

〈論文〉

Hume's Theory of Personal Identity in the *Treatise*: The Connection of Book I and Book II

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Introduction

Preface

Nicholas Capaldi begins his paper titled "Hume's Theory of the Passion" in the following way:

The general neglect of Hume's theory of the passions has always puzzled me, especially in view of the fact that without understanding that theory one cannot understand the structure and main theme of the Treatise, one cannot understand Hume's analysis of belief, the function of the discussion on scepticism, the sympathy mechanism, and hence the whole of Hume's moral theory, and one cannot understand Hume's conception of the self. In short, the failure to comprehend fully the theory of the passions detracts from any attempt to comprehend the most significant issues in Hume's philosophy. (David Hume, vol. 4. p. 249)

Capaldi's complaints on the general neglect of Hume's theory of passions was not gratuitous, since, as he comments in his footnote, the general anthology of commentary on Hume, *Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. V. C. Chappel in 1966, for instance, contained "not a single essay on the passions." It is true, of course, that since then some precious works on Book II have been published by Passmore, Ardal, Mercer, Baier, or Capaldi, to take the few, which could be a promising sign of the evaluation of this unduly neglected work of Hume's. But no one seems to have ever succeeded in illustrating the whole character of Hume's theory of the passions, or in clarifying any of the following interrelated problems which are involved as the

central issues of his system proposed in Book II. It really is a wonder how Hume's critics could avoid entering upon these subjects in their attempt to elucidate Hume's intention in the *Treatise*.

Why is Hume so concerned with the cause and origin of the passion?

What is meant by Humean "sympathy"?

What is suggested by the double relation of impressions and ideas?

What is the relation of "sympathy" to his "true system" from which the passion is derived?

What is claimed by "conversion" of ideas into impressions?

What induced him to claim that such a problematic process as "conversion" was the core of his system?

Why does he begin his discussion on passions with the indirect passions instead of the direct passions, reversing the order which seems natural or reasonable?

Why is it necessary for Hume to insist upon the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and the passions?

What could be the ground for Hume to claim that "sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding" (T 320)?

Why does Hume look so suddenly careless and hasty in delivering his discussion on the direct passion?

What different roles are assigned to the direct and the indirect passions in his system of passions?

Why does the will enter as the main subject into the discussion of the direct passions?

Why is the distinction between the calm and the violent passions necessary?

What is intended by "the situation of the object" in which determines the violence of the passion?

Why are the theory of the double relation of impressions and ideas the theory of sympathy which were established with so much emphasis and elaboration never mentioned in his later works?

It is a mistake to suppose that these problems are relevant only to Hume's theory of passions. For the full understanding of Hume's intention in the *Treatise*, we need to be prepared to answer these problems, since they are all derivative from the principles which form the bases of the theory of ideas in Book I. They are issues in which Hume had to be involved so far

as he holds the analogy between two systems of the understanding and the passions. Capaldi's remarks are therefore not entirely gratuitous, though with some obvious exaggerations, which suggests that the proper evaluation of the theory of passions developed in Book II is important for understanding the structure and main theme of the *Treatise*.

But if what is intended in Book II is so closely related to Book I, why is the theory of passion neglected so far by those critics who are concerned with the explication of the theory of ideas proposed in the preceding work? Capaldi finds the source of this general tendency in the misunderstanding or prejudice of "the secondary literature on Hume" (*David Hume*, vol. 4. p. 249) produced by "Hume's older and less sympathetic commentators," and he tries to show how "both on Hume's philosophy in general and on the passions in particular [it] seems plagued by a recurrent malady" (*David Hume*, vol. 4. p. 249). Capaldi's contention seems well-founded, but his explanation does not go far. We need to investigate whether there might be some other causes, inherent or internal in Hume's treatment of passions in Book II, which have created such a traditional bias among critics.

There are indeed some serious misleading allusions or confusions in Hume's contention regarding the passions, and they are most explicit in his discussion of the direct passions in his final chapter. And of all the factors which might have caused the general neglect of Book II, the most crucial one must be the fact that Hume seems to have virtually abandoned his hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas that he had established with such elaboration and confidence in Book II. Especially the last chapter regarding the direct passion appears quite different from his preceding chapters, because it is so careless or distracted that we may suspect that he is trying to get rid of his hypothesis as soon as possible. If the author himself had really abandoned it, meaning to mention it in none of his later works, there is no wonder why Book II has been kept off Hume's commentators' concern or interest.

It is true that he published the revised edition of Book II as "the Dissertation on Passions." But neither the double relation of impressions and ideas nor *sympathy* is mentioned anymore. It is true that sympathy is mentioned in *Enquiries*, but only as our common ordinary affective experience, which is nothing to do with the technical concept of *sympathy* he was so devoted to establish in his system of passions. These subjects which form the core of his theory of passions were completely eliminated from his later versions because of the difficulties which originated, as we shall see later, from his far-fetched analogy between his system of the understanding and the system of passions.

It does not follow, however, that Book II is not worth our investigation or of no interest. On the contrary, no other work of Hume's is so rich in material which illustrates resources in illustrating his original intention as well as his difficulty he faced in pursuing his strategy and carrying it out. It really is worth our whole attention and admiration to watch how careful Hume is in establishing his "true system" from which the passion arises. It is almost impossible not to be charmed and intrigued by the delicacies and complications of his argument expounded with the elegance of Eighteenth century classical English, which is most explicit in his treatment of our affective experience.

There is a still another positive reason to support Capaldi's insistence upon the importance of Book II, which, however, is not explicitly mentioned in the above quotation. It is often noted that Hume calls our attention to the necessity for the distinction between two aspects of our identity, viz. personal identity regarding our thought or imagination and personal identity regarding passions. And one of Hume's intentions in the *Treatise* is to illustrate our identity in terms of the mutual corroboration of these two aspects. However, the general opinion of Hume's commentators seems to be that only the former aspect of our identity is discussed in the *Treatise*. Don Garrett, for instance, in his excellent analyses of Hume's account of personal identity, outlines it in terms of twenty inter-connected arguments, none of which refers to the second aspect of our identity regarding passions. Not a word is said about the latter aspect in his whole discussion, as if Hume had never dealt both aspects.

This exclusive concern with one half of Hume's account of personal identity has become such an influential tradition since Kemp Smith that it affects even the valuable comments made by Wade Robinson, Barry Stroud, A. H. Basson, S. C. Patten, Passmore, David Pears, Robert J. Fogelin, to take only a few. There are indeed a few rare critics, like Capaldi or Baier, who suggest the possibility that Hume is developing his discussion on the latter aspect of our identity in Book II. But even the latter critics' orientation of the argument seems to be misguided, because it is more eager to illustrate the connection between Book II and III, rather than the connection between Book I and II.

At the end of Book I, Hume claims that the two aspects of our identity, one regarding the imagination and the other the passions, are connected with one another. "Our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or

future pains or pleasures”(T 261). Now according to the general opinion, Hume has distinguished these two aspects of our identity, only to be devoted to the former without any reasonable excuse for dropping the latter completely from his theory. But how could he dispense with the discussion of the latter aspect, when he regards its corroboration of the former aspect so important and necessary? It seems more natural to take this rather abrupt assertion of the role of the latter aspect as the prior announcement of his new subject to be discussed in the following investigation, and to suppose that in Book II Hume is now prepared to enter into the discussion on our identity regarding the passions.

Hume’s basic method of reasoning in Book I is to illustrate our identity regarding the imagination by the analogy with the identity of plants and animals, and to contend that “identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together, but is merely a quality which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination when we reflect upon them”(T 260). And Hume’s intention in Book II lies in not only to account for our identity regarding the passions in terms of the same principle but also in proving the solidity of his system by demonstrating “the exact correspondence” between two systems of the understanding and the passions. In other words, personal identity regarding the passions discussed and involved as the core issue of Book II is intended to be “the confirmation” of the hypothesis he has just established regarding our identity in Book I. The whole structure of the *Treatise* depends upon “the great analogy”(T 290) or rather “the exact correspondence”(T 320) between these two systems of the understanding and the passions. His intention in his second book lies therefore neither in introducing new principles nor in developing a new theory, but rather in applying the same principle to the new domain of our mind in order to show the solidity of his hypothesis.

Hume often invites us to compare these two systems of the understanding and the passions to each other, and to see that the latter “is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding”(T 320). He seems to assume that his theory turns out fallacious unless one and the same principle can account for both operations of our mind. It is indeed Hume’s main strategy in the *Treatise* to show “the strong confirmation of his hypothesis” by means of “the exact correspondence” between these two hypotheses regarding the understanding and regarding the passions. However, he finds this “great analogy” still short of “the strong confirmation”(T 319), and searches for a stricter criterion of the solidity of his theory, namely the involvement of some *ad hoc* process, namely the production of a new passion, in the latter

system. Hume assumes that his hypothesis established for the former system is confirmed only when one and the same principle involved in the former is proved to entail "something more surprising and extraordinary"(T 320) in the latter system. In other words, his hypothesis is confirmed when it is proved that the same principle acting upon the different mechanism of the understanding and the passions naturally gives rise to a different process: the fiction of a continued and distinct object in the former, and the production of a new passion in the latter.

"The true idea of the human mind," being "a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect"(T 261), consists of two aspects which corresponds to both repertoires of the understanding and the passions: not only "our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas"(T 261) but also these ideas, in their turn, produce other impressions"(*ibid.*). The former process entirely depends upon the smooth passage of the imagination prepared by the conjunction of perceptions, which necessarily gives rise to the latter process when the imagination is joined or assisted by passions. In short, the same thing happens, only with "something more" or extra in the latter, namely the production of a new passion by means of the double relation of impressions and ideas. "The imagination and passions, [when they] assist each other in their operation"(T 339), necessarily cause "the concurrence of two impulses"(*ibid.*) for the production of a new passion, as Hume put it. Or, when those principles which forward the transition of ideas "concur"(T 284) with those which operate on the passions, both uniting in one action, and bestow on the mind "a double impulse"(*ibid.*), the new passion "must arise with so much greater violence"(*ibid.*) and with "so much more easy and natural"(*ibid.*) transition of the imagination, according to him.

The production of a new impression as the extra experience is thus regarded as the proof of the same operation of the mind involved in two different systems of the understanding and the passions: it entails the same occurrence in both systems. This is why Hume is so concerned in Book II with the origin of a passion, or rather with the double relation of impressions and ideas from which a new passion is derived. It is true that the new passion is derived from the mere association among ideas in the imagination and that no "real bond"(T 259) can never be observed among perceptions, as Hume emphasises. But it does not follow that the new passion is something 'fictitious' or 'imaginary': the production of new impression entails *ipso facto* the "sense" or "feeling" of our identity, which can never be other than real by definition.

This book has a double intention. On the one hand, it is meant to propose an neglected

aspect of Hume's inquiry of human nature through the illustration of "the true system"(T 286) from which a passion is derived. I have to be devoted mainly to the explication of the complexities of his discussion developed in Book II, as Hume's argument on passions contains extremely obscure premises and hypotheses. Hume's doctrine of the "conversion of ideas into impression," for instance, involves such a notorious difficulty which is criticised by several commentators. And I shall try to reconstruct the structure of his system of passions by collecting and connecting his scattered and fragmentary remarks to each other so that it could reflect Hume's original intention.

And on the other hand, I intend to show how this parallelism between two systems of the understanding and the passions contributes to the production of "the true idea of the human mind"(T 261) by means of the "corroboration" of these two aspects of our identity regarding the imagination and regarding the passions. It is a mistake to suppose that, as Baier holds, "Book Two takes back Book One's conclusion that a person is a system of causally linked 'different existences,' which 'mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other'"(Baier 142). How could he "take back Book One's conclusion" when Hume's assertion for this causally linked system at the end of Book I is nothing but the claim for the necessity of the corroboration of these two systems of the understanding and the passions? Hume's purpose in Book II lies in the confirmation of his conclusion on Book I by demonstrating "the exact correspondence" between these two systems of the understanding and the passions. The theory of passions therefore not only presupposes the theory of ideas developed and established in Book I: the former system is the development of one and the same principle upon which the latter is founded. It is indeed this "true idea of the human mind as a system of different perceptions" that he tries to illustrate in Book II in terms of the corroboration of the two aspects of our identity.

To be more exact, Hume's theory of personal identity consists of three interrelated aspects: personal identity regarding the imagination, and personal identity regarding the indirect passions and regarding the direct passions. Through the discussion on our identity regarding the indirect passions, he proposes the hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas as "the true system"(T 286) from which the passions are derived. And in the final chapter on the direct passions, he intends to establish the last aspect of our identity, by involving the will and the necessary actions. "The true idea of the human mind" is thus suggested to be a dynamic system founded upon these three interrelated aspects of our identity which would

eventually lead us to actions.

But why did Hume retract his theory of personal identity in the Appendix? Varieties of trial have been given, but there is no general agreement about their relative merits, since this is indeed “an extreme case of the underdetermination of interpretation by evidence”(Hume Studies: Pears 289). In my final chapter, I must still try a modest proposal, as it seems unavoidable to touch upon this long disputed problem. The main source of the critics' confusion is, it seems to me, derived from the misinterpretation of Hume's confession in the Appendix: “upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent”(T 633). Obviously there is no room for misunderstanding what is referred to by “the section concerning personal identity.” This direct reference to the last section of Book I nevertheless causes a real trouble when it leads us to seek the cause of his misgiving within the discussion delivered in this specified section.

It is in this section of Book I that he proposes his basic method of reasoning adequate for the discussion of personal identity regarding our thought or imagination. But evidently it does not necessarily follow that he finds something inconsistent with his discussion on this aspect of our identity, since his theory of personal identity consists of another two relevant aspects, regarding the indirect and the direct passions. When Hume complains in the Appendix that he cannot explain the principle of connection which binds our particular perceptions together, and makes us attribute to them “a real simplicity and identity”(T 635), it is quite likely that he comes to acknowledge the necessity for “something which is simply not possible within his system, namely ... stronger connections between perceptions than those allowed by the doctrine of the main text of the *Treatise*”(Hume Studies 290), as is suggested by David Pears. Hume might have expected, for instance, to explain the derivation of our peculiar “feeling” or “sentiment” of our own identity in terms of the integration of these three aspects, just as belief is explained in terms of “a peculiar feeling”(T 624) produced by the association of ideas.

Hume's strategy for the confirmation of his hypothesis he has established in Book I is, as I suggested, to demonstrate “the exact correspondence” between two systems of the understanding and the passions. If so, in order to discover the cause of Hume's misgiving, it may be useful to try to see if there is any ‘crack’ of this asserted analogy between these two phenomena regarding the understanding and regarding the passions. It is easy to see that, when Hume has established the theory of personal identity regarding the indirect passions, he has a good

ground for asserting the exact correspondence between these two systems. He is proposing “the true system”(T 286) of the double relation of impressions and ideas from which a passion is derived, asking us with considerable confidence to “compare it to that[=the hypothesis] by which I have already explained the belief attending the judgments which we form from causation”(T 289).

In the last chapter, Hume discusses the will and necessary actions as the relevant subject to the direct passions. He seems to have intended to assign to the will some crucial role as “the internal impression”(T 399) necessarily involved in the production of our identity. Here again Hume invites us to see the analogy between these two systems of the understanding and the passions, by mentioning another internal impression, viz. the impression of the necessary connection, as “the effects of custom on the imagination”(T 405), and insists upon the great cement between “natural and moral evidence”(T 406). It is also remarkable that he actually spares one section of this last chapter for the discussion on “the effects of custom” and another two for “contiguity and distance in space and time,” so as to demonstrate, it seems to me, the analogy between these two operations of the mind to be involved in producing the internal impressions of the will and of the belief or the necessary connection.

However, in his account for the last aspect of our identity relevant to the direct passions, Hume seems completely at a loss in pursuing the analogy. It may first appear that by the end of Book II Hume has successfully completed the theory of personal identity with discussions of both of these aspects of the indirect and the direct passions, resorting to the analogy between two systems of the understanding and the passions. In spite of its appearance, however, the sudden change of the style or tone of his argument explicit in the last chapter suggests that Hume is in a serious and fundamental difficulty for continuing the same method of reasoning for the final aspect of our identity relevant to the direct passions. It is hard to believe that Hume’s original intention is fully established or that he is happy with his treatment in this concluding chapter in which his theory of personal identity is supposed to be completed. It is also noticeable that his usual panache which was so explicit in his foregoing discussions disappears in this last chapter. Here seems to be the key to the problem what causes him to recant his theory of personal identity in the Appendix. In my last chapter, I shall try to propose that Hume’s misgiving is derived from his failure in explaining the last aspect of our identity in such a way as it could reflect “the exact correspondence” to the operation of the understanding, just because this aspect is closely connected to the will and necessary actions.

Chapter I: Personal Identity regarding our thought or imagination

(1) Hume's strategy in Book I

Regarding Hume's treatment of the self, there has been a disagreement among critics whether his discussion in Book I contradicts his argument in Book II. Hume is inconsistent, they say, since he denies "the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being"(T 633) on the one hand, and claims for "the impression or consciousness of our own person"(T 318) on the other. Hume asserts in Book I that there is no such idea as self (T 252) whereas in Book II he maintains that "the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us"(T 317). Kemp Smith was influential enough to establish B. M. Laning's issue as a traditional charge that Hume's treatment of the passions was inconsistent with what Hume had said earlier about the self. In spite of his valuable contribution to the appreciation of Hume's philosophical importance and to the removal of the unfounded traditional Reid-Green accusation on Hume, Kemp Smith was yet responsible for creating another traditional prejudice against Hume's theory of the passions, by maintaining that Hume's discussion on the passions is largely irrelevant to the main argument of the *Treatise*.

The critics' charge for Hume's inconsistency in question is mainly derived from their failure in seeing the connection between Book I and Book II. It is important to detect "a consistent point of view behind his remarks"(Capaldi 259), as Capaldi points out, since one of Hume's main intentions in the *Treatise* lies in illustrating our identity in terms of the corroboration of these two aspects discussed in Book I and Book II respectively. Hume's purpose in the *Treatise* is to present a unified interpretation of human nature by means of a sort of contrastive analysis of our experience in Book I and Book II, as the Advertisement of the *Treatise* explicitly shows: "The subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves." It is not a contradiction but a dependence of the latter upon the former that makes the whole theme of the *Treatise*, as we shall find in the following chapters.

In Book I Hume discusses personal identity as it regards our thought or imagination. Let us first try to see how the idea of self is supposed to arise according to Hume's hypothesis, and what could be the peculiarity of this aspect of our identity to be distinct from the other aspect regarding the passions. His discussion can be divided into the preliminary and the main argu-

ment. His purpose in the preliminary argument is to demonstrate the adequacy of accounting for this aspect of our identity by means of the same method of reasoning which he has established for the illustration of the identity of plants and animals. This part of his argument, though short and preliminary, makes the core of Hume's theory of personal identity, as it is here that the basis of the theory of personal identity as a whole is established. And in the main argument, he is engaged in illustrating how memory contributes to the production of our identity by making the relation of resemblance and causation among the perceptions possible.

The preliminary argument of his theory of personal identity in Book I consists of the following ten main issues:

(1) "There is no impression constant and invariable"(T 251) throughout the whole course of our lives from which "the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea"(T 252).

(2) "They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind"(T 253).

(3) For the illustration of our identity regarding our thought or imagination, "we must take the matter pretty deep, and account for that identity, which we attribute to plants and animals"(T 253).

