

〈論文〉

The causes of the calm and the violent passions in Hume's *Treatise*

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1 Introduction

Of the central six sections of Part 3 of Book II of the *Treatise*¹ in which Hume discusses the determination of the will, commentators' focus is almost invariably on the first section, "The influencing motives of the will," while leaving the succeeding five sections almost unattended.² My concern in this paper is with the five neglected sections of T2.3.4-9, in which Hume discusses "the causes and *effects* of the calm and violent passions," and to show that no less crucial role is assigned to this subject to make his theory of the will as it is than that of his discussion of "the combat of the calm and violent passions" delivered in T2 3 3.

Hume is known as a Hutchesonian in propounding the notion of the calm passions, and in rejecting the rationalists' view that men are virtuous only so far as they give preference to reason.³ He obviously inherits this calm/violent distinction from Hutcheson, as he claims that to be motivated by the calm passions is to act with the

¹ References cited as "T" and "SBN" are all made respectively to David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. David F. Norton and Mary I. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), and to David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). Unless indicated, italics contained in the quotations are original.

² John Laird observed, for instance, that "the remainder of Hume's examination of the passions was rather desultory" *Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature*, Archon Books, 1967, p.205.

³ James Moore argues, however, "their moral philosophies were indeed very different in origin and inspiration, that in crucial respects their views on moral subjects were directly opposed" ("Hume and Hutcheson," *Hume and Hume's Connexions*, M. A. Stewart & John P. Wright (ed.), The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994, p.25).

view of the greatest possible good whereas to be motivated by the violent passions is to act with the view of the present short-term interest. Although “Hume begins with Hutcheson's (and Malebranche's) distinction between calm affections and passions,” however, he “then diverges from it,” as John Wright points out,⁴ because he highlights that the same passion can be calm or violent in his later discussion.

If we divide Hume's account of the will into the Hutchesonian and the non-Hutchesonian aspects⁵ given in T2.3.3 and in T2.3.4-9 respectively, the following contrast between Hume's two treatments of the will becomes clear. So far as the Hutchesonian aspect is concerned, strength of mind implies the prevalence of the calm passions, and therefore is a matter of “the *general* character or present disposition of the person” (T2.3.3.10; SBN 418), because, Hume writes, “there is no man so constantly possessed of this virtue as never on any occasion to yield to the solicitations of passion and desire” (ibid.). By contrast, so far as the non-Hutchesonian aspect is concerned, we have fairly good reason to believe that we can control our decision concerning the actions and resolutions by placing “the object in such particular situations as are proper to increase the impulse of the passion” (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419), because “all depends upon the situation of the object...[which] will be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other” (ibid.) as he teaches us. Hume's theory of the will is novel and original as it depends on the integrity of these two aspects of the will.

⁴ Wright insists that “while it is clear Hume was influenced in his discussion of these topics by Hutcheson, there is a fundamental difference” between Hutcheson's and Hume's notion of “the calm passions” (“Butler and Hume on habit and moral character,” *Hume and Hume's connexions*, op. cit. p.110-111).

⁵ There is a heated debate among commentators on how and in what respects Hume's treatment of the calm passions and morality differs from that of Hutcheson's, though they commonly agree that “Hume was influenced in his discussion of these topics by Hutcheson,” while admitting that “there is a fundamental difference in the two accounts,” as John Wright points out (John Wright, “Hume and Hume's Connections,” op. cit. p.111). But I am not here committed with this subject, as I employ the expressions of “Hutchesonian” and “non-Hutchesonian” only to highlight the difference of the two aspects of Hume's treatment of the will.

2 The Hutchesonian aspect of the will

Hume follows Hutcheson by claiming that what motivates us to act is not reason but passion, and rejects the rationalists' notion of "the combat of passion and reason,"⁶ which "give[s] the preference to reason, and assert[s] that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates" (T2.3.3.1; SBN 413)⁷. Their false view of a combat of reason and passion as the determination of the will is derived from their mistake of taking the calm passions for reason, which takes place because they are both equally calm, and cause no disorder in the soul (T2.3.3.8; SBN 417), according to Hume. It is the combat of the calm and the violent passions rather than the combat of passion and reason that determines the will, he argues, as "reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will" and "can never oppose passion in the direction of the will" (T2.3.3.1; SBN 413).

