

〈論文〉

Personal Identity and Passions in the *Treatise*:
The Connection between Book I and II (Part 2)

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Chapter V: The Problem of Other Minds

(1) The position regarding other selves

We might naturally wish and expect that Hume had some concern at least to the so-called problem of other minds when he introduced *sympathy* as “a very powerful principle in human nature”(T 577). It might indeed be our common reaction to ask him for a clue, not to say for an answer, for the intractable problem concerning other selves, when he mentions *sympathy* as the principle “which makes us partake of the satisfaction of every one that approaches us”(T 358), since in his discussion of *sympathy* he is obviously committed to the problem how it is possible for us to be aware of the contents of other people’s minds. It is an established opinion among critics, however, that against our expectation “Hume does not appear to recognise any epistemological problem concerning other selves”(Pitson 266).

Regarding Hume’s notion of *sympathy* or his theory of passions, it is often pointed out that “Hume appears to entertain no doubt whatsoever about our capacity for gaining awareness of the mental states of others — and, indeed, never directly addresses the issue of scepticism in this context”(Pitson 256). This alleged feature of his treatment of our affective experience is generally taken as the reflection of his position that “the existence of others as the subjects of mental states is presupposed both in Hume’s discussion of the understanding in Book I of the *Treatise*, and also in his discussion of the passions — in particular, the indirect passions — in Book II”(Pitson 256). But how, we may well ask, could Hume avoid the commitment of such epistemological problem when he accepts some form of dualism at least by claiming, e.g. that “the subject of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations, we are not conscious”(T 329)? We are thus left unsatisfied with such “obvious puzzles here arising from the literal impossibility of observing the mind of another person or self ..., and similarly of sharing the sentiments of another mind in any sense other than having sentiments which may be like those of someone else”(Pitson 261). It might seem not entirely gratuitous to

conclude with Pitson that “Hume’s position in relation to our knowledge of other selves is ultimately inconsistent”(Pitson 260).

The object of this paper is to assert the following points:

1. Hume’s original intention in his discussion of *sympathy* does not lie in answering the problem of other minds : *sympathy* is intended to be one of those phenomena in which a passion arises from the double association of impressions and ideas. This is the reason why the awareness of this problem of other minds seems lacking.

2. It is a mistake, however, to assume that Hume does not “recognise any epistemological problem concerning other selves”(Pitson 266), or to suppose that his notion of *sympathy* depends upon “his unquestioning acceptance of the existence of other minds”(Pitson 263), still less “the existence of the human body”(Pitson 259). Rather, Hume had a full acknowledgement, it seems to me, that he was committed to the problem of other minds in so far as his notion of *sympathy* has such an aspect which is virtually describable as person-perception dependent upon the causal inference between the affections and their external signs.

3. The misgivings regarding Hume’s treatment of *sympathy* are derived mainly from the general misunderstanding that his notion of *sympathy* is a piece of cognitive process of inferring the mental state of others from their behaviour and utterances. It is true that Hume’s *sympathy* is definitely based upon the causal inference between the affections and their external signs. And it is also evident that *sympathy* is intended by Hume as the phenomenon in which the system of the passions is most explicitly illustrated as the parallel with the system of the understanding. But it nevertheless is “the failure to see and to emphasize that sympathy is a form of inference ‘exactly correspondent to the operation of our understanding’ ”(Capaldi 266).

4. Hume’s answer for the problem of other minds seems to be prepared like this: once we understand that we are all endowed with this remarkable propensity “we have to sympathise with others”(T 316), and “enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them”(T 319), we may realise how the problem of other minds is reduced into a pseudo problem.

5. All we need to do regarding this problem is, therefore, the illustration of our “common experience”(T 332) as well as of “a kind of representation, which tells us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves”(ibid.). It is in the following part of his discussion in which Hume insists upon the exact correspondence between these two sets of the indirect passions, viz. pride/humility, love/hatred, that we can find the direct expression of his

position regarding the problem of other minds.

“There are few persons that are satisfied with their own character, or genius, or fortune, who are not desirous of showing themselves to the world, and of acquiring the love and approbation of mankind. Now it is evident, that the very same qualities and circumstances, which are the causes of pride or self-esteem, are also the causes of vanity, or the desire of reputations; and that we always put to view those particulars with which in ourselves we are best satisfied. But if love and esteem were not produced by the same qualities as pride, according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others, this method of proceeding would be very absurd; nor could men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person with those themselves have entertained. It is true, few can form exact systems of the passions, or make reflections on their general nature and resemblances. But without such a progress in philosophy, we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular, but are sufficiently guided by common experience, as well as by a kind of presentation, which tells us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves. Since then the same qualities that produce pride or humility, cause love or hatred, all the arguments that have been employed to prove that the causes of the former passions excite a pain or pleasure independent of the passion, will be applicable with equal evidence to the cause of the latter”(T 331/2).

(2) The whereabouts of his intention

We may have a good ground to support above quoted Pitson’s assertion regarding Hume’s discussion of the understanding that “the existence of others as the subjects of mental states is presupposed”(Pitson 256). It is Hume’s well-known strategy in Book I to “suppose we could see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions which constitutes his mind or thinking principle”(T 260). There is plainly no room for us to inquire, therefore, if we are fully justified in judging “what will operate on others” by “what we feel immediately in ourselves”: we are asked here to put this problem aside temporarily in Book I. In so far as his theory of ideas is concerned, there may be no room to raise any objection against Hume when he asserts at the end of Book I that “the case is the same, whether we consider ourselves or others”(T 261).

Now we might naturally expect that a new strategy must be adapted by Hume for the discussion of passions, since his main concern in the second Book is to illustrate how *sympathy* makes us “enter,” for instance, “into the sentiments of rich and poor, and partake of their plea-

sure and uneasiness”(T 362). However, to our discouragement, in his discussion of passions, there is no direct comments which indicate Hume serious concern with this notorious problem relevant to other minds, so that we are obliged to admit that “there is, for Hume, no puzzle concerning the possibility of our being aware of what these states are”(Pitson 266). It thus becomes more or less an established opinion that in his discussion of *sympathy* Hume takes “for granted the legitimacy of ascribing mental states to others”(Pitson 262). It may be true that *sympathy* is not intended specifically as the solution of the problem of other minds, because his intention in introducing the notion of *sympathy* lies elsewhere. But it is a mistake, it seems to me, to assume that he overlooks or ignores this problem in his discussion of passions. The object of my paper is to assert that, for all his apparent indifference, this problem is definitely within the scope of his investigation in Book II, and that his answer for this intractable problem is prepared in such a way as we see in the following discussion.

Hume’s main strategy in the *Treatise* lies, as we have insisted, in illustrating the two different aspects of the human minds relevant to the understanding and relevant to the passions by means of the same method of reasoning. It is not surprising, therefore, if we find that the problem of other minds is not specifically identified by him as the subject for which a different method of reasoning is needed.

Hume argued in Book I, as we remember, regarding the existence of material objects that “we may well ask, *What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?* but it is in vain to ask, *Whether there is body or not?*”(T 187), as “that is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings”(ibid.). And crucially, this strategy of Hume’s thus asserted is never to be taken as his implication that the existence of bodies should be taken for granted. His point lies not in his insistence that bodies exist, but rather that this is the very point from which we should start. This is how all his inquiry into the cause of our belief in the existence of external objects has started, leading him to such a sceptical conclusion “both with respect to reason and the sense”(T 209) as this: “The only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions” (T 211), and “it is a gross illusion to suppose that our resembling perceptions are numerically the same; and it is this illusion which leads us into the opinion that these perceptions are uninterrupted, and are still existent even when they are not present to the senses” (ibid.).

Now, in order to hold the analogy with the system of the understanding, we might reason-

ably assume that Hume needs to pursue the same strategy, and expect him to hold the same issue regarding the system of the passions: we may well ask, *What causes induce us to believe in the existence of other minds?* but it is in vain to ask, *Whether there is other minds or not?*, as that is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings. Needless to say, this is not his own remark in terms of which Hume illustrates his own position regarding the passions. Throughout his discussion on passions, he never tried to make his position clear in such a way as we expect. What he actually proposes us instead is the emphasis on “the exact correspondence” between the two systems of the understanding and the passions. Is it so fanciful to suggest that he only spared the trouble of explaining his position in Book II, just because he is merely proceeding the same method of reasoning which he has proved so successful in illustrating the system of ideas?

In that case, it may not be entirely unfounded to grant Hume this parallel position: we may well ask, *What causes induce us to believe in the existence of other minds?* but it is in vain to ask, *Whether there is other minds or not?*, as that is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings. And once we assign him this parallel standpoint, it seems quite reasonable to allow him another parallel view: it does not follow from this position that we should take for granted the existence of other minds (Pitson 269), not to say of the existence of the human body, as critics often suggest (ibid.). Hume’s point in Book I lies in suggesting that “to the ask whether there is a body or not” is to ask an impossible question for which no answer is available, because that is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings. Parallely to ask whether there are other minds or not is to ask a pseudo question for which no answer is necessary, because we are endowed with a natural “propensity we have to sympathise with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments”(T 316) for all our own intention. Plainly this does not imply that Hume takes for granted “the legitimacy of ascribing mental states to others”(Pitson 262), nor that he asserts the “unquestioning acceptance of the existence of other minds or selves”(Pitson 263), as critics often maintain. Thus far is the whereabouts of Hume’s intention regarding the problem of other minds, it seems to me. Let us now try to see if this interpretation agrees with Hume’s real position.

(3) The outline of his strategy

It often pointed out that Hume’s notion of *sympathy* is intended as the parallel with the perception of external objects, especially when *sympathy* is accounted for by Hume like this:

“No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes and effects. From these we infer the passion: And consequently these give rise to our sympathy”(T 576).

Pitson, for instance, thus holds that “in some ways the epistemological issue concerning other selves seems very similar to the one”(Pitson 258) regarding the existence of material objects: in both cases alike, we are unable to justify the inference to the existence of something which can never immediately be known, viz. the state of mind of the other person and the external objects, since such inferences depends upon our experience of cause and effect in the form of an observed constant conjunction between the items concerned.

Nothing is more natural to see the analogy between these two kinds of inference, because for one thing, the analogy is intended by the author himself, and for another, *sympathy* is claimed to be the phenomenon which is definitely founded upon the causal inference between affections and their outward signs or symptoms. And the general opinion or rather charge against Hume’s notion of *sympathy* is derived mainly from the fact that he seems quite indifferent to the difference between these two kinds of inference.

For all the parallelism, there is obviously a crucial difference between these two kinds of causal inference. Hume’s scepticism with our perception of physical objects on the one hand is derived from that one cannot find a theory which makes sense of the existence of the object in terms of the continued and independent existence of our perceptions, since “the only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions”(T 211) which are by nature perishing and entirely dependent on ourselves. The difficulty with the inference to the existence of other minds, on the other hand, is caused from the fact that the inference is never verifiable, as the only connection I experience is the one in my own case. The latter may be said, therefore, to have a double-fold difficulty, as it presupposes the connection between the mental occurrences and their external signs or symptoms established in my own past experience through the former kind of inference. And the general complaint about Hume’s notion of *sympathy* issues from his seeming negligence of this crucial difference between these two kinds of inference.

Hume is often charged for the lack of his awareness about this serious double-fold difficulty peculiar to the latter inference. It is even suggested that in Book II the awareness about the difficulty he has been so concerned in Book I regarding the former inference is missing: “Hume

does not in fact see the inference to the mental states of others as presenting the same difficulties as the philosopher's inference from perceptions to external object"(Pitson 259). It is mainly from his apparent indifference to this difficulty that Pitson, for instance, concludes that "Hume takes the existence of the human body for granted in his discussions of sympathy" (Pitson 259). In the following discussion I hope to show not only that such a common conclusion as Pitson's but also the charge with Hume's indifference about the double-hold difficulty regarding the inference to other minds itself is unfounded.