(4) "The objects which are variable or interrupted, and yet are supposed to continue the same, are such only as consist of a succession of parts, connected together by resemblance, contiguity, or causation"(T 254).

(5) "Our chief business, then, must be to prove, that all objects, to which we ascribe identity, without observing their invariableness and uninterruptedness, are such as consist of a succession of related objects"(T 255).

(6) "For the illustration of the nature of personal identity, the same method of reasoning must be continued which has so successfully explained the identity of plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature"(T 259).

(7) "The identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies"(T 259).

(8) "Identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together, but is merely a quality which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination when we reflect upon them"(T 260).

(9) "Our notions of personal identity proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas"(T 260).

(10) "The only question, therefore, which remains is, by what relations this uninterrupted progress of our thought is produced, when we consider the successive existence of a mind or thinking person"(T 260).

Hume begins his discussion with "the denial of the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being"(T 633). His denial is founded upon both logical and empirical grounds. On the one hand, according to his theory of ideas, "it must be some one impression that gives rise to every real idea"(T 251), since "self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference"(*ibid.*). However, it is evident that there is no impression which "continues invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives"(*ibid.*). It therefore is the logical conclusion that there is no such ideas as self.

On the other hand, it is an empirical truth that "I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception"(T 239). It is our general opinion that "when my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist"(*ibid.*). It must be concluded, therefore, that "they are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind"(T 253). He thus establishes from these two conclusions that our mind is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement"(T 252).

If "they are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind"(T 253), our chief business is to account for our great propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possessed of an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives. And in order to explain this propension, "we must account for that identity, which we attribute to plants and animals"(T 253), as "there being a great analogy betwixt it and the identity of a self or person"(*ibid.*), according to him. This is Hume's basic strategy for explaining personal identity in Book I.

Our notion of identity in general depends upon the following double erroneous process in which an "imperfect"(T 256) and a "perfect"(T 254) identity are produced. On the one hand, the former "imperfect" identity is derived from "a confusion and mistake"(T 253) of substitut-

ing “the notion of identity, instead of that of related object”(T 254), by the resemblance between these two kinds of action of the imagination, by which we consider the uninterrupted and invariable objects and by which we reflect on the succession of related objects are “almost the same to the feeling”(T 254).

We are then led to involve the latter “perfect” identity, by “feigning”(T 254) the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption, on the other hand. This is how we come to “run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to disguise the variation”(T 254). And “where we do not give rise to such a fiction, our propensity to confound identity with relation is so great, that we are apt to imagine something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts besides their relation”(T 254/5). When we attribute identity to variable or interrupted objects, our mistake is commonly attended with a fiction in this way, “either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inexplicable, or at least with a propensity to such fictions”(T 245). This is exactly what happens, according to him, when we ascribe an identity to plants and vegetables.

It is easy to see that Hume’s theory of personal identity in Book I depends upon this “great analogy” betwixt the identity of plants or animals and the identity of a self or person. However, to our surprise, Hume never tries to make it clear what could be the ground for the assertion of this analogy. The only possible ground for him to assert this analogy is, as far as we can guess from his contention, that “I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception”(T 252), just as it is with the case of perceiving external objects. This common feature cannot provide a sufficient ground for “the great analogy” between our identity and the identity of external objects. But instead of showing any concern to such a possible claim as this, Hume maintains with much confidence that, when we proceed to explain the nature of personal identity, “it is evident that the same method of reasoning must be continued which has so successfully explained the identity of plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature”(T 259). And it is obvious in this contention that he is not intending to prove how adequate it is to explain our identity by the analogy with the identity of plants and animals, but rather he seems to regard this analogy as something too evident to require any proof, evident enough to provide a solid basis for his whole argument. So when he concludes that “the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies”(T 259), he might seem committing the circu-

larity of argument.

However, this charge for his being in a circularity would turn out unfounded, if we reconstruct his discussion like this: Hume proposes our identity regarding our thought or imagination as an aspect of the identity which can be adequately defined in terms of the identity of plants and animals. In other words, his intention lies not in proving that this aspect can be adequately illustrated by this analogy, but rather in asserting that personal identity has such a basic aspect which is common to the identity of plants and animals and other external objects. What he intends to suggest is that the notion of self which we are apt to regard as "something mysterious and inexplicable"(T 255) is nothing peculiar to our identity, but is a "fiction" invented by the imagination along with other continued existences of the perceptions of our senses. And so far as this analogy holds, we might easily decide this question whether "it be something that really binds our several perceptions together, or only associates their ideas in the imagination" (T 259). There is no room to argue against his position that, in pronouncing concerning the identity of a person, we can never observe any "real bond"(T 259) among his perceptions: we only "feel" one among the ideas we form of them. Since "our notions of personal identity proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterpreted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas"(T 260), "the only question therefore is to specify the relations by which this uninterrupted progress of our thought is produced, when we consider the successive existence of a mind or thinking person"(*ibid.*).

(2) Hume's basic method of reasoning

We have seen that Hume's strategy for illustrating our identity in Book I is to "continue the same method of reasoning which has so successful in explaining the identity of plants and animals"(T 259) and other external objects. It is not his conclusion, as we noted, but rather his premise that "the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is ... of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies"(T 259). We have also observed that Hume's asserted method of reasoning consists of the following two erroneous processes in which an "imperfect" and a "perfect" identity are produced. Because, it is above all the relation of ideas which "produce identity by means of that easy transition they occasion"(T 262). Initially identity involves "the confusion and mistake"(T 254), which makes us substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of related objects"(*ibid.*). It is this initial "confusion and mistake" that caus-

es the “imperfect” identity. However, this first “confusion and mistake” caused by resemblance is still short for the production of “perfect” identity: we need to proceed and “boldly assert that these different related objects are in effect the same, however interrupted and variable”(T 254). The “fiction of the continued existence of our senses”(T 255) or rather of “the notion of a soul, self, and substance” are thus produced only “to justify to ourselves this absurdity”(T 254) or to “disguise”(ibid.) the variation.

And when we do not “feign” a soul or self in attributing a “perfect” identity to the succession of perceptions, we are apt to imagine, instead, “something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, beside their relation”(T 254). This is exactly the case with regard to the identity we ascribe to plants and vegetables, according to Hume. We now see why it is the identity of “plants and animals” or of “vegetable and animal bodies,” and not the identity of any other sorts of “compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature”(T 259) that Hume finds “the great analogy” with in illustrating our identity. An “imperfect” identity, once entertained, generally leads us to a “perfect” identity, since our mistake of attributing an identity to variable or interrupted objects is commonly attended of a “fiction, either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inexplicable”(T 255), according to Hume.

Thus far is Hume’s basic method of reasoning for the illustration how we come to attribute identity to the succession of perceptions. It is now necessary to examine this asserted method of reasoning by clarifying how the initial “mistake” is claimed to introduce the final “fiction,” or rather how the former “imperfect” identity develops into the latter “perfect” identity.

Supposing any mass of matter of which the parts are contiguous and connected to be placed before us, Hume tries to illustrate how we are led into “the mistake”(T 255) of ascribing an identity to a succession of different perceptions in terms of the following four main stages with which we gradually develop our “artifice”(T 267) for “inducing” the imagination to take the passage along related ideas.

1) When “some very *small* or *inconsiderable* part” is added to, or subtracted from, this mass, we seldom scruple to pronounce it the same, since, though this change would, strictly speaking, absolutely destroy the identity of the whole, we find the alteration too trivial and unimportant(T 255/6). It is because “the passage of the thought from the object before the change to the object after it, is so smooth and easy, that we scarce perceive the transition, and

are apt to imagine, that it is nothing but a continued survey of the same object”(T 256). This “error” arises from “the resemblance this act of the mind bears to that by which we contemplate one continued object”(T 255), according to him.

2) When the change of part in a mass of matter becomes so considerable that it might be expected to destroy its identity, we are yet apt to ascribe to it the same identity, where “the change is produced *gradually* and *insensibly*”(T 256). It is because “the mind, in following the successive changes of the body, feels an easy passage from the surveying its condition in one moment, to the viewing of it in another, and in no particular time perceives any interruption in its actions”(T 256), chiefly owing to the relation of resemblance.

3) Where the changes are at last observed to become too considerable, there is still another “artifice”(T 257), by which “we may induce the imagination to advance a step further”(ibid.), namely “a combination to some *common end* or purpose”(ibid.). A ship, for instance, of which a considerable part has been changed by frequent reparations, is still considered as the same, since the common end, in which the parts conspire, is the same under all their variations, and affords an easy transition of the imagination from one situation of the body to another. The relation of causation is obviously involved in this artifice so as to induce the imagination to advance another further step.

4) Now as the final stage, when both vegetables and animals endure a total change in a few years and their form, size, and substance, are entirely altered (T 257), we are still apt to attribute to them an identity by resorting to a more sophisticated “artifice”: we add “*sympathy* of parts to their *common end*, and suppose that they bear to each other the reciprocal relation of cause and effect in all their actions and operations”(ibid.). The involvement of causation is explicitly requested in this final stage, as the relation which makes not only a mutual reference to some general purpose, but also “a mutual dependence on, and connection with, each other”(T 257) possible.

[In order to understand Hume's intention, it may be worth our notice that *sympathy* is invoked in this final stage as a sort of reciprocal power, or ‘attraction.’ Because, although the concept of *sympathy* in Book I is entirely different from *sympathy* discussed and illustrated regarding passions in Book II, Hume intends to show some implicit parallelism between these two concepts.]

Hume's method of reasoning is now to be completed with the addition of two more erroneous processes which are generally involved when we ascribe an identity to perceptions.

They are the confusion of “numerical” with “specific” identity on the one hand, and, on the other, our propension of the mind which causes such a phenomena in which what is expected has less influence in destroying the identity whereas what is unusual and extraordinary has more influence in breaking the continuity of the thought or identity. From the former mistake, it happens, for instance, that a man who hears a frequently interrupted and renewed noise would take it still as the same noise, “though it is evident the sounds have only a specific identity or resemblance”(T 258). It is derived from the latter mistake that, though the nature of a river consists in a motion and change of parts, we nevertheless regard it continuing the same during several ages.

Hume has now achieved his “chief business”(T 255) required for establishing his basic “method of reasoning” for the discussion on “the identity of plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature”(T 259). We can clearly see the whereabouts of Hume’s intention in the above illustration: he tries to show how the “imperfect” identity caused by the relation of resemblance develops into the “perfect” identity with the assistance of another relation of causation. The process of this development is demonstrated in terms of the “artifice” we gradually develop for the “inducement” of the imagination to take the easy passage along the related ideas.

And it is this final stage, in which the most sophisticated artifice is supposed to be required, that the identity of a person is suggested to be relevant: “an infant becomes a man, and is sometimes fat, sometimes lean, without any change in his identity”(T 257). It is easy to see that “the identity of a person”(T 259) is mentioned here as the outcome of exactly parallel operation of the imagination which gives rise to the notion of the identity to vegetables and animals: “an oak that grows from a small plant to a large tree is still the same oak, though there be not one particle of matter or figure of its parts the same”(T 257). And so far this analogical or common aspect of our identity is concerned, there is evidently no room to argue against Hume’s position that our identity “cannot therefore have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like object”(T 259).

When Hume claims that “the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is ... of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies”(T 259), he must be referring to this basic aspect of a person who above all is a physical existence occupying a spatio-temporal location in this external world as one of the items among other animate or inanimate objects along with oaks, vegetables, and animals. If it is Hume’s intention in Book I to account for this

aspect of a person as a physical being, it may be hard to criticise Hume for "his uncritical transference of his treatment of the identity of material object to the identity of minds"(Hume Studies 125) following David Pears: it is Hume's purpose to assimilate our mind to a physical existence by insisting upon our common feature to "plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature"(T 259). And "the case is the same, whether we consider ourselves or others"(T 261), as far as this aspect of our identity is concerned.

If we agree with Hume's contention that the notion of our identity arises from "a like operation of the imagination upon like objects"(T 259) of vegetable and animal bodies, it must also be agreed that "the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one"(*ibid.*). Our identity is "fictitious," just because it only be "by mistake"(T 255) we ascribe an identity to the succession of different perceptions which is supposed to constitute our mind, so far as we continue the same method of reasoning. Could it really be "by a mistake"(T 255) that I believe in my continuous existence during the whole years since my birth? What does Hume actually mean by asserting that our identity is "fictitious"? Is he suggesting that there is any room for doubting about my existence being the same person before and the end of dinner, for instance? Would it follow from his position that we can meaningfully ask, not in imaginary context, if I am really existent in this present moment? Or, does he suggest that I am susceptible to such a doubt, for instance, whether my child I am now breastfeeding in my arms is really existent, just as it is reasonable for us to ask whether an apple before my eyes is really eatable? If Hume answers these questions in the affirmative, it would be plainly difficult to accept Hume's contention that our identity is "a fiction," nothing different from the case in which we "feign" the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses.

Hume is of course well aware of the limit of this method of reasoning. He even emphasises it, by insisting that it allows us a "fictitious"(T 259) identity, since it can only be "by mistake" (T 255) that we ascribe an identity to the succession of perceptions which is supposed to constitute the mind. But Hume seems to suggest this fictitious feature of our identity not as its limit or drawback, but rather as the proof of his system. His hypothesis regarding our identity is confirmed, as he seems to assume, that even such a most intimate and apparently immediate experience as the identity of oneself is a "fiction"(T 255) produced by the easy transition occasioned by the relations of ideas just as it is in the case with other external existences.

Hume calls for our attention concerning the identity of a person to that we can never

observe any “real bond”(T 259) among his perceptions, by maintaining that “the understanding never observes any real connection among objects, and ... even the union of cause and effect, when strictly examined, resolves itself into a customary association of ideas”(T 259/260). But it is important to remember that Hume nevertheless is not denying that we “feel”(T 259) one among the ideas we form of them. In the Appendix, he affirms, for instance: If perceptions are distinct existence, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connections among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. “We only *feel* a connection or determination of thought to pass from one object to another”(T 635). In this contention, some implicit parallelism may seem asserted by Hume with his another contention regarding the necessary connection which is “discovered not by a conclusion of the understanding, but is merely a perception of the mind”(T 205/6).

If it is this aspect of our identity which is “only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies”(T 259) that Hume intends to illustrate in Book I, there could be nothing that would possibly cause Hume’s complaint in the Appendix, so far as personal identity regarding our thought or imagination is concerned. Because what he tries to discover in this part of his discussion is not “the principle of connection [among our particular perceptions] which ... makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity”(T 635). He is not to be charged for his failure in discovering such a principle, since he has successfully attained his aim in Book I by illustrating this aspect of our identity which is common to the identity of “vegetable and animal bodies.” It is only that, once he has succeeded in illustrating this aspect of our identity, this important problem is left out of his hand Hume: what could be the peculiarity of our identity, which cannot be explained in terms of the identity of any other sorts of “compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature.”

Hume’s strategy for his next problem is to demonstrate how the connection among related ideas, though imaginary, would give rise to a new impression, or rather the impression of reflexion or passion. He is so concerned to the derivation of a new passion in Book II, because “the true system”(T 286) from which a passion is derived necessarily involves “the impression or consciousness of our own person”(T 318), as he tries to show in his discussion on passions. It is, I think, in terms of this “true system” that Hume intended to illustrate “the principle of connection, [among our particular perceptions] which ... makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity”(T 635). There is of course no inconsistency between these two claims: that there should be the principle of connection among our particular perceptions which makes

us attribute to them “a real simplicity and identity” and that we never observe “any real bond” among perceptions. When he proposes “the true idea of the human mind”(T 261) as “a system of different perceptions or different existence” at the end of Book I, he is already committed to this new aspect of our identity relevant to “the true system” from which the new passion is derived, since “the true idea of the human mind” consists of such a process in which not only “our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas”(ibid.) but also “these ideas, in their turn, produce other impressions”(ibid.).

(3) Memory as the source of personal identity

We have seen in the foregoing argument that the first half of Hume's discussion on personal identity in Book I is constituted of the following four issues: (1) the mind consists in the successive perceptions, (2) all objects, to which we ascribe identity, without observing their invariableness and uninterruptedness, are such as consist of a succession of related objects, (3) the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one, since it is of a like kind which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies, (4) our notions of personal identity proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas. It is now clear how and why Hume is so devoted to the demonstration of the analogy between the identity of plants or animals and the identity of a self or person. Hume is ready for the main argument in the second half of the section on personal identity in Book I, after having been successfully rejected the possibility of discovering any internal impression of the self as something apart from all our ordinary impressions and ideas.

In his main argument on personal identity regarding our thought or imagination, Hume focuses upon the principles or ties by which the unity among perceptions is produced, maintaining that “we must confine ourselves to resemblance and causation, and must drop contiguity, which has little or no influence in the present case”(T 260). Hume is certainly misleading in mentioning “contiguity” as the relation irrelevant to his present issue, since he only means that spatial contiguity is nothing to do with the connection among different perceptions which are supposed to be the constituents of the mind. The importance of temporal contiguity in the mental life of a person is insisted by Hume when he maintains that “they are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind”(T 253). Hume also acknowledges the cruciality of temporal contiguity regarding the relation of causation.

Specifying resemblance and causation, dropping spatial contiguity, he thus sets about clari-

fyng how these two relations can produce “this uninterrupted progress of our thought”(T 260), making us suppose ourselves possessed of an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives. Hume immediately enters into the discussion on memory, assuming that both resemblance and causation depend upon memory as “a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions”(T 260).

Hume shares the common view with Locke in claiming for the cruciality of memory in producing personal identity. However, Hume’s assertion for the memory “as the source of personal identity”(T 261) is differently oriented from Locke’s, who suggests that memory is the sole criterion of personal identity. In Hume theory, memory is important in producing our identity, not because it itself provides a genuine criterion of personal identity, but because “nothing could more contribute [than memory] to the bestowing a relation on this succession amidst all its variations”(T 260) on the one hand. And on the other, memory is important, just because it “alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions”(T 261). By producing the relations of resemblance and the notion of causation in this way, he claims, memory not only “produces” but also “discovers” our identity.

But why does Hume distinguish between these two functions of memory by maintaining regarding resemblance that “the memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production”(T 261)? When he asserts regarding causation that “memory does not so much *produce* as *discover* personal identity”(T 262), he is emphasising this distinction by italicising them. But what made him so concerned to this distinction? What kind of function of memory is suggested by “discovering” or “producing” our identity?

In order to understand Hume’s intention in these assertions, it seems necessary to mark that he started his discussion on the relation of resemblance by asking us to “suppose we could see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions which constitutes his mind or thinking principle, and suppose that he always preserves the memory of a considerable part of past perceptions”(T 260). This supposition of Hume’s may be taken to be either of the following two different requests. It could be the request on the one hand that we should try to ignore this peculiar property of the mind that what is happening in my own mind has a ‘privacy’ to which no other person is accessible. In other words, I might be asked to suppose as if I could observe directly that succession of perceptions which constitutes other people’s mind or thinking principle just as I observe immediately my own mind.

It could be taken, on the other hand, to be the explicit exposition of his position he has

kept so far in the foregoing discussion. Hume is just reiterating that the identity of the mind of a person can be illustrated in terms of the connections among perceptions, by the analogy with the identities of plants or animals or material objects. And so far as we hold the analogy between these two kinds of identities, there is nothing essentially different between my own mind and other's except that the former happens to be open to my observation whereas the latter is concealed within his body.