A clear parallelism between Hume and Hutcheson is found in their use of the calm/violent division. Hume, by claiming that "[b]esides these calm passions, which often determine the will, there are certain violent emotions of the same kind, which have likewise a great influence on that faculty" (T2.3.3.9; SBN 418), maintains that these two kinds of passions lead us to act with these opposite views: a violent passion of resentment, for instance, "makes me desire his [=another's] evil and punishment independent of all considerations of pleasure and advantage to myself" (ibid.), whereas the calm one often makes us "counteract a violent passion in prosecution of their interest and design" (T2.3.3.10; SBN 418). Hume is committed to the Hutchesonian ethical implication when he observes that "strength of mind implies

⁶ John Wright finds it "important to distinguish Hume's account of the distinction between so-called 'reason' and passion from that of Hutcheson" ("Butler and Hume on habit and moral character," op.cit.p.110). So far I agree with Wright, but not with his view that this fundamental difference lies in these two accounts": that "calm desires and tendencies" are claimed by Hume as "real passions," and that Hume admits that "there can be calm passions which do not lead us to seek some good either for ourselves or others" (ibid. p.111).

⁷ James Moor argues that, although both Hutcheson and Hume were commonly in opposition to the rationalists' position that it was reason that prompts us to act morally, "the aims or objectives of the two philosophers were far from identical or even entirely compatible": reason is incapable of it for Hutcheson because "virtuous conduct can only be prompted by virtuous motives," whereas for Hume because "reason, strictly speaking, does not prompt us to act at all," which is a locution Hutcheson never employed." (James Moore, "Hume and Hutcheson," op. cit. p.40).

prevalence of the calm passions above the violent” (T2.3.3.10; SBN 418). For, although Hutcheson does not explicitly mention the *violent* affection, the calm/violent division is employed by him implicitly in terms of the fundamental difference between “affections” and “passions.” On Hutcheson’s account, “affections” are calm as they “incline us whatever Objects were apprehended as the Means of Good,”⁸ implying their conformity with the real qualities of their object, whereas “passions” incline us to act with limited, selfish, or present interest because they involve “a *confused Sensation*” which “keeps the Mind much employed upon the present Affair, to the exclusion of every thing else, and prolongs or strengthens the Affection sometimes to such a degree, as to prevent all deliberate Reasoning about our Conduct.”⁹

But, if the calm passion is thus distinguished from the violent one, what would happen with this distinction when the emotional disturbance of a passion changes? Hutcheson hardly discusses this question, nor the possible continuity between an “affection” and a “passion.” We may here observe that for Hutcheson a passion is calm or violent by its type rather than by its emotional intensity with which it actually appears in the mind. It is this use of the calm/violent division that is adapted by Hume when he introduced the calm/violent distinction at the outset of Book II, and insisted that those which are generally calm are the calm passions even when they rise to the greatest height, whereas those which are generally violent are the violent ones even when they “decay into so soft an emotion, as to become in a manner imperceptible” (T2.1.1.3; SBN 276). This Hutchesonian use of the calm/violent division may be characterized as a class or type-distinction.

It is this Hutchesonian use of the division that allows Hume to assert that “strength of mind implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent” (T2.3.3.10; SBN 418).¹⁰

⁸ Francis Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, p.31.

⁹ Hutcheson, *ibid.* p.31. “Passions” are regarded by Hutcheson, as by many early modern philosophers, to be “consequences of limited and ‘partial Views” and arise from selfish interest and mistaken understandings of the public good, and consequently are less present in the broader view.

