction of any two desires which arise from different principles”(T 385). It is this “direction or tendency to action”(T 381), arising from “a certain appetite or desire”(T 382), that carries the mind out of the seclusion of “the four affections, placed as it were in a square”(T 333), and that makes the experience something more than a mere an affection.

Hume has already mentioned this property of the direct passions when he pointed out this “difference betwixt these two sets of passions of pride and humility, love and hatred”(T 367): “love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoined with, benevolence and anger”(ibid.) whereas “pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action”(ibid.). The former set of passions are “always followed” by a desire and an aversion of the happiness of the person beloved so that they are “not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion which they produce, but carry the mind to something further”(T 367), according to him. Hume’s intention seems to lie in estab-

lishing the system of passions as a mechanism dependent on the conjoinment of “the two different causes from which a transition of passion may arise”(T 385), viz. a double relation of ideas and impressions, and the principle of a parallel direction, the former of which is relevant to the indirect passions whereas the latter to the direct. The key to understand the connection among the three books of the *Treatise* may be prepared here: the connection of the system of passions with the system of ideas depends principally upon the former principle, and its connection with the system of morals upon the latter. Here seems to be a clue to the problem why Hume begins Book II with the discussion of the indirect passions instead of the direct, reversing the method which at first sight seems more natural, as we shall see in the following discussion.

(2) Why Hume begins with the indirect passions

The two distinctions are devised by Hume concerning the reflective impressions: the direct and the indirect, and the calm and the violent. Regarding the first distinction, Hume might seem attaching little importance to the division, claiming that he can “justify or explain any further” than this: by direct passions we are to understand “such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure”(T 276) whereas “by indirect, such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities”(ibid.). It follows from this definition that the former includes both bodily and non-bodily sensations which “arise from a natural impulse or instinct”(T 439), such as hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites, as well as the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends or benevolence. These direct passions are, unlike other reflective impressions, not the derivatives from ideas, but “produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections”(T 439).

The reflective impressions are distinguished again by the second distinction into the calm and the violent. “This division is far from being exact”(T 276), dependent solely upon the violence with which perceptions appear in the mind. But Hume assigns an important role to “this vulgar and specious division”(T 276) in his discussion of the will and actions. The entire account of the last chapter on “the will or direct passions” is dependent on the illustration of “the influence of the imagination on passions” in terms of the “those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(T 419).

It might be a common reaction to expect Hume to begin his discussion of passions with the subject of the direct passions, as the direct passions is claimed to arise “immediately from good

or evil” whereas the indirect only “from the conjunction of other qualities”. We may be puzzled therefore to find Hume directly enters into the discussion of “a set of” the indirect passion, viz. pride and humility, after giving a brief definition we have seen above.

Annette Baier shares the same puzzle, and suggests that “to understand Book Two of the *Treatise*, and its place in the *Treatise* as a whole, we need to see why he there begins with pride, and why its ‘indirectness’ is important”(B 133). Baier marks “reflexivity, indirectness, conflict”(B 134) as Hume’s “philosophical priorities” by which Book II is connected with Book I. She sees “literary as well as philosophical reasons for the early concentration in Book Two on conflict and on emotional see-saws”(B 133) in that “contrariety and quick emotional changes were a feature of the end of Book One”(ibid.). In other words, the set of opposite passions, viz. pride and humility, were selected therefore as the opening themes of Book II, partly because “reflectivity, indirectness, conflict are ... themes that are carried over from Book One”(B 134), according to her. The other reason for his choice of “conflict in the indirect passions” or of “pride rather than love” lies, as she suggests, in “the need to supplement Book One’s incomplete account of self-awareness”(B 133), or the lack of “our awareness of fellow persons”(ibid.).

Baier is certainly quite plausible when she sees the connection between Book I and Book II in Hume’s selection of pride and humility as the initial subject of the latter book, and in holding: “Book Two does not take back Book One’s conclusion that a person is a system of causally linked ‘different existences,’ which ‘mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other’ ”(B 142). But for choosing pride and humility as his initial topic, Hume had a more serious systematic reason, it seems to me, rather than Baier’s “literary as well as philosophical reasons”.

It seems reasonable to suppose that for Hume what was required first at the beginning of the second book must be to establish the basis of his new system. For this purpose, the indirect passions is a more adequate subject than the direct, because the former passions arise from the concurrence of both associations of impressions and of ideas whereas the latter may be “excited by only one relation”(T 352). In other words, it was more convenient for Hume to establish first “the true system” of the double association of ideas and impressions, and then to show the system of the direct passions, since the latter system depends in a great measure on the “principle of a parallel direction”(T 384), viz. a peculiar principle which causes a transition of impressions, but not ideas. We may here remember that “the relation of ideas must forward the transition of impressions”(T 380). So far as the association of impressions presupposes the associa-

tion of ideas, it must be the former system relevant to the indirect passions that makes the basis of the theory of passions, on which the latter system relevant to the direct passions is founded.

It may also explain why Hume has chosen the indirect passions to be discussed next to ideas that the indirect passions are more like ideas whereas the direct passions are more like sensations. The former passions are, as we remember, though defined as “simple and uniform impressions”(T 277), virtually complex or ‘hybrid’ impressions which have both peculiar sensations and peculiar ideas determined “not only by a natural, but also by an original property”(T 280). The latter passions, on the other hand, is more like sensations, and include even bodily sensations as their family members, so that they are the subject proper for the discussion of the influence of the passions on the will and actions.

In the preceding chapters, we have seen that Hume’s main strategy in Book II is to hold the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and of the passions, and to show how the affective case makes the parallel to the preceding hypothesis relevant to ideas. In other words, his exclusive concern in Book II lies in illustrating the new aspect of the human mind by means of the same method of reasoning, viz. in terms of the transition of the imagination which takes the smooth passage prepared by the association of ideas. This analogy is so important for his system that he tries to prove through his lengthy “eight experiments”(T 332) that “it is by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produced”(T 347), or that “an object without a relation, or with but one, never produces either of these passions”(ibid.). Through the discussion of the indirect passions in the first part of Book II, he has thus established that, when “those principle which forward the transition of ideas here concur with those which operate on the passions ... bestow on the mind a double impulse”(T 284), “a new passion must arise with so much greater violence, and the transition to it must be rendered so much more easy and natural”(ibid.). This is “the true system”(T 286) intended by Hume as the “no despicable proof of both hypothesis”(T 290) of the understanding and the passions.

After having established the basis of his theory of passions as “the true system” by which a passion arises from the double association of ideas and impressions, Hume then proceeds to examine the cause and the effect of the direct passions. Now regarding the direct passions, he calls for “proper limitations”(T 419) to the double association on the ground of that passions “readily mingle and unite, though they have but one relation, and sometimes without

any”(T 420). Our puzzle often alleged regarding Hume’s selection of his opening subject of Book II may be here solved, it seems to me, when we understand how important it is for him to show that one and the same method of reasoning he has established in Book I is applicable as “the double association of impressions and ideas” to the illustration of the origin of a passion: the easy transition of the imagination along related ideas may give rise to a new passion by causing the “transfusion”(T 290) of impressions. The indirect passion was therefore a proper subject for him to show the analogy or connection with his preceding discussion delivered in Book I whereas the direct passion was intended for the illustration of the connection with the subject of morals, as it involves the will or volition which makes the central theme of Book III.

But is he not inconsistent to admit regarding the direct passions that a passion can arise without involving the association of ideas, or even without any association at all, while contending regarding the indirect passion, on the other hand, that “there is always required a double relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect, in order to produce either love or hatred”(T 351)? Does it follow from these “limitations” that he failed in holding his basic strategy of accounting for the system of passions by the analogy with the system of the understanding? The answer is definitely in the negative, because Hume’s claim of the limitations to the productive system of the double association does not imply his recantation of his basic strategy of explaining the system of passions in terms of the easy transition of the imagination. On the contrary: he intends to demonstrate much stronger “union” between the imagination and passions in his discussion of the origin of “volition”(T 414) or “the impulse of passion”(T 415) to actions, as we shall see in the following discussion. as “the influence of the imagination upon the passions”(T 425) in the nature and properties of the will, which depends on “the circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(T 419). He intends not only to prove “the force of moral evidence”(T 404) by the analogy with the “natural evidence”, but also to show “how aptly natural and moral evidence cement together, and form only one chain of argument betwixt them”(T 406). He is quite sure of demonstrating that “the union betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy as that in any natural operations, so its influence on the understanding is also the same in determining us to infer the existence of one from that of another”(T 404).

This basic strategy of Hume’s for holding the analogy between the system of the understanding and the system of the passions may also explain why pride and humility are more convenient for him than love and hatred as the initial subjects of his discussion. It is because the

production of the former set of passions requires the double association of impressions and ideas whereas it is not so absolute with the latter set, as “the passions of love may be excited by only one relation of different kind”(T 351/2).

We may still wonder with Baier, however, why Hume has selected those four particular passions, viz. pride and humility, and love and hatred, among varieties of passions. Baier suggests that Hume’s selection of these two set of passions is the reflection of his concern to “self-awareness” and “our awareness of fellow persons”(B 133) respectively. She points out, as the solution of our puzzle, that the former set succeeds “contrariety and quick emotional change”(B 133) which were “a feature of the end of Book One”(ibid.). Here are “literary as well as philosophical reasons” for his “early concentration in Book Two on conflict and on emotional see-saws”(B 133), according to her.

Besides, she continues, Hume was fully aware of “the need to supplement Book One’s incomplete account of self-awareness”(B 133), so that he first took up pride and humility as the succeeding topic for more discussion and for their connection, and then tried to “supplement” it with his discussion of love and hatred, hoping to add the new aspect of “our awareness of fellow persons”(B 133). Book I, at least in its first half, is “full of ‘egoism’ ”, according to her, whereas in Book II a person is treated with “flesh and blood”(B 130), or “as a person among persons”(B 133). Baier thus invites us to see Hume’s intention not only of his second book but of the *Treatise* as a whole in his emphasis on the “contrariety of passions”(B 131), or in his different treatment of a person in Book I and Book II, and holds that “in Book Two he seems to realize that the best picture of the human soul is the human body, so he can speak of ‘qualities of our mind and body, that is self’ ”(B 131).

But Hume’s intention in his selection of these two sets of passions seems to lie elsewhere. Our puzzle regarding his exclusive concentration on these two sets of passions may be solved more naturally when we understand that the indirect passions are those specific passions which are “determined to have self [or the other self] for their object, not only by a natural, but also by an original property”(T 280). In other words, these passions “placed betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produced by it”(T 278), are all called indirect passions, forming a family consist of the four main passions of pride, humility, love and hatred. We may mark that none of them is mentioned as the name of a particular passion, but the general name of those group of passions. “Love may show itself in the shape of tenderness, friendship, intimacy, esteem, good-will, and in may other appearances; which at the bottom are the same

affections, and arise from the same causes, though with a small variation, which it is not necessary to give any particular account of”(T 448). Hume confines himself to the “principal” passions “in their most simple and natural situation, without considering all the variations they may receive from the mixture of different views and reflections”(T 447), just because “it is easy to imagine how a different situation of the object, or a different turn of thought, may change even the sensation of a passion”(T 447/8), according to him.

And these two sets of basic passions are special for his system in that the production of the indirect passion presupposes “the situation of the mind”(T 397) constituted of the four basic passions placed in a definite relations to each other “as it were in a square”(T 332): “pride is connected with humility, love with hatred, by their objects or ideas: pride with love, humility with hatred, by their sensation or impressions”(T 333). None of these four passions arises independently from the rest, therefore, since the production of the indirect passion depends on the transition of the mind along the four sides of this square established by the similitude of sensation of pain or pleasure as well as by the similitude of ideas of self or the other self, according to the light of our place to the object. A new passion thus presupposes this “situation of affairs”(T 338) in which passions “transfuse themselves into any other impressions”(ibid.) as the imagination proceeds or returns back “attended” with the related passions.