Hume's own closing comment of this part of his discussion, that "the case is the same, whether we consider ourselves or other"(T 261), seems to suggest that it must be this latter supposition, and not the former, that is claimed by Hume when he asks us to "suppose we could see clearly into the breast of another"(T 260).

By this supposition, the mind of a person is assimilated to a kind of double-bottomed box in which "some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure"(T 252) are packed and collected together, ready to be joined by past perceptions which are put away behind the partition in the inner part of the box as memories. According to this assimilation, the identity of the mind of another person can be illustrated in terms of the connection among these different perceptions which are supposed to constitute his mind. And by his initial supposition, Hume is encouraging us to discover the principles of connection among these different perceptions which constitute the mind of another person. It is because, in his system our notions of personal identity proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas. In this supposed circumstance, memory is expected to contribute to the production of resemblance among these distinct perceptions by raising up the images of past perceptions. It is "the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought"(T 261) that would "convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object"(*ibid.*), as Hume puts it. The identity is therefore "nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together, but is merely a quality which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination when we reflect upon them" (T 260), just as it is in the case with the identity of material objects. Let us now examine how memory is supposed to function in giving rise to the notion of the identity of another person's mind in this artificially constructed circumstance.

For the sake of clearer illustration of this situation, it may be useful to introduce the following assimilation: this supposed circumstance in which I "could see clearly into the breast of

another, and observe that succession of perceptions which constitutes his mind”(T 260) is exactly like the circumstance in which I am watching a movie-screen upon which “several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in a infinite variety of postures and situations”(T 253).

Let us consider first how the notion of the identity of such a movie-screen is produced. My perception of the screen is always interrupted by my blinking, by the change of my physical posture, by my body’s physiological change, by the variation of the lightening, and so on. It seems possible to suggest then that my perception of the screen consists of the succession of these varieties of distinct perceptions. And the notion of identity of the screen arises, according to Hume, when these interrupted and different perceptions are connected together by relation so as to prepare the smooth passage for the imagination, making the whole seem like the continuance of one object. This is how the continued existence of the perceptions of my senses is “feigned”(T 254) only to justify to ourselves this absurdity of taking these different related objects to be the same, however interrupted and variable, as Hume puts it. Let us call this unity of different perceptions ‘the unity $a+b+c+\dots$ ’ upon which the identity of the screen is dependent.

It may here be suggested that my perception of the screen involves another unity, ‘the unity $x+y+z+\dots$,’ among the varieties of images reflected upon the screen. Let us now establish that his circumstance in which I am observing the movie-screen upon which various images are reflected consists of these two kinds of unity $a+b+c+\dots$ and unity $x+y+z+\dots$. It must here be noted regarding these two unities that the latter unity depends upon the former unity, and not vice versa. In other words, whether I may or may not identify what images are reflected upon the screen is evidently irrelevant for my perception of the screen as a continued and distinct existence whereas my perception of images upon the screen logically presupposes the perception of the screen. It is in this sense that the unity $x+y+z+\dots$ is logically dependent upon the unity $a+b+c+\dots$, but not vice versa.

And it is also important to mark that the function of memory is the same for both unities: the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought, by raising up the images of past perceptions. It does not follow nevertheless that what is involved in the production of these two unities is one and the same operation of memory. It is crucial to remember that in this circumstance, memory is required to function in two different ways, in producing the unity $a+b+c+\dots$ and the unity $x+y+z+\dots$

On the one hand, it is required for the perception of the screen: it contributes to the production of the former unity by making up the gaps among discreet and separate perceptions of a, b, c, ..., by adding to the present perceptions the images of past perceptions before my blinking or before the change of my physical posture, as well as the possible images of the screen, and so forth. On the other hand, memory is required for the perception of [the image of] an apple, for instance, reflected upon the screen. It contributes to the production of the latter unity by connecting different perceptions, x, y, z, ..., by the similar procedure. Although the procedure of producing the unity required for memory is in both cases is the same, the operation of memory which contributes to the production of the unity $x+y+z+\dots$ is entirely different from the one which contributes to the production of the unity $a+b+c+\dots$

The same account can be applied to our present circumstance in which I am supposed to "see clearly into the breast of another person, and observe that succession of perceptions which constitutes his mind." By the analogy with the above circumstances in which I observe the succession of images reflected on the movie-screen, my experience of observing the succession of perceptions may be taken to involve two different unities, $x'+y'+z'+\dots$ and $a'+b'+c'+\dots$. It can also be asserted, by this analogy, that the identity of the mind of another person is a quality which we attribute to these different perceptions, a', b', c', ..., because of the union of their ideas in imagination, whereas it is the unity among different perceptions, x', y', z', ... that gives rise to the notion of identity of whatever is occurring in his mind, namely the unity of consciousness. It is important to distinguish between these two unities of perceptions, since, although what I am observing is one and the same object, viz. the mind of another person or a movie-screen, my experience consists of two different perceptions, each involving different unities, as we have seen in the analogical case of my watching a movie-screen. This analogy suggests again that the unity $x'+y'+z'+\dots$ logically presupposes the unity $a'+b'+c'+\dots$, but not vice versa.

How is memory expected to contribute to the production of these two unities, then? It is the similar function that is required for memory in both cases: to produce resemblance among different perceptions, so that the imagination can be conveyed more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object. It nevertheless is the case that one and the same operation is involved in both unities, as we have noted before: what prepares smooth passage among different perceptions, x', y', z'... is the memory of this person to whom the succession of these perceptions belongs whereas it is my memory as the observer

who is supposed to see clearly into his breast that contributes to the production of easy passage among different perceptions, a' , b' , c' ...

And Hume does not forget to insist upon the importance of memory in producing a unity among different perceptions, and actually adds another supposition to his initial one in the following way: "suppose we could see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions which constitutes his mind or thinking principle, and suppose that he always preserves the memory of a considerable part of past perceptions"(T 260). But which unity could it be, the unity $x'+y'+z'+...$ or the unity $a+b+c+...$, that is supposed to have the benefit of this person's good memory?

When Hume asks for the first initial supposition, he obviously intends to continue the same method of reasoning he has established for the identity of material objects: he requests us to suppose "we could see clearly into the breast of another," so that we can "observe that succession of perceptions which constitutes his mind" just as we observe a movie-screen. And so far as Hume is concerned to the unity $a'+b'+c'+...$, pursuing the analogy with the identity of material objects, he is right in holding that "the case is the same whether we consider ourselves or others"(T 261). To put it in the other way round, this remark given at the end of his discussion shows that what he has observed regarding the identity of another person's mind is intended for the discussion on the unity $a'+b'+c'+...$. However, when Hume adds another supposition that this person "always preserves the memory of considerable part of past perceptions"(T 260), he is plainly arguing for another unity $x'+y'+z'+...$, just because the asserted memory is expected to contribute to the production of this former unity. Whether "he always preserves the memory of a considerable part of past perceptions"(T 260) concerns only the former unity $x'+y'+z'+...$, and not the latter unity $a+b+c+...$. Here lies Hume's difficulty: he is committed to the former unity while he is still continuing the same method of reasoning which is adequate only to the latter, but not to the former unity $x'+y'+z'+...$

And indeed in his immediately succeeding paragraph, Hume enters into the discussion on the unity of consciousness, $x'+y'+z'+...$, contending that "the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect"(T 261). Hume vaguely realises, it seems to me, not the seriousness of his mistake, but that he has been already committed to a new unity $x'+y'+z'+...$ while he is intending to discuss the latter unity $a'+b'+c'+...$. Hume's dilemma arises either from his failure in distinguishing between these two kinds of unities or from his

confusion in adapting the adequate method of reasoning for the explanation of the former unity $x' + y' + z' + \dots$, for which, instead of the analogy with plants and animals, the analogy with my own mind is involved.

(4) The producing of personal identity v.s. the discovering of personal identity

The foregoing argument seems to provide the key for understanding what function of memory is actually referred to when Hume asserts that “the memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions”(T 261). We owe our identity to memory which produces “the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought”(T 261), since it is this function of memory that would “convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object”(ibid.), according to him.

In this assertion, Hume sounds like believing that the frequent placing of resembling perceptions produced by memory leads us to think of them as constituting one mind. To put it crudely, he seems to take it for granted that the succession of different perceptions is, once connected into a unity by relation, automatically guaranteed to belong to one mind. Hume certainly realises that resemblance is not enough for this task, since we do not remember everything that happens to us, as he points out. But he still seems to assume that resemblance is enough to lead us to suppose these sequences of actually remembered experiences as belonging to, in fact partially constituting, a single mind, as Barry Stroud points out.

However, as Stroud suggests, it is extremely doubtful if it is simply the resemblance in a sequence of perceptions that leads us to think of them as constituting or belonging to one mind. Because, although we are told by Hume that “an image necessarily resembles its object” (T 260), “the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought” (T 261) presupposes that all these perceptions occur in one mind. “Even if resemblance can and does have an effect on us, it might be that the perceptions must resemble each other because they all occur in one person's memory before we come to think of them as constituting one mind”(Stroud 124). This is the very point criticised by David Pears, who claims that “perceptions are ascribed to their owner not because they possess any kind of order in their owners' minds but simply because their owners have them”(Hume Studies 296).

This situation can be illustrated in terms of those two kinds of unities we have just examined above. We have tried to illustrate the artificially constructed circumstance in which I am

observing that succession of perceptions constituting the mind of another person by the analogy with the circumstance in which I am observing the succession of images reflected on a movie-screen. In the former circumstance, my perception is suggested to involve two kinds of unities, $x'+y'+z'+\dots$ and $a'+b'+c'+\dots$, just as in the latter circumstance my perception of an apple on the screen consists of two different unities, $x+y+z+\dots$ and $a+b+c+\dots$, of different perceptions, each relevant to the perception of an [image of] apple and relevant to the perception of the screen respectively. We have seen regarding the latter circumstance that the unity $x+y+z+\dots$ logically presupposes the unity $a+b+c+\dots$, since the perception of an apple on the screen entails the perception of the movie-screen. And so far as we hold the analogy between these two circumstances, it must also be asserted regarding the former that the unity $x'+y'+z'+\dots$ logically presupposes the unity $a'+b'+c'+\dots$.

This relation between these two kinds of unity provides the key to our present problem what causes Barry Stroud's suspicion regarding the role of resemblance in producing our identity. It is true, as Hume asserts, that the resemblance in a sequence of perceptions would "convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object"(T 261). It does not follow, however, that the resemblance leads us to think of it as belonging to one mind, but rather the resemblance presupposes the notion of one mind in the sense in which all these perceptions occur in one mind. This is simply because, the resemblance among different perceptions which constitute the mind of another person contributes to the production of the unity of consciousness, $x'+y'+z'+\dots$, which logically presupposes the unity $a'+b'+c'+\dots$, so far as that aspect of our identity which is to be illustrated by the analogy with the identity of material objects. In other words, the resemblance among these different perceptions contributes only 'obliquely' to the production of latter unity $a'+b'+c'+\dots$, since the former unity $x'+y'+z'+\dots$, being the product of this resemblance, logically presupposes the notion of one mind, namely the outcome of the unity $a'+b'+c'+\dots$.

Hume's discussion on the role of resemblance in producing our identity is conspicuously obscure and perfunctory, as is noted by Barry Stroud. It is because, it seems to me, Hume vaguely realises the difficulty involved in this part of his discussion by pursuing the analogy between the mental and the physical occurrences. He seems aware, if not clearly, that in illustrating personal identity, he has already carried his argument beyond the scope of the method of reasoning he has so far developed regarding the identity of plants and animals. It might be

this awareness that led him introduce the distinction between two roles of memory, “discovering” and “producing” our identity. Memory is claimed to contribute not only “discovering” but also “producing” our identity by means of the relation of resemblance among perceptions whereas it “does not so much produce as discover personal identity, by showing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions”(T 262). Hume goes to such an extent that he explains how memory contributes to the producing or the discovering of our identity in terms of the relation of resemblance or causation respectively, but Hume nevertheless tries no effort to make it clear why such a distinction is necessary. It seems at least possible, however, to find a clue in the above argument for understanding what Hume actually mean by “discovering” or “producing” our identity, or why he claims for the distinction between these two roles of memory.

As we have seen, although Hume shares a common opinion with Locke regarding the role of memory in producing personal identity, he never maintains, unlike Locke, that memory is important as the sole criterion of personal identity, nor tries to define personal identity in terms of memory. Instead, memory is claimed to be important, simply because it makes two crucial connections among perceptions possible: it not only “discovers” but also “produces” personal identity by means of the relation of resemblance whereas it only “discovers” by the relation of cause and effect. Let us try and examine first how memory plays both roles of “producing” and “discovering” our identity by means of the relation of resemblance.

By asserting that memory “produces” our identity by means of resemblance among perceptions, Hume is referring, it seems to me, to that function of memory which assists the imagination to produce “the fiction” of the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses by raising up images of past perceptions and by removing the interruption among perceptions. Since “an image necessarily resembles its object”(T 260), “the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions ... convey[s] the imagination more easily from one link to another, and makes the whole seem like the continuance of one object”(ibid.). We thus ‘invent’ or ‘produce,’ as opposed to ‘discover,’ personal identity, just as we do with the identity of plants and animals and other external objects. According to this method of reasoning, the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only “a fiction”(T 255), “feigned”(T 254) or “disguised”(T 254) out of “confusion”(T 254) or by “mistake”(T 254, 245) or “error”(T 255), as we have seen in the foregoing argument.

If it is this aspect of our identity that is asserted to be “produced” by memory through the

relation of resemblance, it may be reasonable to hold that what Hume is concerned to is the unity $a'+b'+c'+\dots$. According to Hume's initial supposition of my seeing clearly into the breast of another and observing that succession of perceptions which constitutes his mind, the notion of the identity of his mind is produced in the analogical manner in which the notion of the identity of the movie-screen is generated, as we have seen above. In other words, the identity of his mind is suggested in terms of the unity $a'+b'+c'+\dots$ just as the identity of the screen is suggested in terms of the unity $a+b+c+\dots$ when I am observing the movie-screen. This is the way in which memory contributes to the "production" of our identity, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions.

How could memory contribute to "discovering" our identity by means of resemblance, then? Hume's answer for this question must be that memory "discovers" the identity by "the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought"(T 261). As we have noted above, it is not only by means of resemblance but also by causation that memory contributes to "discovering" personal identity. Or rather, the function of "discovering" our identity belongs essentially to the repertoire of memory relevant to causation. Resemblance is required for "discovering" our identity, just because the relation of cause and effect presupposes resemblance. In Hume's theory resemblance makes the core of the causation, since the relation "which we call cause and effect, is founded on past experience, and on our remembrance of their constant conjunction"(T 87). Memory is thus claimed to contribute not only to the "production" of our identity by raising up images of our past perceptions but also to its "discovery" by raising up those images together with their usual attendants, and by acquainting "us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions"(T 261).

It is true that "the idea of cause and effect is derived from experience"(T 89/90), so that "had we no memory, we never should have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person"(T 261/2). Memory therefore "produces" our identity so far as our identity depends upon our past experience or rather "the immediate impressions of our memory and senses"(T 89). But it nevertheless is the case that by the relation of cause and effect "we can ... extend our identity beyond our memory"(T 262). Memory "discovers" our identity only when "we can extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed"(T 262). It is the peculiarity of personal identity that memory is involved in those two

different manners in giving rise to the notion of the identity. But how could memory actually “discover” our identity “by showing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions”(T 262)?

Hume is critical to the opinion that “memory produces entirely our personal identity” (T 161) typically asserted by Locke who assumed that the primary function of memory consists in reviving “perceptions which the mind has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before”(II. x. 2). It is because, as Hume thinks, “we can extend our identity beyond our memory”(T 161). It does not mean, however, that Hume regards the role of memory to be trivial or unimportant. On the contrary: memory is claimed to be “the source of personal identity”(T 261), since it is memory which makes us “extend the identity of our persons beyond our memory”(T 262), by acquainting “us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions”(T 261). It is “in this view,” according to him, that memory is asserted to do “not so much produce as discover personal identity, by showing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions”(T 262).

If so, it is obviously the unity $x'+y'+z'+\dots$ that is relevant to the function of memory of “discovering” our identity. It is worth remembering what is added by Hume to his initial supposition of my seeing “clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions which constitutes his mind”(T 260): Hume adds another supposition that “he[=this another person] always preserves the memory of a considerable part of past perceptions”(T 260). The memory of this person to which the succession of perceptions is supposed to belong is relevant to the unity of $x'+y'+z'+\dots$ whereas my memory as the observer of this succession of perceptions relevant to the unity $a'+b'+c'+\dots$, as we have seen above. This situation can be clearly illustrated in the analogical case of my observing a movie-screen upon which an image of an apple is reflected. On the one hand, the memory of this person contributes to “the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions” reflected upon the screen, conveying the imagination more easily from one link to another, and making the whole succession seem like the continuance of an apple. On the other hand, my memory as the observer of this screen contributes to the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions caused by the every constituents of the physical circumstance to which both the screen and my body are belonging, conveying the imagination more easily from one link to another, and making the whole seem like the continuance of a screen. And, as we have discussed, the perception of an apple in the former case consists of the unity $x+y+z+\dots$ whereas it is the unity

$a+b+c+\dots$ that the perception of the screen in the latter case consists of.

Hume points out that our identity does not necessarily depend upon “the immediate impressions of our memory and senses”(T 89), by mentioning that, although we have entirely forget the incidents of our past days, we would never affirm, in our ordinary context, that the present self is not the same person with the self of that time. It is simply because, according to him, “having once acquired this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our memory”(T 262). It is evidently the unity of consciousness, $x'+y'+z'+\dots$ then that whether I forget the incidents of my past days or not has something to do with, but not with the unity $a'+b'+c'+\dots$. When Hume maintains that memory “discovers” our identity, he is arguing how the unity of consciousness, $x'+y'+z'+\dots$ is given by means of the relation of cause and effect. It is indeed in this context that “the true idea of the human mind” is suggested by Hume “as a system of different perceptions or different existence, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect”(T 261).

(5) The true idea of the human mind

By proposing “the true idea of the human mind” as a system of different perceptions linked together by the relation of cause and effect, Hume is now entering into the new discussion on the unity of consciousness, $x'+y'+z'+\dots$, directly referring to what I perceive if I “could see clearly into the breast of another, and observe as that succession of perceptions which constitutes his mind or thinking principle.” He has thus switched over his method of reasoning according as he has changed the subject of discussion from the unity $a'+b'+c'+\dots$ to the unity $x'+y'+z'+\dots$. So far he has concerned to the illustration of our identity in terms of the circumstance in which I were observing the mind of another person in such a way as I observe a movie-screen, but now he is committed to the observation of what is going on in the mind of another person which is just like watching what is reflected on the movie-screen, the image of an apple, for instance. In other words, after having been devoted to that aspect of personal identity which could be accounted for by the analogy with the identity of plants and animals, Hume is entering into the discussion on “the true idea of the human mind,” for which illustration he has to resort to a new analogy, or rather an assimilation, of the mind of another person to my own.

Hume has introduced this new analogy for the discussion of the new aspect of our identity,

by supposing as if I “could see clearly into the breast of another, and observe”(T 260) immediately what is occurring in his mind just as I can observe in my own case. This assimilation involves another supposition: the mind of another is the same as mine, being “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement”(T 253). In my own case, when I observe my own mind and “enter most intimately into what I call myself”(T 252), what I discover is “some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure”(T 252), as Hume witnesses. If so, it is reasonable to suppose, by this analogy, that what I discover in the mind of another is again “a bundle or collection of different perceptions” (T 252) of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. I may observe in his mind varieties of images or perceptions, e.g. the image of an apple, love, pain, passing away and moving on according as he perceives or experiences, e.g. an apple, love, pain. It may not be fanciful to suggest that my observation of the succession of perceptions which constitutes the mind of another is very much like the experience of my observing the succession of different perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement passing away or moving on a movie-screen.