¹⁰ There is a clear parallelism to this remark of Hutcheson’s: “We obtain *Command over the particular Passions*, principally by strengthening the *general Desire* thro frequent Reflection, and making them *habitual*, so as to obtain Strength superior to the *particular Passions*,” as we may take “the *particular Passions*” on Hutcheson’s account to correspond to the violent passions on Hume’s whereas “the *general Desires*” to the calm passions (Francis Hutcheson, *ibid.* p.32).

The combat between the calm and the violent passions may take place because the two kinds of passions have opposite directions: the calm passions are conducive to our greatest possible good whereas the violent to some particular or short-term interest, regardless of our real profit. The two parties in this combat are different from each other by their type, but not necessarily by their intensity, otherwise Hume's notion of this combat would "threaten to make nonsense of his own previous talk of calm passions counteracting violent ones."¹¹ For, "when opposition leads to violent combat, the victors will be as guilty of violence as the vanquished," Annette Baier points out, because "the victory will not often be won without resort to counter-violence" according to Hume's teaching that "an opposition of passions commonly causes a new emotion in the spirits, and produces more disorder, than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force" (T2.3.4.5; SBN 421)¹². "The best way to save Hume's theses here is," Baier suggests, "to suppose that 'calm passion' usually means 'typically calm,' not 'necessarily calm, even when it meets opposition.'" ¹³ On this use of the calm/violent division as a type-distinction, Hume has reason to underline that "passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 418). We may here understand why "[w]e must ...distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion; betwixt a violent and a strong one" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419).

3 The non-Hutchesonian aspect of the will

But if the influence of the passions on the will is not in proportion to their violence as Hume maintains, isn't Hume contradictory to maintain that "when we would govern a man, and push him to any action, 'twill be commonly a better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419)? He seems inconsistent to assert that "all depends upon the situation of the object, and that a variation in this particular will be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other" (ibid.) while emphasizing the necessity of distinction between the violence and the calmness, or the force and the weakness, of a passion.

¹¹ Annette Baier, *The Progress of the Sentiments*, Harvard University Press, 1994, p.168.

¹² Ibid.p.168.

¹³ Ibid.p.168.

Our puzzle concerning the above contradiction may be solved if we suppose that, although Hume's discussion on the combat of the calm and the violent passions was founded on a Hutchesonian distinction between calm and violent, he has now diverged from it, by allowing the same passion to be sometimes calm and at other times violent. It is plain that, when Hume highlights "those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419) as the central subject concerning the will, the calm/violent division is meant not for the indication of the class or type of a passion, but of the manner in which "the impulse of passion" (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414-5) carries us to action. It is in the illustration of how "the variation in this particular [=the situation of the object] will be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419) that Hume tries the answer this question: while both the calm and the violent passions pursue good, and avoid evil; and both of them are increased or diminished by the increase or diminution of the good or evil," why does this difference happens: "the same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one"? This question which is hardly attended by Hutcheson is now spotlighted as the "subject which belongs very properly to the present question concerning the will" (ibid.), to be answered in sections T2.3.4-9 in terms of "the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 418).

In his discussion of the combat of the calm and violent passions, Hume claimed it to be "the common error of metaphysicians" to have ascribed "the direction of the will entirely to one of these principles, and supposing the other to have no influence" (T2.3.3.10; SBN 418), as "both these principles operate on the will; and where they are contrary, ...either of them prevails" (ibid.). But, do we always act through a combat as such? There may be a struggle of the calm and violent passions where we need to choose or decide our action, but in the rest of our everyday life we live and act without going through such a tough process as to choose our action. For, "when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry' d to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction" (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414) as Hume puts it.

This circumstance in which we are simply carried by an emotion of aversion or propensity to action is described by Hume in terms of the following three processes.