The main reason why Book II begins with pride and humility is thus to show the connection to the preceding book, whose last subject is personal identity. Hume has chosen these two basic passions as the initial subjects of his discussion of passions, because they are special passions which, “being once, raised, immediately turn our attention to ourselves, and regard that as their ultimate and final object”(T 278).

(3) Why the will enters into the discussion of passions

The entire theory of passions in Book II is intended to converge on the discussion of “the will and direct passions” in this last chapter, in which the whole feature of “the true idea of the human mind”(T 261) emerges at last as a dynamic system dependent on the corroboration of the two operations of the imagination and affections. In the first half of his discussion of the indirect passions, Hume has built successfully the basis of the system of passions through the inquiry how it is possible for the mind to “make our distant perceptions influence each other”(T 261) by the double relation of ideas and impressions. Upon this basis, he is demonstrating in the last half of his discussion of passions how “our identity with regard to the pas-

sions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination”(T 261) through the illustration of the circumstance in which “a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(ibid.) arises. In Hume affective system, all depends on such a “close union”(T 424) of the two operations of the imagination and affections that “nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the latter”(ibid.).

To be exact, in order to show how the two aspects of our identity corroborate with each other, it is not sufficient, as he thinks, to explain how “a present concern for our past or future pains” arises. For, he needs to illustrate not only how “desire [or aversion] arises from good [or evil] considered simply”(T 439) but also the circumstance in which “the will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body”(ibid.). In other words, the system of passions depends on the final process in which, “when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414). It entirely owes to the corroboration of the two systems of the mind that these emotions proceeded not only from our immediate sensation of pain or pleasure but also from our future pains or pleasure “extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed us by reason and experience”(T 414).

In the discussion of the indirect passions, Hume has shown, through the illustration of “a true system” from which a passion arises from the double association of ideas and impressions, that no ideas can affect each other “unless they be united together by some relation which may cause an easy transition of the ideas, and consequently of the emotions or impressions attending the ideas, and may preserve one impression in the passage of the imagination to the object of the other”(T 380). But regarding the direct passions, there is not much room for us to inquire into their origin, since the emotion of aversion or propensity is produced “immediately” from the prospect of pain or pleasure, and “frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable”(T 439). It is true that in the last two sections, he accounts for the origin of some direct passions, viz. fear or hope, curiosity or the love of truth, through the illustration how “when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity”(T 414). But he is more concerned with the problem how “the impulse of passion”(T 415) for actions, by claiming that “the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it”(T 414). For, the corroboration of the two aspects of the mind, the cognitive and the affective, may be clearly observed in the circumstance in which “this

emotion rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect”(T 414). In so far as “reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition”(T 414), this is the very circumstance in which the corroboration of the two aspects of the mind is required. Hume is quite sure of his success in establishing the “moral evidence”(T 404) as “a conclusion concerning the actions of men, derived from the considerations of their motives, temper, and situation”(T 404) by the analogy with the “natural evidence” regarding physical or ordinary matters. The last chapter is thus spent for the demonstration “how aptly natural and moral evidence cement together, and form only one chain of argument betwixt them”(T 406), and for the establishment that “there is a general course of nature in human actions, as well as in the operation of the sun and the climate”(T 402/3).

The last chapter of Book II is thus spent mainly for the discussion of the will and “necessary actions”(T 400), and for the illustration of “a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions”(T 406). It is by means of the division of the calm and the violent passions that the influence of passions on the will and actions is to be illustrated, as Hume thinks that “the actions of the will” is explained in terms of the influence of the imagination on passions, or in “the situation of the object”(T 419) which render a passion either calm or violent (*ibid.*). He is sure that a crucial key to the question concerning the will is discovered in that “the same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a clam one”(T 419). He begins the examination of this “situation of the object”(T 419) with a good prospect of his success of proving that “the union betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy as that in any natural operations, so its influence on the understanding is also the same in determining us to infer the existence of one from that of another”(T 404). The discussion of passions is thus intended to be accomplished with the illustration of the intimate connection between passions and actions, which is to be prepared for the succeeding work on morals in Book III. Hume has a confidence in his successful demonstration that “there is no known circumstance that enters into the connection and production of the actions of matter that is not to be found in all the operations of the mind; and consequently we cannot, without a manifest absurdity, attribute necessity to the one, and refuse it to the other”(T 404). And this strong “cement” or parallelism between “natural and moral evidence” is, for him, the “no despicable proof of both of his hypotheses” regarding ideas and passions, and consequently of the *Treatise*.

(4) The will and “the necessary actions”

The last chapter of the direct passions consists of three parts: Hume establishes first that “all actions of the will have particular causes”(T 412), then proceeds to examine “what these causes are, and how they operate”(ibid.), and discusses the direct passions briefly as the last topic in the rest of Book II. Let us examine how Hume’s affective system he has thus far developed through the discussion of the indirect passions can be completed with those three discussions, which seems rather too short or fragmentary for these crucial subjects.

He begins his discussion with the criticism of the prevalent “doctrine” of liberty or free-will, which proceeds, according to him, from this common misunderstanding: “our actions are subject to our will on most occasions”(T 408), and “the will itself is subject to nothing”(ibid.). His intention lies not in rejecting the doctrine, but in suggesting, by giving the proper definition of the “liberty” and “necessity”, that there is no contradiction between the doctrine of the free-will and the belief that “the actions of the wil ... arise from necessity”(T 405).

Although this part of his discussion may seem complicated, Hume’s strategy is simple: to show the parallelism between “the actions of matter”(T 400), e.g. the operations of the sun and the climate, and “the actions of the mind”(ibid.), viz. “the actions of the will”(T 405). He rehearses the definition of necessity he has given regarding the former actions in Book I on the one hand, and suggests, on the other, that no peculiarity is involved that may distinguish the latter actions in this particular from “the operations of senseless matter”(T 410). He shows first that “the actions of matter” are to be regarded “as instances of necessary actions”(T 400), and then reasons that “whatever is, in this respect, on the same footing with the matter, must be acknowledged to be necessary”(ibid.). The following is the rough sketch of his argument by which he tries to prove that “in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxims, as when we reason concerning external object”(T 403):

Although it is universally acknowledged that the operations of external bodies are necessary, in no single instance the ultimate connection of any objects is discoverable either by our senses or reason. It is their “constant union alone” that we are acquainted with, and it is from this constant union the necessity arises. The necessity, therefore, is nothing but “a determination of the mind” to pass from one object to its usual attendant, which entirely depends on “the constant union and the inference of the mind”, and wherever we discover these, we must acknowledge a necessity. As it is the observation of the union which produces the inference, and not by any insight into the essence of bodies, it will be sufficient to “prove a constant union

in the actions of the mind, in order to establish the inference along with the necessity of these actions”(T 400/1).

Hume’s object in this part of discussion is thus to establish that “like causes still produce like effects in the same manner as in the mutual action of the elements and powers of nature”(T 401). Since “our actions have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances”(T 401), “in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxims as we reason concerning external objects”(T 403). “As the union betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy as that in any natural operations”(T 404), it must be asserted that “its influence on the understanding is also the same in determining us to infer the existence of one from that of another”(ibid.): “when any phenomena are constantly and invariably conjoined together, they acquire such a connection in the imagination, that it passes from one to the other without any doubt or hesitation”(T 403). It then follows that “there is no known circumstance that enters into the connection and production of the actions of matter that is not to be found in all the operations of the mind”(T 404). If so, “we can not, without a manifest absurdity, attribute necessity to the former, and refuse it to the other”(T 404). We all believe, he points out, that “the actions of the will arise from necessity”(T 405), and the greatest part of our reasonings is employed in judgments concerning our own actions and those of others. He thus asserts “the necessity of human actions”(T 410), and suggests to place them “on the same footing with the operations of senseless matter”(ibid.). This is how he claims that, instead of ascribing to the will “that unintelligible necessity, which is supposed to lie in matter”(T 410), we should “ascribe to matter that intelligible quality which ... must allow to belong to the will”(ibid.).

“The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty” or free-will partly depends on “a false sensation or experience even of the liberty of indifference”(T 408) which we are supposed to feel when we choose our actions. But “the necessity of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not properly a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being who may consider the action, and consists in the determination of his thought to infer its existence from some preceding objects: as liberty or chance, on the other hand, is nothing but the want of that determination, and a certain looseness, which we feel in passing or not passing from the idea of one to that of the other”(T 408). And “though in reflecting on human actions, we seldom feel such a looseness or indifference, yet it very commonly happens that, in performing the actions themselves, we are sensible of something like it”(T 408), which is taken “as a demonstrative, or even an intuitive proof of human liberty”(ibid.). “We feel that our actions are subject to our will

on most occasions, and imagine that the will itself is subject to nothing”(T 408), because we feel that “it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself even on the side on which it did not settle”(ibid.). We feel that “this image or faint motion ... could have been completed into the thing itself”(T 408), because we find, upon a second trial, that it can. This is the common way how we are committed to the doctrine of liberty.

“But those efforts are all in vain”, according to Hume, because, “whatever capricious and irregular actions we may perform, in order to prove our liberty of the will, we can never free ourselves from the bonds of necessity”(T 408). “We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; even where he cannot, he concludes in general that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition”(T 408/9). The necessity defined in two ways, viz. as the constant union and conjunction of like objects, and as the inference of the mind from the one to the other, is properly attributed to “the will of man”, since “no one can has ever pretended to deny that we can draw inferences concerning human actions, and that those inferences are founded on the experienced union of like actions with like motives and circumstances”(T 409). Hume concludes, that, in so far as we can thus draw inferences concerning human actions, which are “founded on the experienced union of like actions with like motives and circumstances”(T 409), “necessity must be allowed to belong to the will of man”(ibid.).

It is “a great resemblance among all human creatures”(T 318), as we remember, that was specifically marked by Hume as the basis of the system of the indirect passions. And now in his present discussion of the direct passions, it is the difference among individuals that is marked by him, though paradoxically, as the proof of the “uniformity in human life”(T 402). In order to understand this paradoxical situation, Hume invites us to see how “the different stations of life influence the whole fabric, external and internal”(T 402) of individuals: “The skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer”, for instance, “are different from those of a man of quality: so are his sentiments, actions, and manners”(ibid.). His point lies in that “these different stations of life arise necessarily, because uniformly, from the necessity and uniform principles of human nature”(T 402). Human society is founded upon the diversity or differences among individuals, which maintains such an uniformity in human life, as he points out. In other words, it is this diversity as such that, while maintaining an uniformity or regularity, makes the society as it is, e.g. the different care and attendance of parents towards their children as they grow older,

the different skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer from those of a man of quality. It is from this diversity that the foundations of government, e.g. the distinction of property and ranks, are derived. And in the diversity as such we can see not only “a general course of nature in human actions”(T 402/3), but also “characters peculiar to different nations and particular persons, as well as common to mankind”(T 403). “The knowledge of these characters is founded on the observation of an uniformity in the actions that flow from this; and this uniformity forms the very essence of necessity”(T 403), according to Hume.