Hume seems to be aware that, when he asserted “the true idea of the human mind,” he has now entered into the new aspect of his discussion. This must be one of the reasons at least why in this connection he calls our attention, rather abruptly, to the distinction of these two aspects of our identity, personal identity regarding the imagination and personal identity regarding the passions, claiming for the necessity of their corroboration with each other. Hume has discussed the former aspect of our identity by continuing “the same method of reasoning which has so successfully explained the identity of plants and animals and other external objects”(T 259). What he has been devoted to in Book I is the unity $a' + b' + c' + \dots$, involved by the supposition of my seeing clearly the mind of another, which is just like my watching a movie-screen. This aspect of our identity relevant to this unity is “only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies”(T 259).

The new topic of discussion to be dealt with in Book II is announced by his assertion for “the true idea of the human mind,” which is defined as “a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other”(T 261). Hume mentions “a republic or

commonwealth” as an analogical system “in which several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts”(T 261). Here seems a definite analogy, as Hume assumes, between these two systems: “as the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity”(T 261). There is indeed an analogy between a republic and a person as a dynamic system in which “whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation”(T 261), as Hume maintains. But is this analogy really adequate to the task of illustrating “the soul” or the asserted “true system of the human mind”?

When Hume suggests to compare a soul to a republic, in order to illustrate how “the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity”(T 261), It might look as if he were concerned to the unity of perceptions which are supposed to constitute the mind of another person, by the analogy with my own mind. In spite of his intention, however, Hume is still continuing the same former method of reasoning, being devoted to the unity $a'+b'+c'+\dots$, resorting to the analogy between the mental and physical occurrences. In order to see this situation, it may be useful to recall here Hume’s explanation regarding the process in which we come to attribute identity to animals or vegetables which endure a total change in a few years: even when their form, size, and substance, are entirely altered, yet we still attribute identity to them, by adding a sympathy of parts to their common ends, and supposing that they bear to each other the reciprocal relation of cause and effect in all their actions and operations. All this is possible, he explains, just because “not only the several parts have a reference to some general purpose, but also a mutual dependence on, and connection with, each other”(T 257). According to this explanation, there is nothing essentially different in Hume’s method of reasoning in accounting for the identity of plants or vegetables and the identity of a republic “in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts”(T 261). If so, when Hume so confidently assures us of the analogy between the soul and a republic, he is evidently still occupied with this aspect of our identity which could be illustrated in terms of the unity $a'+b'+c'+\dots$. In spite of this situation, however, when he proposes “the true idea of the human mind ... as a system of different perceptions ... linked together by the relation of cause

and effect," he has started the discussion upon the new aspect of our identity, which could be illustrated only in terms of the unity of consciousness, $x'+y'+z'+\dots$

"The true idea of the human mind" is, according to him, such a dynamic system in which "different perceptions or different existences ... mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other"(T 261). To watch this system from outside must be exactly like observing a movie-screen upon which one image chases another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expelled in its turn, since it is asserted that in this true system again "one thought chases another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expelled in its turn"(T 261). Now, Hume would argue in this connection that memory contributes to the production of the unity among these different perceptions, by "the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought"(T 261), so that the imagination can be conveyed more easily from one link to another, making the whole seem like the continuance of one object. But whose memory could it be that is supposed to be involved in producing the unity in question? It is of course the memory of the person to whom these varieties of perceptions are supposed to belong, and cannot be the memory of the observer who is observing this succession of perceptions from outside. To put it in the other way round, what occupies Hume's mind when he proposes "the true idea of the human mind" must be the unity of consciousness, $x'+y'+z'+\dots$, since it is to this unity that the good memory of this another person matters. Hume's confusion is clear by now: what is intended by "the true idea of the human mind" is the aspect of our identity which is to be illustrated in terms of the unity $x'+y'+z'+\dots$ whereas what Hume suggests by the analogy of the mind with a republic is the aspect of our identity which is to be explained in terms of the unity $a'+b'+c'+\dots$

Hume seems to have acknowledged the difficulty, though vaguely, in developing his argument in the last part of his discussion in Book I. This is the reason, it seems to me, why "Hume's explanation is much briefer and more perfunctory here than in his account of the idea of continued and distinct existence of objects, and [why] he does nothing to clear up its obscurities or to make it more plausible"(Stroud 123/4), as Barry Stroud points out. It appears strange and surprising indeed to find Hume's account on such a crucial subject so short and simple. Barry Stroud might not be entirely ungratuitous in marking this briefness and perfunctoriness as the symptom of Hume's awareness of his difficulty acknowledged and developed later in the Appendix.

(6) How the analogy holds

Hume's basic method of reasoning for the illustration of "the identity of a self or person"(T 253) in Book I is to "take the matter pretty deep, and account for that identity, which we attribute to plants and animals"(*ibid.*). It is because, as Hume thinks, "there being a great analogy betwixt it and the identity of a self or person"(T 253). It is Hume's premise, rather than his conclusion, that "the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man"(T 259) is "of a like kind"(*ibid.*) with that which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies, and therefore a "fictitious"(*ibid.*) one. It is indeed evident as well as important that our identity has such an aspect as is dependent upon our existence as a physical being, subject to the space and time condition by which every constituent of the external world is determined. Hume is well-founded in claiming that our "identity depends on the relations of ideas; and these relations produce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion"(T 262).

Following his suggestion that, when "we now proceed to explain the nature of personal identity"(T 258), "the same method of reasoning must be continued which has so successfully explained the identity of plants and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature"(*ibid.*), let us now go back and examine briefly his former section titled "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," because it is in this section that Hume establishes this basic method as a "consistent system"(T 210) which illustrates "the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of body"(T 187/8). Hume assumes that the basic aspect of our identity must be illustrated in terms of the belief in the existence of body, or rather that our existence as a mental being depends upon the belief in our existence as a physical being. He begins this section with the distinction between the belief in the continued and in the distinct existence, and starts with the former, which first takes place, to be followed by the latter as its "necessary consequence"(T 210).

What makes the basis of his argument is this maxim: "everything that enters the mind, being in reality as the perception"(T 190), so that "it is absurd to imagine the senses can ever distinguish betwixt ourselves and external objects"(*ibid.*). His method of reasoning for illustrating how we attribute a continued existence to our perceptions consists of the following four procedures: (1) to explain the principle of identity, (2) to give a reason why the resemblance of our broken and interrupted perceptions induces us to attribute an identity to them, (3) to account for that propensity, which this illusion gives, to unite these broken appearances by a continued existence, (4) to explain that force and vivacity of conception which arises from the

propensity.

The first issue is explained like this: “the principle of individuation is nothing but the invariableness and uninterruptedness of any object, through a supposed variation of time, by which the mind can trace it in the different periods of its existence, without any break of the view, and without being obliged to form the idea of multiplicity or number”(T 201). The second issue is derived from this principle of individuation: “an easy transition or passage of the imagination, along the ideas of these different and interrupted perceptions, is almost the same disposition of mind with that in which we consider one constant and uninterrupted perception”(T 204). This propensity of the imagination of taking the easy passage is assisted by memory, which “presents us with a vast number of instances of perceptions perfectly resembling each others” (T 208). It is this resemblance that makes us mistake one for the other, and substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of related object, and contributes to the production of an “imperfect”(T 256) identity.

And here we are naturally carried from the second to the third process, owing to this resemblance which involves not only “a propension to consider these interrupted perceptions as the same”(T 208) but also “a propension to connect them by a continued existence”(ibid.). Because, “when the exact resemblance of our perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity, we may remove the seeming interruption by feigning a continued being, which may fill those intervals, and preserve a perfect and entire identity to our perception”(T 208). What makes the core of Hume's theory of identity is this third process in which the “imperfect” identity develops into the “perfect”(T 254) identity owing to these two propensions of resemblance.

The notion of “a perfect simplicity and identity,” however, is yet to be established until we here not only “feign but believe this continued existence”(T 208) in the next process. “Some lively impressions of the memory” is required “in the last place,” in order to make us believe the continued existence of body, since belief, in general, consists in nothing but the vivacity of idea. This is how Hume accounts for the cause or origin of the belief of “the vulgar” who suppose “their perceptions to be their only objects, and at the same time believe the continued existence of the matter”(T 209). He is so proud of the consistency of this system that he confidently assures us that this is a “perfectly convincing”(T 210) system, “supported by the strongest proofs”(ibid.). This system is meant to confirm his central issue that “a strong propensity or inclination alone, without any present impression, will sometimes causes a belief

or opinion”(T210).

This “method of reasoning” which provides the whole basis for his succeeding discussion may be summarized into these four following issues:

(1) The principle of individuation.

(2) The resemblance of certain perceptions gives “propension to bestow an identity on our resembling perceptions”(T 209); “they are only our resembling perceptions, which we have a propension to suppose the same”(ibid.).

(3) This propension produces the fiction of a continued existence; there is “no other effect than to remedy the interruption of our perceptions, which is the only circumstance that is contrary to their identity”(T 209).

(4) “In the last place, this propension causes belief by means of the vivacity of the present impressions of the memory; without the remembrance of former sensations, we never should have any belief of the continued existence of body”(T 210).

Hume has indeed a good ground for explaining personal identity in terms of this system, since it is evident that the belief in the continued existence of our own being makes the core of the identity of a self or person. It is this aspect of our identity that he intends to illustrate as “our identity regarding our thought or imagination,” by calling our attention to such an aspect of an infant as is common to an oak tree: “an infant becomes a man, and is sometimes fat, sometimes lean, without any change in his identity”(T 237). Hume is well-founded in holding that “the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is ... of a kind with which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies”(T 259), since this aspect of our identity is nothing essentially different or peculiar from the identity of an oak “that grows from a small plant to a large tree is still the same oak, though there be not one particle of matter or figure of its parts the same” (T 257).

Here it is easy to see that our “identity depends on the relations of ideas; and these relations produce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion”(T 262). Besides, it would never happen that, even when a person has entirely forgot the incidents of his past days, he affirms that “the present self is not the same person with the self of that time; and by that means overturn all the most established notions of personal identity”(T 262). It is because, “having once acquired this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our memory”(T 262).

Personal identity is derived from the operation of the imagination by which “we feign the

continued existence of the perceptions of our sense, to remove the interruption; and run into the notion of a *soul*, and *self*, and *substance*, to disguise the variation"(T 241). So far as this aspect of our identity is concerned, "the case is the same, whether we consider ourselves or others"(T 261), as Hume assures us. Because, there is nothing essentially different in both procedures by which "myself" and "the self of other people" arise as the outcome of the connection among ideas, involving the belief in the continued existence.

Having established the system which gives rise to the opinion of a continued existence, Hume proceeds to hold that a distinct or independent existence "follows as a necessary consequence"(T 210). It is because, "if the objects of our senses continue to exist, even when they are not perceived, their existence is of course independent of and distinct from the perception; and vice versa, if their existence be independent of the perception, and distinct from it, they must continue to exist, even though they be not perceived"(T 188).

Regarding the "internal" perceptions, however, we are not likely to be disturbed by "the mistake" of representing our perceptions as distinct from or external to us, since it is evident that I do never suppose in our ordinary context that, for instance, the pleasant sensation I feel about my dear child or my own beautiful house is external to me, belonging to the object in question, nor even that my toothache is distinct from, or independent of me. We might therefore conclude that this intractable problem, "what deceives us to suppose our perceptions to be distinct from ourselves," is irrelevant to personal identity, so that the analogy between physical and mental occurrences fails here.

It is plainly a mistake, however, to suppose that the belief in the distinct existence is irrelevant to personal identity, since, as we have seen above, our identity depends upon the easy transition of the imagination among related ideas which produces the belief in the existence of a body. As Hume insists, nature has not left this to our choice whether we assent to "the principle concerning the existence of body"(T 187). "It is in vain to ask, *Whether there be body or not?*"(*ibid.*), since "that is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasoning"(*ibid.*). We may well ask, however, "what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?"(T 287), or rather the principles which produce the belief in a continued and a distinct or independent existence. And owing to the intimate connection betwixt those two principles, "we no sooner establish the other follows as a necessary consequence"(T 210). It is thus evident that the belief in the distinct existence belongs to the core of our identity, so far as our identity depends upon the great "propension to ascribe an identity to these successive percep-

tions, and to suppose ourselves possessed of an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives”(T 253).

Now, there still remains a problem which might suggest the looseness of the analogy between the identity of a material object and the identity of a self or person. We may reasonably wonder why one of the procedures required for the former is not mentioned by Hume for the latter. Regarding the former identity, we may remember that “the present impressions of the memory” is called for “in the last [fourth] place” as the functions of memory of bestowing a vivacity on that fiction of the continued existence. However, Hume’s account of personal identity stops, as it seems, at the third process in which “we feign the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption; and run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to disguise the variation”(T 254). If Hume really intends to hold the analogy, he should have mentioned this function of memory of bestowing a vivacity on this fiction, and makes us believe the continued existence of a self or person in the last place. Because, it is by means of this vivacity that the “imperfect” identity changes into the “perfect” identity. It seems quite strange therefore that any special involvement of vivacity is claimed for in the final process of the production of our identity. Is it simply because the necessary involvement of a vivacity of the present impressions of memory is too obvious? If it is, we still need to ask whether this vivacity bestowed by memory is really adequate for the task of changing the fiction into the belief in the continued existence of a self or person. Or if it isn’t, we have to seek another source of the vivacity.

We have seen that Hume’s theory of personal identity consists of these two main issues: (1) it is “the succession of perceptions which constitutes his mind or thinking principle” (T 260), and (2) “identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together, but is merely a quality which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination when we reflect upon them”(ibid.). The role assigned to memory is therefore to “bestow a relation on this succession amidst all its variations”(T 260), by (a) “the frequent placing of (b) these resembling perceptions (c) in the chain of thought”(T 261). The first function of (a) is naturally pursued, since the memory is essentially “a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions”(T 260). The second condition of (b) relevant to resemblance is yet to produce our identity until (c) joins to carry the imagination beyond our memory, and render the “imperfect” identity “perfect.” The mere “production

of a considerable part of past perceptions”(T 260) shown as (a) is therefore not sufficient: memory is required to fulfill the condition of (b) and (c), by producing the ‘horizontal’ and the ‘vertical’ connection among the succession of perceptions which is supposed to constitute our mind.

The second condition of (b) is attained, according to Hume, automatically as it were, when memory raises up the images of past perceptions, as “an image necessarily resembles its object”(T 260). This is how “the memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions”(T 260), as we have seen in the foregoing discussion. When Hume maintains regarding this aspect of our identity that “the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions” may “convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object”(T 261), what is pictured as the mind of a person is a sort of ‘static model’ of scattered mental items related to each other along which the imagination takes its way. It is ‘static’ in the sense in which any more active involvement of the mind than pursuing the first task of (a) is not required for the attainment of the second condition of (b), as memory is essentially a faculty of producing replicas. The notion of “the imperfect identity”(T 256) of a person arises, as we have seen, when this connection of resemblance “makes us substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of related objects”(T 254), producing this ‘horizontal’ or ‘quasi-spatial’ connection among different perceptions.

So far as the second condition of (b) is fulfilled, Hume has a good ground to hold the analogy between the mental and physical occurrences, by asserting that “this resemblance gives us a propensity to consider these interrupted perceptions as the same; and also a propensity to connect them by a continued existence, in order to justify this identity, and avoid the contradiction in which the interrupted appearance of these perceptions seems necessarily to involve us”(T 208). Here Hume could have proceeded to argue that “here then we have a propensity to feign the continued existence of all sensible objects; and as this propensity arises from some lively impressions of the memory, it bestows a vivacity on that fiction; or, in other words, makes us believe the continued existence of body”(T 209). This is indeed how the “imperfect” identity develops into the “perfect” identity, as we have seen regarding the identity of material objects.

However, instead of contending that “we here not only feign but believe”(T 208) this continued existence, Hume immediately calls for the third condition of (c), viz. causation as another

er necessary connection among perceptions, in terms of “the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought”(T 261). Third condition of (c) is thus claimed to be necessary so as to render the “imperfect” identity of a self or person “perfect.” Memory is requested here to produce another connection among perceptions, by acquainting us with “the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions”(T 261). Hume asserts memory to be “the source of personal identity”(T 261), chiefly because we owe to memory this notion of “that chain of causes and effects which constitute our self or person”(T 262). He assumes that, though the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a “fictitious” one, it reflects “the true idea of the human mind”(T 261) only when these different perceptions which constitute our mind are given a ‘vertical’ or ‘quasi-temporal’ connection by the relation of cause and effect.

It is worth our special notice that, when the connection of causation joins to assist the relation of resemblance, a new aspect or dimension of the human mind suddenly emerges: the whole constitution acquires such a dynamism as “one thought chases another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expelled in its turn”(T 261). It is really surprising to find that a “fictitious” connection among perceptions produced by the natural propensity of the imagination could cause such a ‘dynamic’ process in which not only “our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas”(T 261), but also “these ideas, in their turn, produce other impressions” (*ibid.*). The only exception of the definite rule that “our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions”(T 5) is thus “the impression of reflection,” which “is derived, in a great measure, from our ideas”(T 7), in Hume’s theory of ideas.

And if it really is the case that the asserted connection among perception, whether it is connected by “some real bond”(T 259) or not, gives rise to a new impression, as Hume assures us, the vivacity of memory is plainly superficial: no vivacity is required to make us believe, as opposed to feign or suppose, the reality of the idea in question. Because, as we shall see in our later discussion, “the new passion” simply entails “a double impulse”(T 284) or rather a “greater violence,” which renders the transition of the imagination “so much more easy and natural”(*ibid.*). In the system from which the identity of a self or person arises, the last process in which the “imperfect” identity develops into the “perfect” does not depend upon the vivacity of the present impression of memory. This must be the part of answer for our question why Hume does not take the trouble of calling for the vivacity of the present impression of memory as the necessary involvement in his discussion on personal identity. Needless to say, this does

never imply the triviality of the role of "the propensity [of resemblance which] causes belief by means of the present impressions of the memory"(T 209), nor of the vivacity of the present perception of memory. Because, as we have noted above, causation which joins resemblance to make the fourth process possible depends upon the relation of resemblance, and presupposes the entire system from which the belief in the continued and distinct existence arises.

The points raised in the above argument may be summarized like this:

(1) There is a definite correspondence between the system by which the belief in the continued and distinct existence of body arises and the system by which the identity of a self or person arises.

(2) All four processes involved in the former system are required for the latter, for all its seeming difference that the latter dispense with the fourth process involved in the former.

(3) It is a mistake therefore to suppose that the identity of all sensible objects involves the belief in the continued and distinct existence whereas personal identity involves only the belief in the continued existence: the entire system by which the former identity arises is presupposed for the the production of the latter identity.

(4) In both cases, it is resemblance produced by memory that gives us a "propensity" not only to consider the different perceptions as the same, but to ascribe to them an identity by "feigning" the continued and distinct existence of all sensible objects.

(5) What distinguishes the latter identity from the former is that causation is needed to join resemblance in the last process, producing another connection among perceptions.