It may be true, as critics points out, that no direct discussion of the problem of other minds is contained in Book II. It is because, I think, *sympathy* was not intended originally as the solution of the problem of other minds. But, only if we collect and connect the fragments of his remarks relevant to this issue scattered throughout his discussion of passions with each other into the form of unity, we shall see that he never avoids nor overlooks the existence of the problem. It might not be so fanciful to put the point of the general charge the other way round and to suggest that Hume's entire theory of passions itself is the investigation of this problem, showing the way out of this intractable problem. It seems evident at least that his treatment of *sympathy* or passions as a whole contains several crucial clues to this notorious problem, though most of them are given rather independently just like detached pieces of a zig-saw puzzle. I shall now be concerned to the following seven remarks chosen rather arbitrarily from the different parts of his discussion of passions, and try to combine them together, hoping to have a glimpse of his intention.

(1) "*Besides these original causes of pride and humility, there is a secondary one in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the affections. Our reputation, our character, our name, are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride, virtue, beauty, and riches, have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others*"(T 316). "*Whatever other passions we may be actuated by, pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge, or lust, the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor would they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others*"(T 363).

(2) "*No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathise with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments*"(T 316).

(3) *“Now it is evident, that the very same qualities and circumstances, which are the causes of pride or self-esteem, are also the cause of vanity, or the desire of reputation ... But if love and esteem were not produced by the same qualities as pride, according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others, this method of proceeding would be very absurd; nor could men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person with those themselves have entertained”*(T 332).

(4) *“Regard now with attention the nature of these passions [of pride and humility, love and hatred], and their situation with respect to each other. It is evident here are four affections, placed as it were in a square, or regular connection with, and distance from, each other”*(T 333).

(5) *“Thus the pleasure which a rich man receives from his possessions, being thrown upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and esteem; which sentiments again being perceived and sympathised with, increase the pleasure of the possessor, and, being once more reflected, become a new foundation for pleasure and esteem in the beholder”*(T 365).

(6) *“But without such a progress in philosophy, we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular, but are sufficiently guided by common experience, as well as by a kind of presentation, which tells us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves”*(T 332).

(7) *“The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object to which we are related”*(T 354).

Initially, it is in the course of his discussion of pride and humility that love/hatred is introduced as the additional or “secondary cause” of the passion: “even the other causes of pride, virtue, beauty, and riches, have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others”(T 316). Here love and hatred are yet to be specified as a new “set” of passion which is intended to be the partner of pride/hatred, but mentioned only vaguely as “the opinions or sentiments of others” which has an influence on our passions. It is worth remembering that in Hume’s system, love/hatred is mentioned not as a particular name, but rather as a general name of the ‘hybrid’ perception which is composed of pleasurable/painful sensation and the idea of the other self, e.g. esteem, respect, admiration, pity, envy, malice. Similarly, whatever reflective impression constituted of pleasurable/painful sensation together with the idea of self is called pride/humility, as I have noted before.

There is nothing original or extraordinary in his claim regarding this first issue that “besides these original cause of pride and humility, there is a secondary one in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the affections”(T 316). Because, our experience always

tells us how “our reputation, our character, our name, are considerations of vast weight and importance; even other causes of pride, virtue, beauty, and riches, have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others”(T 316). A rich costume belonging to me may cause pleasure but not pride unless I cannot expect, though implicitly, any respect or admiration from others. I am proud of my dress, just because I am sure, if sub-consciously, that it will produce love or esteem or envy in the mind of others. In this case, the former, viz. rich costume, is the original cause of my pride and the latter, viz. love or esteem, is the secondary cause, according to Hume’s definition.

Some may deny it, holding that they are quite indifferent how other people would think or feel about them, and that they are pleased with the beautiful costume because of its beauty or preciousness. A beautiful dress delights us, of course, just as a plain shell or stone which a child happens to find among sand on a beach may cause him a great pleasure. Hume does not exclude such a possibility of its being a purely sensational reaction, which is nothing essentially different from the sensation of cold or heat, surprise, some kind of pleasure or pain. His point lies only in that the status of its purely sensational reaction is quite distinct from the status to which the reflective impressions such as passions, desires, and emotions belong to, since the former belongs to the first order layer whereas the latter to the third: the human mind as Hume pictures has a sort of sandwich-structured system made of several layers in which impressions and ideas appear alternately with a definite order in such a way as the lower order layers supply the base for the higher order ones, as Hume has defined at the beginning of Book I (T 7/8). And in Hume’s system, even an aesthetic emotion, which might seem a mere sensational reaction, belongs to the third order, because “though our first object be some senseless inanimate piece of matter, it seldom we rest there, and carry not our view to its influence on sensible and rational creatures”(T 363). Our aesthetic reaction is thus distinct from sensations, according to him, in that it involves, though implicitly, the idea of “sensible and rational creatures.”

It has been contended that, although we have “special organs which are so disposed as to produce the passion”(T 287) of pride, a “foreign object, e.g. a rich costume, is still necessary as a primary “cause” which “gives the first motion to pride,” and sets those organs in action” (T 288). But if pride depends upon such a “secondary cause”(T 316) as the sentiment or opinion of others, how would it affect “the true system”(T 286) which is established upon the double association of impressions and ideas between the passion and the foreign object? What

makes it possible for the affection of others to have any influence over the double association of impressions and ideas established between pride and a rich costume at all? How can we judge what is happening in another person's mind at all when "no passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind"(T 576)?

It is here that Hume introduces the second issue, viz. *sympathy*, as the natural "propensity we have to sympathise with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments"(T 316). There seems no special difficulty in connecting the first with the second issue, as it is evident that, in order for the sentiments and opinions of others to have any influence over our mind at all, we must have some means to know what is happening in their minds. And now Hume assures us that such a means is embedded in our mind as a remarkable "quality of human nature"(T 316) so that we are obliged to "enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them"(T 319).

However, against this reasoning, one might raise the following objection. If we accept Hume's assurance and assume that my pride about my rich costume is an emotional reaction produced by the love or respect of others, how could he still hold that the passion is the effect of their love or admiration when I feel proud of my rich costume, before or without actually having any comments from others? In such a case, there is obviously no actual sentiments or opinions to be communicated to me and to have any influence over my affections. Is it not the **knowledge** or mere conceiving, and not the **communication** or actual receiving, of their opinions or sentiments that is supposed to be the [secondary] cause the passion? In Hume's system the former is distinct from the latter, since what is asserted in the latter is the sentiments of others as impressions whereas in the former the sentiments of others as ideas. Why is it that in Hume's system the former is inadequate for the production of the passion? There must be some intention for Hume to hold the latter in stead of the former, which may be identified through the rest of the discussion.

The third issue is asserted rather independently when he calls our attention to the resemblance between the two sets of passions, pride/humility and love/hatred, claiming that "the very same qualities and circumstances, which are the causes of pride and self-esteem, are also the cause of vanity, or the desire of reputation"(T 332). But, why is the resemblance or symmetry between the two sets of passions so important for his hypothesis? Because, he answers, "if love and esteem were not produced by the same qualities, according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others, this method of proceeding would be very absurd; nor could men

expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person with those themselves have entertained”(T 332). Although few can “make reflections on their general nature and resemblance”(T 332), he points out, “without such a progress in philosophy, we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular”(ibid.). He thus takes the resemblance between two sets of passion as the “full and decisive proof”(T 331) of the “correspondence in the sentiments of every other person with those themselves have entertained”(T 332), which guarantees that “we are sufficiently guided by common experience, as well as by a kind of presentation, which tells us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves”(T 332).

What supplies the solid foundation for our belief in our “common experiences”(T 332) is thus claimed to be the double-bound tie with which these four passions, viz. pride, humility, love, and hatred, are inseparably related to each other. This is the fourth issue illustrated as the “four affections, placed as it were in a square”(T 333). Hume spares the whole succeeding section for eight experiments in order to prove how these four passions are connected together by a rigid double-hold tie into a form of square.

But the resemblance or symmetry between the two sets of passions, one may suggest, is plainly the story about a single mind, not the story between minds. If so, how are we justified by the asserted resemblance in judging what will operate on others on the basis of what we feel immediately in ourselves? How could Hume maintain that the former supply the foundation of the latter, or that this resemblance is the proof of *sympathy*?

In order to understand this situation, it is necessary to mark as his fifth issue that passions and affections are essentially “the impressions of reflexion”(T 7/8) which are mainly the derivation from or reflection of another person’s affections. Hume illustrates how pride may be considered as the reflexion of love and love of pride, taking an example of a rich man who is satisfied with his possessions, in the following way. There must certainly be “the first source of all the passions which arise from them,” e.g. “an original satisfaction in riches derived from the power which they bestow of enjoying all the pleasures of life”(T 365). And “the pleasure which a rich man receives from his possessions, being thrown upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and esteem, which sentiments again being perceived and sympathised with, increase the pleasure of the possessor, and being once more reflected, become a new foundation for the pleasure and esteem in the beholder”(T 365). It is thus claimed that, besides “an original satisfaction in riches,” the possessor has also “a secondary satisfaction in riches”(T 365), viz. pride or vanity, arising from the love and esteem he acquires by them. This is why satisfaction or vanity

is nothing but “a second reflection of that original pleasure which proceeded from himself” (T 365).

But if pride is in this sense the reflexion of love and love of pride, or if humility is the reflexion of hatred and hatred of humility, as he assumes, how could it be the proof that the case is the same with others? This question may be answered by Hume in the following way. The original sensation (A) which arises in my mind reflects upon my friend’s mind as an emotion or passion (B), which is a ‘hybrid’ impression composed of (A) and the idea of my own person. (B) returns back to me as another ‘hybrid’ impression (C), involving an additional constituent, viz. the idea of my friend. (C) may be reflected once again upon my friend’s mind as (D), accompanied again by the idea of myself, only to have a third return back to my mind as (E), followed again with the idea of my friend, and so on. In this view, the second or third return of my original sensation, viz. (C) or (E), may be regarded as the proof of (B) or (D) respectively which is supposed to have arisen in my friend’s mind, though there is no way for me to know if it has really happened. It seems not entirely gratuitous to suggest that this is what is implied by his sixth assertion: “we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular, but are sufficiently guided by common experience, as well as by a kind of presentation, which tells us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves”(T 332).

For all his assurance, we may still feel suspicious when we find him assuming that the symmetry or resemblance between the two sets of passion guarantees the correspondence between two minds, making us “enter into”(T 319, 360) or “partake of the satisfaction of every one that approaches us”(T 358). And all these puzzles regarding his strategy for the problem of other minds seems to be solved when his seventh issue is given as an emphasis upon his former assertion: “The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object to which we are related”(T 354). It is indeed this last issue that not only his theory of *sympathy* but also his entire system of passions depends upon. Let us now try to see what could be the bearing of his suggestion regarding the problem of other minds in the succeeding section.