First, “from the prospect of pain or pleasure…the aversion or propensity arises towards any object” (ibid.). Secondly, “these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object” (ibid.). Thirdly, “this emotion rests not here, but, making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect” (ibid.). When I am motivated to buy a house, for example, what pulls the trigger of my motivation is the prospect of pleasure from the house. I desire to own the house as I believe it would make my life more comfortable. “Desire arises from good consider’ d simply; and aversion is derived from evil” (T2.3.9.7; SBN 439) as Hume puts it. It is not in Book II, however, but in Book I that Hume discusses this initial process which depends on the relation between my belief and my desire. In his section, “Of the influence of belief,” he established that “belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions” (T1.3.10.4; SBN 120). In the present section of Book II, he reiterates it by observing: “belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression. This vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the calm as well as the violent” (T2.3.6.10; SBN 427). By thus rehearsing his former assertion, Hume underlines not only that these two books are connected in an important way, but also that “the imagination and affections have a close union together” (T2.3.6.1; SBN 424).¹⁴

In the second process, owing to this intimate relation between my belief and my desire, my desire for the house increases according as the emotion arising from the prospect of pleasure from the house increases. But when the house turns out to be too expensive, my motivation fails while my desire remains the same. “The will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain’ d by any action of the mind or body” (T2.3.9.7; SBN 439) as Hume comments.¹⁵ It is this situation that concerns Hume’s main issue which we have noted above: although both the calm and the violent “passions pursue good, and avoid evil; and both of them are increased

¹⁴ Baier emphasizes the importance of this union of the imagination and the passions by quoting Deleuze's issue that “the fixing of 'les rapports' between passion and imagination is what constitutes the originality of Hume's theory of the passions” (Baier, op.cit.p.310.fn).

¹⁵ Hume here echoes Hutcheson, who writes: “The Apprehension of Good, either to ourselves or others, as attainable, raises *Desire*: The like Apprehension of Evil, or of the Loss of Good, raises *Aversion*, or Desire of removing or preventing it” (Hutcheson, op. cit., p.50).

or diminished by the increase or diminution of the good or evil,” why does this difference take place: “the same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces a calm one” ? (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419)

Thirdly, reason and experience are summoned up to play the role of a navigator for the emotions. Since I am motivated to get the house only when I find it attainable, this process cannot be discussed separately from the third process, in which reasoning takes place to show how to pursue good, and avoid evil, as “according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation.” (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414). Although reasoning thus has an important relation to “the impulse of passion,” “the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it” (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414).¹⁶ Hume’s task in the last stage of his treatment of the will is to explain the impulse of passion for action in terms of “those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent” (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419).

4 The causes of the violent passions

Since Hume’s discussion of the combat of the calm and violent passions is based on the Hutchesonian type-distinction of calm and violent, we are easily misled to take his account of the causes of the violent passions delivered in the later sections to have the same implication, and to be “a description of the ways in which we come to be moved by inadequate ideas, the ways in which ideas acquire more force than what, strictly speaking, properly belongs to them.”¹⁷ Although this interpretation is widely shared by commentators, Hume’s discussion of the causes of the violent passions should be taken not to be the illustration of “all circumstances [in which] our own particular situation with regard to these actions prevents us from forming adequate ideas of them,”¹⁸ I argue, but to be the examination of the those circumstances in which “the passion commonly acquires new force and violence” (T2.3.4.6; SBN 421), and to suppose that “[g]enerally speaking, the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will” (T2.3.8.13; SBN 437). For, the calm/violent division, once free

¹⁶ The understanding exerts itself here as demonstrative reasoning, assisted by abstract reasoning.

¹⁷ Rachael Kydd, *Reason and Conduct in Hume’s Treatise*, Thoemes & Kinokuniya, 1946, p.133.