(7) Where the analogy fails

Let us now take a simple concrete example to see how far the asserted analogy between the identity of material objects and the identity of a self or person holds. Let us also suppose, following Hume's suggestion, that, when I am pleased to hear the song of a bird singing in the tree, "they are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind"(T 253). My simple experience of hearing the song of a bird depends upon the connection among the succession of these different and interrupted perceptions, viz. a1, a2, a3, ..., following these four processes: (1) These perceptions are connected to each other by resemblance. (2) This succession of resembling perceptions is assimilated to be the contemplation of one continued object. (3) In order to disguise the variation, we feign a continued existence of the perceptions of our senses. (4) The vivacity of the present impression of memory is conveyed to make the fiction into the

belief of the continued existence of the singing bird.

(1) $a_1 + a_2 + a_3 + \dots$

↓ (the substitution of the notion of identity instead of that of the related object)

(2) $aaa\dots$

↓ (the fiction of the continued existence)

(3) a

↓ (enforcement of the idea by the vivacity of memory)

(4) A (the continued existence of the singing bird)

This is “the method of reasoning ... which has so successfully explained the identity of plants, and animals, and ships, and houses, and of all compounded and changeable productions either of art or nature”(T 259), as we have seen in the foregoing discussion. And it is evident, according to Hume, that the identity of my “self or person” arises when I am enjoying the song of a bird depends upon the connection among different perceptions, viz. b_1, b_2, b_3, \dots , since “the same method of reasoning must be continued”(T 258) when we proceed to explain the nature of personal identity. It is important for Hume that the identity of a person can be explained “perfectly”(T 253) in terms of the connection among perceptions, just as it is with the identity of all other sensible objects, as it is Hume’s basic premise that “every impression, external and internal, passions, affections, sensations, pains, and pleasure, are originally on the same footing”(T 190). Our identity “cannot have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like object”(T 259).

We have seen above that the perception of the song of a bird depends upon the connection among the succession of different perceptions, a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots , which constitute my mind when I am enjoying the song of a bird. It may worth asking here what could be the relation of these two successions of different perceptions, viz. the succession of a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots and the succession of b_1, b_2, b_3, \dots , both of which are supposed to arise at the same time when I hear the song of a bird. Are these two successions of perceptions different, completely distinct from each other, or are they connected to each other with any intimate relation? To put it in the other way round, how could one and the same experience of hearing a song of a bird gives rise to these different succession of perceptions, or rather how it is possible for the mind to distinguish one from the other, if these different successions as such were possible at all?

What constitute a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots may be essentially such sense data of sound that are different,

discreet, and momentary, short of being even a fragment of tune or note, entirely subject to the interruption caused by the slight movement of my body or sense organs as well as by the change of the conditions which constitute the physical environment. It might be suggested, on the other hand, that b_1, b_2, b_3, \dots are various kinds of "internal" or bodily impressions or sensations of "hear or clod, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure"(T 252), which are supposed to "succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity ... in a perpetual flux and movement" (*ibid.*) in my mind when I am enjoying the song of a bird. Now between these two kinds of successions, there might be asserted, rather misleadingly, a causal dependence of the latter upon the former in the following way.

Every item belonging to the former succession is accompanied by each corresponding item belonging to the latter succession, establishing a close causal connection between these two successions: when I heard the first sound of the song, I was surprised, and the second sound caused pleasure, and the third expectation, joy, excitement, and so on. It is this causal correspondence between each item constituting these two successions that Hume establishes later in Book II as the following principle: "no object is presented to the senses, nor image formed in the fancy, but what is accompanied with some emotion or movement of spirits proportioned to it"(T 373).

Hume's argument might be taken like this. It is the connection among the succession of those perceptions, viz. b_1, b_2, b_3, \dots , that gives rise to the identity of my own person when I hear the song of a bird, which is intimately connected with another succession of perceptions, a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots , by the connection of cause and effect. And what makes the unity of the former succession possible is its causal connection with the latter succession of perceptions which are combined to each other by resemblance. In other words, once the unity of the latter succession is established, there naturally follows the unity among of the former succession, owing to the causal relation between these two successions. This is how one and the same experience of hearing the song of a bird gives rise to the identity of myself as well as the identity of the singing bird through the unity of the former succession and the unity of the latter succession respectively.

The constituents of the former succession $b_1 + b_2 + b_3 + \dots$ are thus combined to each other rather 'obliquely,' being entirely dependent upon the connection among the constituents of the latter succession. What makes the connection among the former constituents, e.g. pleasure, delight, joy, disappointment, expectation, possible is neither the relation of resemblance nor

the relation of cause and effect between them, but is their causal connection with the constituents of the latter unity, viz. the perceptions of the song of a bird. My surprise (b1) is related to the succeeding experience of my pleasure (b2), not because my pleasure (b2) is caused by my surprise (b1) nor is resembling to it, but because my surprise is caused by my first perception of the sound (a1), which is connected with the second perception of another sound (a2), which causes my pleasure(b2). Although the connecting tie which links each member of the former unity is very loose, it might still be suggested that this unity allows the mind to find “something further than what immediately appears to it,” and conveys the imagination from one link to another, and makes the whole seem like the continuance of one object, namely the continued existence to my self or person. The former unity $b_1+b_2+b_3+\dots$ thus necessarily presupposes the latter $a_1+a_2+a_3+\dots$. It is exactly this dependence of the former upon the latter that is asserted by Hume when he claims that “ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing”(T 341).

- (4) $a_1 + a_2 + a_3 + \dots$
 ↓ (causal correspondence)
 $b_1 + b_2 + b_3 + \dots$
 (5) $b_1 + b_2 + b_3 + \dots$
 ↓ (the substitution of the notion of identity instead of that of the related object)
 (6) $bbb\dots$
 ↓ (the fiction of the continued existence)
 (7) b
 ↓ (enforcement of the idea by the vivacity of memory)
 (8) B (the continued being of my self or person)

It might thus be asserted that the same method of reasoning is now proved to be adequate for the illustration of the identity of a self or person, since there is no difficulty in accounting for the transition of the imagination from the fifth process to the eighth in which the connection among the b-perceptions gives rise to the identity of myself, resorting to the same method of reasoning. However, for all its seeming similarity, in order to pursue this analogy for the illustration of the unity of the b-succession, there is a definite difficulty to be solved which is derived from the peculiarity of impressions: “ideas may be compared to the extension and

solidity of matter and impressions, especially reflective ones, to colours, tastes, smells, and other sensible qualities”(T 365). It is indeed this difference between ideas and impressions that makes the main source of Hume's difficulty in establishing the theory of impressions, or rather passions, in Book II by the analogy with the theory of ideas.

We have seen in the foregoing argument that we owe the inference of “a double existence” (T 189) from a single impression entirely to the easy transition of the imagination along the related perceptions. “The mind looks further than what immediately appears to it”(T 189), just because the connection among perceptions conveys the imagination easily from one link to another, and makes the whole seem like the continuance of one object. All this is possible, therefore, because of this property of the ideas, which “never admit of a total union, but are endowed with a kind of impenetrability by which they exclude each other, and are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction, not by mixture”(T 366).

When I hear the song of bird, we have seen that each item of the a-succession, a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots , is connected to each other by resemblance into a unity of $a_1 + a_2 + a_3 + \dots$. And it is crucially the transition of the imagination along related ideas of the sense data of the sound, and not the transition along related impressions that makes the connection among a-perception possible. The smooth passage prepared along related ideas is, just like stepping stones, possible only because “ideas never admit of a total union, but are endowed with a kind of impenetrability by which they exclude each other, and are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction, not by their mixture”(T 366). Impressions make a definite contrast to ideas in this respect: “impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union, and, like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression which arises from the whole”(T 366). It is from this property of passions that “some of the most curious phenomena of the human mind are derived”(T 366), according to Hume. And it is also this property of impressions that causes such a stringent difficulty peculiar to the theory of passions as this: the unity among the impressions itself can never prepare the smooth passage for the imagination.

However, it is a complete mistake to suppose that this crucial difference between these two kinds of perceptions discouraged Hume in holding the analogy with these two systems of ideas and passions. Hume is so sure of his success in establishing “the true system” of passions by the analogy with the former system, claiming for “the double relation of impressions and ideas the passion is derived”(T 286): “with how much greater facility must this transition

be made, where these two movements mutually assist each other, and the mind receives a double impulse from the relations both of its impressions and ideas!"(*ibid.*) Through this "true system," Hume succeeds in continuing the same method of reasoning for the illustration of the origin of passions in terms of the transition of the imagination, or rather in terms of the "double impulse"(T 284) involved by the transition, which takes the smooth passage along both of the related ideas and the related impressions.

Here lies the answer why Hume finds it necessary to discuss these two aspects of personal identity relevant to our thought or imagination and relevant to passions separately, in order to answer this question "what then gives us so great a propensity to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possessed of an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives"(T 253). Although both notions of personal identity "proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas"(T 260), the latter aspect can only be illustrate by means of a more complicated system of the double connection of impressions and ideas whereas the former depends upon the connection of ideas.

(8) The necessity of the corroboration between the two aspects of personal identity

Hume assures us that our minds "are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement"(T 252). He also assures us that, "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure"(T 252). However, what Hume intends to propose as the system from which the identity of my self or person is produced is not such a simple system as is entirely dependent upon the connection among b-perceptions, namely among those "particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure," that may be witnessed by myself when I enter most intimately into what I call myself. In the foregoing argument, I have tentatively tried to explain the derivation of the notion of my own identity in terms of the processes of (5)+(6)+(7)+(8), by the analogy of the processes of (1)+(2)+(3)+(4). But, it is a mistake, as we see clearly now, to suppose that what Hume suggests as the system relevant to the identity of my own self or person is the connection among those perceptions which we specifies above as b-perceptions, since the connection among perceptions, viz. $b_1+b_2+b_3+\dots$, can never prepare the smooth passage for the imagination, just

like the connection of $a_1 + a_2 + a_3 \dots$: each constituents of the former process, viz. $b_1, b_2, b_3 \dots$ transfuses to each other, since "impressions are susceptible of entire union, and, like colours, may blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression which arises from the whole"(T 366).

We must start from the beginning, and ask again what is implied by "the true idea of the human mind"(T 261) "as the system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect"(*ibid.*). We have seen in the above argument how our notions of personal identity proceed entirely from smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas, mainly according to the principle of resemblance. And here now, Hume introduces "the relation of causes and effects" into his system, mentioning "that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person"(T 262). But how could causation join resemblance, converting the former static system into such a dynamic one in which these different perceptions "mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other"(T 261)?

In order to understand this circumstance, it is useful to recall here the table of order in which perceptions appear in the mind. In Hume's system, perception first appears to the mind as the impression of sensation, which is copied as an idea. Among those ideas, the idea of pleasure or pain returns upon the mind as the new impressions called the impression of reflection, which, perhaps, in their turn, giving rise to other ideas and impressions in its fourth or later returns upon the mind. And, as we have already noted, it is only the impression of reflection that is derived from ideas, only as the third return of the impression of sensation. What is claimed as the system from which the true idea of the human mind arises is then the system in which these perceptions appear to the mind in this definite order, or rather the system in which the first perception causes the second, which in turn produces the third, and so on. There is nothing special about the connection between impressions and ideas so far as the latter causes the former, since "our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions" (T 5). And the only exception of this definite rule is "the impression of reflection," viz. passions, desires, and emotions, which "is derived in a great measure from our ideas" (T 7). It may not be gratuitous to suggest that what Hume proposes as the system from which "the true idea of the human mind" arises is then nothing but the system of the production of the impression of reflection, since in this system not only "our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas"(T 261), but also "these ideas, in turn, produce other impressions"

(*ibid.*). In other words, the human mind is peculiar, just because it involves such impressions as passions, desires, and emotions, which are derived from ideas.

It is easy to see how Hume's basic system established by the analogy with plants and animals suddenly acquires its dynamism once another relation, causation, joins to assist the relation of resemblance, in producing the new connection among perceptions, when Hume calls our attention to such an active aspect of the true system of the human mind as this: "our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas, in their turn, produce other impressions"(T 261), or that "one thought chases another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expelled in its turn"(*ibid.*). It may not be absurd to characterise this causal connection among different perceptions as vertical in order to distinguish the other basic connection of resembling perceptions as horizontal, and to suppose that Hume's final intention lies in establishing a dynamic system dependent upon the vertical and horizontal double connections among different perceptions.

Hume's basic system established by the analogy with the identity of plants and animals is, as we have seen, mainly dependent upon the latter horizontal relation. And this system would now acquire solidity by the addition of the former vertical connection among different perceptions. Though "fictitious" the identity of a self or person may be, being dependent upon the latter horizontal relation among different ideas, it is now guaranteed through the former vertical connection that "whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation"(T 261). This circumstance is best illustrated in "a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts"(T 261). Because, "as the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its law and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his ideas, without losing his identity"(T 261), according to Hume. And it is "in this view" that Hume insists upon the necessity of the corroboration of these two aspects of our identity regarding the imagination and regarding the passions in the following way: "in this view our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures"(T 261). Thus at the very end of Book I, Hume has now announced the new subject, and is ready to enter into the new discussion on passion in the next book.

(9) The connection between Book I and Book II

It is one of the most controversial problems regarding Hume's *Treatise* whether there is a direct connection between Book I and Book II. There is of course no room to argue that these two Books at least have the same theme, as it is Hume's original intention of the *Treatise* to demonstrate that "the subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves"(Advertisement). But what is controversial is whether the issue he discusses at the end of Book I is directly succeeded in Book II. And the general understanding of critics, though with rare exceptions, seems to be that Hume's discussion on personal identity is complete in Book I, intended not to be developed in the succeeding work. One of the objects of this book is to show that, in spite of the general understanding, these two books are connected in such an inseparable way as to make the issue of personal identity the core of the *Treatise*.

In the last section of Book I allocated for the discussion of personal identity, Hume insists upon the necessity of distinguishing "betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves"(T 253), the former of which is claimed to be that the present subject to be discussed in Book I. Nothing may seem more natural, then, that the former aspect is intended to be discussed in Book I, and the latter in Book II. But it is the general opinion of Hume's critics that Hume has completed his theory of personal identity in Book I without entering into the discussion on the other aspect. There is indeed no remark on the latter aspect in any part of his discussion in Book II, which may show Hume's explicit concern to the subject of personal identity. However, the real problem which causes the critic's uneasiness regarding this issue is derived not from Hume's claim for the distinction between these two aspects, but rather from his insistence upon the necessity of their corroboration with one another. At the end of his discussion of personal identity in Book I, he definitely maintains that "our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination"(T 261). If it is really so, it may be more natural to suppose that Hume intends to illustrate in his succeeding work how the undiscussed aspect serves to corroborate the aspect already discussed in Book I, and that it is the necessary procedure for the completion of his system he is so proud of.

A best strategy for settling this controversy seems to see why Hume requests the necessity of the corroboration of these two aspects of our identity. Hume thinks that personal identi-

ty regarding our thought or imagination requires the corroboration with our identity regarding passions “by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261). But what is referred to “by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”?

Let us now examine the circumstance in which Hume mentions the necessity for the corroboration, as the key to answer this question seems to be prepared in the very context in which this assertion is given. We have noticed that the corroboration of these two aspects of our identity is suggested immediately after his proposal of “the true idea of the human mind ... as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect”(T 261). In this part of his discussion, he introduces a new principle of connection, viz. causation, between ideas and impressions, claiming that “our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas, in their turn, produce other impressions”(T 261). What occupies Hume’s mind as “the true idea of the human mind” is then a system of different perceptions connected causally into the sandwich construction with layers of impressions and ideas in turn in the following manner:

“Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of sensation, and those of reflection. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes. The second is derived, in a great measure, from our ideas, and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain, of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflection, because derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas: which, perhaps, in their turn, give rise to other impressions and ideas; so that the impressions of reflection are not only antecedent to their correspondent ideas, but posterior to those of sensation, and derived from them.”(T 7-8)

It is noticeable how perceptions appear in the mind in a definite order. It may not be too exaggerated to suggest that the following order of their appearance makes the core of Hume’s system of the mind: (1) the impressions of sensation, (2) the ideas of pleasure or pain, (3) the

impressions of reflection, viz. passions, desires, and emotions, (4) the ideas of the impressions of reflection, (5) other impressions and ideas, and so forth.

As “the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere”(T 275), “there must be some impressions which, without any introduction, make their appearance in the soul”(ibid.). All our experiences are thus derived originally from sensations produced through our sense organs, examination of which belongs to the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy. Those impressions which first strike upon the senses make the second appearance to the mind as the ideas of pleasure or pain. This is how “perceptions of the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas”(T 2). And now in their third return, the new impressions arise from these ideas of pleasure or pain as the impressions of reflection.

But, isn't it only such a perception as is admitted through our sense organs that could be called an impression, strictly speaking? It is true that in Hume's system there is a definite priority of impressions over ideas and that “our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions”(T 5). Instead of allowing other source of an impression, however, Hume insists upon the possibility for an idea to change into a real impression. What makes the dynamism of Hume's system is the very process in which an “lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression; these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity”(T 354).

The point of the above quotation lies in the distinction between the sensation and the impression of reflection: the latter is the third return upon the mind of the former impression copied and modified by the memory or imagination. What deserve our attention is the latter kind, according to Hume, since “the first arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes”(T 7) whereas “the second is derived, in a great measure, from our ideas”(ibid.). In establishing the theory of the impressions of reflection or passions, Hume's main business is to explain how it is possible for the first impression to re-appear as an impression, and not as an idea, in its third return.

It may not be gratuitous to suggest here that what is asserted as this system of the production of the impressions of reflection is nothing but “the system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect”(T 261) proposed at the end of Book I as the system from which “the true idea of the human mind” arises. Hume's main theme in Book II is naturally the origin of the impressions of reflection, or the establishment of “the true system”(T 286) from which passions are derived, just because “the

true idea of the human mind” depends upon the production of those impressions which are dependent upon the memory or imagination rather than upon our sense organs. At the end of his discussion on personal identity in Book I, Hume introduces this new aspect of the human mind, namely the productive system of the impressions of reflection as the new subject for Book II, as he has “fully explained the nature of our judgment and understanding”(T273).

This correspondence of these two systems seems to provide the key to our problem, viz. how “our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures”(T 261). It may not be fanciful to suggest at first that the former underlined assertion, “the making our distant perceptions influence each other,” is taken to be the restatement of this assertion regarding “the true idea of the human mind” that different perceptions “mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other”(T 261) and the latter underlined part, “giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures,” the restatement of his contention that “our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas, in their turn, produce other impressions”(ibid.).

In Hume’s system, the minds are “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perceptual flux and movement”(T 252). And what makes our identity regarding our thought or imagination is “the union of their ideas in the imagination when we reflect them”(T 260), which may be characterized as a horizontal connection mainly dependent upon the resemblance among the different perceptions, as we have suggested in the last chapter. This aspect of our identity alone, however, cannot reflect the true idea of the human mind. It requires the corroboration of another aspect regarding the passions. The latter aspect depends upon the connection between two kinds of perceptions, viz. ideas and impressions, which could be characterized as a vertical or causal connection. What is suggested in terms of these underlined assertions may be the way in which those different perceptions are combined to each other by causation into a sandwich construction of impressions and ideas. At the end of his discussion on the former aspect of our identity in Book I, Hume proposes the new subject to be discussed in the succeeding work, namely how such a connection between impressions and ideas is possible at all. “The true system”(T 286) of the double relation of ideas and impressions from which passions arise is the very hypothesis he is establishing in Book II as the answer to this question: how is it possible that “the same person may vary his ideas, without losing his identity”(T 261)? What makes

the core of the mechanism by which the impression of reflection arise from the ideas of pleasure or pain is the process in which "our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas, in their turn, produce other impressions"(T 261). This is why Hume is so exclusively devoted to the origin of passions in Book II. So far as this interpretation holds, it is easy to see how immediately starts the latter where he left off the former book.