(4) *Sympathy* distinct from the belief attending judgments

In order to understand Hume’s intention regarding our present issue, it seems quite useful to mark that Humean *sympathy* presupposes concretes or often physical circumstances in which the perceiver is related to the perceived in some specific way. We may well notice how

he tries to picturise in such a real and detailed way how *sympathy* happens: “Suppose the ship to be driven so near me, that I can perceive distinctly the horror painted on the countenances of the seamen and passengers, hear their lamentable cries, see the dearest friends give their last adieu, or embrace with a resolution to perish in each other’s arms ...”(T 594). Or, we may feel as if we were present at any of the more terrible operations of surgery, when he describes how “even before it begun, the preparation of the instruments, the laying of the bandages in order, the heating of the irons, with all the signs of anxiety and concern in the patient and assistants, would have a great effect upon my mind, and excite the strongest sentiments of pity and terror”(T 576). We may also remember how emphatic Hume is about the presence of another person before our eyes in his accounts of *sympathy* [e.g. T 317, T 358, T 592].

It may not be entirely gratuitous to claim that *sympathy* as Hume conceives has such an important aspect as to be defined in terms of person-perception in which the perceiver is related in some definite way to the perceived, rather than in terms of a private mental experience to which only the person concerned is secretly accessible. What is asserted as Humean *sympathy* consists partly in that to have a person as the object of perception entails the idea of his sentiments and opinions through “those external signs in the countenance and conversation” (T 317). In other words, to perceive a person is, for him, to perceive “the effects of passion in the voice and gesture,” which carries my mind immediately from these effects to their causes, and gives rise to a lively idea of the passion.

It is often pointed out that there is an interesting parallel between the inference to the mental states of others and the causal or probable reasoning regarding the existence of external objects. When we perceive external objects, what we can directly experience is the perceptions themselves so that the objects of the perception are only supposed to exist. Our perception depends upon the causal inference from the observed to the unobserved owing to the customary conjunction between them established by our past experience. It then follows that “we cannot appeal to our experience as proving any rational basis of the claim that our perceptions are caused by external objects”(Pitson 258). In parallel with this, it is often maintained that “Hume appears to accept that the contents of another person’s mind are not immediately perceived by us and are known only by their ‘signs’ or effects”(Pitson 258). “His account of human testimony treats the ideas of others as causal links between the facts or objects represented and the words or discourses through which we are made aware of these facts”(Pitson 258). Here comes this assertion that “the parallel with the perceptual case ... seems quite close”(Pitson 259):

“there is an inference to the existence of something which can never immediately be known — the state of mind of the other person — from its associated causes and effects”(ibid.).

In order to understand the nature of Hume’s notion of *sympathy*, the parallel between these two kinds of inferences cannot be too exaggerated, because for one thing *sympathy* is intended by Hume as the strong confirmation of his system of the understanding, and for another *sympathy* presupposes the causal inference between the sentiments or opinions and their external signs or symptoms. It is reasonable that *sympathy* is the “exactly correspondent to the operations of the understanding”(T 320), since Hume’s strategy for proving the consistency of his hypothesis he has established in Book I is, as we have noted, to illustrate the system of the passions by the same method of reasoning. And so far as this strategy of Hume’s is concerned, there is nothing in his account of *sympathy* which may invite any critics’ doubt or objection.

It is in the next step, however, when he proceeds and argues that “the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very passions they represent”(T 319) that this strategy requires some important adjustment in the following way.

Originally the conversion of an idea into an impression is intended as an decisive proof of this analogy when he asserts with apparent confidence like this: “sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding; and **even** contains something more surprising and extraordinary”(T 320) [My emphasis], viz. the conversion. His original intention regarding the conversion may be explicitly seen in the following passage:

“The different degrees of their force and vivacity are, therefore, the only particulars that distinguish them [=impressions and ideas]; and as this difference may be removed, in some measure, by a relation betwixt the impressions and ideas, it is no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion may by this means be so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion. The lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression; and it is certain we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by often thinking of it. But this is most remarkable in the opinions and affections; and it is there principally that a lively idea is converted into an impression. Our affections depends more upon ourselves, and the internal operations of the mind, than any other impressions; for which reason they arise more naturally from the imagination, and from every lively idea we form of them”(T 319).

It seems quite evident that Hume's intention in the above quotation lies in defining the conversion in terms of degree of the force and vivacity with which an idea appears in the mind. He thought, I seems to me, he could prove the "the exact correspondence" between the system of the understanding and the system of the passions only if this ad hoc process, viz. conversion, turns out to be nothing but the extreme case of the former system in which "the lively idea of any object always approaches its impression"(T 319), or at least one of those special cases in which "we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by often thinking of it"(ibid.). The conversion is thus defined as the process which depends upon the forcefulness of the vivacity with which the affection of another person is entertained: "The idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself ..."(T 317).

Here naturally arises such a general misunderstanding regarding Hume's assertion of conversion as we see in the following view:

"When Hume talks of the idea one forms of the sentiments of another it is natural to understand this as a reference to belief. For Hume has earlier characterised belief as a lively idea related to a present impression, and the present impression in this case would presumably be provided by one's perception of the other's behaviour or utterances, as well as the circumstances in which these occur. The belief that someone else has a certain sentiment is then supposed to be converted into the very sentiment itself. In general the effect of belief is to make ideas themselves more impression-like in degree of force and vivacity, thus facilitating the process by which an idea might be transformed into the impression it represents"(Pitson 262).

Capaldi has the share of this position when he asserts: "Belief is the conversion of an idea into an impression by means of vivacity, and for that reason belief has such an influence upon behaviour. Since the causes of the passions are ideas, these ideas can affect us only by becoming like impressions"(Hume 264). According to Hume's discussion of belief in the existence of external objects, "there is always a present impression and a related idea, and the present impression gives a vivacity to the fancy; and ... the relation conveys this vivacity by an easy transition to the related idea"(T 289). And in our present case also, the relations "convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner"(T 318). An idea of a

sentiment or passion may by this means so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion, by acquiring the force and vivacity from the present impression of ourselves. “There is evidently a great analogy”(T 290) betwixt these two hypotheses, as Hume assures us. And in so far as this analogy is intended by the author himself as we explicitly see in the following assertion, it seems quite natural to agree with critics, and to assert that *sympathy* is intended as the form of belief entertained “in the strongest and most lively manner”(T 314).

“For, besides the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinced of the reality of the passion with which we sympathise; besides this, I say, we must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection. And since these relations can entirely convert an idea into an impression, and convey the vivacity of the latter into the former, so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition, we may easily conceive how the relation of cause and effect alone may serve to enliven an idea”(T 320).

Obviously the point of Hume’s second quotation lies in this: the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinced of the reality of the passion with which we sympathise, must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, in order to convey the vivacity from the impression to the related idea “so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition,” only when we can “feel the sympathy in its full perfection.” He plainly assumes in this part of his contention that the conversion is the matter of degree of vivacity with which the idea in question appears in the mind. And if the conversion were really the matter of degree of vivacity as he misleadingly implies, Hume’s theory of sympathy is clearly untenable: a lively idea of any object may approach its impression, but never be converted into “a real impression”(T 354).

When Hume asserted that “sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding; and even contains something more surprising and extraordinary”(T 320), he was convinced, it seems to me, of his success in proving the analogy through the illustration of this ad hoc process of conversion in terms of the force and vivacity with which an idea appears into the mind. Ironically, however, he has to accept that it is here the analogy fails: however vivacious an idea may be, the lively idea never changes “into a real impression”(T 354). It is true that what makes a most important feature of *sympathy* is the aspect of person-perception. But it is crucial to mark that “sympathy is not a cognitive process of inferring the mental states of others from their behaviour and utterances”(Pitson 262) as Pitson maintains, in so far as

sympathy contains something more, or ad hoc, viz. conversion, as the heart of this affective experience. In spite of his emphasis upon “the exact correspondence,” “it would be the failure to see and to emphasize that sympathy is a form of inference ‘exactly correspondent to the operation of our understanding’ ”(Capaldi 266), as Capaldi warns us.

Does it follow from this collapse of the analogy that “Hume’s position in relation to our knowledge of other selves is ultimately inconsistent”(Pitson 260), as it is often contended? Is it likely that Hume recognised the failure of pursuing his basic strategy as the mark of the inconsistency of his notion of *sympathy*?

The answers for these questions may turn out to be in the negative, when we find that, in spite of his insistence upon the degree of the vivacity as the crucial factor of the conversion, his real intention regarding the conversion lies elsewhere: the conversion depends upon not the forcefulness of the vivacity, but upon the uniqueness of the vivacity, viz. “the vivacity of conception with which we always form the idea of our own person”(T 318). Though misleading as he really is in over-emphasising the analogy between the two kinds of inference, what is asserted by him is not that the lively idea of **any** objects is converted into an impression, but that “it is there **principally** [in the opinions and affections of others] that an idea of a sentiment or passion may by this means so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion”(T 319) [My emphasis]. It is, therefore, not the analogy but rather the distinction of the idea of a passion from any other ideas that is claimed by this assertion: *sympathy* is different from any kind of causal inference regarding material objects in that the former involves the conversion of an idea into an impression. And his main concern in Book II lies in answering the question why the idea of a passion becomes “the very passion itself” while every other lively idea remains an idea.

Hume’s answer for this question is that the conversion entirely depends upon not the relation among objects, but the relation between the object in question and ourselves. Because it is mainly this relation, especially that of resemblance, between what is perceived and what perceives that can convey to the former the vivacity with which we always form the idea of the latter. “The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person”(T 318). What makes the conversion possible is neither the resemblance nor the vivacity in general, but “a great resemblance among all human creatures”(T 318), just because it is only the latter relation that can “convey the

impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner”(T 318).

To put it the other way round, the principal way to “agitate the spirits”(T 352) or give rise to the impression or “idea of our own person” is to have the idea of the passion of others. It is true that “we are at all times intimately conscious of ourselves”(T 339), but “ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing”(T 340). This is the reason why “we must turn our view to external objects”(T 340), “It is natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us”(T 340/1), simply because, on the appearance of such an object, the mind “awakes, as it were, from a dream; the blood flows with a new tide; the heart is elevated; and the whole man acquires a vigour which he cannot command in his solitary and calm moments”(T 353), according to him. “Hence company is naturally so rejoicing, as presenting the liveliest of all objects, viz. a rational and thinking being like ourselves, who communicates to us all the actions of his mind, makes us privy to his inmost sentiments and affections, and lets us see, in the very instant of their production, all the emotions which are caused by any object”(T 353). Here lies the very point Hume intends to illustrate in terms of *sympathy*: “Every lively idea is agreeable, but especially that of a passion, because such an idea becomes a kind of passion and gives a more sensible agitation to the mind than any other image or conception”(T 353).

(5) How to enter into the sentiments of others

But we may be still left with this serious question: how “we enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them”(T 319). What could be the ground for Hume for maintaining that “we must enter into this sentiment of the proprietor”(T 360) when we esteem or contempt a person upon account of his riches or poverty, for instance? What is actually asserted when he claims that the idea of the affection of another person, e.g. his satisfaction, is converted into “the very impression it represents”(T 319)? Does he mean that I am also satisfied? How can “we enter into the sentiments of rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness”(T 362)?

In order to answer all these questions, it is useful to recall that in Hume’s system passions are essentially the ‘hybrid’ impressions composed of impressions and ideas: the peculiar object of the indirect passion is the self or the other self “determined by an original and natural instinct”(T 286). When I feel the passion of respect or esteem for a rich person, for instance,

one of the two components of my respect, viz. the pleasurable sensation, is derived or “proceeds from” the satisfaction of the “thinking conscious being, which is the very object of love”(T 362). My respect or esteem for a rich person is thus the ‘hybrid’ impression constituted of both this pleasurable sensation originated from his pleasure and the idea of him. If so, Hume may be justified in claiming at least as a logical assertion that in so far as I feel esteem, I “enter” so deep into his satisfaction: logically I have the share or “partake” of his pleasure in the sense in which my respect as a ‘hybrid’ impression contains as its main constituent the pleasurable sensation derived from the rich person. It is logically one and the same pleasurable sensation that composes both my esteem and his satisfaction: the former passion is produced when it is partnered with the idea of the other self whereas the latter when it is combined with the idea of the self. This may be taken to be the situation claimed by Hume when he holds that it is “the pride of *sympathy*, by which we enter into the sentiments of rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness”(T 362).