“We must certainly allow”, he holds, “that the cohesion of the parts of matter arises from natural and necessary principles, whatever difficulty we may find in explaining them; and for a like reason we must allow, that human society is founded on like principles”(T 401). “And our reason in the latter case is better than even in the former”, he assures us, “because we can also explain the principles on which this universal propensity is founded”(T 401). “For is it more certain”, he asks, “that two flat pieces of marble will unite together, than two young savages of different sexed will copulate?”

“Moral evidence” established as “a conclusion concerning the actions of men, derived from the consideration of their motives, tempers, and situation”(T 404) is thus asserted by Hume to have the same constancy and the same influence on our actions as the “natural evidence” which we form concerning “the actions of matter”. But why does Hume attaches so much importance to “a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions”(T 406), by calling our attention “how aptly natural and moral evidence cement together, and form only one chain of argument betwixt them”(T 406)?

It is because, as Hume thinks, natural and moral evidence must be “of the same nature, and derived from the same principles”(T 406), in order that “the mind feels no difference betwixt them in passing from one link to another”(T 407) so as to be no less “certain of the future event than if it were connected with the present impression of the memory and senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a physical necessity”(ibid.). He finds here a clue to his problem how it is possible for the mind to have “a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261), which must be something more than the mere entertainment of a thought or an image, as we shall see in the rest of the discussion.

Hume is quite satisfied with his “entire victory”(T 412) in proving that “all actions of the will have particular causes”(ibid.), and now proceeding to explain “what these causes are, and

how they operate”(ibid.).

(5) The combat of passion and reason

In explaining the causes which “produce any action, or give rise to volition”(T 414), Hume marks the common talk of “the combat of passion and reason”(T 413), and inquires into the source of this general misunderstanding: “Every rational creature is obliged to regulate his actions by reason, and if any other motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, till it be entirely subdued, or at least brought to a conformity with that superior principle”(T 413). What he suggests in the place of this “combat” of passion and reason is the ‘corroboration’ of passion with reason, in terms of which he is explaining the causes of “the actions of the will” or “volition”. There could be no combat between reason and passion, he insists, since “reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will”(T 413) nor “can never oppose passion in the direction of the will”(ibid.).

It is because, on the one hand, the understanding exerts itself only after these two ways: “as it judges from demonstration or probability, and as it regards the abstract relations of our ideas, or those relations of objects of which experience only gives us information”(T 413). The first operation of reasoning therefore “alone can hardly be the cause of any action”(T 413), but “only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects”(T 414). Hume’s present business is then to show when and how this first “abstract or demonstrative reasoning” leads us to the second operation of the understanding, and makes us “cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect”(T 414).

On the other, a passion is defined as “an original existence”, or “a modification of existence”, containing “no representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification”(T 415). It is impossible, therefore, that “this passion can be opposed by, or be contradictory to truth and reason”(T 415). “When I am angry”, for instance, “I am actually possessed with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five feet high”(T 415).

We may here see an obvious contrast in Hume’s treatment of these two kinds of passions, viz. the direct and the indirect. We may remember that his previous discussion of the indirect passions rests on this property of passions: “passions are determined to have self for their object, not only by a natural but also by an original property”(T 280). And now in his present

discussion of the direct passions, a passion is claimed to be “an original existence”, containing “no representative quality”. Here seems to be a main reason why Hume finds it necessary to treat passions in two separate discussions: the indirect passions are assimilated more to ideas, being ‘hybrid’, composed of ideas and impressions, whereas the direct are assimilated more to bodily sensations which are derived from “a natural impulse or instinct”(T 439). It is “the distinguishing characteristic” of the direct passions that some of them are not only like bodily sensations, but also are nothing but bodily sensations or appetites, e.g. lust, hunger.

A passion as “an original existence” can never “be opposed by, or be contradictory to truth and reason”(T 415), according to Hume, since “this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects which they represent”(ibid.). If I “prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger”(T 416), my choice could never be contrary to reason, he holds, as “a passion can be called unreasonable either when founded on a false supposition, or when it chooses means insufficient for the designed end”(T 416). Any affection or passion is unreasonable only in so far as it is “accompanied with some false judgment”(T 416) or opinion, and “even then it is not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment”(ibid.). But if it is not reason that is “capable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion”(T 414/5), what could be the “reason” that is supposed to oppose our passion when we talk of “the combat of passion and of reason”?

If it is only “a contrary impulse”, Hume answers, produced by “the faculty which have an original influence on the will”(T 415) that can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, the only possible candidates that could “determine the will”(T 417) are “calm passions”. By calm passions, he means either “certain instincts originally implanted in our natures”(T 417) such as benevolence, resentment, the love of life, kindness to children, or “the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, considered merely as such”(ibid.). These calm desires and tendencies are certainly “real passions”, but nevertheless “produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation”(T 417), according to him. In this respect, calm passions are very much like reason, since reason also “exerts itself without producing any sensible emotions”(T 417), and “scarce ever conveys any pleasure or uneasiness”(ibid.). As it is natural that “every action of the minds which operates with the same tranquility is confounded with reason”(T 417), he observes, “when any of these passions are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations

of reason, and are supposed to proceed from the same faculty with that which judges of truth and falsehood”(ibid.).

“Beside these calm passions”, according to Hume, “which often determine the will, there are certain violent emotions of the same kind, which have likewise a great influence on that faculty”(T 417). “The combat of passion and reason” commonly talked of is nothing but the combat or “dispute” between these two principles for the government of the will and actions, as he explains, and where they are contrary, “either of them prevails, according to the general character or present disposition of the person”(T 418). “What we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent”(T 418), and “the common error of metaphysicians has lain”, he points out, “in ascribing the direction of the will entirely to one of these principles, and supposing the other to have no influence”(ibid.). It is from “these variations of temper”, according to him, that “the great difficulty of deciding concerning the actions and resolutions of men”(T 418) is derived, “where there is any contrariety of motives and passions”(ibid.). Thus far is the introductory part of his reasoning, by which he is illustrating the causes of the will or actions in terms of “the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions”(T 418).

(6) The situations of the objects which render a passion either calm or violent

“It is obvious”, Hume assures us, that “when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414). It is this “consequent emotion of aversion or propensity” that is mentioned by Hume as the direct passion, or the impression which arises “immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure”(T 399), e.g. desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear, the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends, curiosity, the love of truth, hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites. In his preceding discussions of the indirect passions, Hume was exclusively concerned to illustrate the origin of passions, and to establish the system from which a passion arises. But in his discussion of the direct passions, what occupies Hume’s main concern lies not in the causes of passions themselves, but in something else, viz. “the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions”(T 418). It is only two short sections that he prepares for the inquiry into the source of the four “principal” passions, viz. fear and hope, curiosity or the love of truth, probably because the direct passions are hardly “accountable”, arising “imme-

diately” from pain or pleasure, or frequently “from a natural impulse or instinct”(T 439). The last chapter assigned for the direct passions is spent mostly for the illustration of the influence of passions on the will and actions or “the situation of the object”(T 419) which “are proper to increase the violence of the passion”(ibid.).

Hume’s strategy in the last chapter is to illustrate first the circumstance in which this consequent emotion of aversion or propensity “rests not here, but, making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect”(T 414), and only after that, he intends to explain the origin of some “principle” passions, viz. fear and hope. Against our natural expectation, he begins his discussion of the direct passions not with the problem how the aversion or propensity towards any object arises from the prospect of pain or pleasure, but with the problem how “we are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(ibid.). His first business is thus to explain the circumstance in which “these emotions [of aversion or propensity] extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience”(T 414). He focuses on the problem whence this “impulse of passion”(T 415) arises, as “it is plain that, as reason is nothing but the discovery of their connection, it cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect us”(ibid.): “reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition”(ibid.). There seems to have a good ground to expect that we may have a full view of Hume’s system of passions when he is succeeded in illustrating how “a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261) carries us “to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 413): his system is intended to have both aspects relevant to the indirect and the direct, the former of which is related to the system of the understanding by means of the double association of impressions and ideas whereas the latter to the system of morals by means of the impulse for actions.

In explaining how passions influence the will and actions, Hume seeks a clue in this familiar assumption commonly accepted in our everyday life: “when we govern a man, and push him to any action, it will commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions, and rather take him by his inclination, than what is vulgarly called his reason”(T 419). It is true, he admits, that “passions does not influence the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper”(T 418). But “notwithstanding this”, as he holds, in order to push one to any action, “we ought to place the object in such particular situations as are proper to increase that violence of the passion”(T 419). Hume, while claiming the distinc-

tion between a calm and a weak passion or between a violent and a strong one, sees a close connection between the will and passions in “those circumstances of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(T 419).

The key to this connection lies in that, he thinks, while both of the calm and the violent passions pursue good and avoid evil, and change their violence according as the increase or diminution of the good or evil, “the same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one”(T 419). “We may observe”, he suggests, “that all depends upon the situation of the object, and that a variation in this particular will be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other”(T 419). Asserting that “this subject belongs very properly to the present question concerning the will”(T 419), he finds it necessary to examine “to the bottom” “those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(ibid.). Let us now follow him and see whether he really succeeds in explaining “those circumstances and situations of object” by means of “a close union”(T 424) of the imagination and affections.

In his discussion of the indirect passions, Hume tried to show in terms of the double association of ideas and impressions how the close union of the imagination and passions gives rise to a new passion. And in his present discussion of the direct passions, he intends to illustrate the close union in terms of this “situation of the object”(T 419, 438) which changes the calm and the violent passions into each other: “wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations”(T 424). It is important for him to explain “the willing of actions”(T 417) in terms of the “influence of the imagination upon passions”(T 424), as it is Hume’s basic strategy in Book II, as we remember, to hold the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and the passions.

Hume seems quite sure of his success in attaining this desired result when he has invited us “to examine to the bottom” and to “consider some of those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(T 419). In the succeeding four sections, he struggles for this purpose in order to discover “the common course of human affairs”(T 401) which shows “the same uniformity and regular operation of natural principles”(ibid) in human life. It is his basic assumption, as we have noted above, that “there is a general course of nature in human actions, as well as in the operations of the sun and the climate”(T 402): “like causes still produce like effects; in the same manner as in the mutual action of the elements and pow-

ers of nature”(ibid.). And it was under this assumption that he tried to discover some general principles through the examination of “particular situations as are proper to increase the violence of the passion”(T 419) for which he discusses in four sections “the effects of custom”, “the influence of the imagination on the passions”, and “contiguity and distance in space and time”.

Although he was successful more or less in explaining “the actions of men” by means of “the same maxim as, when we reason concerning external objects”(T 403), he was obliged to admit that “the causes and effects of these violent and calm passions are pretty variable, and depends, in a great measure, on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual”(T 437). He leaves “this subject of the will”(T 437) with this comment: “Philosophy can only account for a few of the greater and more sensible events of this war [= struggle of passion and reason]; but must leave all the smaller and more delicate revolutions, as dependent on principles too fine and minute for her comprehension”(T 438). As we shall see in the later discussion, this comment of Hume’s seems merit our special attention, as it is virtually a concluding remark of the last chapter of Book II, leaving only 2 minor sections on the direct passions.

(7) The causes and effects of the calm and violent passions

Before examining Hume’s discussion on “the situation of the object”(T 419, 438), we need to recall again why he mentions such an obviously obscure notion as the key concept for the illustration of the influence of passions on the will and actions. We need to mark the whereabouts of his intention in sparing four in ten sections of the last chapter for the discussion of these seemingly extraneous subjects, viz. “the effects of custom”, “the influence of the imagination on the passions”, “the contiguity and distance in space and time”(T 427). What is intended through the illustration of “the situation of the object” is no doubt the demonstration of “the influence of the imagination upon the passions”(T 424) in terms of “a close unity”(ibid.) between the imagination and passions: “Wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations”(ibid.). When he asks us to “observe, that all depends upon the situation of the object, and that a variation in this particular will be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other”(T 419), “the situation of the object” is conceived in Hume’s mind as a convincing proof, or final plain picture, of the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and the passions. We may here see how Hume consistently pursues the same method of reasoning

in the both discussions of the indirect and the direct passions, by holding the analogy between the two systems of the mind in terms of the double relation between the impressions and ideas for the former passions and in terms of the “close union” of the imagination and the passions for the latter.