¹⁸ Kydd, *ibid.*p.134.

from the Hutchesonian ethical implication, allows Hume not only to mention "force and violence" together but even to assert "a close union of the imagination and affections."¹⁹

This interpretation may be supported by expressions such as "a new emotion in the spirit" (T2.3.4.5; SBN 421), "new force and vivacity" (T2.3.4.3; SBN 421), "new force and violence" (T2.3.4.6; SBN 421), "an agitation in the mind" (T2.3.4.7; SBN 421), amply employed by Hume in his discussion of the causes of the violent passions. Thus the notion of "violence" in Hume's expression "force and violence" seems to be different from the one employed in his discussion of the combat of the calm and the violent passions, which depends on a sharp distinction between force and violence. Hume argues in his discussion of "custom," for instance, that "a difficulty of the spirits moving in their new direction" "is in itself very agreeable, like everything which enlivens the mind to a moderate degree," because "this difficulty excites the spirits" (T2.3.5.2; SBN 422-3). "The ferment of the spirits" (T2.3.5.3; SBN 423), or the excitement of the spirits in the present notion of violence may properly be taken to entail pleasure, which is not only necessary but also desirable (insofar as it is kept moderate) in order to "keep[s] our spirits from the languid state in which they fall when not sustained by some brisk and lively emotion" (T2.2.4.4; SBN 352), rather than the emotional disturbance, or "momentary gust of passion" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419), which has the Hutchesonian implication of "a *confused Sensation*."²⁰ So far as Hume owns himself to subscribe to this method of thinking, "that man is altogether insufficient to support himself, and that, when you loosen all the holds which he has of external objects, he immediately drops down into the deepest melancholy and despair" (T2.2.4.4; SBN 352), there seems reason to suppose that the subject which occupies Hume's chief concern in his discussion of the causes of the calm and the violent passions is the question, how "the passion commonly acquires new force and violence" (T2.3.4.6; SBN 421), and to

¹⁹ Against this view, James Harris writes that "Hume says he will consider 'some of those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent', but fails to make it clear whether particular passions are calm or violent as a matter of their nature, or whether particular passions can sometimes be calm, and sometimes violent" (James A. Harris, "A complete chain of Reasoning: Hume's project in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Books One and Two, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. CIX, Part 2, 2009, p.142).

²⁰ Cf. fn.6.

show the way by which the mind “awakes…from a dream: The blood flows with a new tide: The heart is elevated; And the whole man acquires a vigour” (T2.2.4.4; SBN 352).

The last five sections of his treatment of the will are employed by Hume for those four “circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent” : (1) the transfusion of passions into each other, (2) the effects of custom²¹, (3) the influence of the imagination on the passions, (4) contiguity and distance in space and time. We might find it rather curious to see that Hume is not so much engaged with the account of the causes of the calm and the violent passions as with the illustration of causes of the force and vivacity of an idea. This puzzle may easily be solved by his emphasis on “a close union of the imagination and affections” (T2.3.6.1; SBN 424), and by this assertion: “Wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations” (ibid.)²². For, it is no wonder that he should be devoted to the enlivenment of an idea or the easy transition of the imagination in order to explain how to enliven a passion insofar as “nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the latter” (T2.3.6.1; SBN 424) as he assures us.

This close union of the imagination and affections was anticipated when Hume established an intimate connection between belief and the passions in Book I. The vivacity of belief is “a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the calm as well as the violent; nor has mere fiction of the imagination any considerable influence upon either of them,” he claims because “’[t]is too weak to take any hold of the mind, or be attended with emotion” (T2.3.6.10; SBN 427). Hume’s initial question, why “the same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one” (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419), is now solved in terms of this maxim,

²¹ While custom and repetition render a passion calm by giving a facility to perform any action, Hume argues, it “increases all *active* habits while diminishes *passive* by producing an inclination and tendency towards it” (T2.3.5.5; SBN 424). The impulse of passion increases in the former case because, the spirits being sufficiently supported of themselves, “the tendency of the mind gives them new force, and bends them more strongly to the action” whereas in the latter “the facility takes off from the force of the passive habits by rendering the motion of the spirits faint and languid,” according to him (ibid.).