He is certainly misleading in ascertaining that the idea of another person’s affection is “presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself and produce an equal emotion as an original affection”(T 319). Because when he maintains that “the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very passions they represent”(T 319), he might be mistakenly taken to imply that I actually become affected with the same emotion as well. It is here that “obvious puzzles” are supposed to arise from “the literal impossibility of observing the mind of another person or self (as I might observe my own reflection in a mirror), and similarly of sharing the sentiments of another mind in any sense other than having sentiments which may be like those of someone else”(Pitson 261). This is not, however, what is intended by Hume by the conversion.

The conversion is not to be taken as a magical black-box process into which an idea enters only to appear out of it as an impression. What is asserted as the conversion is a productive “system” or mechanism of the mind by which, when we have the ideas of the affections of others, “the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them”(T 319). We have seen above how he takes the example of an “esteem for the rich” causing the pride or vanity in the person, and explains it in terms of the circumstance in which “the original satisfaction in riches” returns as “a secondary reflexion of that original pleasure”(T 365) like this: “(1) The pleasure which a rich man received from his possessions, being thrown upon the beholder, causes (2) a pleasure and esteem; which sentiment again being perceived and sympathised

with, increases (3) the pleasure of the possessor, and, being once more reflected, becomes (4) a new foundation for pleasure and esteem in the beholder”(T 365) [My numbering].

“The first source of all the passions which arise from them”(T 365) is certainly “an original satisfaction,” as numbered (1), or “the impression of sensation” derived from the power which riches bestow of enjoying all the pleasures of life. When (1) “is conveyed to the beholder by the imagination”(T 362), “an idea resembling the original impression in force and vivacity”(ibid.) marked as (2) is produced. This “pleasure and esteem” or love in turn is reflected upon the rich man as “a second reflection of that original pleasure which proceeded from himself”(T 365). Now this “secondary satisfaction or vanity” marked as (3), “being once more reflected, become a new foundation for pleasure and esteem in the beholder” as (4). “Here then is a third rebound (5) of the original pleasure, after which it is difficult to distinguish the images and reflections, by reason of their faintness and confusion”(T 365), according to him.

Either the specie of pride or the one of love is produced alternately as a new passion in correspondent to the processes in which the original pleasurable sensation enjoyed by a rich man is thrown upon the beholder, and then returns back to the possessor, and once again received by the beholder, only to have a third rebound to the possessor, and so on. It is remarkable to see how the original pleasure provides the first source of all passions which arise from them, by being passed between the rich man and his beholder just like in a catch-ball game, which nevertheless is described not as the occurrence between minds but as the process of a **single** mind. To be more precise, what is here suggested is not a catch-ball-like process in which one and the same sensation passes to and fro between two minds, but rather is the process in which the imagination takes the passage between two resembling ideas, viz. the idea of my own person and the idea of another person, and returns back again **attended** with the related passions, causing the **transfusion** among passions, as we shall see closely in the later chapters. Love or esteem towards a rich man is thus explained as the reflection of the original satisfaction of the rich person whereas “the secondary satisfaction” or vanity as “a second reflection of that original pleasure which proceeded from himself”(T 365). Hume’s real intention in defining a passion as the reflective impression lies not only in that it is “placed betwixt two ideas of which the one produces it, and the other is produced by it”(T 278), but in that “those rays of passions, sentiments, and opinions, may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees”(T 365). Because in Hume’s view, a passion arises mostly in such a circumstance in which another person is more less involved.

Hume is then a solipsist, one might suggest, who holds that we are living in a solitary world, enjoying only the reflection or shadow of our own mind. But we may easily point out how unfounded this criticism is: it is the fallacy of this solipsist position that Hume tries to prove by appealing this “propensity we **have to** sympathise with others and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments”(T 316). By *sympathy*, we not only receive other people’s inclinations and sentiments but also “enter” into their sentiments and “partake” of their pleasure and uneasiness, according to him. He never claims that, as we are sufficiently guided by what we feel immediately in ourselves, we do **not** need to enter into the mind of others in order to see what will operate on others. He claims instead that, as we are thus “sufficiently guided by common experience”(T 332), all we need to do is to try to examine “what we feel immediately in ourselves”(ibid.), and to illustrate the “presentation which tells us what will operate on others”(ibid.).

No one is more definitely against the solipsists’ position than Hume who insists upon “the force of *sympathy* through the whole animal creation, and the easy communication of sentiments from one thinking being to another”(T 363). It may not be a mere exaggeration to define the second Book as an expression of his ardent desire for establishing the issue that “whatever other passions we may be actuated by, pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge, or lust, the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor would they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others”(T 363). No one would probably be more emphatic in his conclusion from this general view of human nature: “Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man; let the sun rise and set at his command; the sea and rivers roll as he pleases, and the earth furnish spontaneously whatever may be useful or agreeable to him; he will still be miserable, till you give him some one person at least with whom he may share his happiness, and whole esteem and friendship he may enjoy”(T 363).

Hume’s sympathy happens not only where we “remark this resemblance betwixt themselves and others, but also by the natural course of the disposition, or by a certain sympathy which always arises betwixt similar characters”(T 354). The latter case depends upon “our natural temper which gives us a propensity to the same impression which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion”(T 354). In other words, “resemblance converts the idea into an impression, not only by means of the relation, and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea; but also by presenting such materials as to take fire from the

least spark”(T 354). Resemblance in the latter case does not depend upon the recognition or comparison of the two objects with each other, but emerges as a sort of attraction operating between two resembling objects. He seems to suggest by means of his famous metaphor of “the rays of passions” that the recognition of ourselves or our own passions depends upon their reflections upon the minds of others rather than upon our own self-reflections or introspections.

It may be true, as critics points out, that no direct discussion of the problem of other minds is contained in Book II. This general opinion is not entirely gratuitous in the sense in which *sympathy* was not intended originally as the solution of the problem of other minds. Crucially, however, it does not follow that he avoids or overlooks the existence of the problem. His answer is prepared not as a direct answer, but rather as the theory of passions as the whole through which he shows the way how to get out of this intractable problem as we have seen above.

If it is Hume’s basic strategy to hold the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and of the passions as he himself insists, it may not be entirely unfounded to assume that for Hume what is to be inquired regarding the existence of other minds is this question: *What causes induce us to believe in the existence of other minds?* To ask *Whether there be body or not?* is, according to him, to ask an impossible problem. Similarly to ask *Whether there be other minds or not?* or *Whether the case is the same with others?* is to ask another impossible problem. As it regards the problem of other minds, our business is to illustrate “our common experience” or “a kind of presentation”(T 332) which tells us “what will operate on others” in terms of what we perceive or “feel immediately in ourselves.”

(6) Pitson on “Sympathy and Other Selves”

In his paper titled “Sympathy and Other Selves”(Hume Studies, Number II, XXII, November 1996), Prof. Tony Pitson points out quite plausibly that Hume’s treatment of sympathy involves “important questions about the way in which the idea [of other person’s state of mind] is supposed to be acquired”(Pitson 253). In this paper Pitson proposes a quite valuable suggestion regarding the way how Hume’s notion of *sympathy* is to be investigated: in order to understand Hume’s real intention in his discussion of *sympathy*, it is “misleading to represent Hume as a proponent of the Argument from Analogy”(Pitson 263). This is not entirely a new suggestion, since Nicholas Capaldi has already warned us in his excellent article, “Hume’s the-

ory of passions”(Hume 266), to the same effect: “it is the failure to see and to emphasize that sympathy is a form of inference ‘exactly correspondent to the operation of our understanding.’” Pitson’s paper is worth our examination, as it shows a quite interesting illustration of critics’ dilemma regarding Hume’s notion of *sympathy*.

He begins his discussion with the distinction between the two ways by which the problem of other minds is usually considered, viz. as the problem of epistemology and as the problem of the philosophy of mind. The first is the problem regarding our knowledge of other selves, which concerns “whether we can, strictly speaking, be said to have knowledge of other selves at all”(Pitson 256), whereas the second often takes the form of Cartesian dualism. These two aspects are intimately related to each other, the first naturally derived from the second, viz. the Cartesian separation between mind and body.

What Pitson marks as the striking feature of Hume’s notion of *sympathy* is that “Hume does not appear to recognise any epistemological problem concerning other selves”(Pitson 266). But when Hume in his account of *sympathy* “attempts to explain how it is possible for us to be aware of the contents of other people’s mind”(Pitson 256), “he nevertheless accepts some form of dualism (though not ... Decartes’ substance dualism)”(ibid.). “Obvious puzzles here arises,” according to him, “from the literal impossibility of observing the mind of another person or self ..., and similarly of sharing the sentiments of another mind in any sense other than having sentiments which may be like those of someone else”(Pitson 261). Pitson is obliged to conclude after all that “Hume’s position in relation to our knowledge of other selves is ultimately inconsistent”(Pitson 260).

Pitson’s paper consists of the following two main issues:

(A) Hume appears to have no concern to the epistemological aspect of the problem of other minds in his discussion of *sympathy* or of passions.

(B) But for all his seeming indifference, Hume’s notion of *sympathy* virtually involves the epistemological problem regarding other selves.

Pitson’s negative conclusion regarding Hume’s notion of *sympathy* is derived mainly from the dichotomy between these two issues, which involve the following relevant ones.

(a1) Regarding the first point, Pitson holds that “sympathy is not defined cognitively, as a process of inference by which we obtain knowledge of the mental states of others”(Pitson 261).

(a2) He suggests as the alternative position that “the existence of others as the subjects of

mental states is presupposed both in Hume's discussion of the understanding in Book I of the *Treatise*, and also in his discussion of the passions — in particular, the indirect passions — in Book II"(Pitson 256).

(b1) The second point is asserted by Pitson on the ground that Hume's notion of *sympathy* depends upon the causal inference between passions and their external signs or outward symptoms, which shows an interesting parallel with the perceptual case Hume was so concerned in Book I regarding the existence of the external world.

(b2) While marking the similarities between these two kinds of inferences on the one hand, Pitson claims the difference between them on the other hand, asserting that the former presupposes the existence of bodies (Pitson 259), which makes the source of the scepticism regarding the latter's inference.

(b3) "His unquestioning acceptance of the existence of other minds or selves"(Pitson 263) is the reason why "Hume does not in fact see the inference to the mental states of others as presenting the same difficulties as the philosopher's inference from perceptions to external objects"(Pitson 259), according to him.

In the succeeding discussion, I shall try to support Pitson's main assertions regarding (A) and (B) as well as (a1) and (b1), while showing how his negative conclusion of the inconsistency of Hume's position is derived from his misunderstanding about the rest of the points identified as (a2), (b2), and (b3).

(7) Hume's position regarding other selves

In his paper, Pitson admits rather simply that Hume does not recognise the first epistemological problem while subscribing to the second position, accepting "some form of dualism, though ... not Descartes' substance dualism"(Pitson 256).