Hume’s assumption that the influence of passions on the will can be explained in terms of “the situation of the object” is grounded on our common belief that “when we would govern a man, and push him to any action, it will commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions, and rather take him by his inclination”(T 519). Upon this ground, he had a good prospect of proving the analogy between the two systems of the mind when he called our attention to the close relation between the will and the violence of a passion, and remarked: “we shall here examine it to the bottom, and shall consider some of those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(T 419). Let us now try to see if this object of Hume has been attained through his discussion of the following subjects, discussed each in separate section: “the transfusion of an emotion into another”, “the effects of custom”, “the influence of the imagination on the passions”, “the contiguity and distance in space and time”.

(1) As the first possible factor of increasing the violence of a passion, Hume marks this “remarkable property of human nature”(T 420): “passions are naturally transfused into each other, if they are both present at the same time”(T 421), though “in their nature they be originally different from, and even contrary to each other”(T 419). This assertion that “any emotion which attends a passion is easily converted into it”(T 419) may be properly taken to correspond to his former contention he has given in his preceding discussion of the indirect passions: “The passions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoined with, benevolence and anger”(T 367), the former of which is the indirect passions and the latter the direct. We may here remember how he has observed that “pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, exciting us to actions”(T 367) whereas “love and hatred are not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion which they produce, but carry the mind to something further”(ibid.).

Hume seeks the first cause which increases the violence of a passions in the connection between the direct and the indirect passions: “when two passions are already produced by their separate causes, and are both present in the mind, they readily mingle and unite”(T 420), so that “the predominant passion swallows up the inferior, and converts it itself”(ibid.). “A suit of fine clothes”, for instance, “produces pleasure from their beauty; and this pleasure produces

the direct passions, or the impressions of volition or desire”(T 439). “Again when these clothes are considered as belonging to ourself, the double relation conveys to us the sentiment of pride, which is an indirect passion; and the pleasure which attends that passion returns back to the direct affections, and gives new force to our desire or volition, joy or hope”(T 439). This is how “these indirect passions, being always agreeable or uneasy, give in their turn additional force to the direct passions, and increase our desire and aversion to the object”(T 439), according to him.

It may merit our attention that this “transfusion” of passions is not, as he asserts, necessarily subject to his general rule of a double relation of impressions and ideas. Hume has claimed so far in his preceding discussion that, “in order to make a perfect union among the passions, there is always required a double relation of impressions and ideas; nor is one relation sufficient for that purpose”(T 419). But in our present case with the direct passions, he asks for “proper limitations”(T 419) to this rule, holding that the double relation is “requisite only to make one passion produce another”(T 419/420).

Hume’s request for the “limitations” is not inconsistent to his basic position that “the relation of ideas must forward the transition of impressions”(T 380). He has already claimed in the preceding discussion, as we remember, that there are “two different ways” which makes the transition of passions possible, viz. a double relation of ideas and impressions, and the “principle of a parallel direction”(T 384). The main difference between the indirect and the direct passions lies in that the former passions owe its origin to the first principle whereas the origin of the latter mostly to the second, which is “similar”(T 385) to the first. It is this “conformity in the tendency and direction of any two desires which arise from different principles”(T 458) that is in Hume’s mind when he suggests: “when two passions are already produced by their separate causes, and are both present in the mind, they readily mingle and unite, though they have but one relation, and sometimes without any”(T 420). This is how, as he points out, when a person is once heartily in love, the jealousies and quarrels which are generally so subject to anger and hatred, are yet found to give additional force to the prevailing passion, viz. his love: “the spirits, when once excited, easily receive a change in their direction; and it is natural to imagine this change will come from the prevailing affection”(T 420).

Hume assumes that the asserted “situation of the object”(T 419) which changes the calm into the violent passion can be thus explained in terms of the “transfusion” of passions into each other: “Since passions, however independent, are naturally transfused into each other, if

they are both present at the same time, it follows, that when good or evil is placed in such a situation as to cause any particular emotion besides its direct passion of desire or aversion, that latter passion must acquire new force and violence”(T 421). This is why we naturally desire what is forbid and take a pleasure in performing actions, merely because they are unlawful: “a new emotion caused by an opposition of passions is easily converted into the predominant passion, and increases its violence beyond the pitch it would have arrived at had it met with no opposition”(T 421).

(2) He points out “the effects of custom” as the second possible factor of increasing the violence of a passion, observing that “nothing has a greater effect both to increase and diminish our passions, to convert pleasure into pain, and pain into pleasure, than custom and repetition”(T 423). We may here remember what a crucial role was assigned to custom when he held in Book I that “belief is an act of the mind arising from custom”(T 114). But we may be disappointed here to find his short treatment of this important subject so causal or almost empty: he seems to have nothing more to say than to repeat his former assertion concerning “two original effects upon the mind in bestowing a facility in the performance of any action, or the conception of any object, and afterwards a tendency or inclination towards it”(T 422).

(3) The third factor is a “close union” between the imagination and affections: “Wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations”(T 425). We might naturally expect in the section titled “Of the influence of the imagination on the passions” that Hume is delivering a central issue in this section which may make the core of the system of the direct passions. But, this short section, though quite relevant to his main theme, is not prepared for the discussion of such a general topic, but is meant only for the demonstration of this issue: how “the more general and universal any of our ideas are, the less influence they have upon the imagination”(T 425), and consequently upon passions.

The subject of this section is thus restricted to a story of the Athenians who rejected Themistocles’ design in the past Greece. Hume repeats his former assertion as a comment of this story that “belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression”(T 427), and observes: “this vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the calm as well as the violent; nor has a mere fiction of the imagination any considerable influence upon either of them, as it is too weak to take any hold of the mind, or be attended with emotion”(ibid.). He asks us here to see not only that “lively passions commonly attends a lively

imagination”(T 427), but also that “the force of the passions depends as much on the temper of the person as the nature or situation of the object”(ibid). To put it the other round, he contends on the one hand that a passion owes its “force” or “impulse”(T 414), though obliquely, to the liveliness of ideas, and on the other that for this reason belief has such an influence upon behaviour.

(4) Claiming that “the force of the passion depends as much on the temper of the person as the nature or situation of the object”(T 427), Hume now intends to explain this “nature or situation of the object” in terms of the easy transition of the imagination which passes from the object in question to ourselves: the contiguous objects, “by means of their relation to ourselves, approach an impression in force and vivacity”(T 428) whereas the remote ones, “by reason of the interruption in our manner of conceiving them, appear in a weaker and more imperfect light”(ibid.). Observing that “contiguous objects must have an influence much superior to the distant and remote”(T 428), he holds that “this is their effect on the imagination”(ibid.), and consequently “on the will and passions”(ibid.). For the discussion of this subject, he prepares two sections with the title, “Of contiguity and distance in space and time”, and tries to illustrate “the situation of the object” in terms of the space-time relations of an object to ourselves.

He begins his discussion with obvious confidence by observing that “there is an easy reason why everything contiguous to us, either in space or time, should be conceived with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other object in its influence on the imagination”(T 427): “ourself is intimately present to us, and whatever is related to self must partake of that quality”(ibid.). There seems no doubt that he intends to establish a mental version of the Newtonian science founded on space-time coordinates when he asserts: “The imagination can never totally forget the points of space and time in which we are existent; but receives such frequent advertisements of them from the passions and senses, that, however it may turn its attention to foreign and remote objects, it is necessitated every moment to reflect on the present”(T 427/8). What is in Hume’s mind when he mentions “the situation of the object”(T 419, 438) or “particular situations as are proper to increase the violence of the passion”(ibid.) must be a sort of mental space with a definite perspective extended from the original “points of space and time in which we are existent”(T 427). Following this “common way of thinking that we are placed in a kind of middle station betwixt the past and future”(T 437), he assumes that the imagination takes an easy or difficult passage to the object in question from the original stand-points of space and time in which we are existent.

He marks the following three “remarkable” phenomena “the situation of the object” consists in: “why distance weakens the conception and passion, why distance in time has a greater effect than that in space, and why distance in past time has still a greater effect than that in future”(T 432). Through the illustration of these phenomena by the same method of reasoning he has established regarding the understanding, he tries to show that “from this effect of it [= the easy progress of ideas] on the imagination is derived its influence on the will and passions”(T 431). After this illustration, he prepares a separate section for the consideration of the reverse of these phenomena, which is intended as the confirmation of his preceding reasoning: “why a very great distance increases our esteem and admiration for an object, why such a distance in time increase it more than that in space, and a distance in past time more than that in future”(T 432). He explains these reversed phenomena again in terms of the transition of the imagination, which is depends on the same principles as those of the motions of bodies, e.g. “the gravitation of matter”(T 435), assuming that “the tendency of bodies, continually operating upon our senses, must produce, from custom, a like tendency in the fancy”(ibid.).

After having thus completed the illustration of “the situation of the object” in terms of the four different principles, he declares to leave “this subject of the will”(T 437), and to enter into the discussion of the last topic, viz. the origin of the direct passions. Before leaving the subject, he finds it “not improper” “to resume, in a few words, all that has been said concerning it, in order to set the whole more distinctly before the eyes of the reader”(T 437).

This “resume” is virtually a comment rather than a summary, or a conclusion drawn from all that he has examined in the preceding four sections. After repeating that the so-called “combat of passion and reason” is nothing but the struggle of the violent and of the calm passions, Hume notes simply: “the causes and effect of these violent and calm passions are pretty variable, and depend, in a great measure, on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual”(T 437). There is nothing in this conclusion of Hume’s that may cause our disagreement, as this is exactly what we feel in our everyday life, viz. that “human conduct is irregular and uncertain”(T 403), being so dependent “on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual”. At the same time, we may feel like complaining that Hume flatly betrayed our expectation, as this is not what Hume has promised us to show in his discussion of “the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions”(T 418). It is a quite opposite issue to his final comment that we have expected him to prove, viz. that “the union betwixt motives and

actions has the same constancy as that in any natural operations, so its influence on the understanding is also the same in determining us to infer the existence of one from that of another”(T 404).

At the beginning of his discussion, Hume sounded quite cheerful, as we remember, when he began his discussion with this observation: “there is not in philosophy a subject of more nice speculation than this, of the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions”(T 418). He seemed to have a good prospect for giving a philosophical speculation to the influence of passions on the will, with an obvious acknowledgement that this subject belongs properly to philosophy. It is because he was sure of attaining his desired object that he invited us to examine the question concerning the will “to the bottom”, and to “consider some of those circumstances and situations of the objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(T 419). And, as we have seen in the above discussion, he was successful more or less in accounting for the alleged “circumstances and situation of the object”(T 438) by his basic method of reasoning, viz. “by the borrowing of force from any attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination”(T 438).