²² While suggesting that this proceeds from the principle “*that any attendant emotion is easily converted into the predominant,*” Hume finds it sufficient for his purpose to reflect many instances which “confirm this influence of the imagination upon the passions” (T2.3.6.1; SBN 424).

that "lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination" (T2.3.6.9; SBN 427).

Hume's treatment of the non-Hutchesonian aspect of the will began with this robust remark: "There is not in philosophy a subject of more nice speculation than this, of the different *causes* and *effects* of the calm and violent passions" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 418). This discussion, however, is concluded modestly with this observation: "Both the *causes* and *effects* of these violent and calm passions are pretty variable, and depend, in a great measure, on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual" (T2.3.8.13; SBN 437). Hume frankly accepts that the contribution of his inquiry into the causes of the violent passions is rather limited, by making it clear that there is a definite uncertainty concerning the will, not only because the force of a passion is not always in proportion to its violence, but also because "a calm passion may easily be changed into a violent one, either by a change of temper, or of the circumstances and situation of the object" (T2.3.8.13; SBN 438). While admitting that "[p]hilosophy can only account for a few of the greater and more sensible events of this war; but must leave all the smaller and more delicate revolutions, as dependent on principles too fine and minute for her comprehension" (*ibid.*),²³ Hume seems to assume that this limitation does not infect his system. For, he has proved the consistency of his hypothesis insofar as he has succeeded in explaining the main causes of the calm and the violent passions by the same method of reasoning, viz. "by the borrowing of force from any attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination" (*ibid.*). We might well suppose that on leaving the subject of the will at the end of Book II, Hume is satisfied with his result, as he has shown successfully his main theme, "The subjects of the understanding and passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves" (Advertisement), through the demonstration of the analogy between the two systems of the mind, of the understanding and of the passions.

5 Conclusion

It is an established opinion among critics that Hume's theory of the will provides

²³ James Harris points out that "this sense of the ultimate inscrutability of the ways in which the passions succeed and alter each other is an other respect in which Hume's text displays the influence of Malebranche and the Augustinian tradition" (Harris, *op. cit.* p.143).

the foundation of morals discussed in Book III. Wherever there is any difficulty in understanding his treatment of the will or morals, we try to find the key to the solution in the fact that in Books II and III the calm/violent division is employed commonly for a Hutchesonian distinction. There is, however, another aspect of the will, I suggested, in which the calm/violent division is employed not with this Hutchesonian ethical implication, that to be moved by a calm passion is to act with a view of the greatest possible good whereas to be moved by a violent one is to act with a view of the present short-term interest regardless to our real profit. This non-Hutchesonian aspect of the will is recognizable only by noticing the connection between the first two books of the *Treatise*, as it depends on “a close union of the imagination and affections.”

It is true, as is often pointed out, that in writing the *Treatise* Hume draws his subjects or ideas from the main body of contemporary or traditional literature²⁴, and that Hume’s treatment of the will is delivered on the basis of the current state of heated debate of liberty and necessity. But it is a mistake to conclude that “Hume only puts Hutcheson’s view pointedly.” Although Hume is Hutchesonian in his discussion of the will in terms of the combat of the calm and violent passions, he has departed from Hutcheson in his account of the determination of the will in terms of the close connection between the imagination and the passions. Hume has reason to claim that Book II “contains opinions, that are altogether as new and extraordinary” (TA30: SBN 659) in the sense that no other philosopher has ever tried to explain the will in terms of the integration of two different aspects.

²⁴ Anthony Flew, *Hume’s Philosophy of Belief*, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1961, p. 142. Terence Penelhum also writes: “Hume’s position has an easily traceable ancestry. What he says is anticipated in Chapter XXI of Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, and is intended as a response to the penetrating but confusing treatment of the idea of power in Section XXI of Book II of Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*” (*Themes in Hume: The Self, The Will, Religion*, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2000, p.158) Barry Stroud observes: “The general strategy of his ‘reconciling project’ is not new. It is found in all essential respects in Hobbes” (*Hume*, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, Henley, Boston, 1977, p. 153).