It might seem quite reasonable to agree with Pitson, and to hold that "Hume appears to entertain no doubt whatsoever about our capacity for gaining awareness of the mental states of others, — and indeed, never directly addresses the issue of scepticism in this context"(Pitson 256). It may indeed be quite unlikely that *sympathy*, as Hume originally conceived, is intended as the solution of the problem of other minds. However, it is unfounded, it seems to me, to conclude with Pitson that "the existence of others as the subjects of mental states is presupposed both in Hume's discussion of the understanding in Book I of the *Treatise*, and also in his discussion of the passions — in particular, the indirect passions — in Book II"(Pitson 256).

No doubt, Pitson is entirely well-founded in holding that Hume's strategy in Book I is, as Hume explicitly expresses in his discussion of personal identity, to "suppose we could see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions which constitutes his mind or thinking principle"(T 260). And in so far as he pursues this strategy, "the case is the same whether we consider ourselves or others"(T 261). It is worth remembering at the same time that this method of reasoning is adequate for the illustration of this aspect of our identity common or analogous to "that identity which we attribute to plants and animals" (T 253). Hume's intention in accounting for "the identity of a self or person" by the analogy with the identity of plants and animals lies in showing that our identity "cannot therefore have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like object" (T 259). In other words, this aspect of our identity, characterised as "personal identity as it regards our thought or imagination"(T 253), is "only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies"(T 259). Pitson thus has a good ground for his assertion that "the existence of others as the subjects of mental states is presupposed ... in Book I"(Pitson 256).

But could it really be the case that in Book II Hume does not recognise any epistemological problem concerning other selves, as Pitson suggests? Against Pitson's assertion, Hume seems to have adopted a different strategy for his discussion of *sympathy* or passions. Because, a different strategy is needed for the illustration of another aspect of our identity, distinguished as "personal identity as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves," which is intended to be distinct from "the identity of plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature"(T 259). In order to see if Hume really recognises the epistemological aspect of our present issue, it seems necessary to understand that *sympathy* is intended by Hume as a form of (person-)perception.

(8) *Sympathy* as person-perception

"When any affection is infused by sympathy," Hume maintains, "it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it"(Pitson 317). In Hume's discussion of *sympathy*, we may easily notice that much importance is assigned to the observation of "the effect of passion in the voice and gesture"(T 576) of a person, which carries my mind "immediately" from these effects to their causes, and makes me entertain the idea of the passion. It may not be entirely gratuitous to

hold that what is asserted as *sympathy* is in effect a kind of person-perception, rather than a mere private affective experience to which only the person concerned is accessible: person-perception depends upon a particular (often physical or material) circumstance in which the perceiver and the perceived make two main constituents. This may be the reason why in his accounts of *sympathy* Hume emphasises the immediate presence of another person or “every one that approaches us”(T 358), or the concrete or detailed cases in which I am supposed to be present at a terrible operation of surgery (T 576) or shipwreck (T 594). And in so far as *sympathy* is defined by Hume as a natural “phenomenon” which necessarily happens at the presence of a person, we may naturally agree with Pitson in maintaining that Hume’s notion of *sympathy* involves the epistemological problem of other selves.

In other words, the epistemological problem regarding the mental states of others is involved in Humean *sympathy* as the issue concerning this problem: What makes the experience in question the perception of a person, distinct from the perception of “plants and animals, and ships, and houses, and all compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature”? And if it is possible to take Humean *sympathy* as a form of perception at all, there is nothing strange or extraordinary in that the epistemological issue supposed to be involved in his notion of *sympathy* “seems very similar”(Pitson 258) to the one with his account of perception of external objects.

Although *sympathy* may probably be intended by Hume not as the solution of the epistemological problems regarding other selves, however, Hume actually recognised, it seems to me, that he could not avoid the involvement of the epistemological problem in his discussion of *sympathy* when he claims as the basis of *sympathy* the causal inference between the passions of others and their behaviour. Pitson may be justified in holding that, for all his obvious lack of concern with the epistemological aspect of the problem, Hume is virtually committed to the problem when he “attempts to explain in his discussion of *sympathy* how it is possible for us to be aware of the contents of other people’s minds”(Pitson 258). And Hume’s answer regarding the problem of other minds is prepared, it seems to me, in his discussion of *sympathy* or passions like this: The epistemological problem concerning other selves turns out to be a pseudo problem, once we acknowledge how we are all naturally subject to “that propensity we have to sympathise with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments”(T 316). In this sense, Pitson seems plausible in concluding that “there is, for Hume, no puzzle concerning the possibility of our being aware of what these [mental] states [of others]

are”(Pitson 266), once he establishes “the true system”(T 286) by which a passions or “impression of reflection” is derived. Because, *sympathy* is nothing but a case in which a new passion arises from the double association of impressions and ideas, as we shall see in the following discussion. But this answer of Hume’s may not be taken as the suggestion that we do not need to inquire how we come to “endorse a constant conjunction between body and mind generally and not just in our own case”(Pitson 260), or that “we can scarcely be in the position ... engaging in an inference from the occurrence of such states in ourselves to the existence of such states in other selves”(Pitson 267).

(9) *Sympathy* as a parallel with the causal inference in general

Pitson marks that there is an interesting “parallel” between the inference to the mental states of others and the causal or probable reasoning regarding the existence of external objects. When we perceive external objects, he argues, what we can directly experience is the perceptions themselves so that the objects of the perception are only supposed to exist. Our perception depends upon the causal inference from the observed to the unobserved owing to the customary conjunction between them established by our past experience. It then follows that “we cannot appeal to our experience as proving any rational basis of the claim that our perceptions are caused by external objects”(Pitson 258).

In parallel with this, Pitson maintains, “Hume appears to accept that the contents of another person’s mind are not immediately perceived by us and are known only by their ‘signs’ or effects”(Pitson 258). “His account of human testimony treats the ideas of others as causal links between the facts or objects represented and the words or discourses through which we are made aware of these facts”(Pitson 258), according to him. Here comes his assertion that “the parallel with the perceptual case ... seems quite close”(Pitson 259): “there is an inference to the existence of something which can never immediately be known — the state of mind of the other person — from its associated causes and effects”(ibid.). He then questions: “Can this be justified, any more than the corresponding inference from perceptions to objects?”(Pitson 259). If not, he reasons, “Hume would apparently be committed, after all, to questioning the extent to which we can be said to have knowledge of other selves”(Pitson 259). Hume in his discussion of *sympathy* is, as he maintains, thus committed to “the epistemological aspect” of the problem of other minds.

It seems clear that Pitson also subscribes to the general position often referred to as the

Argument from Analogy in his attempt of understanding Hume's treatment of other selves as a parallel provided by his discussion of belief in the existence of external objects. The Argument from Analogy is the typical "form of argument which would justify the ascription of mental states to others on the basis of the bodily behaviour, and other circumstances, we observe"(Pitson 256), according to Pitson. It is "the argument that I may justifiably ascribe mental states to others on the basis of the analogy between their behaviour and circumstances and my own when I am the subject of certain mental states"(Pitson 256). And "an underlying assumption is that mental states form a causal link between external circumstances, in so far as they affect the body, and bodily behaviour"(Pitson 256). One of Pitson's main intentions in his paper lies in showing that Hume is not "committed to a version of the Argument from Analogy considered as a kind of inductive inference"(Pitson 263).

But against his intention, Pitson seems to ascribe Hume the same position as the Argument of Analogy especially when he suggests that "Hume does not in fact see the inference to the mental states of others as presenting the same difficulties as the philosopher's inference from perceptions to external objects"(Pitson 259). The former inference does not inherit the same difficulties as the latter, Pitson explains, just because in the former "experience does, after all, enable us to be acquainted with the causal relation between mental and physical events"(Pitson 259), which we are at least able to experience in our own case, whereas in the latter we cannot appeal to our experience for any rational basis which may justify the inference.

This reasoning of Pitson's seems not acceptable for Hume. When Hume contends that "sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding; and even contains something more surprising and extraordinary"(T 320), it seems unlikely that what is in his mind as the peculiarity of the former affective experience is the former's dependence upon the conjunction between the mental states and their behaviour which one can directly experience. Because, in so far as the experience remains within the causal inference between another person's affections and their external signs, the affective experience in question is claimed to contain nothing peculiar or distinct from the inference regarding "any other matter of fact": "when we sympathise with the passions and sentiments of others, these movements appear at first in our mind as mere ideas, and are conceived to belong to another person, as we conceive any other matter of fact"(T 319), as Hume puts it.

To put it the other way round, there is nothing essentially different between the statuses

of these two inferred ideas themselves: the idea of the mental states thus inferred and “conceived to belong to another person” on the one hand, and the idea of a present or gift, for instance, inferred and conceived to belong to a swollen paper-bag on the table with a card attached to it. And what makes the causal inference possible in both cases is alike the customary conjunction between the two items established through my past experience. Resemblance is certainly required for both inferences as the relation which makes the inference possible, but only to such a degree as a causal inference in general rests upon the constant conjunction of two objects in past experiences, and upon the resemblance of a present object to one of them. It is worth noting that what is here claimed to be relevant to the causal inference of another person’s affection is not necessarily “a great resemblance among all human creatures”(T 318) so emphatically insisted by Hume throughout his discussion of *sympathy*. Because, in so far as Hume’s discussion regarding the initial stage of the sympathetic process is concerned, “Hume seems to endorse a constant conjunction between body and mind generally and not just in our own case”(Pitson 260), as Pitson maintains. It is not, it seems to me, that Hume here ignores, nor fails in recognising, the epistemological aspect of the problem, but rather Hume seems not allowing any extraneous element to enter into these initial “movements” of the mind.

And it is only in the next process in which this “great resemblance among all human creatures” joins to assist the causation, and to establish the connection between the perceiver and the object in question that the former inference to another person’s affection becomes distinct from the latter regarding the matter of fact. This is why Humean *sympathy* happens especially when we have our own resemblance before our eyes. It is this relation of resemblance betwixt ourselves and the object in question, and not the resemblance between objects themselves, that makes the departure of the former inference from the latter possible, by conveying the vivacity of “the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner” (T 318).

Pitson is not entirely gratuitous, it might be held, in holding that Hume takes the existence of the human body for granted in his discussion of *sympathy*, since Hume’s notion of *sympathy* depends upon the great similarities among human beings. It is misleading at least, however, to suppose that Hume’s explicit remarks on the bodily similarities between human beings is the sign or reflection of “his unquestioning acceptance of the existence of other minds or selves”(Pitson 263). Because, what is crucial for *sympathy* is not the existence of the human

body, but rather the relation of resemblance which prepares the easy passage between the subject and the object concerned.

It may certainly be the case that “the stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person”(Pitson 318). But the object which contributes to the production of the relation between it and ourselves is not necessarily be something really existent nor even physical, but could be imaginary or non-concrete, since resemblance is not claimed by Hume as a relation which presupposes the real existence of bodies, but rather as the one which may seduce the mind so as to take the imaginary transition between related ideas, e.g. “the general resemblance of our natures” or “any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language”(T 318).

It is true that there is a definite parallel between *sympathy* and our probable or causal reasoning in general, as Pitson admits, and that resemblance makes the crucial factor for both kinds of inferences. But it is important to mark that *sympathy* nevertheless is distinct from any species of inference: what makes *sympathy* as it is is the resemblance between the subject and the object in question, or rather the involvement of “the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person”(T 318). Pitson is well-founded in this sense in pointing out that “sympathy is not defined cognitively, as a process of inference by which we obtain knowledge of the mental states of others”(Pitson 261). *Sympathy* is definitely based upon a causal inference between another person’s affections and their external signs, but it nevertheless is distinct from any other kinds of ordinary inference.