But, now on leaving this “subject of the will”(T 437), Hume sounds rather pessimistic in admitting that “what makes this whole affair more uncertain is, that a calm passion may easily be changed into a violent one, either by a change of temper, or of the circumstances and situation of the object”(T 438). He even claims a limitation to philosophy, observing that “philosophy can only account for a few of the greater and more sensible events of this war [between the violent and the calm passions], and must leave all the smaller and more delicate revolutions, as dependent on principles too fine and minute for her comprehension”(T 438). It seems not entirely gratuitous to see a definite difference of his tone or manner in his final observation, and to draw this conclusion that he failed, as he felt, in attaining his desired object. But, what made him so discouraged as to make him mention a limit of philosophy?

Hume’s strategy for illustrating the influence of passions on the will and actions depends on the assumption that “the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will”(T 437). In other words, he has assumed that “the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions”(T 418) must provide an important key to this question: when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, why and how “we feel a consequent aversion or propensity, and are carried or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414). This strategy, however, turns out unfounded, not because “passions influence not the will in

proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper”(T 418). This cannot be the reason for his pessimistic conclusion. For, from the beginning, Hume has taken it into his consideration, with an intention to make it a part of his strategy, that the calm passion may become “the predominant inclination of the soul”(T 418), and “direct[s] the actions and conduct without that opposition and emotion which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion”(ibid.). Although it might seem flatly contradictory to his original position that the calm passion may “have made everything yield to it”(T 419), it was intended not as an exception, but as the confirmation, of the corroboration of the two operations of the understanding and of the passions: even “calm ones, when corroborated by reflection, and seconded by resolution, are able to control them [= the violent] in their most furious movements”(T 437/8).

As we have seen above, Hume was certainly not entirely mistaken in his strategy for explaining “the situation of the object” which renders a passion either calm or violent, by means of “the borrowing of force from any attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination”(T 438). He was nevertheless imprecise, however, in holding “**all** depends upon the situation of the object, and that a variation in this particular will able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other”(T 419) [my emphasis], as “a calm passion may easily changed into a violent one, either by a change of temper, or of the circumstances and situation of the object”(T 438). But is a **perfect** analogy between “natural causes and voluntary actions”(T 406) so important for his system? Has he found any adjustment of this part of his strategy possible? In order to answer this question, we need to examine in the next section what is given as the last discussion of the system of the passions in Book II, viz. the origin of the direct passions.

(8) The direct passions — hope and fear

But why is it the will, and not the direct passions, that Hume discusses first in the last chapter prepared for the direct passions? It may be our natural expectation that Hume would directly enter into the discussion of the direct passions, as it was the other half of the passions, viz. the indirect passions, that has occupied his mind all along in his preceding chapters. In spite of this expectation, however, the last chapter begins with the will, and moreover, most of this concluding chapter is exhausted with the discussion of this rather extraneous topic. The first eight in ten sections are spent for the subject of the will, and it is the only last two sections that the direct passions becomes the subject of his discussion. We may be puzzled to find this

chapter, and consequently Hume's treatment of passions as a whole, so obviously lack of proportion: the direct passions is the main subject only in the last two sections whereas other 24 sections are spent for the discussion of the indirect passions. It might then be concluded that Hume attaches more importance to the indirect passions, and that the direct passions is regarded to have only a small contribution to his system.

But, as we have seen in the preceding discussion, this conclusion is completely mistaken. In Hume's system, it is the direct passions that have "an original influence on the will"(T 415) or on "any act of volition"(ibid.). This is why those indirect passions which are "pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire"(T 367) cannot "immediately excite us to actions"(ibid.): without the direct passions, we could never have such an "impulse"(T 415) to actions. Only those indirect passions which are "followed by, or conjoined with"(T 367) the direct passions can "carry the mind something further"(ibid.) to actions. It is this property of the direct passions that connects Book II with his succeeding work on morals. The connection between Book I and Book II, on other hand, depends on this property of the indirect passions that "these passions are determined to have self [or the other self] for their object, not only by a natural, but also by an original property"(T 280).

Is it superficial to complain that, in spite of this important role of the direct passions in Hume's system, the last two sections is too brief and his argument too slack or too loose, in comparison to his treatment of the other half of passions, to be a concluding discussion for his theory of passions? Was he really satisfied with this short treatment of his last subject? Let us examine his discussion of the direct passions, and try to see if he really discussed all that he found necessary to show in order to complete his system of passions.

Hume begins his discussion by repeating his former definition of the direct passions: "the impression which arise from good and evil most naturally, and with the least preparation, are the direct passions of desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear, along with volition"(T 438). He then proceeds to argue that "the mind, by an original instinct, tends to unite itself with the good, and to avoid the evil, though they be conceived merely in idea, and be considered as to exist in any future period of time"(T 438). We may here remember how he held in his discussion of the will that "it is from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object"(T 414). In short, the direct passion is for him "a present concern"(T 261) or "emotion of an aversion or propensity"(T 414) which arises "by an original instinct"(T 438) not only from "an immediate impression of pain or pleasure" but also from "the

prospect of pain or pleasure from any object”(T 414).

Hume has claimed, as we remember, that “no object is presented to the senses, nor image formed in the fancy, but what is accompanied with some emotion or movement of spirits proportioned to it; and however custom may make us insensible of this sensation, and cause us to confound it with the object or idea, it will be easy, by careful and exact experiments, to separate and distinguish them”(T 373). And he assured us that even a part of extension or a unit of number “has a separate emotion attending it when conceived by the mind”(T 373). The discussion of the direct passions is thus begins with the illustration how these emotions which attend or accompany ideas are “intermingled” with each other, and “produce a third impression or affection by their union”(T 442), according to the transition of the imagination. He tries to illustrate how “a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures” arises as hope or fear from the “union” or “mixture” of these “separate emotions” attending the ideas of our future pains or pleasures.

Hume’s concern in his discussion of the will was directed to the problem how this “emotion of aversion or propensity” “rests not here”, but carry us “to avoid or embrace what will gives us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414). He tried to explain this “impulse of passion”(T 415) for actions in terms of “the circumstances or the situation of the object which render a passion calm or violent”(T 419): “the same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one”(ibid.). Now in this last part of his discussion in Book II, he is demonstrating how “the emotion of aversion or propensity towards any object” arises from “the prospect of pain or pleasure from the object” in terms of another “situation of the object”: “the very same event, which, by its certainty, would produce grief or joy, gives always rise to fear or hope, when only probable and uncertain”(T 439/440).

For the explanation of the problem why “this circumstance makes such a considerable difference”(T 440), he resorts to the principles he has “already advanced in the preceding book concerning the nature of probability”(ibid.), and holds that “the passions of fear and hope may arise when the chances are equal on both sides, and no superiority can be discovered in the one above the other”(T 443). “In this situation”, he contends, “the passions are rather the strongest, as the mind has then the least foundation to rest upon, and it is tossed with the greatest uncertainty”(ibid.). The origin of the violent passions is thus explained in terms of an easy transition of the imagination along related ideas and its consequent union of passions: “When good is certain or probable, it produces joy. When evil is in the same situation, there arises grief or sor-

row. When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to fear or hope, according to the degree of uncertainty on the one side or the other”(T 439).

It is plain that Hume marks these instances of “contrary passions”(T 441) as the “proofs”(T 444) or confirmation of “a close union”(T 424) between the imagination and passions. He explains the passions of hope and fear as “the different mixture of these opposite passions of grief and joy”(T 443) which arises “from their imperfect union and conjunction”(ibid.) in the following manner. “According as the probability inclines to good or evil, the passion of joy or sorrow predominates in the composition: because the nature of probability is to cause a superior number of views or chances on one side; or, which is the same thing, a superior number of returns of one passion; or, since the dispersed passions are collected into one, a superior degree of that passion”(T 441). And “when any object is presented that affords a variety of views to the one, and emotions to the other, though the fancy may change its views with great celerity, each stroke will not produce a clear and distinct note of passion, but the one passion will always be mixed and conjoined with the other”(T 414), since the imagination is, just like a wind-instrument of music, “extremely quick and agile”(ibid.) whereas “the passions are slow and restive”(ibid.), resembling a string-instrument. This is the way, according to him, how “the grief and joy being intermingled with each other, by means of the contrary views of the imagination, produce by their union, the passions of hope and fear”(T 441).

Hume establishes this “hypothesis concerning hope and fear”(T 443) through the examination of “the influence of the relations of ideas”(T 443) upon passions in the following three different cases in which the “contrariety of passions”(T 441) arises: “If the objects of the contrary passions be totally different, the passions are like two opposite liquors in different bottles, which have no influence on each other. If the objects be intimately connected, the passions are like an alkali and an acid, which, being mingled, destroy each other. If the relation be more imperfect, and consists in the contradictory views of the same object, the passions are like oil and vinegar, which, however mingles, never perfectly unite and incorporate”(T 443).

In the first case in which “the contrary passions arise from objects entirely different, they take place alternately, the want of relation in the ideas separating the impressions from each other, and preventing their opposition”(T 441), e.g. a man afflicted for the loss of a lawsuit, but joyful for the birth of a son.

In the second case in which “the same event is of a mixed nature, and contains something adverse and something prosperous in its different circumstances”(T 442), “both the passions,

mingling with each other by means of the relation, become mutually destructive, and leave the mind in perfect tranquility”(ibid.). This “perfect tranquility” is noted as a “plain proof”(T 444) of “the influence of the relations of ideas” upon passions, or of the “exact” correspondence between the imagination and passions, because the “exact encounter [of passions] depends upon the relations of those ideas from which they are derived, and is more or less perfect, according to the degrees of the relation”(T 442).

In the last case in which “the object is not a compound of good or evil, but is considered as probable or improbable in any degree”(T 442), “the contrary passions will both of them be present at once in the soul, and, instead of destroying and tempering each other, will subsist together, and produce a third impression or affection by their union”(ibid.), because “contrary passions are not capable of destroying each other, except when their contrary movements exactly encounter, and are opposite in their directions, as well as in the sensation they produce”(ibid.). In this third case of probability, although “the contrary chances are so far related that they determine concerning the existence or non-existence of the same object”(T 442), “this relation is far from being perfect, since some of the chances lie on the side of existence, and others on that of non-existence, which are objects altogether incompatible”(ibid.). While the imagination runs from one view to the other, “each view of the imagination produces its peculiar passion, which decays away by degrees, and is followed by a sensible vibration after the stroke”(T 442). This is the way how “hope and fear arise from the different mixture of these opposite passions of grief and joy, and from their imperfect union and conjunction”(T 443).

Hume is sure that this “hypothesis concerning hope and fear carries its own evidence along with it”(T 443), in which “the influence of the relations of ideas is plainly seen in this whole affair”(ibid.). This is “the examination of hope and fear in their most simple and natural situation”(T 447). Besides these “principal”(T 448) passions, there may be “all the variations”, e.g. terror, consternation, astonishment, anxiety, produced from “the mixture of different views and reflection”(ibid.), “a different situation of the object, or a different turn of thought”(T 447/8).

(9) The love of truth and curiosity

The direct passion is for Hume principally the name of “the inclinations of a human being”, both violent and calm, who is subject not only to the “bodily appetites”(T 439), e.g. lust, hunger, surprise, derived from his physiological constitution of his being, but also to the non-bodily appetites of the soul, e.g. curiosity, benevolence, originally “implanted in human nature”(T 453)

which are often established as his custom or habit. Having explained the origin of violent passions, viz. fear and hope, the last subject Hume discusses for the system of passions is the calm passions, or “desires and inclinations, which go no further than the imagination, and are rather the faint shadows and images of passions, than any real affections”(T 450), viz. the love of knowledge and curiosity. “When a passion has once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of the soul”(T 418/9), as we have seen above, though “commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation”(ibid.), “it directs the actions and conduct without that opposition and emotion which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion” (T 419).