Chapter II: The theory of passions

(1) Kemp Smith's criticism of Book II

Since Kemp Smith, it seems still an established opinion among critics, though with some exceptions, that "Book II, as regards sequence and mode of exposition, is the least satisfactory of the three Books which constitute the *Treatise*"(KS 160). Hume would accept this opinion with much bitterness, since, against his firm confidence of his success in the first two thirds of the Book, he was obliged to admit that he eventually failed in establishing a theory of passions according to his original programme. In the last chapter, he was obviously in a complete deadlock, not knowing how to make his treatment of the direct passions consistent with his original intention or with his system of the ideas he has established in Book I, as we shall see later.

It does not follow, however, that Book II is the least important of the three Books, or that Kemp Smith's criticism regarding Book II is entirely convincing. Kemp Smith gives five main reasons why Hume's second work "bewilders" his readers. They may be worth our brief survey, since they reveals Hume's latent intention, though they are mostly derived either from his misunderstanding or from his failure in grasping the author's real intention.

The first reason is given by Kemp Smith like this:"the reader has been led, by the order in which Hume has chosen to expound his teaching, to expect that in passing to Book II the central doctrines of Book I will be illustrated and enforced. Instead he finds himself faced by a quite new set of problems, with but little direct bearing on the problems of knowledge, and with their ethical bearings treated only in an incidental, somewhat casual manner"(KS 160). The first half of Kemp Smith's expectation regarding Hume's new work of passions is entirely well-founded, as I am trying to show in the succeeding discussion: Hume's intention in Book II lies exactly in the application of his system he has established regarding the ideas to the new aspect of the mind, and in giving a "despicable proof"(T 290) of the hypothesis through the demon-

stration of the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and the passions. The second half of his expectation, however, is rather unfounded, as it is not Hume's intention to enter upon the moral subjects in Book II. Hume's purpose in Book II lies in the illustration of "a statics and dynamics of the mind"(KS 161) in terms of the "corroboration"(T 261) of the two systems of the mind relevant to the idea and to the (reflective) impressions respectively. Book III is intended as the application of this unified system of the mind to the moral sphere, as he acknowledges in the Advertisement: "If I have the good fortune to meet with success [in demonstrating that the subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves], I shall proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism, which will complete this Treatise of Human Nature."

As the second reason "why the reader is bewildered, and why his previously awakened interests are apt to be diminished or thwarted"(KS 160) by Book II, Kemp Smith suggests like this: "more than a third of Book II is employed in the treatment of four passions which have no very direct bearing upon Hume's ethical problems, and play indeed no really distinctive part in his system — pride and humility, love and hatred, viewed in and through a complex double process of association"(*ibid.*). Kemp Smith's complaint may be shared by most of Hume's readers, who are puzzled why he has chosen these four passions among varieties of our affections or emotions, and has to spare so much space exclusively for the discussion of the origin of these passions. Hume could have been kinder or more deliberate in opening the new Book, and explained why he has chosen these passions and how the new subject is connected with his discussion delivered at the end of his last Book.

Against this claim, however, Hume might maintain that the new subject has been announced previously at the end of the last Book when he claims that "our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination"(T 261). The new Book is intended as the demonstration of the circumstance in which the notions of the former identity arises by means of the double association of impressions and ideas. Our notions of personal identity regarding the passions depends upon the system of the production of these two sets of passion of pride and humility, love and hatred, whose object are the self or the other self respectively. This is why he is so devoted to the illustration of the origin of passions or of the circumstance in which "a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasure"(T 261) arises. In this view, Kemp Smith's second charge turns out unfounded, as Hume's treatment of these four passions is intended to have no "direct bearing upon Hume's ethical problems," but

to play indeed really distinctive part in his system illustrating the other aspect of our identity.

“In so far Hume's purpose in discussing these four passions is to support his thesis that the laws of association play a role in the mental world no less important than that of gravity in the physical world,” Kemp Smith admits, “his argument does connect itself with that of Book I”(KS 160). In order to understand Hume intention in the *Treatise*, it is important not to overlook that “his treatment of these passions and of causal inference form the two main bodies of evidence which he is able to cite in support of that thesis”(KS 160/1). But it is also important to mark that Book II is intended as more than the mere confirmation of the hypothesis he has established in Book I : he tries to show in terms of “the association both of impressions and ideas, as well as the mutual assistance they lend each other”(T 284) how the mere system of different perceptions could acquire such a dynamism as is suggested as “the true idea of the human mind”(T 261) at the end of Book I. The production of a new passion is specifically marked by Hume as the proof of this dynamism, as it is the “double impulse”(T 284) produced by the “concurrence” of these two kinds of principles which forward the transition of ideas and which operate on the passions, “both uniting in one action”(ibid.).

Kemp Smith's third complaint about Hume's introduction of “two special laws of association (one of them between impressions!) additional to those mentioned in Book I”(KS 161) then turns out misdirected. Because, in so far as his main purpose in Book II lies in illustrating the circumstance in which our notion of personal identity regarding passions arises, he had a good reason for introducing the new association of impressions, or in calling for the “assistance” of the natural relation of resemblance to join the relation of causation, since it is only by the former relation that the “transfusion” of one impression into another is possible. There seems nothing surprising in assuming that these two kinds of associations or “attractions”(T 283) of the ideas and the associations of impressions are already in Hume's mind from the very beginning of his writing of the *Treatise*, and that “his statement of the laws of association in Book II is prior in date of first writing to that in Book I”(KS 161) as Kemp Smith assures us. And in that case, it may be quite natural for Hume to mention in Book I the first association which alone is sufficient for making the basis of the system of ideas by producing the transition of the imagination whereas the second only in Book II, since the latter depends upon the former.

Kemp Smith is completely justified in his fourth charge about “Hume's lengthy digression, in Part iii, on the subject of free-will and necessity”(KS 161) which added further complication to the whole arrangement of Book II. Hume's discussion “of the will and direct passions” in his

last chapter of Book II “bewilders” us so much that we may suspect that he himself is thrown into confusion, not knowing how to pursue his original strategy. As Kemp Smith suggests, this part of his investigation “ought properly to have followed immediately upon the discussion of the idea of necessary connexion in Book I”(KS 161). And Hume must have been the best person who knows it. However, it must be noted that the subject of the will or necessary action is intended not as a “digression” but as a main “subject” of the last chapter. Hume had a good reason to discuss the subject of will and necessary action in relation to the direct passions rather than as a part of the theory of ideas, I suspect, and to begin with the discussion of the direct passions immediately with the definition of the will as “the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind”(T 399). As he proceeds, however, his argument gradually loses his usual lucidity or even consistency. The perfunctoriness and looseness of his reasoning of the direct passions is so obvious, as we shall examine later, that we must conclude that he failed in completing the theory of passions in accordance with his original programme.

The fifth and last charge is laid upon Hume’s decision to formulate his doctrine of belief and his doctrine of sympathy “as pieces of argument and evidence that *independently* confirm one another”(KS 161). In so far as Hume’s original intention lies, as we have argued so far, in holding the analogy between these two systems of the understanding and of the passions, nothing is more natural for him than his programme of modeling the latter doctrine upon the former. But what makes Kemp Smith dubious about this decision of Hume’s is that “Hume’s doctrine of belief is ... modelled throughout upon his doctrine of sympathy, which must have been antecedently arrived at”(KS 161). The fifth point thus alleged by Kemp Smith is so crucial as to make the core of Hume’s real intention in the *Treatise*, so that the real bearing of this problem may emerge only after the illustration of the full details of Hume’s doctrine of sympathy in the succeeding discussion.

The central design of the *Treatise* is, as the Advertisement shows, to demonstrate that “the subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves.” No one would deny that the *Treatise* is intended to propose an integrated view of these two aspects of the human mind, and that we shall get the better view of his intention when we try to examine his work from this perspective. It is indeed a surprise to find that, for all the vast number of Humean literature issued in the last several decades, no comprehensive

picture has been proposed regarding Hume's system of passions, or at least regarding the problem whether the same system is really suggested in both Books. My purpose of this investigation is three-fold: first to illustrate that it is Hume's intention to explain the system of the passion by proceeding the same method of reasoning he has established regarding the understanding, next to see if he is successful in pursuing this original intention by holding the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and the passions, and lastly to show that his intention lies in something more than in a mere confirmation of his hypothesis by the application of the same system to the other aspect of the mind, namely in the demonstration of such a dynamism of the human mind as he pictured as "the true idea of the human mind" at the end of Book I.

(2) The basic structure of the system of passions: the analogy between Book I and Book II

Before entering into the main discussion, it is necessary to give a rough sketch of Hume's basic method of reasoning in Book II. His discussion of passions starts with these three distinctions among perceptions: original and secondary, calm and violent, and direct and indirect. The first distinction between original and secondary is the same as the distinction between impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection. According to him, "Original impressions, or impressions of sensation, are such as, without any antecedent perception, arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs"(T 275), "Secondary, or reflective impressions, are such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately, or by the interposition of its idea"(T 275). The mind, in its perceptions, begins with the former, "which, without any introduction, make their appearance in the soul"(T 276) through the sense organs. And Hume confines himself to secondary and reflective impressions, which arise either from the former original impressions, or from their ideas, as he is afraid that the examination of the former impressions would lead him too far from his subject, into the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy.

The reflective impressions are divided into two kinds, "the calm and the violent"(T 276). Although "this division is far from being exact"(T 276), being dependent solely upon the violence of its appearance in the mind, "this vulgar and specious division"(*ibid.*) is assigned a crucial role in Hume's discussion of the will or the direct passion later at the end of Book II.

Passions are again divided into the direct and the indirect. By direct passions Hume

means “such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure”(T 276) whereas “by indirect, such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities”(ibid.). The former passions comprise pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, malice, generosity, and the latter, desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security. Hume might seem to attach too little importance to this distinction, simply holding that “this distinction I cannot at present justify or explain any further”(T 276). But in spite of its appearance, it is intended to be a basic division to which his system of passions owes its dynamism.

Having introduced these three kinds of division, Hume immediately begins his discussion of the indirect passions, viz. pride and humility, without giving any explanation why he begins with the indirect passions, and not with the direct passions. Annette Baier asks, quite naturally, “why he there begins with pride, and why its ‘indirectness?’”(Baier p. 133) Baier suggests that “reflectivity, indirectness, conflict – these are the opening themes, and they are all themes that are of importance for understanding Hume’s version of morality, as well as being themes that are carried over from Book One”(Baier p. 134). Baier is convincing when he points out that “the chosen opening of Book Two shows us something about its relation to the books that precede and follow it”(Baier p. 134). However, she goes too far when she suggests that it is Hume’s “philosophical priorities” that lead him to selecting pride and humility as the opening topic of his new book.

Hume had in fact a more positive reason for beginning with the indirect passions. The indirect passion is the proper subject for the initial main discussion on passions, just because it has a definite cause as well as an object originally assigned by nature so that it could be illustrated by the analogy with the system he has established in Book I. It is the indirect passion that provides a typical example of “the true system”(T 287) of the double relation of impressions and ideas from which the passion is derived. The elucidation of the derivation of the direct passion, on the other hand, involves some serious difficulties as we will see in his discussion at the end of Book II, since it involves the will and voluntary actions. The reason why Hume has chosen the paired passions of pride and humility or of love and hatred as the opening topics of Book II is thus that they are “simple and uniform impressions”(T 275) determined to have self or another self for their object, “not only by a natural, but also by an original property”(T 280). It is not because of his preference of “reflectivity, indirectness, conflict” as Baier assumes: the central theme of Book II lies not in the illustration of “contrariety, opposi-

tion and hostile coexistence that human passion exhibit”(Baier p. 145), but rather in his demonstration of a natural propensity called “sympathy, which makes us partake of the satisfaction of every one that approaches us”(T 258).

Hume's discussion of Book II naturally starts with his remark at the end of Book I: “the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other”(T 261). This contention may be taken not to be the conclusion of Book I, but rather to be the announcement of a new subject to be discussed in the new Book: the demonstration “the true idea of the human mind”(T 261), i.e. a dynamic conception of it. The proposed system is so active that not only do our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas but also these ideas, in their turn, produce other but new impressions. This is not, however, a new system but is rather another aspect of the system that Hume has just established in Book I and now regards with considerable pride and enthusiasm. What is intended by the theory of passions is the illustration of a new aspect of the same system in terms of the causal connection between impressions and ideas. Hume is now expected to account for the principle of connection which binds these two kinds of perception together, and makes us attribute to the mind a simplicity and identity.

Hume's strategy for illustrating personal identity in Book I is to explain our “propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possessed of an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course of our lives”(T 253). His conclusion is, as we have seen, that “our identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together”(T 260), since “our notions of personal identity proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas”(ibid.). In Book II he continues the same method of reasoning, and tries to account for our identity regarding passions in terms of the smooth progress along the related ideas. In order to illustrate how the connection of perceptions produces an easy transition of the imagination, all Hume has to do is, as it might seem, to discover again the principle of connection among perceptions, viz. impressions, instead of ideas.

However, the pursute of the same strategy obviously involves a crucial difficulty: it is only the connection between the related ideas that provides the smooth passage for the imagination: between the connections impressions do not provide such an easy road. This difficulty is produced by a peculiarity of impressions distinct from ideas: although “ideas never admit of a

entire union, but are endowed with a kind of impenetrability by which they exclude each other, and are capable of forming a compound by their conjunction, not by their mixture”(T 365), “impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union, and, like colours, may be blended so perfectly together (*ibid.*). This is the reason why Hume finds it necessary to distinguish between two aspects of personal identity regarding our thought or imagination and regarding passions in order to answer the question what gives us so great a propensity to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions which constitute the mind.

The system of passions therefore must involve the association of ideas as well as the association of impressions, as it is only the former which can prepare the smooth passage for the imagination. Hume’s problem in establishing the system of passions is to explain how these two kinds of association “concur in the same object”(T 284), and to illustrate the effects of the concurrence.

In Book I we have seen how much we all owe to the smooth progress of the imagination along related ideas when we “run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to disguise the variation”(T 254), by “feigning the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the interruption”(*ibid.*). It is essentially the association of ideas that is the source of our identity regarding our thought or imagination. And if one kind association has such a great influence as to induce us to attribute an identity when all that we are given is a series variable or interrupted objects, what would happen when another kind of association joins and concurs in the same object? It is easy to imagine that “the transition is more easily made where both concur in the same object”(T 284), since these two kinds of association are very much apt to “assist and forward each other”(T 284).

What Hume specifically notes in this case is the “double impulse”(T 284) bestowed on the mind when “those principles which forward the transition of ideas ... concur with those which operate on the passions”(*ibid.*). But what could be the consequence of a “double impulse” as such? Hume’s answer to this question is: “the new passion, therefore must arise with so much greater violence, and the transition to it must be rendered so much more easy and natural” (T 284). To put it the other way round, the production of an impression of reflection or passion is *ipso facto* the proof of these two kinds of association concurred in the same object. So far as the production of our identity is concerned, there is nothing essential different between the system of the understanding and the system of passions: in both systems “the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one”(T 259), since “identity is nothing really

belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together, but is merely a quality which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination when we reflect upon them”(T 260). In pronouncing concerning the identity of a person, we never observe any “real bond”(T 259) among his perceptions. What makes a crucial difference between these two systems, however, is that the latter depends upon connections among perceptions, which, though imaginary or fictitious, give rise to a real or new passion. The investigation of the cause and the effect of passions thus makes the heart of Hume's theory of personal identity. Let us now try to examine Hume's discussion on the passions of pride and humility, and see how far Hume is successful in continuing the same method of reasoning for the illustration of the system of passions.

(3) The double relation of impressions and ideas

Hume's main concern in Book II is directed to the derivation of a passion, just because the production of new a passion straightforwardly entails “a double impulse” caused by “the concurrence” of two kinds of associations of impressions and ideas which makes the transition the mind so much more easy and natural. His business for the establishment of the system of passions is therefore to explain how these two kinds of association are possible at all.

In order to pursue this business, Hume marks “three properties of human nature”(T 283), which, “though have “a mighty influence on every operation of the understanding and passions”(ibid.), are not commonly much insisted on by philosophers”(ibid.). They are three kinds of associations, viz. “the association of ideas,” “the association of impressions,” and “the mutual assistance they lend each other”(T 284). It is the first kind of association that makes the progress of our thoughts possible, by preparing the passage from one object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produced by it. Although “it is impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily upon one idea for any considerable time, and nor can it be its utmost efforts ever arrive at such a constancy”(T 283), “when one idea is present to the imagination, any other, united by these relations naturally follows it, and inters with more facility by means of that introduction”(ibid.). It is this first kind of association that Hume has so often observed and explained in Book I.

The second kind of association is possible, as there being “an attraction or association” (T 284) among impressions, as well as among ideas. Although “it is difficult for the mind, when actuated by any passion, to confine itself to that passion alone, without any change or variation”

(T 283), “all resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow”(*ibid.*). The “remarkable difference”(T 284) between the first and the second kind of association is that the former depends upon all three relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation whereas the latter “only by resemblance”(T 284).

It is in terms of the third kind of association, viz. the combination of the first and the second kind of association, that Hume intends to illustrate the origin of passions. The production of a new passion presupposes, as he assumes, “the association both of impressions and ideas, as well as the mutual assistance they lend each other”(T 284). Hume now takes pride and humility as the main and initial topic of his discussion on passions, and tries to explain the cause and effect of the passions, by applying the third principle of association to the case in which a man is vain of a beautiful house which belongs to him.

Hume’s strategy for explaining how a beautiful house belonging to a person causes pride is now very simple: he marks four constituents of the circumstance in which the double relation of impressions and ideas is established between the person and the object in question. Hume’s business is the specification of the four properties, or rather two sets of properties, belonging to each of these two constituents of the circumstance, viz. the person and the house, between which the double association of impressions and ideas is to be established.

Hume marks two items constituting the circumstance in which the passion in question arises, pride and its cause, viz. the beautiful house. Let us tentatively call the former (P) and the latter (C).

Regarding (C), Hume specifies two elements which constitutes the cause, viz. (CS) “beauty” as the quality which it operates, and (CO) “self” as the subject on which it is placed. They constitute (C)’s “essential”(T 280) properties: “beauty, considered merely as such, unless placed upon something related to us, never produces any pride or vanity; and the strongest relation alone, without beauty, or something else in its place, has as little influence on that passion”(*ibid.*).

Regarding (P), he calls our attention to another set of “original qualities” which constitute the passion of pride, viz. (PS) “the pleasant sensation” and (PO) “self” as its peculiar object. “The peculiar object of pride and humility is determined by an original and natural instinct” (T 286), and “the original quality ... is their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul ... which constitute their very being and essence”(*ibid.*).