(10) The conversion as a parallel of the belief attending the judgments

It might still seem reasonable to consider, as Pitson suggests, the conversion claimed to be involved in *sympathy* as “the parallel provided by his discussion of belief in the existence of external objects”(Pitson 257). Regarding Hume’s claim of the conversion of an idea into an impression relevant to *sympathy*, Pitson contends in the following way:

“When Hume talks of the idea one forms of the sentiments of another it is natural to understand this as a reference to belief. For Hume has earlier characterised belief as a lively idea related to a present impression, and the present impression in this case would presumably be provided by

one's perception of the other's behaviour or utterances, as well as the circumstances in which these occur. The belief that someone else has a certain sentiment is then supposed to be converted into the very sentiment itself. In general the effect of belief is to make ideas themselves more impression-like in degree of force and vivacity, thus facilitating the process by which an idea might be transformed into the impression it represents"(Pitson 262).

It may be admitted that Pitson shares the general view regarding Hume's assertion of the conversion so commonly accepted among critics. Capaldi, for instance, belongs to the same position when he holds like this: "Belief is the conversion of an idea into an impression by means of vivacity, and for that reason belief has such an influence upon behaviour. Since the causes of the passions are ideas, these ideas can affect us only by becoming like impressions"(Hume 264). According to Hume's discussion of belief in the existence of external objects, "there is always a present impression and a related idea, and the present impression gives a vivacity to the fancy; and ... the relation conveys this vivacity by an easy transition to the related idea"(T 289). And in our present case also, the relations "convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner"(T 318). An idea of a sentiment or passion may by this means so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion, by acquiring the force and vivacity from the present impression of ourselves. "There is evidently a great analogy"(T 290) betwixt these two hypotheses, as Hume assures us. And in so far as this analogy is intended by the author himself, it seems quite natural to agree with Pitson, and to assert that *sympathy* is intended as the form of belief entertained "in the strongest and most lively manner"(T 314).

But is it not inconsistent to hold on the one hand that "sympathy is not defined cognitively, as a process of inference by which we obtain knowledge of the mental states of others"(Pitson 261), and to suggest on the other that we may seek its "parallel provided by his discussion of belief in the existence of external objects"(T 257)? It is this apparent inconsistency, it seems to me, that may be the source of Pitson's "obvious puzzles arising from the literal impossibility of observing the mind of another person or self ..., and similarly of sharing the sentiment of another mind in any sense other than having sentiments which may be like those of someone else"(Pitson 261).

Pitson tries to solve this inconsistency in the following way. "Where the feelings of another

er person are concerned, the belief is in effect a causal one which reflects a propensity of human nature to ascribe emotions to external object generally — a propensity which is modified through experience as we learn to identify appropriate in accordance with the degree of resemblance (contiguity, etc.) between oneself and the subject of emotion involved”(Pitson 263). “But in so far as belief is in this way involved in sympathy,” as he reasons, “it is not characteristically a matter of a belief being consciously formulated as part of some explicit process of inference from bodily behaviour”(Pitson 263). Hume’s intention in his discussion of *sympathy* lies, Pitson thus concludes, in holding that “we can scarcely be in the position ... engaging in an inference from the occurrence of such states in ourselves to the existence of such states in other selves”(Pitson 267), since in *sympathy* “a process of association is involved for which imagination rather than the understanding is responsible”(Pitson 263).

Plainly, what gives the basis of this reasoning of Pitson’s is Hume’s repeated insistence upon the degree of force and vivacity of a perception as the crucial factor which makes the conversion of an idea into an impression possible. It is indeed a great pity that Hume is misleadingly so emphatic about the importance of the force and vivacity with which an idea arises in the mind that we are naturally led to this common misunderstanding: that the conversion of an idea into an impression is nothing but an extreme case in which “the lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression”(T 318). And in spite of his implication, it is a mistake to assume that the conversion as the core process of Humean *sympathy* depends upon the degree of force and vivacity with which an idea of another person’s affection appears in our mind.

It seems rather evident that in the first part of his discussion of *sympathy*, Hume actually tries to define the conversion in terms of degree of the force and vivacity of the conception of an idea: “The idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself ...”(T 317). It is quite likely, it seems to me, that the idea of the conversion is conceived first by Hume as a special case in which “the lively idea of any object always approaches its impression”(T 319), or as one of the “most remarkable” cases in which “we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by often thinking of it”(ibid.).

Hume’s initial intention seems quite obvious especially in the succeeding paragraph in which he maintains like this: “the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinced of the reality of the passion with which we sympathise, ... must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection”(T 320), because “all

these relations, when united together,” “can entirely convert an idea into an impression, and convey the vivacity of the latter into the former, so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition”(T 320). Evidently his point in these assertion lies in that causation must be assisted by resemblance just to make the relation stronger so that the vivacity is conveyed “so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition.” He plainly assumes in this part of his contention that the conversion is the matter of degree of vivacity with which the idea in question appears in the mind. And if the conversion were really the matter of degree of vivacity as he misleadingly implies, Hume’s theory of *sympathy* is clearly untenable: a lively idea of any object may approach its impression, but never be converted into “a real impression”(T 354). It becomes gradually clear, however, that Hume’s real intention lies elsewhere, as he develops his discussion into the issue that the conversion depends upon “the vivacity of conception with which we always from the idea of our own person”(T 318). [Incidentally, we may also realise that what Hume intends to illustrate as *sympathy* is the very circumstance in which “the idea, or rather impression of ourselves”(T 319) is necessarily invoked, or rather the aspect of our identity characterised as “personal identity as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves”(T 253), as I have discussed in a separate paper.]

There is of course no room to raise any objection against Hume’s position that “sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operation of our understanding”(T 319), in so far *sympathy* is based upon the causal inference which shares a common feature with any other inferences regarding ordinary matters. The analogy between these two systems is meant to be the proof of the consistency of his system Hume has established regarding the understanding in Book I. And what is crucial with this analogy must be the difference as well as the correspondence between the two systems which may become explicit as one and the same method of reasoning is applied to the two different aspects of the mind: in the latter the lively idea of any objects always approaches its impressions whereas in the former a lively idea is converted into an impression. And it is exactly from this difference illustrated through the analogy between these two systems that the epistemological problem of other minds emerges.

It may be unfounded, therefore, to assume that this epistemological problem enters into Hume’s discussion regarding *sympathy* as “the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others which is so prominent in Descartes”(Pitson 259/260), as Pitson maintains. Because, by introducing the notion of the conversion of an idea into an impression, Hume successfully avoids the commitment of this notorious question (though involving another

intractable problem of the conversion in stead) how we could be “justified in ascribing a constant conjunction between these types of cause and effect; whereas experience reveals their conjunction at most only in one case — our own — and leaves it an open question what may be the cause of the behaviour of others”(Pitson 260). In so far as the theory of the conversion is held consistent, Hume may not be required to answer Pitson’s question “how can Hume take for granted the possibility of obtaining knowledge of the minds of others, if this depends on a problematic inference from the bodily behaviour (and other circumstances) we are able to observe to mental states which are not directly available to us?”(Pitson 260)

(11) *Sympathy* as the typical case in which a passion arises

It may certainly be a part of Hume’s intention in his discussion of *sympathy* to demonstrate how “our acceptance of others as the subjects of mental states forms part of that response to experience for which nature itself is ultimately responsible”(Pitson 267), as Pitson points out. *Sympathy* is defined by Hume as “a very powerful principle in human nature”(T 577), or often as “a phenomenon” produced by the natural or original propensity of the imagination which carries my mind to another person’s sentiments and opinions whenever a person appears before my eyes.

When Hume thus defines *sympathy* as the process proceeding from the natural progress of the imagination, we may well notice that what is employed for the illustration of this affective experience is exactly the same method of reasoning he has established for the account of the nature of personal identity in Book I. Regarding the latter, he has contended, as we remember, that “identity depends on the relation of ideas; and these relations produce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion”(T 262). *Sympathy* is also defined as the process which depends upon the imaginary association of ideas between myself and others. It is only the connection of related ideas, and not the connection among impressions, as we remember, that could prepare the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the imagination: ideas “never admit of a total union, ... endowed with a kind of impenetrability”(T 365).

What makes *sympathy* special, however, is the involvement of another kind of connection among perceptions, viz. the association of impressions: *sympathy* happens only when the transition of the imagination along the related ideas involves another connection, viz. the “transfusion”(T 290) among correspondent impressions. The connection of impressions generally depends upon the connection of ideas, as impressions themselves cannot cause the transition of

the imagination: impressions, unlike ideas, are “really mingle and unite”(T 420) or “naturally transfuses into each other, if they are both present at the same time”(T 421) in the same mind.

And crucially, as the consequence of the “transfusion”(T 290) or “entire union”(T 366), just like in the case with “colours”(T 366), impressions are converted into a new passion, each of them “losing itself, contribute only to vary that uniform impression which arises from the whole”(T 366). What is now required for Hume is, therefore, only to demonstrate how “the imagination and affections have a close union together, and that nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the latter”(T 424). This is what Hume tries to establish as “the true system”(T 287), or the double association of impressions and ideas, from which a passion arises.

And *sympathy* is marked as a typical case in which a new passion arises from this double relation. To put it the other way round, *sympathy* is the phenomena in which the affections of others give rise to a new passion “in conformity to the images we form of them”(T 319), or rather “an equal emotion as an original affection”(T 317). This is how “the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent”(T 319), according to Hume. And most of cases in which a new passion arises is specifically when we have the image or resemblance of ourselves. A new passion is not the experience which arises in my own mind irrelevantly or independently from another’s person’s affection. Rather, a passion, or “the impression of reflection” as he calls, is in most of cases the reflection of other people’s affections, or the reflective impressions, in the sense in which a new passion is modeled upon another person’s affections so as to be “in conformity to the images we form of them”(T 319). It is specifically this feature of our affective experiences that Hume calls our attention by calling it “the conversion of the idea of another person’s affection into the impression.” *Sympathy* is thus illustrated as one of the most remarkable cases in which a passion arises by the double association of impressions and ideas.

Hume’s intention in his discussion of *sympathy* lies in illustrating the circumstance in which “passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them”(T 319) by the double association of impressions and ideas. In other words, what he intends as “sympathy” is to demonstrate how personal identity regarding passions depends upon the circumstance in which a passion, or rather impression of reflection, is produced whenever we have a person as the object of our perception. “Hence company is naturally so rejoicing, as presenting the liveliest of all

objects, viz. a rational and thinking being like ourselves, who communicates to us all the actions of his mind, makes us privy to his inmost sentiments and affections, and lets us see, in the very instant of their production, all the motions which are caused by any object”(T 353). “Every lively idea is agreeable, but especially that of a passion, because such an idea becomes a kind of passion”(T 353). We may fail in seeing Hume’s real intention if we try to understand his notion of *sympathy* as a kind of causal inference or as a parallel of the perception of external objects. *Sympathy* as Hume contends is not a form of inference, not because it reflects our natural “response for which nature itself is ultimately responsible”(Pitson 267), but because it depends upon the connection of impressions as well as the connection of ideas in such a way as we have seen above.

In Hume’s treatment of *sympathy* or passions, we might find no trace of his explicit concern with any epistemological problem concerning other selves, as Pitson points out. In Book II Hume might seem to pursue his former position he has acknowledged regarding his treatment of the understanding that “the case is the same whether we consider ourselves or others” (T 261). In spite of its appearance, however, it may be agreed how gratuitous it is to take that “there is, for Hume, no puzzle concerning the possibility of our being aware of what these [mental] states [of others] are”(Pitson 266). Besides, it may be not only misleading but also pointless to assume that Humean *sympathy* depends upon “the existence of other minds like our own”(Pitson 267), or to suppose that “Hume takes the existence of the human body for granted in his discussions of sympathy”(Pitson 259). If Hume in his discussion of passions really “assumes the existence of other minds like our own”(Pitson 267) or the existence of bodies, as Pitson asserts, his notion of *sympathy* or his entire theory of passions would be of minor importance. It may be justifiably contended that, although his theory of *sympathy* may not be proposed as the solution of the problem of other minds, it nevertheless shows the way how this intractable problem of other minds could be reduced into a pseudo problem.