This last brief section is thus allocated for the calm passion, viz. “curiosity, or the love of truth”, and for the inquiry into “its origin in human nature”(T 448). “The pleasure of study” consists, according to Hume, chiefly in “the action of the mind”(T 450, 451), and partly in “the discovery of that truth we examine”(T 451). But the second constituent, viz. “the importance of the truth”, makes only a subsidiary foundation of pleasure, as it is requisite only “to fix our attention”(T 451). For, “where we are careless and inattentive” on the one hand, “the same action of the understanding has no effect upon us, nor is able to convey any of that satisfaction which arises from it when we are in another disposition”(T 451). But “where the mind pursues any end with passion, though that passion be not derived originally from the end, but merely from the action and pursuit, yet by the natural course of the affections”(T 451), on the other hand, “we acquire a concern for the end itself, and are uneasy under any disappointment we meet with the pursuit of it”(ibid.). This “concern for the end itself” “proceeds from the relation and parallel direction of the passions above mentioned”(T 451), according to him.

In explaining how this concern gives rise to our satisfaction, Hume marks a resemblance between philosophy and hunting or gaming, and points out that in both cases the pleasure consists in “the actions of the mind and body; the motion, the attention, the difficulty, and the uncertainty”(T 451). He invites us to see in the comparison this common feature that “the utility or importance itself causes no passion, but is only requisite to support the imagination”(T 452). “The end of action may in itself be despised, yet, in the heat of the action, we acquire such an attention to this end, that we are very uneasy under any disappointments”(T 452) in getting it. In short, “the end of the action” is necessary only as a target of our attention, so that whether it is worth our attention or not is not so important. For, the pleasure arises neither from the interest alone nor from the game or from philosophy itself, but “from both causes

united, though separately they have no effect”(T 452), which is just like in “certain chemical preparations, where the mixture of two clear and transparent liquids produces a third, which is opaque and coloured”(ibid.). It is the interest, he concludes, which we have in any game or in philosophy that engages our attention in any action, whereas “it is from that concern our satisfaction arises”(T 452). “The same theory that accounts for the love of truth in mathematics and algebra, may be extended to morals, politics, natural philosophy, and other studies, where we consider not the abstract relations of ideas, but their real connections and existence”(T 452/3), according to him.

Having thus shown the whereabouts of the problem concerning the love of knowledge by the analogy with hunting or gaming, Hume is now entering into the main discussion, as we may expect, and to illustrate the system by which pleasure or satisfaction is derived from “the action of the mind”. In other words, although “the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable”(T 439), it is quite unlikely, we may suppose, that Hume finds it sufficient to settle his present problem with the suggestion that we are mentally structured to feel pleasure whenever we are in the pursuit of something, just as we are naturally structured to feel bodily pleasure when we have physical exercises.

In this respect, Hume did not betray our expectation. For, he seems ready to develop this issue into another discussion of curiosity, viz. “an insatiable desire of knowing the actions and circumstances of their neighbours, though their interest be no way concerned in them, and they must entirely depend on others for their information”(T 453). In spite of its similarity to “the love of knowledge”, curiosity is “a passion derived from a quite different nature”(T 453), according to him, and is distinct from the love of truth in that it does not always require such a definite “end to our action”(T 452) nor “attention to the end”, as “it is not every matter of fact of which we have a curiosity to be informed; neither are they such only as we have an interest to know”(T 453). “It is sufficient”, therefore, “if the idea strikes on us with such force, and concerns us so nearly, as to give an uneasiness in its stability and inconstancy”(T 453), since curiosity is founded upon doubt rather than a desire of knowing. “As it is the nature of doubt to cause a variation in the thought, and to transport us suddenly from one idea to another”(T 453), curiosity consists principally in a “pain”(ibid.) or in “uneasiness”, rather than in pleasure or satisfaction.

Thus far is the discussion we find concerning the subject of curiosity, and of passions.

Hume has here completed his discussion of passions rather abruptly with no such a concluding remark or general comment about this affective aspect of the mind as we find at the end of his discussion of ideas in Book I. But, after having gone through all the complexities and complications of the human mind, how could Hume leave his inquiry without giving a reference to his original intention, or to the “corroboration” of the two aspects of the mind, viz. the understanding and the passions, which was mentioned earlier at the end of his previous book? We know that the *Treatise* was originally written with a definite “design”, which is explicitly declared in the author’s own Advertisement: “The subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves”(T xi). What is intended in the system of passions as the second book of the *Treatise* must be, as we remember, a perfect “cement” of “natural and moral evidence”(T 406). We need to ask Hume this important question: Has he succeeded in establishing the system of passions in such a way as he originally intended?

We have seen that Hume’s main concern in Book II lies in explaining the nature and origin of passions by the same method of reasoning he has established regarding the understanding. It is because, as we remember, the system of passions is intended as “a convincing proof” of the consistency of the system of the understanding. We have noticed how often Hume calls our attention to “a great analogy”(T 290) betwixt the two systems of the mind. When he established “the true system”(T 286) from which pride or humility is derived, for instance, he invited us to “compare it to that by which I [= he] have already explained the belief attending the judgments which we form from causation”(T 289), and insisted on “a great analogy betwixt that hypothesis, and our present one of an impression and idea, that transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation”(T 290), and claimed that this “analogy must be allowed to be no despicable proof of both hypothesis”(ibid.). Later in his discussion of sympathy, he again asks us to compare the two systems of the mind, and to see “that sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding”(T 320), asserting: “What is principally remarkable in this whole affair, is the strong confirmation these phenomena give to the foregoing system concerning the understanding, and consequently to the present one concerning the passions, since these are analogous to each other”(T 319). Also in his discussion of love and hatred, after the emphasis on the importance of the principle that “no ideas can affect each other, either by comparison, ... unless they be united together by some relation which may cause an easy transition of the ideas”(T 380), he observed that “this principle is very remarkable, because it is analogous to what we have observed both concerning the under-

standing and the passions”(ibid.).

In his discussion of the direct passions, though there is no such explicit references to the analogy between the two systems of the mind, we find instead a suggestion of much stronger connection between the two aspects of the mind than a mere correspondence: “natural and moral evidence cement together, and form only one chain of argument”(T 406). For, his theory of the will or actions depends on the assumption that “there is a general course of nature in human actions, as well as in the operations of the sun and the climate”(T 402). The origin of the violent passions such as hope and fear is explained by what he has “already advanced in the preceding book concerning the nature of probability”(T 439). He assumes that he can illustrate the source of the calm passions, viz. curiosity or the love of truth, in terms of “the influence of belief ... to enliven and influx any idea in the imagination”(T 453) by observing that “by the vivacity of the idea we interest the fancy, and produce, though in a lesser degree, the same pleasure which arises from a moderate passion”(ibid.).

If one of his main aims in establishing the system of passions lies in proving the consistency of the system of the understanding as we have supposed so far, and if Hume is really successful in establishing a satisfactory system, isn't it rather unusual of him to leave his discussion of passions without giving a word of “an entire victory”(T 412) about this great achievement? He could at least have tried to make us remember that the consistency of both hypotheses is now proved through the demonstration of the analogy with the both systems of the understanding and of the passions. Is it too fanciful to suggest that he had some reason for leaving the discussion of passions incomplete without giving a concluding remark concerning the parallelism between the two systems of the mind? But if this suggestion is adequate, what could be the reason of his disappointment which caused his final retreat?

In order to answer this question, it is important to recall that the entire theory of passions he has so far developed in his preceding discussion is intended to converge on the “connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions”(T 406). For, it is owing to this “connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions” that “the mind feels no difference betwixt them in passing from one link to another; nor is less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the present impressions of the memory and senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a *physical necessity*”(T 406). Hume's system of passions has been initially set in such a way as to make the corroboration of the two aspects of the mind in full bloom in the circumstance in which “a present concern for our past or future pains or

pleasures”(T 261) arises. When he finished the discussion of the indirect passions, all he needs to add is to prove how “the union betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy as that in any natural operations, so its influence on the understanding is also the same in determining us to infer the existence of one from that of another”(T 404). He was successful indeed in showing “the influence of the imagination upon the passions”(T 425) in terms of “the situation of object” in which “wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations”(T 424). But he was nevertheless unsuccessful in pursuing his original intention, not because his hypothesis is inconsistent nor because his strategy mislaid, but because his system is founded upon this stronger condition for which his evidence is not sufficient: “the same experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volitions, and actions, or figure and motion”(T 406/7).

He has proved that “a calm passion may easily be changed into a violent one ... by a change of the circumstances and situation of the object, as by the borrowing of the force from any attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination”(T 438). But if “the causes and effects of these violent and calm passions are pretty variable, and depends, in a great measure, on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual”(T 437), as he admits, it is evident that he cannot hold such a stronger issue as is required for his system as this: “in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxims, as when we reason concerning external objects”(T 403). Here comes his concession and his assertion of the limit of philosophy: “Philosophy can only account for a few of the greater and more sensible events of this war [between passion and reason]; but must leave all the smaller and more delicate revolutions, as dependent on principles too fine and minute for her comprehension”(T 438).

Chapter IX: Personal Identity regarding Passions

(1) Two questions for the last discussion

The two questions are left to be discussed in this last chapter of Book II as a sort of conclusion concerning Hume’s treatment of passions. The first is the problem whether or not personal identity regarding passions is discussed at all in the *Treatise* as the counterpart aspect of personal identity regarding our thought or imagination which he had discussed at the end of Book

I: if it is, we need to specify what is suggested as the theory of the former aspect of our identity. The second question for the last discussion is this long disputed puzzle: What could be the cause of his dissatisfaction expressed in the Appendix?

Concerning the first problem, it seems to be an established opinion among critics that the *Treatise* contains no discussion of personal identity regarding passions. This aspect of our identity is mentioned by the author twice in Book I not as the subject intended for his discussion, they seem to think, but as a sort of remainder or notice for readers that what is discussed in the *Treatise* is not a complete theory of personal identity, viz. only such an aspect as is analogous with “that identity, which we attribute to plants and animals”(T 253).

When Hume claims so emphatically that “it is evident the same method of reasoning must be continued which has so successfully explained the identity of plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature”(T 259), his main intention in proceeding to “explain the nature of personal identity” lies in showing, as it may seem, that the same method of reasoning is adequate even for the illustration of “so great a question in philosophy”, rather than in propounding a complete theory of our personal identity. Hume’s treatment of this subject in Book I is intended therefore mainly for the demonstration of the solidity of his hypothesis he has just established concerning the identity of plants and animals.

But, is it really conceivable, we may naturally wonder, that Hume found such a negative aspect of the mind sufficient for his purpose as is “only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies”(T 259)? If the *Treatise* is intended to be a general account of the human mind, it is indeed difficult to imagine that he was satisfied only with the illustration of a “fictitious” aspect of our identity without attempting to make it complete by the involvement of the other aspect of the mind relevant to passions.

One might still insist that, however difficult may it seem, no one can deny this definite fact: personal identity regarding passions is mentioned twice in Book I, and that’s all. But that there is no direct mentioning of this aspect of our identity in Hume’s later work does not necessarily exclude this possibility, it seems to me, that it is discussed as the central subject in his discussion of passions in Book II, or rather, broadly speaking, that the entire theory Hume has established as the system of passions itself is planned as his treatment of our identity relevant to passions. How is it possible, we may rather ask, to establish a complete theory of passions

without involving this aspect of our identity, which is relevant to the crucial question, why we are concerned with our past or future interest or actions, which is the problem relevant to our identity regarding passions rather than to our identity regarding the imagination? The problem how “the concern we take in ourselves”(T 253) in the past or in the future must “find its fullest expression in a certain kind of motivation for action”(Mc 553) as a subject which belongs not to “the province of the imagination, but of the passions”(ibid.), as McIntyre points out.

