

〈論文〉

Personal Identity and Passions in the *Treatise*:  
The Connection between Book I and II (Part 3)

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#### **(5) *Sympathy* as the cause of the indirect passions**

In explaining the origin of our esteem for the rich and powerful, Hume resorts to the same strategy he has established regarding pride and humility, and tries to specify the two kinds of source from which the ingredients of the passion, viz. the pleasurable sensation and the idea of the other self, are derived. Nothing is more natural for him, therefore, than to begin his discussion of esteem with the inquiry into the source from which the ingredient of "the satisfaction we take in the riches of others, and the esteem we have for the possessors"(T 357) is supposed to be derived. Because, as we have seen in the last section, esteem and contempt are considered by him as "species of love and hatred"(T 357), regarding which his main business was to answer the question "wherein consists the pleasure or uneasiness of many objects which we find by experience to produce these passions"(T 351).

The most promising candidates for the source, as Hume suggests, may be "the objects they possess; such as houses, gardens, equipages, which, being agreeable in themselves, necessarily produce a sentiment of pleasure in every one that either considers or surveys them"(T 357/8). The great influence of the reflection of these agreeable objects is insisted on when he observes that "we seldom reflect on what is beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, with-

out an emotion of pleasure or uneasiness”(T 358). It is this observation that is expanded in the next section into the basic principle that “almost every kind of ideas is attended with some emotion, even the ideas of number and extension, much more those of such objects as are esteemed of consequence in life, and fix our attention”(T 393). The rest of his discussion of passions is founded upon this new principle that “every object is attended with some emotion proportioned to it”(T 374), “however custom may make us insensible of this sensation, and cause us to confound it with the object or idea, it will be easy, by careful and exact experiments, to separate and distinguish them”(T 373).

We may here recall what was contended in his foregoing discussion regarding the origin of pride: “anything that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object”(T 288). Because, when I am proud of my beautiful house, the beautiful object may supply the ingredient of the agreeable sensation pride is composed with, just because “no object is presented to the sense, nor image formed in the fancy, but what is accompanied with some emotion or movements of spirits proportioned to it”(T 373). We might here expect that by the same reasoning the pleasurable sensation as the ingredient of our esteem is claimed to be the derivative of the “emotion” which accompanies the idea of those agreeable objects. This expectation, however, turns out unfounded in the following way.

In order to illustrate the peculiarity of our present circumstance, Hume mentions the case of “an avaricious man [who] is respected for his money”(T 360). We can see in this case, he suggests, that our respect arises not from the idea of any beautiful or agreeable object which his money afford the enjoyment of, but rather from the satisfaction which the power affords the person who is possessed of it, since “there scarce is a probability or even possibility of his employing of it in the acquisition of the pleasure and conveniences of life”(T 360). If “riches and power alone, even though unemployed, naturally cause esteem and respect”(T 359), it may follow, as he thinks, that the pleasant sensation our respect consists in is derived from the sentiment or pleasure this avaricious man enjoys rather than from the pleasurable sensation caused by the agreeable objects themselves.

Having thus specified “the original satisfaction” enjoyed by the rich person as the source of the pleasurable sensation our esteem consists in, Hume’s next business is to account for the source of the other consistent, viz. the idea of the other self, which esteem is composed of. No difficulty seems to be involved for this business, since it is evident that, “however the ideas of

the pleasant wines, music, or gardens, which the rich man enjoys, may become lively and agreeable, the fancy will not confine itself to them, but will carry its view to the related objects, and, in particular, to the person who possesses them”(T 358). And the peculiarity of our present case is not only that the idea of the rich person is “unavoidably” involved in the reflection on those agreeable objects; “he must enter into the original conception”(T 359), and “is considered as enjoying these agreeable objects”(ibid.).

Hume has now specified the sources of both ingredients, viz. the pleasurable sensation and the idea of other self, which the passion are composed of. These two kinds of ingredients, viz. the pleasurable sensation and the idea of the other self, are just ready for the production of the ‘hybrid’ impression of the passion. Here may be asserted the double association of impressions and ideas between the rich person’s satisfaction and the passion itself, viz. the pleasurable sensation and the idea of the rich person relevant to the former, and the pleasurable sensation and the idea of the other self which constitutes the latter. He thus holds the analogy with the case of pride like this: “This agreeable idea or impression [of the rich person’s satisfaction] is connected with love which is an agreeable passion. It proceeds from a thinking conscious being, which is the very object of love. From this relation of impressions, and identity of ideas, the passion arises according to my hypothesis”(T 362).

We may have a good reason to assume that the same effect as the case with pride would here happen: “Those principles which forward the transition of ideas here concur with those which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse. The new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater violence, and the transition to it must be rendered so much more easy and natural”(T 284). And by the analogy with pride, he may also maintain not only that “the one idea is easily converted into its correlative; and the one impression into that which resembles and corresponds to it”(T 286/7), but also that, since the former set of an impression and idea “transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation”(T 290), “this is the more natural, that the pleasant idea, or image, produces here a passion towards the person by means of his relation to the object”(T 358).

But if the rich person “unavoidably” “enters into the original conception, and is considered as enjoying these agreeable objects”(T 359), we might here wonder how these two ingredients, viz. the idea of the person and his satisfaction, are converted into the components of the passion, when the former are both ideas whereas the latter impressions. In our foregoing discus-

sion, pride was claimed to arise when the pleasant sensation caused by a “foreign” object is converted into the component of the passion: the former is naturally enlivened by the vivacity of the idea of ourselves with which it is combined and partnered. It is the relation between the “foreign” object and ourselves, as we recall, that makes the conversion possible, since “the stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person”(T 318).

With our present case again, Hume proceeds the same reasoning, and tries to account for the conversion in terms of the vivacity conveyed from the present impression of ourselves by the relation of the resemblance shared among all human creatures, and observes: “As the ideas of pleasure can have an influence only by means of their vivacity, which makes them approach impressions, it is most natural those ideas should have that influence, which are favoured by most circumstances, and have a natural tendency to become strong and lively; such as our ideas of the passions and sensations of any human creature”(T 358). Hume thus assumes that the idea of the satisfaction of the rich person is converted into the impression when enlivened with the vivacity of ourselves conveyed by the relation between the agreeable objects and the rich person on the one hand and by the relation between the person and ourselves on the other. In other words, our esteem is supposed to arise here again when his satisfaction is converted or “transfused” into the new passion by acquiring the vivacity from the present impression of ourselves, which is conveyed via the idea of the rich person. And in so far as our esteem is derived from the enlivened idea of his satisfaction, “It is unavoidable but **he** must enter into the original conception”(T 359), according to Hume.