Chapter VI: The Origin of the Indirect Passions (Love and Hatred)

(1) The whereabouts of his intention

Hume’s theory of passions consists of two parts, relevant to the direct and the indirect passions, which are both defined as “the impressions of reflexion,” being derived mainly from

ideas. Hume seems to find no decisive difference between these two kinds of passions, as they both proceed from “the same principle”(T 276). The first differs from the former only in that they “arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure”(T 276) whereas the other proceed “by the conjunction of other qualities”(ibid.). But if there really is “so great a resemblance betwixt these two sets of passions”(T 329), and if all the observations which we have formed concerning pride and humility are “equally applicable to both sets of passions”(T 330), why did he have the trouble of dividing his investigation of the indirect passions into two parts, the one regarding pride/humility and the other regarding love/hatred? We may also wonder why it is the second, and not the first set of passion that he has chosen as the initial subject of his discussion. Hume seems to have a definite reason for this procedure, as we see below.

One of the clues for this puzzle may probably be found in that the indirect passions are virtually those ‘sophisticated’ impressions which are more or less subject to the influence of the “secondary”(T 316) or ‘remote’ cause in the opinions of others. It is useful to remember how, besides the “original causes” of pride and humility, *sympathy* is introduced by Hume as the “secondary cause in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the affections” (T 316). The ‘immediate’ or “original causes”(T 316) of the indirect passions “have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others”(ibid.), according to him. It seems quite reasonable to assert that what Hume calls the indirect passions are varieties of those two sets of basic “reflective” impressions, viz. pride/humility, love/hatred, which are derived in some way or other through *sympathy*. It might not be unfounded to suggest that, when he defines “by indirect such [passions which] proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities”(T 276), he refers to this peculiar circumstance in which the indirect passions proceed from the conjunction of the immediate and the secondary causes. In other words, the indirect passions are those impressions which are “determined” to have self or other self for their object, “not only by a natural but also by an original property”(T 280), just because they are mainly derived from *sympathy*.

In the foregoing chapters, we have seen how the pride or humility whose object is self are produced by such an immediate or original causes as, e.g. a beautiful or shabby house belonging to me or to another person. We are now examining the cause and effect of the other set of passions, love/humility, whose object is some other person. This set of passion includes, e.g. “our esteem and contempt for the rich and powerful, pity and malice, respect and contempt, and amorous passion: love and hatred are general names for those indirect passions, just as it is

with pride and humility, which has some other person as the object “determined by an original and natural instinct”(T 286).

Hume begins his discussion with his excuse for the abridgement of his account of the cause and effect of the new set of passion, asserting that all the observations which we have formed concerning pride and humility are equally applicable to love and hatred, as there is so great a resemblance between them, except that “the object of love and hatred is evidently some thinking person”(T 331). So far as we judge from his repeated insistence upon “so great a resemblance betwixt these two sets of passions”(T 329), it may not be entirely gratuitous to suggest that he has begun his discussion of the second set of passions with the assumption that his only business required for the rest of his discussion of the indirect passions is to show how it is again by “the true system”(T 286) of the double association between the impressions and ideas that love and hatred are produced. For all his assurance, however, this assumption turns out unfounded, which makes the first source of his muddle as we shall see in the succeeding discussion.

Hume has argued regarding the passion of pride, as we remember, that, although we have special “organs which are naturally fitted to produce that emotion”(T 288), “some foreign object”(T 287) is necessary as the immediate cause “that gives the first motion to pride and sets those organs in action”(T 288), because “the organs which produce it exert not themselves like the heart and arteries, by an original internal movement”(T 288). It is here between the immediate cause and the passion, we may recall, that the double association of impressions and ideas is claimed to be established: “two established properties of the passions, viz. their object, which is self, and their sensation, which is either pleasant or painful, and the two proposed properties of foreign objects, viz. their relation to self, and their tendency to produce a pain or pleasure independent of the passion. And in so far as this “true system”(T 286) from which the passion is derived is concerned, there is nothing different between the nature and origin of these two sets of passions: “it is by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produced”(T 347). Hume is quite justified in assuming that “it is by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produced”(T 346). He is thus proceeding the same method of reasoning in illustrating the nature and origin of love and hatred.

This part of his discussion of the indirect passions, however, is assigned a different crucial

task necessary for the establishment of Hume's system. It may be agreed that the object of his discussion concerning the first set of the indirect passions lies mainly in establishing "the true system" of the double association of impressions and ideas from which the passion is derived. And his discussion concerning the second set is intended, as we shall gradually see, for demonstrating that this double association is important for the production of a passion, not because it can "bestow on the mind a double impulse"(T 284) which makes the transition of imagination most easy, but because it can "convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person"(T 318). The second part of his investigation of the indirect passions thus consists of the following two main issues.

The first issue is suggested like this: "whatever is related to us is conceived in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related idea"(T 353). Hume claims that it is not necessarily "resemblance" but also "relation" as well as "acquaintance"(T 354) of any object with ourselves that can strengthen the conception of the object to such a degree as to give rise to the passion of love by preparing a smooth passage for the imagination between ourselves and the object. It is quite misleading, as we have noted before, that *sympathy* is insisted by Hume as if it were merely one of those cases in which the idea is conceived "in the strongest and most lively manner"(T 318). What is crucial for the production of a passion is not the vivacity itself which may enliven the related ideas, but rather the circumstance in which "the impression or consciousness of our own person" is conveyed to the related idea by the double association of impressions and ideas established between ourselves and the object. Here lies the very source of "the pleasure or uneasiness of many objects which we find by experience to produce these passions [of love and hatred]"(T 351), according to Hume.

The second issue is the following distinction between these two sets of passions. The passions of love and hatred on the one hand are always followed by, or rather conjoined with, benevolence and anger, so that the former "are not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion which they produce, but carry the mind to something further"(T 367). Pride and humility, on the other hand, "are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exiting to action"(T 367). It is on the basis of this distinction that the "principle of a parallel direction"(T 384) is introduced as the principle of connection peculiar to impressions or passions.

The second is not entirely a new or extraneous issue to his former contention: he has claimed that the *Treatise* depends upon these two properties of human nature, viz. the associa-

tion of ideas and the association of impressions, “which, though they have a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions, are not commonly much insisted on by philosophers”(T 283). And these two kinds of association or attraction have “this remarkable difference”(T 284), according to him, in that, though “ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity, and causation, and impressions only by resemblance”(ibid.). There may therefore be nothing surprising when he maintains as the “principle of a parallel direction”(T 384) that “one impression may be related to another, not only when their sensations are resembling, as we have all along supposed in the preceding cases, but also when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent”(T 381). Hume’s muddle seems to originate here with his introduction of a new principle of a “transfusion” of a passion by mentioning “two different causes from which a transition of passion may arise, a double relation of ideas and impressions, and, what is similar to it, a conformity in the tendency and direction of any two desires which arise from different principles”(T 385).

As we have seen in the foregoing discussions, Hume’s main concern in Book II lies in illustrating the affective aspect of our mind by means of the same hypothesis he has established in Book I, and he seems quite satisfied with his success in demonstrating that “sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding”(T 320). This “great analogy” betwixt two systems of the understanding and the passions is of considerable importance for him, being “the great confirmation”(T 319) of the consistency of his hypothesis.

It is now necessary to mark that “the exact correspondence” as “the proof” of his hypothesis is only one aspect of his object he has intended to illustrate by proceeding the same hypothesis for the account of passions: the same method of reasoning is proved adequate only when it succeeds in demonstrating the **difference** between these two aspect of the mind. In other words, Hume’s business required for establishing the system of the passions is to show not only how “sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding”(T 320) but also how it even contains “something more surprising and extraordinary”(ibid.). The former aspect is established in the discussion of the first set of the indirect passion, viz. pride/humility, in terms of the circumstance in which the idea of another person’s affections arises through the observation of his behaviour. The latter aspect is to be illustrated in his treatment of another set of passions, viz. love/hatred, in terms of the circumstance in which the lively idea of the object cannot remain an idea, but is converted into an impression.

The first half of his discussion of the indirect passions of pride and hatred may be consid-

ered to be a preliminary argument in which he establishes the foundation of the system of passions by the analogy with the system of ideas. Hume's main business in this part of his discussion is therefore to demonstrate how, "when I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion"(T 576). And in so far as this initial "movements" of the mind is concerned, nothing peculiar is contained which is to be distinguished from the causal inference regarding "any other matter of fact"(T 319).

And it is in the second half of his discussion of the indirect passions of love and hatred that he enters into the main discussion, and tries to demonstrate how and when a new passion arises through the conversion of ideas into impressions. In this part of his argument, Hume's wonderful command of English is in full bloom in this part of his argument. We are simply charmed and attracted by his statements so beautifully expressed in a form of philosophy. In spite of its beauty and literary value, however, his language are notably obscure, obviously lacking his usual lucidity and logical rigidity, or even carefulness, just as we explicitly see in the following quotation, which explains what makes the core of his notion of *sympathy*.

"This lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression: these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity. But this change must be produced with the greater ease, that our natural temper gives us a propensity to the same impression which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion. In that case resemblance converts the idea into an impression, not only by means of the relation, and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea; but also by presenting such materials as to take fire from the least spark"(T 354)

(2) The cause or origin of love and hatred

Hume's strategy for the illustration of the nature and origin of love and hatred is exactly the same as he has employed for the other set of the indirect passion, viz. pride and hatred. In other words, Hume's basic premise is that "it is by means of a transition arising from the double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produced"(T 347). We have seen that the passions of pride and humility are, though defined as "simple and uniform impressions"(T 277), virtually 'hybrid' impressions composed of two kinds of ingredient, viz. pleasurable or painful sensations and the idea of the self. And it is important to mark that

love and hatred are again 'hybrid' impressions composed of pleasurable or painful sensations and the idea of the other self: "the object of love and hatred is evidently some thinking person ... and the sensation of the former passion is always agreeable, and of the latter uneasy" (T 331). His main business is again to discover the ingredients of these two kinds of components the passions of love and hatred are constituted of.

Following his preceding system, he begins his discussion with the assertion that "there is always required a double relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect, in order to produce either love and hatred"(T 351). Hume then asks "wherein consists the pleasure or uneasiness of many objects which we find by experience to produce these passions [of love and hatred]"(T 351). However, to our great dismay, Hume at once mentions the limitation to this "universal" principle of the double association like this: "But though this [=the passion arises from the double relation] be universally true, it is remarkable that the passion of love may be excited by only one relation of a different kind, viz. betwixt ourselves and the object"(T 352). This limitation might seem inconsistent to his basic premise of the double association upon which his whole system of passions has been claimed to be founded.

We may seem to have a good reason to take his assertion as the declaration of his renouncement of his basic position that "there is always required a double relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect, in order to produce either love and hatred" (T 351). However, though misleading as he indeed is, he is not making a concession to this "true system"(T 286), but only mentioning that "the passion of love may be excited by only one relation of a different kind, viz. ourselves and the object"(T 352). "Or, more properly speaking, this relation is always attended with both the others"(T 352), according to him.