In other words, there seems a good ground to suppose that, when Hume claims at the end of Book I that “our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261), he is prepared to explain our identity regarding passions as one of the main subjects of his theory of passions in Book II in terms of “a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”. Hume’s strategy for his work of personal identity is, as we may guess, to establish first the “fictitious” aspect relevant to the imagination as the basis of the theory which is common to “all compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature”(T 259), and then to proceed to explain by the same method of reasoning how the other aspect peculiar to the human mind joins to “corroborate” with the first, only when “the true idea of the human mind”(T 261) emerges. The entire discussion in Book II is originally planned to converge finally to the illustration of personal identity regarding passions, or to the depiction of the role of the passions in the creation of a self which is unified through time. And it is plain that he has actually entered into the discussion of the problem how the Humean self can be affected by its past and concerned with its future when he asserted in the last chapter concerning the direct passions that, “when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414). But if it is so, we may be tempted to ask again, why not a word is mentioned about the personal identity regarding passions in any part of his discussion of passions? This is the puzzle I try to solve in this concluding part of my discussion.

What is to be treated as the last subject relevant to Hume’s theory of passions is the question concerning the Appendix in which he declares the recantation of the theory he has propounded so far with considerable pride and enthusiasm in his preceding discussion. This question is the object of critics’ infallible concern and puzzle, for which several promising answers have been suggested, and all possible interpretations have been exhausted. In this chapter, I

am not suggesting a new solution of this problem, but only try to show it in a new perspective through the re-examination of the circumstance which led him confess that he “neither know how to correct his former opinions, nor how to render them consistent”(T 633).

Concerning Hume’s dissatisfaction expressed in the Appendix, there seems an important fact to which we need to pay more attention: it is most likely that the Appendix was written after the completion of Book II. We have a good ground to suppose, it seems to me, that the Appendix published together with Book I and Book II has a much stronger or more natural connection, or though not a systematic but a mental continuation at least, with the conclusion of the latter work than with that of the first.

It is no doubt concerning the issue propounded in Book I that he finds himself “involved in such a labyrinth I [= he] neither know how to correct my [= his] former opinions, nor how to render them consistent”(T 633). It nevertheless is difficult to suppose, however, that he has realised the weakness of his reasoning immediately after the completion of his system in Book I. For, it is inconceivable that he tried to establish a new system of passions in his succeeding work by means of the very method of reasoning which he knew defective. In our preceding chapters we have seen how persistently insistent Hume is in Book II on the exact correspondence between the two hypotheses of the understanding and of the passions. But if he found that the system of ideas he has established in Book I has such a fatal defect as he confesses, how could he be so proud of the analogy between the two systems he has established in Book I and he is establishing in Book II? “The true system”(T 286) of the production of the indirect passions, as we remember, depends on “a great analogy betwixt that hypothesis [by which he has already explained the belief attending the judgments we form from causation], and our present one of an impression and idea, that transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation”(T 290). This analogy is important for Hume, just because it is “no despicable proof of both hypotheses”(T 290). To put it the other way round, his theory of ideas is consistent in so far as it is applicable to the other aspect of the human mind. It is therefore only when his basic strategy of holding the analogy the two hypotheses turns out inadequate to the explanation of the nature of passions that he found something wrong with his hypothesis he has established in Book I.

It seems important to mark that, besides the difficulty in supposing that Book II was written after the realisation of the defect confessed in the Appendix, there is a more natural [mental at least] continuation between the last chapter of Book II and the Appendix. Hume begins his

discussion of passions in Book II with a considerable pride and confidence in the solidity of his system he has just established in his preceding book. No trace of his uneasiness nor doubt about the consistency of his method of reasoning he had just established as the system of ideas is here discernible. Rather, he apparently has a great enthusiasm for confirming this new-born hypothesis through the application of it to the other aspect of the mind. The powerful tone and manner with which he proceeds his argument concerning the indirect passions in the first half of Book II makes such an interesting contrast with the coolness or indifference with which he leaves the discussion of the direct passions at the end of the same work. Although the last chapter "Of the will and direct passions" begins with his usual confident way, and contains several definite assertions regarding "a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions"(T 406), it ends in such a dwindling manner as to make us complain how he could leave the subject of passions without showing the unity between the two separate discussions of the indirect and the direct passions. This continuity between the last chapter and the Appendix may be taken to suggest that there is some connection between the discussion delivered in the last chapter of the direct passions and the cause of his pessimism expressed in the Appendix.

When Hume confesses in the Appendix that he found something inconsistent in "the section concerning personal identity"(T 633), it may be our natural reaction to seek the cause of his dissatisfaction in this specified section of Book I in which he has confined the subject of his investigation to the "fictitious" aspect of our identity analogous to the identity of plants and animals. And what is lacking in this natural reaction is, it seems to me, the consideration of the fact that, if the Appendix was written after Book II, what made him realise as the flaw of his preceding discussion must lie somewhere in the course of his discussion of passions, or more precisely, in his discussion of the direct passions.

It is evident that, at the end of Book I, Hume had a good prospect of his success in illustrating "the true idea of the human mind" in terms of the corroboration of the both aspects of our identity relevant to the imagination and relevant to the passions, and in showing how the "fictitious" aspect of the mind can reflect something real when it is combined with the other aspect which is emerges as "a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures". And his strategy for illustrating the latter aspect is, as we have seen, to explain by his basic method of reasoning, viz. in terms of the association of ideas and the association of impressions, the circumstance in which, when "the emotion of aversion or propensity" arises from "the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object", we are "carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this

uneasiness or satisfaction”(T 414).

Every argument concerning passions is planned and delivered in such a way as to contribute to the establishment of this issue: that “the union betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy as that in any natural operations, so its influence on the understanding is also the same in determining us to infer the existence of one from that of another”(T 404). It is this ultimate issue that Hume intends to establish as the system of passions, because “the identification with a self in the future finds its fullest expression in a certain kind of motivation for actions”(Mc 553) as McIntyre puts it. And he was definitely sure, as we have noted, of his success in proving “a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions”(T 406) through the demonstration how “the mind feels no difference betwixt them in passing from one link to another; nor less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the present impressions of the memory and senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a physical necessity”(ibid.). In order to solve those questions concerning the will and actions, he marks that “when we would govern a man, and push him to any action, it will be commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions”(T 419), and tries to illustrate “the circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(T 419) in terms of “the effects of custom”(T 422), “the influence of the imagination on passions”(T 424), or “the contiguity and distance in space and time”(T 427).

This is why he is so exclusively devoted to the demonstration that “a calm passion may easily be changed into a violent one ... by the borrowing of force from any attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination”(T 438). He was successful more or less in explaining “the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions”(T 418) by means of those basic principles. He nevertheless had a serious reason, however, for doubting if he has achieved “an entire victory”(T 412) in proving “that all actions of the will have particular causes”(ibid.): he was obliged to admit that “the causes and effects of these violent and calm passions are pretty variable, and depends, in a great measure, on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual”(T 437). In short, the evidences available for proving “the influence of the imagination on passions” turns out insufficient for his purpose. For, what is required as the final proof of the consistency of his system is this stronger or stricter analogy between the “natural and moral evidence”(T 406): that “there is no known circumstance that enters into the connection and production of the actions of matter that is not to be found in all the operations of the mind”(T 404).

In spite of his original assumption that the problems concerning the will and actions is explained in terms of “the influence of the imagination on passions” or rather as the “struggle of passion and of reason, as it is called”(T 438), he is obliged to conclude this central part of his discussion with this pessimistic observation: “Philosophy can only account for a few of the greater and more sensible events of this war; but must leave all the smaller and more delicate revolutions, as dependent on principles too fine and minutes for her comprehension”(ibid.). We may here see an interesting contrast between this pessimistic conclusion and the confident assertions we have found at the beginning of the same discussion, e.g. “in judging of the actions of men we **must** proceed upon the same maxims, as when we reason concerning external objects”(T 403). Is it too fanciful to seek here a key to our puzzle, why does Hume look so half-hearted and perfunctory in the succeeding two final sections at the end of Book II? There seems to be a good ground to suggest that, when he failed in explaining his problems concerning the will and actions on the analogy with two systems of the mind relevant to the imagination and passions, Hume realised the inadequacy of his basic strategy for establishing the integrated system of the mind.

In other words, if this analogy is intended as the “proof of both hypotheses”(T 290) he has established regarding the two aspects of the mind, the collapse of the analogy would naturally lead him to suspect if something was wrong with his basic hypothesis with which the system of passion is assimilated. If he cannot explain the other aspect of the mind by the same basic principles he has employed for the illustration of the operation of the understanding, it may follow that he was mistaken in his initial supposition that the true idea of the human mind is explained in terms of “certain properties of human nature, which ... have a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions”(T 283). In the rest of this chapter, I shall try to show that one of the clues to Hume’s dissatisfaction expressed in the Appendix lies in the connection between the confession in the Appendix and the failure in holding the analogy between the two systems of the mind in the latter half of the discussion of the direct passions, which was originally planned for the illustration of “the concern we take in ourselves”(T 253) in the past and in the future.

(2) McIntyre on Hume’s theory of personal identity regarding passions

In her excellent article titled “Personal Identity and the Passions”(Mc 545), McIntyre plausibly argues “that Hume’s distinction between personal identity as it regards the passions

should be taken seriously”(Mc 556). She successfully illustrates in its historical background what made Hume distinguish this aspect of our identity from the other aspect relevant to the imagination, and forces on “concern with our past and future actions”(Mc 549) as the central subject of his discussion of the former aspect. I entirely agree with this basic position of McIntyre’s, except in her two assertions about Hume’s treatment of “two separate questions about the past and the future regarding self-concern”(Mc 550). The aim of this section is to give a slightly different interpretation from her’s of the former aspect of our identity, and to try to support her claim that “Hume recognized questions about personal identity not addressed in Book I, and that Book I makes an important contribution to our understanding of Hume’s account of the self and its identity”(Mc 556). It is mainly in the following two respects that McIntyre’s interpretation differs from what I have tried to show in the foregoing chapters.

First, although I am in an entire agreement with McIntyre in so far as she holds that Book II “details how the Humean self can be affected by its past and concerned with its future”(Mc 557), there seems a difficulty in agreeing with her when she asserts that “the Humean model of mind faces two **separate** questions about the past and the future regarding self-concern”(Mc 550), and thinks that the first question is treated in his discussion of the indirect passions whereas the latter in his discussion of the direct passions. There seems a difficulty in her suggestion that that “Hume’s account of the indirect passions provides the framework for explaining concern with the past”(Mc 551) whereas it is “Hume’s explanations of the will and the direct passions [that] frequently involve ideas or beliefs about ourselves in the future”(Mc 552). For, in his treatment of the indirect passions, there seems hardly any such discussion of “our concern with the past”(Mc 557) as McIntyre sees. Hume’s intention in the first half of his discussion of passions lies somewhere else, and these two aspects of our self-concern are discussed together in the second half of his discussion in terms of “a present concern in our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261), as we have seen in the foregoing sections.