This point is carried further when he contends: “where we esteem a person upon account of his riches, **we** must enter into this sentiment of the proprietor”(T 360), because, the “approach [to reality], by an illusion of the fancy, appears much greater when we ourselves are possessed of the power than when it is enjoyed by another; and that, in the former case, the object seem to touch upon the very verge of reality, and convey almost an equal satisfaction as if actually in our possession”(T 360). But why is it necessary for Hume to make such a strong claim not only that, when we esteem a person for his riches, he must enter into our original conception, but also that we must enter into his satisfaction? Why is it not sufficient for him to suggest that the esteem for the rich is caused by those agreeable “objects they possess; such as houses, gardens, equipages, which, being agreeable in themselves, necessarily produce a

sentiment of pleasure in every one that either considers or surveys them”(T 356)?

We enjoy imagining or surveying beautiful flowers or delicious dishes, serene sceneries, magnificent temples or shrines, etc., simply because, they are as pleasant for our fancy just as they are for our eyes or appetite. And when we reflect on these agreeable objects, we do not need to have any person “enter” into our appreciation or enjoyment of those agreeable objects. If flowers full in bloom are pleasant for our eyes, they must also be agreeable for our imagination whether they grow in my garden or in the wilderness, especially if, as Hume assures us, “no object is presented to the senses, nor image formed in the fancy, but what is accompanied with some emotion or movement of spirits proportioned to it”(T 373). We might thus assume that there is no essential difference between these two cases, e.g. seeing flowers and imagining flowers, in both of which our pleasure is caused by the perception of agreeable objects, nor may we find any serious reason for distinguishing the former causation from the latter. In so far as “it is certain we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by often thinking of it”(T 319), it seems quite irrelevant to our present issue whether the pleasure in question is caused through our sense organs or through our fancy or reflection.

However, Hume gives a definite distinction between these two kinds of pleasure caused by these different perceptions of seeing and reflecting, and establishes his system of passions on this distinction. The former pleasure is called “the impression of sensation,” and is sharply distinguished from the latter, which is called “the impression of reflection.” In order to understand why and how Hume insists on the importance of this distinction, it is necessary to recall that the human mind defined by Hume is constituted of a sort of a sandwich structured system of perceptions in which sensations and ideas arise in turn making definite ordered layers of appearance. And in this system, the impression of sensation belongs to the first or original layer whereas the reflective sensation belongs to the third, or higher but odd numbered ones in the following manner.

“The mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere”(T 275), according to Hume, so that, “since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions which, without any introduction, make their appearance in the soul”(T 275). The impression of sensation thus “arises in the soul from unknown causes”(T 7) “when an impression strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain, of some kind or other”(T 8). This is how the impression of sensation is called for as the origin or

source of our experience, which is copied and remains after the impression ceases as “the idea of pleasure or pain.” When this idea of pleasure or pain “returns upon the soul”(T 8), “the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope, and fear”(ibid.) arise, making the third layer of the system. Hume’s exclusive concern in his discussion of passions is directed to the problem how a new passion could arise when the impression of sensation “returns upon the soul” as “the impression of reflection,” or to illustrate the new passion as “a third rebound of the original pleasure”(T 365).

But if this new impression is the “reflection” of the impression of sensation, what could be the mark which distinguishes between these two kinds of impressions? The distinction between the first sensation of pleasure or pain and its copy as its second appearance, viz. the idea of pleasure or pain, “differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity with which they strike upon the soul”(T 319), according to Hume. What could then be added to this original sensation when it makes the third appearance upon the mind as the reflective impression, after having once been copied or “reflected” upon the mind in its second return?

Hume’s answer is that the original impression, when making the third appearance as a new impression, is accompanied with the idea of the self. In other words, the reflective impression is distinct from the impression of sensation in that the former is the complex or rather ‘hybrid’ impression composed of [the idea] of the impression of sensation and the idea of ourselves or our own person. That is to say, the reflective impression necessarily arises, as Hume suggests, when the idea of the original sensation is combined with the idea of the self, and is consequently enlivened with the vivacity of its partner. The reflective impression is therefore a sort of ‘revived’ impression of the original sensation, which, having once stored in the memory, is converted or “transfused” into a new compound or ‘hybrid’ impression by acquiring vivacity when combined with the vivacious idea of the self. This is what Hume claims by his assertion that “this idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion as an original affection”(T 317).

When I am proud of my beautiful house, for instance, my pride is the “rebound” of my original pleasurable sensation caused by the agreeable object, which is accompanied by the idea of myself. If this method of reasoning is applied to our present case in which we esteem a person for his riches, it might follow that our esteem arises when the idea of the original satisfaction of the rich person returns upon the mind, and is so enlivened as to be converted into a new



impression. But we may wonder how it is possible, in the latter case of our esteem, for his original satisfaction to become enlivened enough to make the third return upon my mind as the impression of reflection. Because it is plainly the idea of the rich person, and not the idea of ourselves, that the idea of the original satisfaction is supposed to be combined to make the new 'hybrid' impression. But it is only the vivacity of the present impression of ourselves that can enliven the related idea "in the strongest and most lively manner"(T 318) in such a way as to make its third appearance possible. This seeming difficulty is easily solved, according to Hume, though with some complication, owing to "a great resemblance among all human creatures"(T 318), which "convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner"(T 318).

A parallelism between these two cases in which pride and esteem are produced is here asserted in the following way. Pride arises when the idea of the original pleasure caused by the agreeable object is converted into the impression when combined with the idea of the self. Similarly our love and esteem for a rich person arises when the idea of his original pleasure caused by the beautiful house is converted into the passion when combined with the idea of the person. Wherever there is the idea of the self or the other self, the idea of the original sensation "changes by degrees into a real impression"(T 354), according to Hume, no matter whether the sensation in question once appeared as an impression in my mind or only as a mere idea.

This is the circumstance in which Hume claims not only that, when we esteem a person for his riches, he must enter into our original conception, but also that we must enter into his satisfaction. In so far as our esteem is the "rebound" or "reflection" of his original satisfaction, it may not be entirely groundless to assert that "we enter into the opinions and affections of others"(T 319). We "partake" of his pleasure and satisfaction in the sense in which our esteem is a 'hybrid' impression, composed of the idea of his person and the peculiar sensation derived from his satisfaction, on the one hand. And on the other, "he enters into the original conception"(T 359) in the sense in which it is not ourselves but the person himself that "is considered as enjoying these agreeable objects"(ibid.). Hence comes his conclusion: "Whatever other passions we may be actuated by, pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge, or lust, the soul or animating principle of them is sympathy; nor would they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others"(T 363).

It is often charged against Hume for being after all a solipsist: though *sympathy* is defined as the mechanism by which we receive by communication the sentiments and affections of others, what is actually illustrated as *sympathy* is not any sort of inter-personal communication between different minds, but is the occurrence we witness in our own single mind. Hume may have a good ground to assert against this charge that to have an idea of the sentiments of others is proved to imply something more than the mere entertainment of the idea. He has successfully demonstrated how justified we are in claiming that “we enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others”(T 319) as to have the share of them as a new ‘hybrid’ impression. It is true that the idea of the other self is “fictitious,” since it is only the “converted” impression of his original satisfaction, and never his original satisfaction itself that we experience when we esteem a person. But if the production of passions depends on *sympathy*, as he maintains, it follows that the idea of the self depends upon the idea of the other self, since it is principally through the production of passions that the idea of the self arises.