Hume invites us to compare “these two established properties of the passions, viz. their

object, which is self, and their sensation, which is either pleasant or painful, to the two proposed properties of the causes, viz. their relation to self, and their tendency to produce a pain or pleasure independent of the passion”(T 286). It is easy to find the correspondence between these two sets of properties, viz. between (PO) and (CO), and between (PS) and (CS), which constitute the double relation of impressions and ideas. “That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion”(T 286), according to Hume. Hence he acknowledges: “I immediately find ... the true system breaks in upon me with an irresistible evidence”(T 286). He assumes that the double relation of ideas and impressions “unavoidably”(T 289) gives rise to a new passion, owing to “a kind of attraction”(T 289) bestowed by nature on certain impressions and ideas, one of which, “upon its appearance, naturally introduces its correlative”(ibid.). “The true system” operates and produces a passion in the following manner:

- 1) “if these two attractions or associations of impressions and ideas concur on the same object”(T 289)
- 2) “they mutually assist each other”(T 289)
- 3) “the transition of the affections and of the imagination is made with the greater ease and facility”(T 289)
- 4) “the mind receives a double impulse from the relations both of its impressions and ideas”(T 287)
- 5) “the new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater violence”(T 284).

It is easy to see that “the true system” from which a passion is derived is the same system he has established regarding the understanding, since the production of a new passion is a natural outcome of the easy transition of the imagination along the related perceptions. Hume assures us with much confidence that “the analogy must be allowed to be no despicable proof of both hypotheses”(T 289). Because, as he assumes, the successful application of the same method of reasoning to the different aspect of our experience would be the confirmation of the validity of his system he has established in Book I. To put it in the other way round, a new passion is the best proof of the solidity of his system, because the connection among perceptions, though imaginary, produces a new passion, which is real and never imaginary.

It is, however, a much stronger analogy that is aimed at when he invites us to “compare” (T 289) this true system to that by which he has already explained “the belief attending the

judgments which we form from causation”(*ibid.*). He maintains: “in all judgments of this kind, there is always a present impression and a related idea; and that the present impressions gives a vivacity to the fancy, and the relation conveys this vivacity, by an easy transition, to the related idea”(T 290). Obviously Hume insists upon the common involvement of the “vivacity” conveyed from “the present impression,” rather than upon the the easy transition of the mind upon which the above asserted five processes of “the true system” are dependent. He emphasizes upon the necessity of the present impression, claiming hat “without the present impression, the attention is not fixed, nor the spirit excited”(T 290). What is regarded most crucial for “the true system” is the vivacity conveyed from the present impression to the related idea. We must add another item to the above procedures as the final constituent of the true system, now that the production of a new passion turns out to presuppose the present impression which gives a vivacity to the imagination.

4) the relation conveys the vivacity from the present impression by an easy transition to the related idea

But what could be “the present impression” which is supposed to be the source of vivacity in our present case? We have seen that what make the circumstance in which a person is proud of his own beautiful house are the object of the passion, viz. himself and the cause, viz. the house by Hume’s definition. If so, it must be either of these two items that conveys the vivacity to its related idea. And it is plain that the latter candidate cannot always appear as impression, as the person may be proud of his house which is yet to be completed or planned only in his mind. The only possible source of the vivacity is the latter candidate, viz. the person himself. It is exactly the idea of ourselves that is intended by Hume to be “the present impression” vivacious enough to fulfill the required condition, by calling this idea the “impression of ourselves”(T 317) or “the impression or consciousness of our own person”(T 318). It is more properly be defined as an impression, not only because “the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us”(T 320) but also because “our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that it is not possible to imagine that any thing can in this particular go beyond it”(*ibid.*). Hume calls our attention to the analogy between our present case with pride and the hypothesis established regarding belief, by maintaining that “whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves, must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception, according to the foregoing principles”(T 317).

Hume’s real point in his discussion on the origin of pride and humility thus turns out to be

in the illustration of “a great analogy betwixt that hypothesis [of belief formation], and our present one of an impression and an idea, that transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation”(T 290). Hume is apparently satisfied with his success, holding that this “analogy must be allowed to be no despicable proof of both hypothesis” (T 290).

In the foregoing argument we have seen what is really meant when Hume claims that “the double relation of impressions and ideas” produces the indirect passions. He proposes with considerable confidence “the true system” of the derivation of pride and humility by the analogy of both systems of the understanding and the passions. And this is the very beginning of his difficulty, which he tries to solve by involving the technical concept of “conversion” in the rest of his discussion, as I shall argue in separate papers.

(4) The conversion relevant to the indirect passions

The central design of the *Treatise* is, as Advertisement shows, to demonstrate that “the subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves.” In pursuing the same method of reasoning he employed in Book I, Hume intends to account for the origin of a passion in terms of the connection among perceptions. And he has a good ground to claim “that cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion”(T 286).

It is plain, however, that, although nature has given us special “organs [which] are so disposed as to produce the passion; and the passion, after its production, naturally produces a certain idea”(T 287), passions must be assisted by “some foreign object” for the excitement of these organs. “The difficulty, then, is only to discover this cause, and find what it is that gives the first motion to pride, and sets those organs in action which are naturally fitted to produce that emotion”(T 288). Hume finds no difficulty in finding the answer: “anything that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self”(T 288) may excite pride, since this passion is “also agreeable, and has self for its object”(ibid.). Hume thus emphasises how the double relation between the ideas and impressions “subsists”(T 289) in the following case and produces an easy transition from one emotion to the other: “a beautiful house belonging to ourselves produces pride; and that the same house, still belonging to ourselves, produces humility, when by any accident its beauty is changed into deformity, and thereby the sensation of pleasure, which

correspond to pride, is transformed into pain, which is related to humility”(T 289). All depends upon “a kind of attraction”(T 289) on certain impressions and ideas bestowed by nature, by which one of them, upon its appearance, naturally introduces its correlative”(ibid.). “The quality which operates on the passion produces separately an impression resembling it; the subject to which the quality adheres is related to self, the object of the passion: no wonder the whole cause, consisting of a quality and of a subject, does so unavoidably give rise to the passion” (T 289).

But we may start puzzling in the next step when Hume proceeds and asserts confidently that the passion arises when an impression and idea “transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation”(T 290). When and how could such a “transfusion” happen from the connection between resembling perceptions? All this can be accounted for, as Hume insists, by the “hypothesis” he has established regarding the belief attending the judgments which we form from causation: this “transfusion” happens when “the present impression gives a vivacity to the fancy, and the relation conveys this vivacity, by an easy transition, to the related idea”(T 290). “There is evidently a great analogy between that hypothesis [regarding belief] and our present one”(T 290), according to him. We may be more puzzled when he assures us that this analogy entails the process in which “the one idea is easily converted into the correlative; and the one impression into that which resembles and correspond to it”(T 286/7).

Hume employs “transfusion” and “conversion” in several crucial parts of his discussion not only regarding the origin of the indirect passions but also regarding the direct passions without giving any definition of these apparently obscure terms. Besides, our difficulty increases when we find that “conversion” gradually changes into a technical key concept through his discussion on “sympathy.”

Hume holds regarding the derivation of pride, for instance, that, when an agreeable object acquires a relation to self, “a relation convert their pleasure into pride”(T 290). Again, regarding beauty or deformity placed upon our own bodies, it is claimed that “this pleasure or uneasiness must be converted into pride or humility”(T 298). Conversion may be taken to imply here simply the specification of “the first passion that appears on this occasion”(T 290) as pride. It seems quite likely that when Hume first employs “conversion” for the illustration of the origin of pride and humility at the beginning of Book II, “conversion” originally was intended not to be a technical concept, but rather something like the specification of an affection.

However, it gradually develops into specifically a technical concept as he proceeds to argue on "sympathy," for instance, that "there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression"(T 320). We may naturally wonder if it is Hume's real intention to hold literally that such an obviously "surprising and extraordinary"(T 320) process is possible at all, since it is plainly absurd or mistaken to assume, as many critics complains, that "the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent"(T 319). And in order to understand Hume's intention in his discussion on passions, we need to see not only how such an extraordinary process is claimed by Hume but also what made him assert such an apparently difficult process belonging to the core of his theory of passions. It seems reasonable to suppose that, for all the distance of their implication, this second technical concept of "conversion" claimed to be involved in "sympathy" is derived from the first concept. In this chapter, let us try to clarify the role of "conversion" involved in the production of pride and humility.

"Conversion" is mentioned only in Hume's discussion on passions. It is a mistake, however, to assume that this process is relevant only to his theory of passions, because "conversion" is derived from the very premise upon which the system of ideas is founded. We have noted that Hume's strategy in Book II is to continue the same method of reasoning he has established regarding the understanding. And in pursuing the analogy, Hume had to invent some special concept in terms of which he could account for the peculiarity of passions. We shall thus start our discussion with the minimum survey of the fundamental structure of Hume's system of ideas.

At the beginning of Book I, Hume introduces four fundamental divisions which constitute Hume's theory of ideas: impressions/ideas, simple/complex, sensations/the impressions of reflexion, the direct/the indirect passions. I shall minimally touch on these distinctions, only to illustrate the rough structure of his system.

"All the perceptions of the mind are double and appear both as impressions and ideas" (T 2). "The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind"(T 1). These two kinds of perceptions are related to each other with a definite "rule" and correspondence: "all our ideas and impressions are resembling" (T 3), and "our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions" (T 5).

Each of these two kinds of perception are divided again into simple and complex, so that

“all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other; and, as the complex are formed from them”(T 4). This general correspondence between impressions and ideas are subject to this limitation: “many of our complex ideas never had impressions that correspond to them, and that many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in ideas”(T 3). I can compose a complex idea of such a city as the New Jerusalem, according to Hume, by combining several simple impressions of golden pavement, ruby walls, though I may never have a complex impression of a city as such. Or, I have a complex impression of Paris, which, however, can never be exactly represented as a complex idea with all its streets and houses in their real and just proportions. It follows from this limitation of the general correspondence that a complex perception is not entirely subject to the rule of the priority of the impressions. It is the case only with simple impressions, and not necessarily with complex impressions, that simple perceptions “always take the precedence of their correspondent ideas, but never appear in the contrary order”(T 5).

It is important to mark another aspect of this general limitation: we can never compose complex impressions by combining simple impressions in such a way as we compose complex ideas by combining simple ideas. We may distinguish different qualities which constitute the complex impression of an apple, for instance, from each other, e.g. a particular colour, taste, and smell. But we cannot compose a complex impression of lukewarm water by combining the simple impression of cold water with the simple impression of hot water. We may of course get the cold sensation and the warm sensation together or at the same time, but never in such a way as the sweetness and the sourness make the complex impression of the taste of an apple, just because sense-impressions coming from different origins do not constitute a single impression. A complex impression is not subject to our own arrangement, but only given to our mind fixed in a definite composition.

It may follow from this that we are entirely passive, being deprived of a mental activeness of creating complex impressions. But could it really be Hume’s suggestion that the human mind remains in such a static passivity, being completely non-productive regarding impressions? Of course, not. Hume definitely assures us that the mind can produce impressions, by proposing “the true idea of the human mind”(T 261) as such a dynamic system in which “our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas, in their turn, produce other impressions”(ibid.). But what kind of impression could they be that are claimed to be produced by ideas in spite of such a strict rule that “our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our

ideas of our impressions”(T 5)?

We need to recall here the third fundamental division which provides the basis of Hume's system: “impressions are divided into two kinds, those of sensation, and those of reflection.” As we have seen at the end of the last chapter, the impressions of reflection arise mostly from ideas. The “idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflection, because derived from it”(T 7). By claiming the definite order in which the impression of reflection appear in the mind, two basic points are confirmed: every experience is originally derived from the impression of sensation, and so that the impression of reflexion is the third return upon the mind, or rather a sort of revival, of the sense impression. To put it in the other way round, impressions are produced in the mind either through our sense organs or by the operation of the memory and imagination from ideas. The first kind of impressions “arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes”(T 7) whereas the second kind is more or less subject to our mental power, as they are the products of ideas, arising mostly when “the idea of pleasure or pain ... returns upon the soul”(T 7). The second kind of impressions called “the impression of reflexion” by Hume may be named ‘the second order complex impression,’ in order to be distinguished from Humean complex impression such as an apple. The former is “new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear”(T 8), and the latter is the impression of sensation, given to the mind already in fixed composition. To be more precise, the former may be called the ‘hybrid’ impression, as it is constituted of two different kinds of perception, viz. an impression and an idea, as we shall see in the following argument.

Although the impressions of reflexion are defined by Hume as “simple and uniform impressions”(T 277), they virtually are “complex” by Hume's own definition, since they are distinguishable into “these two established properties”(T 286): “their object to which the view always fixed when we are actuated by”(T 277) them, and their sensation “which constitute their very being and essence”(T 286). If so, it may be proper to call the passion of pride, for instance, a ‘hybrid’ impression, as it is composed of hybrid perceptions, viz. its peculiar sensation and the idea of self. It is now easy to see Hume's strategy for the illustration of the origin of passions: all he has to do is to show the derivation of each of these “ingredients”(T 366) which constitute these hybrid impressions.

Now, the last basic division, viz. the direct and the indirect, is introduced for the impressions of reflexion. Hume defines the direct passions as those passions which “arise immediate-

ly from good or evil”(T 276) and the indirect passions as those which “proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities”(ibid.), making an excuse for this unsatisfactory justification for this distinction.

We may understand that Hume has a good reason why he has to claim for the double relation of impressions and ideas between the cause and the passion of pride: “that cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion”(T 286). And we may agree with Hume, and is prepared to accept the asserted “general system”(T 290): “all agreeable objects, related to ourselves by an association of ideas and of impressions, produce pride, and disagreeable ones, humility”(ibid.). In illustrating the origin of the passion of pride or humility, Hume’s main business lies therefore in specifying the derivation of the ingredients of these two kinds of components, viz. the peculiar sensation and the idea of self, which constitute the ‘hybrid’ impression. In other words, any object would “unavoidably” give rise to pride, only if it can supply the passion with the ingredients of these two component elements which constitute the ‘hybrid’ impression called pride or humility. What is shown as “the double relation of impressions and ideas” is the way in which the cause in question supplies these two kinds of ingredients composing the hybrid impression of pride. And once two components of “some foreign object” are thus related to these two components of the passion, Hume’s “true system” of the double relation between ideas and impressions immediately starts.

However, this “true true system” involves a serious problem: he has to show how these ingredients derived from a foreign object are altered into the components of the passion. This problem is difficult, just because it cannot be a simple replacement of a pair of component with another pair in such a way in which a barn, for instance, can be “converted” into a garage without structural alteration, being turned to a different use. The ingredient derived from one perception cannot immediately be the component of another perception, and that there must be some peculiar procedure in which the former is altered into the latter.

It is in this situation that Hume involves “conversion” in the following way: “the one idea is easily converted into its correlative; and the one impression into that which resembles and corresponds to it”(T 286/7). It is plain that what is asserted as “conversion” is something more than a mere correspondence between these two sets of impressions and ideas which constitute the passion and its cause, but rather a “transfusion” of (T 289) an impression and idea into

another impression by means of their double relation. But how could such a "transfusion" possible at all?

Apparently, Hume does not find any serious problem here in answer this question, assuming simply that this transfusion is due to "a kind of attraction on certain impressions and ideas, by which one of them, upon its appearance, naturally introduces its correlative"(T 289). When the particular causes of pride is "determined"(T 289) by the double relation between the ideas and impressions "subsisting"(T 289) in this passion, "the first passion that appears on this occasion is joy"(T 290). "A relation [to oneself] is requisite to joy, in order to approach the object to us, and make it give us any satisfaction"(T 291). But besides this, which is common to pride and humility, "it is requisite to pride, in order to produce a transition from one passion to another, and convert the satisfaction into vanity"(T 291). Because, this passion has "a double task to perform"(T 291), as "it must be endowed with double force and energy"(*ibid.*), according to Hume. The only problem therefore is to account for the source or derivation of this special "force and energy" adequate to perform this whole "double task." And this indeed is the problem Hume is so ready to answer by the analogy with his hypothesis he has established regarding the understanding. He now asks us to compare this present "hypothesis" with pride to "that by which I have already explained the belief attending the judgments which we form from causation"(T 389), and insists upon "a great analogy"(T 390) between these two hypotheses: in both cases "the present impression gives a vivacity to the fancy and the relation conveys this vivacity, by an easy transition, to the related idea"(T 290). But what could be "the present impression" as the source of the vivacity in our present case?

Hume's answer for this question is prepared only after five sections in which he discusses "sympathy": as "the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and ... our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person"(T 317) that "whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves, must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception, according to the foregoing principles"(*ibid.*). He assures us that, once the source of vivacity is specified, "the conversion" can be accounted for in terms of "a transition from one passion to another"(T 291) by the analogy with the hypothesis he has established regarding the understanding. The two kinds of ingredient, viz. the pleasurable sensation and the idea of self, supplied by a beautiful house are "altered" or "transfused" into the two kinds of components elements of the hybrid impression of pride respectively, when the latter ingredient, viz. the idea of self, is so strengthened by the strong relation to oneself as to convey its vivacity to the

former ingredient, viz. the pleasurable sensation. This is how by the relation one's pleasure is "converted" into one's pride, according to Hume. The origin of a new passion can thus be illustrated in terms of "the cause of the firmness and strength of conception"(T 627), or rather as a kind of "effects of belief, in influencing the passions and imagination"(T 626). He may have a solid basis so far as he holds that "ideas and impressions differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity with which they strike upon the soul"(T 319). However, he obviously goes too far when he asserts that "a lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression"(T 354). In the later discussion on "sympathy," we shall have a better view how Hume struggles to solve this difficulty involved by "conversion," and comes to realize how his strategy involves a fatal difficulty.

(5) The role of conversion in Hume's system of passions

In the foregoing section we have seen what is asserted as "the true system"(T 286) from which the passion of pride or humility arises, and why the origin of the passion is so important for Hume. Hume explains the cause and object of the passion by means of "the double association of ideas and impressions," in which "the one idea is easily converted into its correlative; and the one impression into that which resembles and corresponds to it"(T 286/7). The conversion asserted as such plainly belongs to the heart of the whole system from which the passion is derived. But what is actually implied by the conversion asserted as the core process of his system? The concept of conversion mentioned all through Hume's discussion on passions is notoriously unclear. To make the concept more obscure, the implication seems to change gradually as Hume develops his discussion from the subject of the indirect to that of the direct passions, as we have noted before. In his discussion on pride or humility, what is meant by conversion is often rephrased as the "transfusion" of one perception into another, meaning a sort of specification of a passion whereas, when he proceeds to argue regarding "sympathy," the concept of conversion becomes so stretched into a technical one as to imply the alteration or transformation of an idea into an impression.

Critics often maintain that it is plainly a mistake to suppose that there could be "conversion" as such, if "conversion" is meant literally. And here lies one of the main causes which discourages critics from their serious inquiry into Hume's theory of passions. It is plain that he could have made his theory of passions more intelligible if he had hold simply that in

“sympathy” the idea of some one else’s affection produces “an equal emotion as an original affection”(T 317) as “the effects of belief, in influencing the passions and imagination”(T 626), without this notorious insertion that “this idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself”(T 354). But why was it necessary for him to hold such an obviously difficult assertion that “the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent, and that the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them“(T 319), instead of claiming simply that the idea of the affections of others causes the passions in conformity to the images we form of them?