And if this is what is really intended by him, Hume is not inconsistent. Because, as we shall gradually see, this limitation is not given by him as the exception of his "universal principle" of the double association of impressions and ideas established between two components of the immediate cause and the passion. Rather it must be taken to be an assertion that, among the two kinds of cause, viz. the immediate and the remote we have seen above, the latter cause to which the "relation [between ourselves and other object] is always attended" is more influential in the production of love or hatred than the former cause. Hume's main object in his discussion of love and hatred may be taken to lie in illustrating how passions necessarily arise from the latter cause, viz. *sympathy*. In his discussion of pride and humility, he has been mainly concerned to the problem how the passion is produced by the double association of impressions

and ideas relevant to the immediate object. And now his concern is directed to the problem how the indirect passions is produced through *sympathy*, or to the illustration of the circumstance in which the sentiments and opinions of others give rise to the passion.

This seems to explain Hume's short digression for the problem which may be properly discussed in Book III as the subject of morals: "why several actions that cause a real pleasure or uneasiness excites not any degree, or but a small one, of the passion of love or hatred towards the actors"(T 351). In this part of his discussion which precedes his main discussion, he tries to show that "several actions that cause a real pleasure or uneasiness" cannot produce love, in spite of their being best candidates which may produce the passion by supplying the source of both ingredients, viz. the pleasant sensation and the idea of the other self, the passion is composed of. For all its importance, Hume spares a minimum space for this part of his discussion, because it is the main subject prepared for the discussion of morals in Book III: his allusion of the actor's design and intention is meant for the illustration that love and hatred are derived mainly from the remote cause, viz. *sympathy*, rather than from the immediate cause which may supply the both ingredients to compose the passion.

We may now understand why Hume divides his investigation of the indirect passions into two parts, viz. the first half regarding pride/humility and the second half regarding love/hatred: the latter is intended for the illustration how love depends upon *sympathy* rather than upon the immediate cause which has been proved to be very influential for the production of pride and humility. Hume marks this difference between these two sets of indirect passions as the crucial feature which contributes to his system of passions.

(3) The circumstance in which the idea of ourselves arises

The section "Of the love of relations" begins with the question, "wherein consists the pleasure or uneasiness of many objects which we find by experience to produce these passions"(T 351)?" This is the question which asks the source of one of the constituents, viz. the peculiar sensation, which compose love or hatred. In the case with pride, as we remember, there required "a foreign object" from which these two kinds of ingredients, viz. a pleasant sensation and the idea of the self, are derived: "anything that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object"(T 289). We may well expect regarding our present case again that such a "foreign" object is required as the source of these two kinds of ingredients which compose the new set of

passion. Our expectation is justified by Hume's assertion that "there is always required a double relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect, in order to produce either love or hatred"(T 351).

We may be puzzled, therefore, when Hume introduces the limitation of this universal principle, by claiming that, "though this be universally true, the passion of love may be excited by only one relation"(T 352), viz. "the relation betwixt ourselves and the object": "whoever is united to us by any connection is always sure of a share of our love, proportioned to the connection, without inquiring into the other qualities"(ibid). In other words, what is required for the production of love is the source of one half of the ingredients which compose the 'hybrid' impression, viz. the idea of the other self, and the source of the other ingredient, viz. the pleasurable sensation, is not necessarily needed or irrelevant. "We love our countrymen, our neighbours, those of the same trade, profession, and even name with ourselves"(T 352), or "every one of these **relations** is esteemed some tie, and gives a title to a share of our affection" (T 352), as he points out.

But love is a "reflective" impression derived from an idea, so that there should be some idea of the agreeable emotion from which the peculiar pleasurable sensation love consists in is derived. What could be the idea of the agreeable emotion which may supply the passion with the ingredients of the pleasurable sensation?

In order to answer this question, Hume marks "**acquaintance**" as "another parallel phenomenon" in which "love and kindness" arises "without any kind of relation"(T 352): "it often happens, that after we lived a considerable time in any city, however at first it might be disagreeable to us, yet we become familiar with the objects, and contract an acquaintance, ... the aversion diminishes by degrees, and at last changes into the opposite passion"(T 354/5). He then assumes that "these two phenomena of the effects of relation and acquaintance, will give mutual light to each other, and may be both explained from the same principle"(T 352). He tries to discover "the influencing quality by which they [=relation and acquaintance] produce [love or kindness as] all their common effects"(T 353). In short, Hume's strategy for the inquiry into the origin of love has these two procedures. The first is to specify relation, acquaintance, and then adding resemblance, as the three typical circumstances in which the passion of love is produced without any other kind of relation. And he proceeds to discover what is common to all these three cases which may produce love "as all their common effects," assuming that the production of love must be dependent upon "the influential quality common to all these

three circumstances.”

He first asserts regarding the first two cases that “the only particular which is common to relation and acquaintance ”(T 353) lies in “producing a lively and strong idea of any object”(ibid.): “such a [lively] conception is peculiarly agreeable, and makes us have an affectionate regard for everything that produces it, when the proper object of kindness and goodwill”(ibid.). And regarding the last case, viz. resemblance, he proves that “it [=resemblance] operates after the manner of a relation by producing a connection of ideas”(T 354). Hence comes his conclusion: “it must be from **the force and liveliness** of conception that the passion [of love] is derived”(T 354).

Hume is extremely misleading here when he insists “the force and liveliness” as the answer of his initial question, “wherein consists the pleasure or uneasiness of many objects which we find by experience to produce these passions”(T 351). Because, for one thing, he never means that every lively idea becomes the passion, but only that the idea of a passion, “because such an idea [as the latter] becomes a kind of passion”(T 353). For another, his real intention does not lie in holding that the conversion of an idea into an impression depends upon the liveliness of vivacity with which the idea is enlivened, for all his insistence that “this lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression; these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity”(T 354).

As we have noted before, Hume might naturally be taken to assume that the affective case in question may be explained by the analogy with “the belief attending the judgments which we form from causation”(T 290) as he actually contends like this: “*The different degrees of their force and vivacity are, therefore, the only particulars that distinguish them: and as this difference may be removed, in some measure, by a relation betwixt the impressions and ideas, it is no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion may by this means be so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion. The lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression; it is certain we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by often thinking of it. But this is most remarkable in the opinions and affections; and it is there principally that a lively idea is converted into an impression*”(T 319). Critics’ distrust or objection regarding his theory of passions is derived mainly from his far-fetched analogy between the conversion relevant to *sympathy* and the belief formation: he is plainly mistaken if he supposes that **every** lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression when it is enlivened enough.

However, Hume’s point in this part of his discussion lies not in the emphasis of the vivaci-

ty itself, but of the “resemblance [between ourselves and the object which] converts the idea [relevant to the object] into an impression ... by transfusing the original vivacity [of the former] into the related idea”(T 353). He is insisting that “whatever is related to us is conceived in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object”(T 354). Sympathy is nothing but these typical cases in which “our natural temper gives us a propensity to the same impression which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion”(T 354). Hume thus answers his initial question like this: it is from “an easy sympathy and correspondent emotions”(T 354) that pleasurable sensation of love is derived. He prepares the whole next section, “Of our esteem for the rich and powerful,” for the illustration of this conclusion, by showing how the passions of esteem and contempt as “species of love and hatred”(T 357) depends upon *sympathy*, by which “we enter into the sentiments of rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness”(T 362).

(4) *Sympathy* and other selves

We might well wonder why it is such a seemingly frivolous passion as “our esteem for the rich and powerful” or “contempt for the poor and miserable” and not more important affections that Hume selects as the subject of his discussion for which he spares the central part of Book II. It is because, he answers, “esteem and contempt” are “species of love and hatred,” which may provide best examples to show that a passion is virtually the reflection of another person’s sentiment derived through *sympathy*. Hume assures us not only that “we have to sympathise with others, and to receive by communication the inclinations and sentiments of others” (T 316): he now goes so far as to hold that “we enter into the sentiments of rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness”(T 362). Hume defines, as we remember, the direct passions as those which “arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure”(T 376) and the indirect as those which “proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities”(ibid.). In this part of his discussion, he is now explaining what he means by “the conjunction of other qualities”: the indirect passions are distinct from the direct in that the former depends on “sympathy, which makes us partake of the satisfaction of every one that approaches us”(T 358). This section is thus meant for the illustration of “the situation of the mind”(T 397) constituted of the four main passions, viz. pride/humility, love/hatred, “placed as it were in a square”(T 333) in which the indirect passion arises.

It is often complained that “Hume does not appear to recognise any epistemological prob-

lem concerning other selves”(Pitson 266). Tony Pitson points out, for instance, Hume’s position in relation to our knowledge of other selves is ultimately inconsistent (Pitson 261), because Hume’s account of *sympathy*, which is in effect “the attempt to explain how it is possible for us to be aware of the contents of other people’s minds”(Pitson 256), presupposes “the existence of others as the subjects of mental states”(ibid.).

It is evident, as we have noted, that, in so far as Book I is concerned, Hume had a good reason for showing no concern to the epistemological problem as such: the whole argument relevant to the operation of the understanding is delivered upon the supposition that “we could see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions which constitutes his mind or thinking principle”(T 260). And it is in Book II that he is exclusively concerned to the problem how we “enter” into the minds of others and “partake” of their sentiments and opinions. Against Pitson’s charge, when he asserts that “where we esteem a person upon account of his riches, we must enter into this sentiment of the proprietor”(T 360), he is not assuming “the existence of other minds like our own”(Pitson 267). He only points out that our esteem for the rich person is nothing but the reflection or “rebound of his original pleasure”(T 365), in the sense in which the former is originated in or derived from what is perceived as his satisfaction. It is true that his notion of *sympathy* is founded upon the bodily similarities between human beings and upon the causal relation between mental and physical events, but it nevertheless is not the case that he “takes the existence of the human body for granted”(T 259) or that he does “endorse a constant conjunction between body and mind generally and not just in our own case”(T 260).

Hume has observed in Book II that the subject of our inquiry relevant to the existence of body is “concerning the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of body”(T 187/8). No one would agree that Hume presupposes the existence of physical objects when he suggests regarding the operation of the understanding: “*We may well ask, What causes induces us to believe in the existence of body? but it is in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is the point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings*”(T 287). If we proceed the same method of reasoning, the proper subject of our inquiry relevant to the existence of others must be concerning the **causes** which induce us to believe in the existence of another conscious being. And we may well ask what causes induces us to believe in the existence of others as the subjects of mental states, but is in vain to ask whether there be other minds or not, as we are logically deprived of the way for getting an immediate access to other minds.

What is required for the illustration of this problem is therefore the “exact systems of the passions, or to make reflections on their general nature and resemblance”(T 332), since “if love and esteem were not produced by the same qualities as pride, according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others, ... could men never expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person with those themselves have entertained”(ibid.). All we can do with this problem is to show how we are “guided by common experiences, as well as by a kind of presentation, which tells us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves”(T 332).

Through the demonstration of our esteem of a rich person in terms of his satisfaction, Hume tries to prove how we are justified in claiming that, where we esteem a person upon account of his riches, “we enter into his interest by the force of imagination, and feel the same satisfaction that the objects naturally occasion in him”(T 364). By showing that none of passions “have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others”(T 363), he intends to establish *sympathy* as “the soul or animating principle”(T 363) of all these indirect passions, e.g. “pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge, or lust.” If this is Hume’s position regarding the so-called problem of other minds, it may be unfounded to hold that “the existence of others as the subjects of mental states is presupposed both in Hume’s discussion of the understanding in Book I of the *Treatise*, and also in his discussion of the passions ... in Book II”(Pitson 256).

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