#### (6) How we enter into another’s sentiment

We have seen so far how Hume is led to this conclusion: “there remains nothing which can give us an esteem for power and riches, and a contempt for meanness and poverty, except the pride of *sympathy*, by which we enter into the sentiments of rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness”(T 362). “The pride of *sympathy*” consists in a series of the following processes: “(1) riches give satisfaction to their possessor; and (2) this satisfaction is conveyed to the beholder by the imagination, (3) which produces an idea resembling the original impression in force and vivacity”(T 362), and then (4) “this agreeable idea or impression is connected with love, which is an agreeable passion”(ibid.) (My numbering). What makes the first source of the passion is “an original satisfaction in riches derived from that power which they bestow of enjoying all the pleasures of life”(T 365). Hume’s concern lies in illustrating what we are supposed to undergo while we are going through the tunnel, as it were, of our consciousness constituted, namely in the second and the third process. Just because these are the processes supposed to arise in the tunnel, Hume has to claim that “**it is unavoidable but he must enter into the original conception**”(T 359) (my emphases) for the second process, or for the third that “we must enter into this sentiment of the proprietor”(T 360): we can never witness the processes by ourselves. These two processes make both aspects of sympathy, in the sense in which sympathy virtually consists of these two occurrences caused by the “natural” transition of the mind.

Regarding the second process, we have seen how “the ideas of pleasant wines, music, or gardens, which the rich man enjoys”(T 359) would make it unavoidable to have him enter into the original conception and to consider him as enjoying these agreeable objects. The idea of the rich people’s original satisfaction, however, cannot make us “partake of their pleasure”(T 362) until it “produces an idea resembling the original impression in force and vivacity”(ibid.). Now Hume assures us that “this idea is presently converted into an impression, and produce an equal emotion as an original affection”(T 317), by “our natural temper [which] gives us a propensity to the same impression which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion”(T 354). Regarding this third process, he also maintains: “we enter into his interest by the force of imagination, and feel the same satisfaction what the objects naturally occasion in him”(T 364). Here he apparently thinks that what is implied by our entering into the interest or sentiments of another person is our entertainment of “the same satisfaction what the objects naturally occasion in him”(ibid.). But what encourages “our natural temper” to make this third process possible?

Hume has already prepared an answer for this question in the previous section: it is “resemblance [which] converts the idea into an impression, not only by means of the relation, and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea; but also by presenting such materials as to take fire from the least spark”(T 354). Since “every human creature resembles ourselves, and, by that means, has an advantage above any other object in operating on the imagination”(T 359), we never fails to enter into another person’s sentiment. “The nature and force of sympathy”(T 576) consists in the fact, as Hume contends, that “the minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations; nor can any one be actuated by any affection which all others are not in some degree susceptible”(ibid.). “As in strings equally wound up, so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature”(T 576).

Hume now affirms that in the fourth process “this agreeable idea or impression is connected with love, which is an agreeable passion”(T 362), and concludes that “it proceeds from a thinking conscious being, which is the very object of love”(T 362). And he comments on this: “from this relation of impressions, and identity of ideas, the passion arises according to my hypothesis”(T 362). It is clear that his argument on “the pride of sympathy” is meant to be the confirmation of his hypothesis previously discussed as the Eighth experiment, namely the rule that “the original passion is pride or humility, whose object is self; and that this passion is

transfused into love or hatred, whose object is some other person”(T 346).

It is important to remember that Hume’s theory of passions consists of the transition of the mind owing to the double relations of objects and sensations: “it is by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produced”(T 347). Love or esteem is not the affection originated in the beholder, but is the derivative or rather the reflection of the pride or satisfaction of the riches. What he tries to establish as the theory of passion is therefore the mechanism of the transition of the mind among two sets of passions “placed as it were in a square”(T 333), connected by the similitude of sensations and their objects. This is how he claims that “love or esteem in others . . . therefore, proceeds from a sympathy with the pleasure of the possessor”(T 365). This is the way how his original satisfaction is conveyed to the beholder, and a passion of esteem arises as its consequence.

But what should be marked with this system is that the reflection of passions would not remain as they are: “the imagination returns back again, attended with the related passions of love and hatred”(T 346). In other words, without “a second reflection of that original pleasure”(T 365) and “a third rebound of the original pleasure”(ibid.) at least, “the idea of the agreeable objects, which they give him [= the possessor] the power to produce, would have but a feeble influence upon us”(T 360). Because, “the chief reason why we either desire them [= riches] for ourselves, or esteem them in others”(T 365) lies in “this secondary satisfaction or vanity”(T 365) rather than in “an original satisfaction in riches derived from that power which they bestow of enjoying all the pleasures of life”(T 365), as he explains.

Hume’s theory of passions is thus explicitly illustrated in his discussion on our esteem for the rich and powerful as a sympathetic system of reflection of passions: “the pleasure which a rich man receives from his possessions, being thrown upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and esteem; which sentiments again being perceived and sympathised with, increase the pleasure of the possessor, and, being once more reflected, become a new foundation for pleasure and esteem in the beholder”(T 365). This sympathetic system of reflection of passions is what Hume tries to establish as the theory of mind in Book II, whose “very nature and essence” is beautifully embodied in his well-known metaphor: “the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each other’s emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments, and opinions, may often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees”(T 365).

His aim of this section lies, no doubt, in the confirmation of his “hypothesis” he has established in his Eighth experiment: “it is by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produced”(T 347). It is now easy to guess why Hume dares to employ such an apparently contradictory terminology, “the pride of sympathy,” for the illustration of this reflective nature of our passions. “The pride of sympathy” sounds contradictory, since it seems difficult to suppose that ‘pride’ can be transferred to, or shared by, some one else: pride is “determined to have self for their object, not only by a natural, but also by an original property”(T 280). It is quite natural if we wonder how such a passion like pride can be communicated to, or enjoyed by, some other person when “it is always self, which is the object of pride and humility; and whenever the passions look beyond, it is still with a view to ourselves; nor can any person or object otherwise have any influence upon us”(T 280). However, resorting to such a contradictory terminology, Hume tries to characterize, as we guess, the case established in his Eighth experiment in which “the original passion is pride and humility, whose object is self; and that this passion is transfused into love or hatred, whose object is some other person”(T 346).

However, it has been shown that what Hume tries to establish in this section is not the mere confirmation of his Eighth experiment, but rather the demonstration how his Eighth experiments would entail that “whatever other passions we may be actuated by, pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge, or lust, the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor would they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others”(T 363). His discussion upon “our esteem for the rich and the powerful” thus makes the core of his theory of passions.