Besides, there seems an inconsistency between the following two assertions. On the one hand, she asserts that our concern in the future is discussed mainly in his discussion of the direct passions, “such as hope and fear, [which] most commonly refer to the future”(Mc 552), claiming that “Hume’s explanations of the will and the direct passions frequently involve ideas or beliefs about ourselves in the future” (ibid.). And she holds on the other that it is “the operation of sympathy that explains the influence of our ideas of the future on our present actions”(Mc 555). But, if a concern in our future is the subject of his discussion of sympathy as

her latter assertion suggests, it must follow that our concern in our future is discussed as the subject relevant to the indirect passions, because sympathy is treated by Hume as the subject belonging to the indirect passions. There seems even a room for doubting if the two aspects of self-concern in the past and in the future are discussed separately in the two different discussions of the indirect and the direct respectively.

The second point of my disagreement lies in McIntyre's suggestion that "it is the operation of sympathy that explains the influence of our ideas of the future on our present actions"(Mc 555). She cultivates a new possibility for explaining "our concern with ourselves in the future" in terms of "the operation of sympathy" by suggesting that "the identification of my interest with the interest of a future person — the identification of myself with that person — is the result of this extended operation of sympathy"(Mc 556). She is quite well-founded in maintaining that "when I think of myself in the future I think of the actions that follow from my present intentions, motives and character: I think of the actions, and the circumstances in which they take place"(Mc 556). "The possible or probable future person facilitates the operation of sympathy"(Mc 556), as "this causal connection between something central to my present self — that is, my intentions, motives and character — and the actions and circumstances of a future person facilitates the operation of sympathy"(ibid.).

In spite of the importance of her suggestion, there seems a difficulty in taking Hume's notion of sympathy as "the principle underlying concern with the future"(Mc 557), or in extending it in such a way as to cover "our concern in the future". For, Humean sympathy as the principle of communication of sentiments and opinions of others is, as we have seen in our preceding discussion, basically a form of inference entirely dependent on the relation between the affections and their external signs and behaviour. The main intention in mentioning sympathy for Hume is to show how a new passion arises from a double association of impressions and ideas. There is no wonder, therefore, that the identification of oneself with others, or even with "a future person"(Mc 556) is quite irrelevant. This is why that his discussion of sympathy does not show any sign of his commitment with such a so-called problem of other mind as "why we identify a future interest as our own, even though there is no strict identity of the self through time"(Mc 556), or with any such epistemological issues as she envisages, e.g. that "self-concern and concern with others differ in degree, rather than in kind"(ibid.).

The main issue propounded in McIntyre's article depends on two distinctions concerning Hume's treatment of personal identity: the distinction between the two aspects of personal

identity, and the distinction of “two separates questions about the past and the future regarding self-concern”(Mc 550). Regarding the first distinction, I share the same view with McIntyre. It is about the second distinction that I mainly disagree with her.

There is certainly no room for asking if Hume has recognised the first distinction, as it was introduced by him with much emphasis at the beginning of his discussion as the basic distinction between “the personal identity as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves”(T 253). It is this distinction that allows him to confine his treatment of personal identity in Book I to the limited aspect of our identity that is common to the identity of plants and animals: “the first is our present subject; and to explain it perfectly we must take the matter pretty deep, and account for that identity, which we attribute to plants and animals”(T 253).

To put it the other way round, this distinction between the two aspects of our identity is required, just because they needs to be discussed separately: the discussion of the first aspect relevant to the imagination is intended as the basis of his theory of personal identity, being analogous with the identity of plants and animals, whereas the peculiarity of our identity distinct from the identity of plants and animals depends on the second aspect relevant to passions. If so, we may naturally expect that a separate discussion is prepared for the latter aspect in Book II. McIntyre has a good reason to suppose at least that “Hume recognized questions about personal identity not addressed in Book 1”(Mc 556).

In spite of the reasonableness of this supposition, it is controversial among critics whether the *Treatise* actually contains the discussion of the second aspect of our identity, and if it does, what is actually proposed by Hume as the theory of personal identity regarding passions. Most critics give negative answers to this question on the ground that there is no explicit mentioning of this aspect of our identity in his discussion of passions. Against this general trend among philosophers, McIntyre argues that this aspect of our identity is treated in Hume’s discussion of passions in terms of “concern with our past and future actions”, and maintains that “Book 2 depicts the role of the passions in the creation of the self which is unified through time” (Mc 557). Although the question “why we attribute identity to the mind”(Mc 547) may be answered through the illustration of our identity regarding the imagination, there still remains this problem, according to her, “why we are concerned with our past or future actions” (Mc 547), which must be explained in order to give a complete illustration of our identity. For, after having rejected the simplicity and strict identity of the self through time, he has to answer

this question, “what makes past and future actions the actions of our person”(Mc 547), so as to answer “the criticisms voiced by Butler, Hutchison, and Reid”(Mc 557) and to complete Hume’s account of personal identity.

I entirely agree with McIntyre in emphasising the importance of the distinction between two aspects of our identity as the basis of his theory of personal identity. She is quite justified in calling our attention to Hume’s closing paragraph of the chapter on personal identity in which he states that the topics treated there “will either illustrate and confirm some preceding part of this discourse, or prepare the way for our following opinions”(T 263). For, in this statement he announces not only the connection of the subject, viz. personal identity, of the last section of Book I and that of the opening discussion of Book II, but also the continuation of the same method of reasoning between these two places. We may remember how he leaves the subject of personal identity in Book I with this sentence which immediately follows the above quotation: “It is now time to **return** to a more closer examination of our subject, and to proceed in the anatomy of human mind, having fully examined the nature of our judgment and understanding”(T 263). We may have a good reason to suppose here that, after having been confined to the aspect of our identity which is analogous with the identity of plants and animals, he is now ready to enter into the examination of the other aspect of the same subject, which is relevant to the other operation of the mind, viz. passions.

McIntyre marks these two different roles Hume assigns to each theory of personal identity given in Book I and in Book II. On the one hand, “Book 1 illustrates the operation of the imagination in generating the belief in a self that is identical through time”(Mc 547), and on the other, Book 2 “details how the Humean self be affected by its past and concerned with its future”(Mc 557), or illustrates “the role of passions in the creation of a self which is unified through time”(Mc 557). She sees “a clear contrast” between these two aspects of personal identity in that “when we turn our attention backwards, the operation of the imagination explains our propension to attribute identity to ourselves”(Mc 553), whereas “the identification with a self in the future finds its fullest expression in a certain kind of motivation for action” (ibid.), the latter of which “is not the province of the imagination, but of the passions”(ibid.).

There is a good reason for supporting McIntyre’s contention that “Book 2 of the *Treatise*, in its account of the passions, provides the resources for supplementing our understanding of Hume’s discussion of personal identity”(Mc 545), because, as she suggests, an account of personal identity must justify not only “the belief in a self that is identical through time”(Mc 547)

but also “concern with our past and future actions”(Mc 549). “It must explain the effect of the past on our present feelings, and thereby provide a foundation for considering the future in choosing our present actions”(Mc 549), as she plausibly maintains. And one of the main reasons for Hume to distinguish two aspects of the mind from one another must lie in that the dynamic system of the mind as he illustrates as “the true idea of the human mind”(T 261) is dependent on their “corroboration”: they need to be supplemented or assisted with each other, just because they have different roles in producing the unified idea of the self through time, as we have seen in our preceding discussion.

We need to remember, however, that Hume had another reason for claiming this distinction between the two aspect of our identity. Personal identity regarding passions, if it is discussed at all, is intended not only as “the resources for supplementing our understanding of Hume’s discussion of personal identity”(Mc 545), as McIntyre points out, but also as the confirmation of the theory he has established regarding the understanding in Book I. To put it the other way round, it is a mistake to suppose that his strict limitation of his discussion to the aspect of our identity analogous to plants and animals in Book I is derived from the necessity of employing different method of reasoning for the illustration of the other aspect of our identity.

Rather, Hume’s exclusive concern in the *Treatise* lies, as we have insisted, in demonstrating the analogy between the two systems of the mind of the understanding and passions through the demonstration of both operations by the same principles or “properties of human nature”(T 283). And what is entailed by the application of the same method of reasoning to both operations of the mind is the following difference derived from the peculiar properties of ideas and impressions: the former is just like “the extension and solidity of matter”(T 366) so that they are explained in terms of the easy transition of the imagination along related ideas, whereas the latter is like “colours, tastes, smells, and other sensible qualities”(ibid.) so that they are explained in terms of the transition or “transfusion” of impressions “forwarded”(T 380) in general by the relation of ideas.

But if it is Hume’s basic strategy in the *Treatise* to explain both operations of the mind by the same method of reasoning, why was it necessary for him to divide the two aspects of our identity? The answer of this question may be found in that the *Treatise* is originally contrived to have this double-fold structure: the hypothesis relevant to the understanding in Book I provides the basis of his system whereas it is by the hypothesis relevant to passions that the system is confirmed. His system is proved to be consistent, in Hume’s view, if and only if one and

the same method of reasoning is applicable to the illustration of the nature and peculiarity of both operations of the mind, because the “analogy must be allowed to be no despicable proof of both hypotheses”(T 290).

Besides this distinction between the two aspects of our identity, what is marked by McIntyre is Hume’s different treatment of the “separate questions about the past and the future regarding self-concern”(Mc 550). She here sees another contrast between Hume’s treatments of self-concern in the past and self-concern in the future which are delivered respectively in his discussion of the indirect and the direct passions: “Hume’s account of the indirect passions provides the framework for explaining concern with the past”(Mc 551), whereas “Hume’s explanations of the will and the direct passions frequently involve ideas or belief about ourselves in the future”(T 552).

McIntyre is quite plausible in suggesting that, “although Book 1’s discussion of personal identity is nearly silent on the relationship of the self to the future, Book 2, in accounting for the passions and the will cannot be”(Mc 552), as “many of our passions, such as hope and fear, most commonly refer to the future, and it is our conception of the future that affects the will”(Mc 552). There is nothing to disagree with her in so far as she claims that “when we turn our attention backwards, the operation of the imagination explains our propension to attribute identity to ourselves”(Mc 553). For, as she suggests, Personal identity regarding the imagination illustrated in Book I depends on the operation of “the imagination [which] associates a series of past perceptions, and mistakes the series for an invariable one, resulting in the ascription of identity to the self”(Mc 552). She then proceeds to hold that a “concomitant analysis of concern with the past”(Mc 552) is contained in Hume’s analysis of pride and humility, as his discussion of the indirect passions is “a natural outgrowth of Book 1’s account of personal identity”(Mc 552). It is here I disagree with her, as she argues that Hume’s description of the origin of these passions of pride and humility “explains why my past actions continue to concern me, even though they are not the actions of one substance, and even though the self is not strictly identical through time”(Mc 551). The point of disagreement lies in that, although the problem how my present self is related to my past occurrence or actions is discussed as the central problem of Hume’s theory of personal identity, it is not included in his discussion of the indirect passions. It is only in his discussion of the direct passions that a present concern in the past and in the future enters into his discussion, as Hume regards it the subject relevant to the will and actions.

McIntyre cultivates an important aspect of Hume's treatment of personal identity through her illustration that "Hume recognized questions about personal identity not addressed in Book 1, and that Book 2 makes an important contribution to our understanding of Hume's account of the self and its identity"(Mc 556/7). When Hume claims that the task of personal identity regarding passions lies in "giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures"(T 261), he must have had a serious intention, as she reasons, of answering the criticisms voiced by Butler, Hutcheson, and Reid, who all agreed that "an account of personal identity must justify concern with our past and future actions — that it must explain the effect of the past on our present feeling, and thereby provide a foundation for considering the future in choosing our present actions"(Mc 549). In the next section, let us try to confirm McIntyre's suggestion, by examining how Book 2 depicts "the role of the passions in the creation of a self which is unified through time"(Mc 557), or if it really "details how the Humean self can be affected by its past and concerned with its future"(ibid.).