#### **(7) Sympathy as “the soul or animating principle of passions”**

In the quest of the chief and predominant “principle capable of producing such an effect”(ibid.) as our esteem for the rich and the powerful, Hume has shown how our affective experience is dependent upon the two aspects of the circumstance which makes the communication of passions possible. Hume’s aim in this section lies in the elucidation of these two processes which makes sympathy as it is: where we esteem a person upon account of his riches, it is not only the case that “he must enter into the original conception”(T 360), but also that “we must enter into this sentiment of the proprietor”(ibid.). This is how he has demonstrated that “the soul or animating principle of them [= passions] all is sympathy”(T 363).

Now regarding “the nature and force of sympathy”(T 575), we may recall Hume’s following assertion we have seen in the very beginning of our enquiry: “when I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself”(T 576). This is how, as he explains, we come to “partake of the satisfaction [or passion] of every one that approaches us”(T 358). As we may also remember, we have tentatively divided this asserted phenomenon into two processes: the idea of another person’s passion comes to be entertained in the first place, which is in turn converted into the passion itself.

Concerning the first process, he comments like this: “no passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes or effects. From these we infer the passion; and consequently these give rise to our sympathy”(T 576). These remarks shows that in Hume’s idea sympathy depends upon the observation of “the effects of passion in voice and gesture of any person”(T 576). Hume apparently thinks that the relation of cause and effect functions so as to convince the agent of the ‘reality’ of the other person’s passion.

Now, returning back to his discussion on our esteem for the rich and the powerful, it may seem quite reasonable to suppose that the entertainment of the idea of the rich person’s pleasure and satisfaction presupposes the relation of cause and effect between his passion and “those external signs in the countenance and conversation”(T 317). In spite of our expectation, however, the observation of any such external signs or effects of another person’s passion is never mentioned throughout his argument in question. When he holds that “riches and power alone, even though unemployed, naturally cause esteem and respect”(T 359), he seems even to contradict to his former assertion that it is “the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinced of the reality of the passion with which we sympathise”(T 320), since there seems no observable effect where “there scarce is a probability or possibility of his employing it [= power or riches] in the acquisition of the pleasures and conveniences of life”(T 360).

Although he definitely asserts that “when any affection is infused by sympathy, it is at first know only by its effects”(T 317), we have to admit that neither any physical aspect nor knowledge of another person plays any essential part of Hume’s sympathetic mechanism. Rather he tries to show his indifference to these generally asserted conditions: the instantaneousness or indiscriminateness of the phenomena looks emphasised when he asserts that “a good-natured man finds himself **in an instant** of the same humour with his company”(T 317)(my emphasis), or that “sympathy . . . makes us partake of the satisfaction of **everyone that approaches**

us”(T 358). What’s more, “the pride of sympathy” starts with “the pleasant wines, music, or gardens, which the rich man enjoys”(T 359), and does not require the rich man himself as the trigger of the mechanism. What Hume tries to establish as the principle of our mind is a simple and natural mechanism explicitly shown in such a phenomenon as this: “though our first object be some senseless inanimate piece of matter, it is seldom we rest there, and carry not our view to its influence on sensible and rational creature”(T 363).

It is not necessarily the relation of cause and effect, Hume seems to suggest, that pulls the trigger of the sympathetic mechanism. It is rather “the great influence which all relations have upon”(T 359) the fancy, which “will not confine itself to them [= agreeable objects], but will carry its view to the related objects, and in particular, to the person who possesses them”(ibid.). And once the idea of the person is introduced into our mind as one of the related ideas, “it is unavoidable but he must enter into the original conception”(T 359), just as we have seen in our previous discussion. It is only in this circumstance that the idea of the person, or rather the idea of his passion, is virtually issued, since “if he enters into the original conception”(T 359), he “is considered as enjoying these agreeable objects”(ibid.). In the section “Of the love of fame” in which he first introduced “sympathy,” Hume has illustrated how sympathy operates, making “the easy communication of sentiments from one thinking being to another”(T 363) possible. Now in this section at issue, he intends to establish it as the all embracing principle which makes the whole human affairs possible, including “our sense of beauty”(T 576).

Now what is generally considered most crucial in Hume’s theory of sympathy is the next second process, in which “this idea [of the another person’s affection] is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion as an original affection”(T 317). As it is often noted, it is not clear what sort of experience is actually referred to by Hume when he mentions “conversion.” What is it like to entertain “an equal emotion as an original affection”(ibid.) as the outcome of the conversion? Hence comes Laird’s notorious contention that sympathy with someone else’s toothache requires us to feel a toothache as well. As we have noted in the beginning of this paper, this is the very point which invites all misgivings about Hume’s sympathy, reducing it to a system to be taken with a grain of salt.

Besides, what makes another source of confusion is Hume’s implicit assimilation of mental occurrences to material objects. In maintaining, for instance, that “as the [= affections] are all

first present in the mind of one person, and afterwards appear in the mind of another”(T 369), Hume obviously assimilates our mental occurrences to material objects. Hume talks about “the pleasure which a rich man receives from his possessions, **being thrown upon** the beholder”(T 365) as if the pleasure were a material object like a ball or virus at least, which can be passed from one person to another. This implicit assimilation of Hume’s becomes conspicuous especially in his illustration of this second aspect of sympathy, and also in his treatment of personal identity regarding thought and imagination at the end of Book I, as David Pears convinces us.

The only possible way to make Hume’s contention concerning this aspect of sympathy intelligible may seem to accept Philip Mercer’s suggestion and to take his sympathy to be a sort of “emotional infection.” But we have seen why his suggestion is untenable. A passion communicated by emotional infection requires no inherent connection with its object, nor any “prior recognition of the other’s existence as a center of consciousness”(Mercer: *Sympathy and Ethics* 14). The pleasure or passion to “be conveyed” to the beholder in Hume’s “true system”(T 287), on the other hand, presupposes the double relation of ideas and impressions: “nothing can produce any of these passions without bearing it a double relation, viz. of ideas to the object of the passion, and of sensation to the passion itself”(T 333).

Through the examination of Hume’s account of our esteem for the rich and the powerful, we have seen how Hume has a good reason for his claim that “where we esteem a person upon account of riches, we must enter into this sentiment of the proprietor”(T 360). And to the question how is it possible for us to “enter into the sentiments of rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness”(T 362), Hume’s answer is convincing: it is by means of “our natural temper [which] gives us a propensity to the same impression which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion”(T 354). This is how, according to Hume, “this satisfaction is conveyed to the beholder by the imagination, which produces an idea resembling the original impression in force and vivacity”(T 362). What is asserted as our entering into another person’s sentiment is, as we have already seen, nothing but the second process of sympathy: “the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent, and that the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them”(T 319).

Our problem, then, is: what is it like to have “an idea resembling the original impression in force and vivacity”(T 362) or “the same impression which we observe in others”(T 354)? What sort of experience is entailed if “we enter into the sentiments of rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness”(T 362)? If we take Hume’s contention of the conversion of an



idea into an impression literally, and suppose that another person's idea would "become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion as an original affection"(T 317), we must agree, as it might seem, with Laird's notorious contention that sympathy with someone else's toothache requires us to feel a toothache as well.

However, Laird's charge derives from his failure in understanding the structure of Hume's theory of passion. He is overlooking the very circumstance which makes Hume's assertion regarding the conversion possible. Hume's assertion regarding the conversion is, for instance, given as an account for "the secondary one [= cause] in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the affections [= pride and humility]"(T 316), as we recall. He refers to such an "remarkable . . . propensity we have to sympathise with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments"(T 316) "in order to account for this phenomenon"(T 316) "that our reputation, our character, our name, are considerations of vast weight and importance"(ibid.). In other words, he refers to sympathy in order to elucidate what sort of process is supposed to be going on when "pride, virtue, beauty, and riches"(T 316) have such an influence upon our mind. Sympathy never happens as an isolated process of our mind: it always happens as "a secondary cause" of our passions, whenever we are affected by passions under the influence of, e.g. "pride, virtue, beauty, and riches"(T 316). We can see his point clear in his contention: "Now I assert, that where we esteem an person upon account of his riches, we must enter into this sentiment of the proprietor, and that, without such a sympathy, the idea of the agreeable objects, which they give him the power to produce, would have but a feeble influence upon us"(T 360). It must be obvious now that Hume's assertion that "we enter into the sentiments of rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness"(T 362) by "the pride of sympathy" is never meant to imply that we are actually enjoying their pleasure or suffering from their uneasiness. To put it in the other way round, the only way we can enter into another person's sentiment is to feel passions, e.g. "hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth, and melancholy; all these passions I feel more from communication, than from my own natural temper and disposition"(T 317). It is only by means of experiencing an esteem or a contempt that "we can partake of their pleasure and uneasiness"(T 362), and not by means of experiencing their sentiments, the latter of which is the outcome of the former experience. It is only when we are "actuated by, pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge, or lust"(T 363) that we can enter into the sentiments of another person, and partake of their affection.

It is now clear where Laird is misguided. In his example of sympathising with someone

else's toothache, Hume would explain that we may feel pity or compassion (both passions are distinguished from sympathy by Hume) but not any sort of toothache. So far as we feel such a pity or compassion toward the person who is suffering from toothache, we have the right to claim that we enter into his sentiment and partake of his suffering. We have now removed unfounded suspicions concerning the second aspect of the circumstance in which we "receive by communication their [= other people's] inclinations and sentiments"(T 316). There is nothing any more which may prevent us from agreeing with Hume's contention: "the soul or animating principle of them [= passions] all is sympathy; nor would they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others"(T 363).

Through the discussion on "our esteem for the rich and the powerful" as one of "particular instances wherein the force of sympathy is very remarkable"(T 363), he has successfully demonstrated it happens that "though our first object be some senseless inanimate piece of matter, it is seldom we rest there, and carry not our view to its influence on sensible and rational creatures"(ibid.). This is why we seek after "foreign objects which may produce a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits"(T 353): "on the appearance of such an object it awakes, as it were, from a dream; the blood flows with a new tide; the heart is elevated; and the whole man acquires a vigor which he cannot command in his solitary and calm moments"(T 353). By means of even such "foreign objects," we can "enter into the sentiments of rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness"(T 362). "Hence company is naturally rejoicing, as presenting the liveliest of all objects, viz. a rational and thinking being like ourselves, who communicates to us all the actions of his mind, makes us privy to his inmost sentiments and affections, and lets us see, in the very instant of their production, all the emotions which are caused by any object"(T 353). Hume has thus succeeded in proving that one of the notorious philosophical problems called 'the problem of other minds' is a problem which in fact does not exist, by showing that so far as the human nature is dominated by the "soul or animating principle"(T 363), we are made to fear of "a perfect solitude"(ibid.). Hence comes Hume's famous confident observation: "Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man; let the sun rise and set at his command; the sea and rivers roll as he pleases, and the earth furnish spontaneously whatever may be useful or agreeable to him; he will still be miserable, till you give him some one person at least with whom he may share his happiness, and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy"(T 363). This is the very phenomenon what Hume tries to elucidate as the theory of passions and or as the *Treatise of Human Nature* as a whole.

## Chapter VII: The Origin of the Compound Passions

### (1) The whereabouts of his intention

Hume spends the second half of his discussion of love and hatred for the investigation of the origin of “the compound passions which proceed from a mixture of love and hatred with other affections”(T392). We may perhaps wonder why it was necessary for him to discuss as each separate topic such a seemingly unimportant passion as benevolence/anger, compassion and pity, malice/envy, respect/contempt, or the amorous passion. Let us try to examine what could be the bearing of this last part of his discussion of the indirect passions.

In order to understand Hume’s intention, it is important to remember this basic assumption that passions are, broadly speaking, the “reflection” of the sentiments and opinions of others in the sense in which the pleasurable or painful sensation a passion consists in is derived principally from another’s affection. What Hume implies by “sympathy” is this whole system by which another’s affection supplies the ingredient of passions through the double association of impressions and ideas. Here lies the reason, we have noted, why Hume names passions, desires, and emotions “the impression of reflection.”

According to this system, when we esteem a person for his riches, for instance, the main source of the ingredient which composes our esteem is the rich man’s satisfaction that he enjoys from his riches. In other words, the passion of esteem or love is the “rebound”(T 365) of the original pleasure of the rich man’s satisfaction which is “thrown upon the beholder”(T 365). When Hume contends that our esteem arises as the consequence of the conversion of the idea of his satisfaction into the impression, what makes the basis of this reasoning is the supposition that, in so far as “the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere”(T 275), there must be some source of our esteem from which its ingredient, viz. the pleasurable sensation, is derived. When the idea of the rich man’s satisfaction is “converted into the very impression it represents”(T 319), the passion arises “in conformity to the image we form of it”(ibid.). This is the hypothesis Hume has established as “the true system” from which the four basic passions of pride/humility and love/hatred are derived.

Hume is well aware, however, that against this hypothesis “there occurs a considerable objection”(T 384) or “contradiction”(T 381) which must be reconciled before he proceeds to

the discussion of the direct passions. "A considerable objection" among others, as he expects, is that how another person's pain could produce love, or another person's pleasure hatred. We have seen in his preceding discussion that riches or poverty gives rise to esteem or contempt by the double relation of impressions and ideas. But we often love those who are poor or miserable, or feel kindness toward those who are suffering from disaster or misfortune. Or, how is it possible to explain envy for the rich or malice for the poor when we are supposed to feel love "from a sympathy with his pleasure" or hatred "from that with his uneasiness" according to his system? It is this contradiction he intends to reconcile in terms of "the double sympathy" or by two kinds of sympathy, viz. "the limited" and "the extended."

Hume's main object in this last part of his discussion of the indirect passions is to show that those cases which seem "more stubborn, and will not so easily bend to our [= his] purpose"(T 367) "are nowise contrary to his system, but only departs a little from that simplicity which has been hitherto its principal force and beauty"(T 367). For him, they are merely the cases which are explained in terms of the mixture of love or hatred, which "counterfeit"(T 368) or "imitate"(T 372) the effects of love or hatred. Through the illustration of the compound passions, Hume is fully sure of the adequacy of his hypothesis, and completes his discussion of the indirect passions with "a sensible proof of the double relation of impressions and ideas"(T 397).

But if Hume's main object lies in the demonstration that the compound passions is not the exception of, nor contradiction to, his hypothesis of the double association of impressions and ideas, is he not inconsistent in introducing here a new principle called "the principle of a parallel direction"(384)? "Is it becoming a philosopher to alter his method of reasoning, and run from one principle to its contrary, according to the particular phenomenon which he would explain?"(T 385). But it is easy to see that this accuse is groundless. For, this extra principle is nothing new or extraneous, but merely a derivative of his preceding one of a double relation of ideas and impressions from which a transition of passion may arise. What is implied by "the parallel direction of the desires" is "a conformity in the tendency and direction of any two desires which arise from different principles"(T 385). it is therefore "a real relation, and, no less than a resemblance in their sensation, produces a connection among them"(T 395).

In his preceding discussion, Hume has already noted as the peculiarity of impressions that "impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union, and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform

impression which arises from the whole”(T 366). He is now mentioning another peculiarity of impressions which is distinct from ideas as “the principle of a parallel direction”: “one impression may be related to another, not only when their sensation are resembling, as we have all along supposed in the preceding cases, but also when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent”(T 381). It is here in the two peculiarities of impressions that he seeks for a solution of his present problems, assuming that “some of the most curious phenomena of the human mind are derived from this property of the passions”(T 366). For Hume, the mixture of love with pity, or of hatred with malice is one of the most curious phenomena “arising from original affections, which are varied by some particular turn of thought and imagination”(T 369).

It may not be amiss to mention that, among these “two different causes from which a transition of passion may arise”(T 385), viz. a double relation of ideas and impressions, and a parallel direction, the second cause is relevant only to love and hatred, but not to pride and humility. For, the second connection takes place with regard to those affections which are always “attended with certain appetite or desire”(T 382), but not with regard to pride and humility which are “only pure sensations, without any direction or tendency to action”(T 381/2).

Hume warns us against this general misunderstanding that “love is nothing but the desire of happiness to another person, and hatred that of misery”(T 367), or that “the desire and aversion constitute the very nature of love and hatred”(ibid.). It is important to mark that in Hume’s system the conjunction of love or hatred with the desire of the happiness or misery of others is entirely natural or contingent. “The desire of the happiness or misery of others”(T 368) is claimed to be “an arbitrary and original instinct implanted in our nature”(ibid.), which arises “according to the love or hatred we bear them”(ibid.). In other words, benevolence and anger are “passions different from love and hatred, and only conjoined with them by the original constitution of the mind”(T 368), so that “according as we are possessed with love or hatred, the correspondent desire of the happiness or misery of the person who is the object of these passions, arises in the mind, and varies with each variation of these opposite passions”(T 368). For, “as nature has given to the body certain appetites and inclinations, which she increases, diminishes, or changes according to the situation of the fluids or solids, she has proceeded in the same manner with the mind”(T 368). All we can do is therefore to try to illustrate the circumstance in which this desire of the happiness or misery of others is “counterfeited”(T 368) as a compound passion, as “pity is a concern for, and malice a joy in, the misery of others, with-

out any friendship or enmity to occasion this concern or joy”(T 369).

## (2) The origin of the compound passions

Let us now begin with pity, which is a “compound” passion derived from the mixture of love with grief. Pity arises, according to Hume, when “our fancy considers directly the sentiments of others, and enters deep into them”(T 381), and “makes us sensible of all the passions it surveys, but in a particular manner of grief or sorrow”(ibid.). Hume’s main concern with the origin of pity lies in the problem, how pity, which is an uneasiness, may be connected with love, which is a pleasurable passion, as this seems contradictory to his hypothesis of the double association of impressions and ideas. In spite of this contradiction, Hume assures us that “it will be easy to explain the passion of pity, from the precedent reasoning concerning sympathy”(T 369). Pity arises, according to him, from “double sympathy”(T 388) derived from the concurrence of two different principles, viz. the double relation of impressions and the ideas, and the parallel direction, as we shall see below.

It is by sympathy, as we have seen, that the pleasurable or painful sensation which composes our esteem for the rich or our contempt for the poor is derived from the “original” satisfaction or pain entertained by the rich or poor person. And it is this pleasurable or painful sensation communicated from the rich or the poor that makes the “first foundations”(T 381) of malice and pity, according to Hume. In other words, malice and pity do not arise till “other passions are afterwards confounded with them”(T 381) so as to be mixed together: “there is always a mixture of love or tenderness with pity, and of hatred or anger with malice”(T 381).

Hume reconciles the contradiction involved in the mixture of the contrary passions in terms of the “chain” of connection established among these three passions, viz. pity, benevolence, and love, by claiming that the first passion is connected to the third via, or rather with the medium of, the second. The first affection is related to the second by the principle of a parallel direction: “pity is a desire of happiness to another, and aversion to his happiness”(T 382) while benevolence is a desire of the happiness of the person beloved and an aversion to his misery. The second item, being “the appetite which attends love”(T 382), is connected to the third “by a natural and original quality”(T 382), as we have seen above. “It is by this chain of the passions pity and malice are connected with love and hatred”(ibid.), according to Hume. Pity is thus illustrated in terms of “these double impressions”(T 387) derived from “the double sympathy”(T 388) correspondent to “two relations, viz. resemblance and a parallel desire”(T

395). It is important to mark that the parallel desire is defined by Hume as sympathy, which is derived from the parallel relation between two desires, no less than the basic sympathy which always arises from the resemblance.

Having shown how to reconcile the contradiction involved in the production of pity and malice, Hume proceeds to solve another difficulty: why “this rule hold good in one case, [and] why does it not prevail throughout?”(T 385)

Hume’s solution is given in the following way. Pity is a mixture of “these double impressions,” viz. the grief derived from the basic sympathy, and benevolence derived from a parallel desire. “In order, then, to make a passion run parallel with benevolence, it is requisite we should feel these double impressions, correspondent to those of the person whom we consider; nor is any one of them alone sufficient for that purpose”(T 387). When our sympathy is “limited, sympathising only with one impression, and that a painful one, this sympathy is related to anger and to hatred, upon account of the uneasiness it conveys to us”(T 387). But when this first or basic sympathy is “extended,” giving rise to the second sympathy relevant to a parallel desire, we feel “benevolence and love by a similarity of direction, however painful the first impression might have been”(T 387).

Whether the basic sympathy involves “the extensive sympathy” or not depends on “the force of the impression”(T 388) communicated by the first sympathy. “A strong impression, when communicated, gives a double tendency of the passions, which is related to benevolence and love”(T 387), according to Hume. That “the extensive or limited sympathy depends upon the force of the first sympathy”(T 387) is the reason why “the same object causes contrary passions, according to its different degrees”(T 387). “Benevolence, therefore, arises from a great degree of misery, or any degree strongly sympathised with: hatred or contempt from a small degree, or one weakly sympathised with”(T 387). This is Hume’s solution of his problem, “Why does sympathy in uneasiness ever produce any passion beside good-will and kindness?”

### **(3) The principle of comparison**

Thus far we have seen how pity arises “when our fancy considers directly the sentiments of others, and enters deep into them, it makes us sensible of all the passions it surveys, but in a particular manner of grief or sorrow”(T 381). When we compare the sentiments of others to our own, however, we feel “a sensation directly opposite to the original one, viz. a joy from the grief, and a grief from their joy”(T 381). When a comparison is invoked, we feel malice, and

when not, pity. In order to account for malice and envy by the same method of reasoning, Hume suggests us to take “the principle of comparison” into consideration in the following way.

In Hume’s system, envy and malice is not the case of antipathy. Nor is the principle of comparison the negative analogue to sympathy. Rather, a comparison presupposes sympathy, as it is by sympathy that another’s affection is communicated to be compared with our own.

It may also merit our attention that the principle of comparison is relevant only to sensations, and not to passions. Hume asserts, for instance, that “in all kinds of comparison, an object makes us always receive from another, to which it is compared, a sensation contrary to what arises from itself its direct and immediate survey”(T 375). It is therefore only “the first foundations”(T 381) of the affections of pity and malice that may be affected by the principle of comparison.

In the case with pity, the original pain of the poor gives rise to grief, supplying the ingredient of the painful sensation which the passion is composed of. But this general hypothesis might seem inadequate for the illustration of the origin of envy, because, when we envy the rich, there seems no source from which its ingredient, viz. uneasiness, is derived, since the only sensation available from the rich’s satisfaction is pleasurable sensation. Hume found it necessary to explain, therefore, how this pleasurable sensation communicated from the rich is “reversed” into a contrary sensation, and be the component of the ‘hybrid’ passion of envy.

It is for the solution of this difficulty that he introduces the principle of comparison, maintaining: “The direct survey of another’s pleasure naturally gives us pleasure, and therefore produces pain when compared with our own. His pain, considered in itself, is painful to us, but augments the idea of our own happiness, and gives us pleasure”(T 376). And once he has shown how the “reversed sensations” are derived from the happiness and misery of others and compose “the first foundations” of the passions, all he has to do is to pursue the same method of reasoning and to hold that malice and envy are, being the desire of misery to another and aversion to his happiness, related to, or mixed with, hatred or anger by “the double sympathy” as he has argued concerning the origin of pity.

We have examined why and how it was necessary for Hume to introduce the principle of comparison in the explanation of the origin of the compound passions. We now need to examine briefly whence Hume derives this principle: “in all kinds of comparison, an object makes us



always receive from another, to which it is compared, a sensation contrary to what arises from itself in its direct and immediate survey”(T 375).

We may recall that Hume has touched on a comparison in his preceding discussion of pride as the limitation to his system from which pride is produced. He has pointed out that our pride is limited or diminished when the cause of the passion, e.g. virtue, beautiful house, turns out not so distinguished or great as we have estimated. The comparison was claimed to be the primary cause that makes the object our pride appear smaller or undistinguished.

Again concerning the compound passions, a comparison of ourselves with others is mentioned as the case in which envy and malice arise as the mixtures of love or hatred. After having detailed “how from the same impression, and the same idea, we can form such different judgments concerning the same object”(T 373), Hume reaches this conclusion: “this variation in our judgments must certainly proceed from a variation in some perception; but as the variation lies not in the immediate impression or idea of the object, it must lie in some other impression that accompanies it”(T 373).

He assumes that this conclusion is supported by the following two principles joined to the influence of comparison. He first marks “a general maxim” that “no object is presented to the senses, nor image formed in the fancy, but what is accompanied with some emotion or movement of spirits proportioned to it; and however custom may make us insensible of this sensation, and cause us to confound it with the object or idea, it will be easy, by careful and exact experiments, to separate and distinguish them”(T 373). “Every part, then, of extension, and every unit of number, has a separate emotion attending it when conceived by the mind”(T 373), according to him. The second principle is that of “our adherence to general rules”(T 374): “When an object is found by experience to be always accompanied with another, whenever the first object appears, though changed in very material circumstances, we naturally fly to the conception of the second, and form an idea of it in as lively and strong a manner, as if we had inferred its existence by the justest and most authentic conclusion of our understanding”(ibid.). From these two principles, he draws this conclusion: “Every object is attended with some emotion proportioned to it; a great object with some emotion, a small object with a small emotion”(T 374).

It is from this conclusion that Hume derives the principle of comparison, holding: “A great object, therefore, succeeding a small one, makes a great emotion succeed a small one. Now, a great emotion succeeding a small one becomes still greater, and rises beyond its ordinary pro-

portion. But as there is a certain degree of an emotion which commonly attends every magnitude of an object, when the emotion increases, we naturally imagine that the object has likewise increased. The effect conveys our view to its usual cause, a certain degree of emotion to a certain magnitude of the object; nor do we consider that comparison may change the emotion without changing anything in the object”(T 374).

Hume derives “this new discovery of an impression” that “objects appear greater or less by a comparison with others”(T 375) from a metaphysical part of optics. But we may not feel ourselves fully justified in transferring the judgments and conclusions of the understanding to the senses in the following two points.

For one thing, how could it safely be established for a general maxim that “no object is presented to the senses, nor image formed in the fancy, but what is accompanied with some emotion or movement of spirits proportioned to it”(T 373), as Hume assures us? This maxim is entirely extraneous to the theory of ideas he has established in Book I. In order to establish the principle of comparison on this maxim, he needs to show whence it is derived.

For the second, Hume’s ultimate object in this part of his discussion is to show that “no ideas can affect each other, either by comparison, or by the passions they separately produce, unless they be united together by some relation which may cause an easy transition of the ideas, and consequently of the emotions or impressions attending the ideas”(T 380). If so, he needs to explain in terms of the transition of the imagination why and how two separate impressions attending the ideas is altered into a “reversed” sensation when they are combined to, or mixed with. Hume’s account for this problem is insufficient, as he is more eager to show that the comparison is possible when it involve something more than the transition of the imagination, viz. the transition of the emotions or impressions attending the ideas. Hume is thus occupied with the demonstration of the consistency of his system of the double association of impressions and ideas, by pursuing the basic strategy of holding the analogy between two system of the understanding and the passions: “This principle is very remarkable, because it is analogous to what we have observed both concerning the understanding and the passions”(T 380).

#### **(4) The origin of respect, contempt, and amorous passion**

In the preceding discussion, pity and malice are illustrated as the mixture of love and hatred, which “arise from the imagination, according to the light in which it places its object”(T

381). Hume is now accounting for the origin of other compound passions in terms of the following three ways by which we consider the qualities and circumstances of others: “we may either regard them as they really are in themselves; or may make a comparison betwixt them and our own qualities and circumstances; or may join these two methods of consideration”(T 390). He then marks that “the good qualities of others, from the first point of view, produce love; from the second, humility; and, from the third, respect; which is a mixture of these two passions”(T 390). “Their bad qualities, after the same manner, cause either hatred, or pride, or contempt, according to the light in which we survey them”(T 390).

Hume proceeds to argue: “All those objects which cause love, when placed on another person, are the causes of pride, when transferred to ourselves; and consequently ought to be causes of humility as well as love while they belong to others, and are only compared to those which we ourselves possess”(T 391). “In like manner every quality, which, by being directly considered, produces hatred, ought always to give rise to pride by comparison, and by a mixture of these passions of hatred and pride, ought to excite contempt or scorn”(T 391). Then he claims it “too evident, from their feeling or appearance, to require any particular proof”(T 390) not only “that there is a mixture of pride in contempt, and of humility in respect“(ibid.), but also “that this mixture arises from a tacit comparison of the person contemned or respected with ourselves”(ibid.).

In order to understand the whereabouts of Hume’s intention, it is useful to recall what Hume has described as “the situation of the mind”(T 397). He tried to illustrate through eight experiments, as we have seen, how affections depends on the transition of the imagination which proceeds along the “complicated attractions and relations”(T 337) of impressions and ideas determined by the relations of the four basic indirect passions “placed, as it were in a square”(T 333). Respect and contempt arise from this “situation of affairs”(T 338) when love is connected with humility, and hatred with pride, according as the imagination passes from love to humility via pride, and from hatred to pride via love. In other words, it is from the connections between the diagonally related two basic passions, viz. between pride and hatred, and between love and humility, that respect and contempt are claimed to arise in the above contention.

But is this mixture between the passions not contradictory with his assertion that pride and humility are “pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action”(T 367)? We may also ask how it is possible that these two passions of

opposite sensations are connected to each other.

These two problems are not recognised by Hume as difficulties. For, what is relevant to the mixtures is not the parallel desires, but the double relation of impressions and ideas, which makes the transition of the imagination possible by the following chain of connections. Pride is connected with hatred indirectly owing to this double relation: pride is related to love by the resemblance of sensations, and love with humility by the resemblance of ideas. The similar chain of connections happens with the mixture of love with humility: love is connected with hatred by the resemblance of ideas, and hatred with humility by the resemblance of sensations. It is this diagonal relation between the two sets of basic passion that is asserted by Hume, when he contends: “no quality in another gives rise to humility by comparison, unless it would have produced pride by being placed in ourselves; and vice versa, no object excites pride by comparison, unless it would have produced humility by the direct survey”(T 392). To put it the other way round, respect and contempt must be considered not as the contradiction, but as the proof of the consistency of his hypothesis that “nothing can produce of these [four basic] passions without bearing it a double relation, viz. of ideas to the object of the passion, and of sensation to the passions itself”(T 333). For, the connection of the four basic “affections, placed in a square” allows the transition of the imagination not only along the four side of the square but also along its diagonal relations.

Hume’s difficulty concerning the origin of respect and contempt lies therefore not in the problem how the mixture of the passions with opposite sensations is possible at all, but rather in the problem, “why any objects ever cause pure love or hatred, and produce not always the mixed passions of respect and contempt”(T 391). He solves his difficulty in the following way.

“No quality in another gives rise to humility by comparison, unless it would have produced pride by being placed in ourselves; and, vice versa, no object excites pride by comparison, unless it would have produced humility by the direct survey. This is evident, object always produce by comparison a sensation directly contrary to their original one. Suppose, therefore, an object to be presented, which is peculiarly fitted to produce love, but imperfectly to excite pride, this object, belonging to another, gives rise directly to a great degree of love, but to a small one of humility by comparison; and consequently that latter passion is scarce felt in the compound, nor is able to convert the love into respect”(T 392).

In the preceding discussion Hume has shown that respect and contempt are derived from the mixture of humility with love, and from the mixture of pride with hatred. What makes this

seemingly contradictory mixture possible is the principle of comparison, that “object always produce by comparison a sensation directly contrary to their original one”(T 392). Respect is claimed to arise, as we have seen, when love is mixed with humility, according as the imagination passes from the former to the latter via pride. It is thus only with the tacit involvement of pride, which plays the role of a medium, that humility and love are connected to each other. Similarly, pride is connected with hatred only via humility, which is related not only to hatred by the resemblance of sensations, but also to pride by the identity of ideas, viz. the other self.

Now if respect is a compound passion, derived from the mixture of love with humility produced by the same object, it may happen that “the latter passions is scarce felt in the compound, nor is able to convert the love into respect”(T 392). This happens when an object peculiarly fitted to produce love, but imperfectly to excite pride, belonging to another, gives rise directly to a great degree of love, but to a small one of humility by comparison, according to Hume. In other words, the object of love may give rise to respect if the object belonging to another is likely to cause pride when it belongs to ourselves. Good-nature, for instance, may be the object of love more than the object of respect, just because this quality, which is fitted to produce love, has not so much power as to excite the imagination to take a passage from love to humility via pride along the four side of “the square” just mentioned above. This is the case with good-nature, good-humour, facility, generosity, beauty, and many other qualities, which, as belonging to another person, have a peculiar aptitude to produce love, with but a small mixture of humility and respect, according to Hume. The same reasoning may be extended, he assures us, to the opposite passions. Hume has shown successfully how the production of respect and contempt depends on the relations of the four basic passions which are connected to each other with double-hold ties in the form of a square.

Hume intends to complete his investigation of the indirect passions with the examination of the origin of the amorous passion. His last business is to prove the solidity of his system through the demonstration how “love betwixt the sexes” arises from the double association of impressions and ideas.

The amorous passion is defined as a compound passion, derived from the conjunction of three different impressions or passions, viz. the pleasing sensation arising from beauty, the bodily appetite for generation, and a generous kindness or good-will. As the origin of kindness is explained from the foregoing reasoning, the only question for Hume is how the second pas-

sion is connected with the first.

There is no difficulty in explaining in terms of the double association of impressions and ideas why the bodily appetite should be excited by the sense of beauty, as the appetite of generation is generally the pleasant kind, and has a strong connection with all the agreeable emotions. The connection between the bodily appetite and the sense of beauty is strengthened when this relation of resemblance is matched with another relation, viz. the parallel direction of the desires, that contributes to the same effect. Hume thus maintains that “from these two relations, viz. resemblance and a parallel desire, there arises such a connection betwixt the sense of beauty, the bodily appetite and benevolence, that they become in a manner inseparable”(T 395).

Having shown with regard to the appetite of generation how the impulse arises from the beauty of the person by a double relation of impressions and ideas, Hume now leaves the discussion of the indirect passions, rehearsing this conclusion: “we have certain organs naturally fitted to produce a passion; that passion, when produced, naturally turns the view to a certain object, [viz. the self or the other self]. But this not being sufficient to produce the passion, there is required some other emotion [= foreign object], which, by a double relation of impressions and ideas, may set these principles in action, and bestow on them their first impulse”(T 379).

(References cited as (T —) are made to David Hume: *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992))