In order to answer this question, it is important to remember that the conversion is claimed to be involved not only for *sympathy* but for the system of the passions as a whole. Neither is the conversion intended to refer only to the case in which the transformation of an idea into an impression happens: regarding the direct passion, for instance, he claims: “it is a remarkable property of human nature, that any emotion which attends a passion is easily converted into it, though in their nature they be originally different from, and even contrary to, each other”(T 419). Conversion is mentioned wherever a transformation of a perception into another occurs in such a way as Hume claims regarding “the true idea of the human mind” (T 261) that “our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas, in their turn, produce other impressions”(T 261). Although conversion is involved only in his discussion on passions, it seems to belong to the core of Hume’s system as a whole. The object of this section is to clarify what is actually implied by conversion, and to show the necessity for involving conversion is derived from the very premise upon which his theory of the human nature is dependent.

At the beginning of Book I, Hume gives a rough sketch of the whole structure of his theory, specifying the main subjects of his succeeding investigation in Book I and Book II, viz. ideas and impressions. Together with the distinction of perceptions between simple and complex upon which his whole theory is founded, he introduces another basic division between two kinds of impressions, viz. the impression of sensation and the impression of reflexion in the following way:

“ An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or

hunger, pleasure or pain, of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas: which, perhaps, in their turn, give rise to other impressions and ideas; so that impressions of reflexion are not only antecedent to their correspondent ideas, but posterior to those of sensation, and derived from them' (T 8).

The division between two kinds of impressions is suggested in order to make it clear that the latter is the proper subject of his investigation whereas the examination of the former belongs to anatomists and natural philosophers. It might seem strange why Hume introduces the division of impressions at the beginning of Book I, instead of in Book II which is reserved for the discussion of impressions. But he has indeed a good reason to introduce the division before entering upon the main subject of the first book: he finds it necessary to explain beforehand the relation of two main subjects of his discussion, viz. ideas and impressions, in terms of the definite order of their appearance in the mind.

By referring to this order with which the impression of reflexion arises in the mind from the idea of pleasure or pain, let us at first examine Hume's strategy in his discussion on the origin of the impression of reflexion, and see what made him claim for such a notoriously obscure notion of conversion.

A delightful object generally causes a pleasurable reaction or impression of sensation. Let us call this S-impression or S-pleasure. When this object is related to a person in some way, it causes some other (separate) pleasurable or painful reaction, which may be called R-impression or R-pleasure, being the impression of reflexion, according to Hume's definition. And all our experiences must be traced back to, or explained in terms of, the original impression of sensation which first strikes upon the senses. Hume's concern lies therefore to illustrate how S-impression which "arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes"(T 7) could re-appear as R-impression after having been copied as S-idea by the memory or imagination in the second return on the mind. To put it in the other way round, Hume's problem is how it could happen that R-impression is not a mere rebound or revival of S-impression, but a new impression. There must then be some system by which S-impression is "converted" or 'altered' into R-impression while going through the modification by the memory or imagination during its sec-

ond return in the mind.

In Book I, the second process in which S-impression is altered into S-idea is investigated as the theory of ideas. It makes the very premise of his theory that our simple impressions are exactly copied in ideas in their second return by the memory and imagination. And what is to be illustrated in the first book is therefore the system by which these ideas are combined to each other so as to produce the “uninterrupted progress of our thought”(T 260) which reflects “the successive existence of a mind or thinking person”(ibid.). And now in Book II, Hume is concerned to another aspect of the mind and to the problem how an impression is derived from an idea against the general rule that “our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions”(T 5), namely the problem how S-idea produces an impression in the next return upon the mind.

When a person is proud of his own beautiful house, the beautiful house first causes S-pleasure, which is copied by the memory or imagination as the idea of S-pleasure or S-idea in its second return upon the mind. And this S-idea “reflected” upon the mind appears as R-impression in the next return. In other words, S-impression caused by the beautiful object is altered into R-impression when it re-appears as the third rebound in the mind, after having been copied by the memory or imagination in the second return. Hume's point lies in that when S-impression is revived in its third return, it is always attended with “the idea of a self or person.” S-impression reflected upon the mind is therefore not a mere revival of S-impression, but is a new impression, since it is now a “hybrid” impression combined with the idea of a self or person.

A “hybrid” impression is, as is defined before, a simple impression, distinct from a complex one, being the combination of impression and idea. In Hume's expression, S-pleasure (=the pleasurable sensation caused by the beautiful house) is “converted” into R-pleasure (=pride) when it is combined with the idea of its owner in its third appearance. “Conversion” is thus the conversion of a simple impression into a hybrid one. The “conversion” of S-idea into R-impression is virtually the conversion of an impression of sensation (S-impression) into an impression of reflection (R-impression), which happens whenever the idea of the self or person enters and influences over S-impression. What is crucial in this circumstance is that the idea of the self or person may have no influence over S-impression until it is modified as S-idea, since it is only the connection among related ideas which causes an easy transition of the imagination.

It is this sandwich-structured system of impressions and ideas which appear alternately to compose several layers that is suggested by Hume when he claims at the end of Book I that “the true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other”(T 261). What makes our mind as it is is this reciprocal process in which not only “our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas”(T 261) but also “these ideas, in their turn, produce other impressions”(ibid.). The impression of sensation appears in the mind as the idea of pleasure or pain, which, returning upon the soul, produces the impression of reflexion, viz. desire and aversion, hope and fear. The peculiarity of the human mind consists in this dynamism with which “one thought chases another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expelled in its turn”(T 261).

A passion is, for Hume, literary the impression of “reflection,” or rather the reflected sensation. Once any sensation enters into the mind through our sense organs, it reflects upon the mind just like a ray of light reflected upon glasses or crystals, returning upon the mind with various shades and colours different from the original one. When we are present at a great feast, for instance, we may naturally enjoy first of all these peculiar joyful sensations which the nerves of the nose and palate are so disposed to convey to the mind. And when this agreeable object acquires a relation to self, “the first passion that appears on this occasion is joy”(T 289). Although this passion discovers itself upon a slighter relation, according to Hume, “a relation to self” is still “requisite to joy, in order to approach the object to us, and make it give us any satisfaction”(T 260). Once the relation to self joins, however inconsiderable it may be, S-impression is immediately “converted” into R-impression. It is remarkable, as Hume insists, that “by so a small relation [as a mere attendance to a great feast, men] could convert their pleasure into pride”(T 291).

As we may remember, it is only after having been “copied by the memory and imagination” (T 8) in its second return upon the mind that S-impression is altered into R-impression in its third return. In other words, S-impression can never be converted immediately into R-impression, but only via S-idea, according to Hume’s hypothesis. It is also important to remember that only the relation of ideas prepares the easy passage for the imagination so as to “produce a transition from one passion to another, and convert the satisfaction into vanity” (T 290). That is to say, S-impression cannot be the proper candidate to be a partner of the idea of self until it is modified into S-idea by the memory and imagination. This is why S-

impression needs to return upon the mind as S-idea, in order to be "reflected" upon the mind as R-impressions in the next round. And this R-impression may be copied again as R-idea in the fourth return, which would cause, in the further return, "beside the same joy, the additional passion of self-applause and vanity"(T 289) when the relation turns out to be much stronger, e.g. being the master of the feast: or it may appear as an entirely opposite passion just like humility, if the relation happens to be foreign, e.g. being a guest of unsuitably gorgeous unfamiliar table.

It is evident that, when Hume argues that a relation "is requisite to pride, in order to produce a transition from one passion to another, and convert the satisfaction into vanity"(T 291), "conversion" is meant to refer the transition from the satisfaction to vanity, namely this part of the process in which original impression returns upon the mind as the third and the fifth rebound involving the fourth one in the middle. This is how the conversion is often re-stated as the "transfusion"(T 290, 421) of one passion into another, being the rebound of S-impression as R-impression. Such a conversion is repeated so far as, as it were, the rays of original sensations are reverberated to appear either as impressions or as ideas alternately until they gradually decay away.

It is this sandwich-structured system that is suggested by Hume at the end of Book I that "the true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other"(T 261). What makes the core of this system is the dynamism consists in these two aspects: "our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas, in their turn, produce other impressions"(T 261). But for this dynamism, our mind would be hopelessly static, completely deprived of its peculiar creativity or activity. The peculiarity of the human mind is thus explained in Hume's system in terms of the dynamism by which "one thought chases another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expelled in its turn"(T 261).

This dynamism, as it turns out, depends upon two kinds of alteration, the modification of an impression into an idea, and the modification of an idea into an impression, only the latter of which is called "conversion." The first kind is not called "conversion," as it entirely depends upon the original property of the human nature that "our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions"(T 5). There is nothing that requires our special explanation so far as this first aspect of this dynamic process is concerned: "our impressions give

rise to their correspondent ideas”(T 261). Nothing is more natural for S-impression to be copied and re-appear as S-idea for which no special force and energy is required. It is this latter kind that is worth our special attention, to be marked specifically as “conversion”: “these ideas, in their turn, produce other impressions”(T 261). Because, as Hume assumes, it is “a double task”(T 291) “to produce a transition from one passion to another, and convert the satisfaction into vanity”(T 291). What makes a crucial difference between these two kinds of alteration is that the mind “must be endowed double force and energy”(T 291) in order to perform the latter conversion.

But what could be the source of this “double force and energy”(T 291) which makes the transition of the imagination relevant to the latter conversion possible? Hume explains this situation resorting to “a great analogy”(T 290) with his hypothesis regarding the belief attending the judgment. In the case with the belief, “there is always a present impression and a related idea; ... the present impression gives a vivacity to the fancy, and the relation conveys this vivacity, by an easy transition, to the related idea”(T 290). Analogously, in our present case there is “the idea, or rather impression of ourselves [which] is always intimately present with us, and our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our person, that it is not possible to imagine that any thing can in this particular go beyond it”(T 317). It follows “according to the foregoing principles”(T 317), as Hume concludes, that “whatever object ... is related to ourselves, must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception”(ibid.), just as it is in the case with causation.

Hume thus assures us that the driving force for S-idea to return upon the mind as R-impression is derived from the “impression or consciousness of our own person”(T 318). “The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person”(T 318), according to Hume. Once a vivacity is conveyed by the relation to the self, S-idea returns upon the mind, converted into a new impression, since “whatever is related to us is conceived in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object”(T 352). This R-impression may again return as R-idea, followed perhaps by another R-impressions according to the variation of the strongness of the relation, which may be repeated so far as the relation continues. All these rebounds of original sensations or “conversions” into new impressions thus depend upon “the impression or consciousness of our own person”(T 318), which makes us conceive it “in the strongest and most

lively manner”(T 318). And so far as it goes, Hume has evidently a good ground to hold that, by the analogy between these two hypotheses of the understanding and the passions, S-pleasure caused by the great feast re-appears in the mind in the third return as R-satisfaction, after having been modified into S-idea, owing to the vivacity conveyed from the idea of myself. This is what happens when the original sensation is converted into the passion of satisfaction.

Hume's point regarding the conversion lies in that S-idea, when enlivened with the vivacity conveyed by the relation to the self, returns upon the mind neither as a vivacious S-idea nor merely as a revived S-impression, but as a new impression. In Hume's theory of ideas, our experience begins with those sensations received passively through our sense organs, which is the only way impressions appear into the mind. Impressions are thus given to the mind in such a fixed manner that we cannot compose complex impressions by combining simple ones at our own command just as we do with complex ideas. However, Hume now allows another source of impressions, which is not entirely dependent upon our sense organs, by holding that “the idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object to which we are related”(T 354) so that “this lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression”(ibid.).

One of the most crucial issues which makes the core of his theory of ideas established in Book I is that “the transition [of vivacity] from a present impression, always enlivens and strengthens any idea”(T 626). What makes the basis of his theory of passions in Book II is, as it turns out, this issue: “whatever is related to us is conceived in a lively manner by the easy transition [of vivacity] from ourselves to the related object”(T 353). The latter issue depends upon, and the development of, the former, both presupposing that “all ideas are borrowed from impressions, and that these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity with which they strike upon the soul”(T 319). From the former issue, it follows that “the lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression”(T 318). Now from the latter, the same but “most remarkable”(T 319) consequence, viz. the conversion of an idea into an impression, follows especially in the case with “the opinions and affections”(T 319). Hume assures us that, since the different degrees of the force and vivacity with which perceptions appear to the mind are the only particulars that distinguish ideas and impressions, “it is no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion may ... so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion”(T 319). It is there [=with “the opinions and affections”] principally that a lively idea is converted into an impression”(T 319). Plainly Hume acknowledges nothing essentially dif-

ferent in both of these two cases, assuming that the conversion of an idea into an impression involved in the latter is only something “more surprising and extraordinary”(T 320), which is the mere extension or extreme case of the former. It is really surprising to find that he regards the conversion, not as the difference, rather as “the strong confirmation”(T 319) of the two systems of the understanding and the passions.

But if he really thinks that the conversion asserted above is the “despicable proof of both hypotheses”(T 290) for the understanding and the passions, he is evidently mistaken. He may be well-founded in holding that these affective phenomena which involve conversion are “exactly correspondent to the operation of our understanding”(T 320) so far as in both cases “there is always a present impression and a related idea; and that the present impression gives a vivacity to the fancy, and the relation conveys this vivacity, by an easy transition, to the related idea”(ibid.). It is plain, however, that something essentially different and “extraordinary” is asserted when he maintains regarding our affective experiences that “this lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression”(T 354). Because, in the former case, however nearer a lively idea may approach to an impression, it still remains an idea, a liveliest idea at most. In our present case with our affective experiences, there is a definite departure from the other one, though they both share the same principle that “the lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression”(T 318).

If so, Hume must accept that his strategy to continue the same method of reasoning he has established for the understanding is inadequate for the explanation of the origin of passions. Hume stands on the safe ground to the extent of holding that “whatever is related to us is conceived in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object”(T 353). And he seems cautious enough to keep somehow within the secure domain when he maintains that “every lively idea is agreeable, but especially that of a passion, because such an idea becomes a kind of passion”(T 353). But once he takes another step and claims boldly that “this lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression”(T 354), he evidently trespasses on the forbidden ground, violating the basic distinction between two kinds of perception upon which his whole system is dependent. Here lies one of the reasons why he eventually fails in establishing the consistent theory of passions, as we shall gradually see in the following discussion.

(6) The circumstance in which the idea of the self arises

It is “the idea, or rather impression of ourselves”(T 317) that makes the core of Hume’s

theory of passions. Passions owe their origin to the liveliness of “the impression or consciousness of our own person”(T 318), which is always available to pursue the crucial role of enlivening the related ideas. It is here that several critics find to have a good reason to hold that Hume's claim for the impression of the self in Book II flatly contradicts to his denial of the idea of the self so definitely asserted in Book I.

Hume's theory of personal identity begins with his argument against those “philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain beyond the evidence of demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity”(T 251). Their assertion is contrary to our experience, according to him, since “when I enter most intimately into what I call myself” (T 252), “I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception”(ibid.). Hume's theory of ideas depends upon the axiom that the human minds “are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions”(T 239), or rather upon the denial of “the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being” (T 633).

It may thus seem, as critics often suggest, that there is an inconsistency between Book I and Book II regarding Hume's treatment of the self. Mercer, for example, admits that “the criticism that the self in Book One is inconsistent with the self in Book Two is at least plausible”(Mercer 28), marking the vagueness of Hume's reference to the self in Book II as the proof that “Hume himself is not too happy about his position”(Mercer 27).

However, if we read Hume's textbook carefully, it is easy to see how gratuitous they are. What is denied by Hume in Book I is “some one impression that gives rise to every real idea” (T 251), since “self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference”(ibid.). “If any impression give rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives”(T 251), but there is no such an impression constant and invariable from which the idea of self is derived; and “consequently there is no such idea”(T 252). It is clear that what is denied is not an idea of the self, but only “a simple, continuous, disembodied Cartesian self”(Hume's Theory of the Self 628), as Capaldi points out.

It is also a mistake to suppose that, as Mercer thinks, the varieties of Hume's terminology in referring to the self in Book II, such as an “idea,” “an impression,” a “conception,” or “consciousness,” shows Hume's indecisiveness of his treatment of the self in Book II.

Unfortunately, a more serious mistake is derived from this general misunderstanding, as we see in Kemp Smith's suggestion: Hume had worked out his moral theory, and with it the doctrine of passions, before the epistemological doctrines of ideas in Book I (*The Philosophy of David Hume* 173). We can never grasp the whole structure of his system without understanding why he find it "necessary to reverse that method, which at first sight seems most natural; and, in order to explain the nature and principles of the human mind, give a particular account of ideas, before we proceed to impressions"(T 7). It is important to see the intimate connection between Book I and Book II: the latter presupposes the former. And there is no room which may cause a doubt in that Hume started his writing of this masterpiece, with everything perfectly calculated in advance, building up his system piece by piece with such a careful and strenuous deliberation. It is necessary to remove the historical misunderstanding on Hume's treatment of the self, by showing how the latter is intended to be the illustration of the former and to provide with concrete circumstances in which the idea of the self arises. Hume's intention is revealed only when we come and see how the two systems of the understanding and the passions are so closely related to each other as to produce "the true idea of the human nature."

The problem regarding the inconsistency asserted to be involved in Hume's treatment of the self is closely related to another problem which is often asked by some philosophers: why he chooses pride and humility as his opening topic of Book II and why he is so exclusively concerned to the two sets of passions, pride/humility and love/hatred, among all varieties of passions and emotions. We may naturally feel puzzled or uncomfortable at the very beginning of Book II when Hume directly enters into the discussion on these individual passions without explaining the reason of his specification of these particular passions.

Another but relevant question may be asked regarding Hume's intention in starting Book II with the indirect passions: why he begins with the indirect passions rather than the direct, reversing the method which seems more natural. We may in general expect him to begin his discussion on passion with the direct passions, since "the impressions which arise from good and evil most naturally, and with the least preparation, are the direct passions"(T 438) whereas the indirect are those passions which "proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities"(T 276). In order to understand Hume's intention, it is necessary to answer this question, as Baier suggests, "why he there begins with pride, and why its "indirectness" is important"(Baier 133).

To both questions, we can answer like this: the opening and the main theme of Book II is

so naturally and intimately related with the preceding discussion that Hume did not find it necessary to take the trouble of preventing all these possible questions. So long as we are careful enough not to overlook the connection between the first two books, it is not difficult to see that there is nothing arbitrary or extraneous in his selection of the opening or main theme which may require his special comments or explanations. The same subject, viz. the self, is carried over from Book I, to be discussed and developed, though in an entirely new aspect, just as he announced at the end of his last work. When leaving the first book, he declared that he was entering "into a more close examination"(T 263) of the same subject, and the investigation of the circumstance in which "the true idea of the human mind"(T 261) arises. Now that he has succeeded in establishing "the consistent system" of the human mind in his first book, he is focusing upon the core problem, applying the same method of reasoning to the other aspect of the same theme.

The discussion on passions begins with the "description" of a set of passions, pride and humility, which have the same object, viz. the self. In involving "that connected succession of perceptions, which we call self"(T 277) as the object of the passion in the new book, Hume is perfectly consistent in his discussion on the origin of the passion, as he holds in his first book that "self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference"(T 251). Hume's purpose in Book II lies, as we have noted, in establishing "the true system" from which a passion is derived. And what makes the core of his theory of passions is, as we remember, the issue that "the impression or consciousness of our own person ... makes us conceive them [=the related idea] in the strongest and most lively manner"(T 318). By referring to the self as "that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness"(T 277), he is now demonstrating how "the views always fixes [upon the self] when we are actuated by either of these passions"(T 277).

Hume's strategy for the discussion of passions is explicitly given at the very beginning of Book II like this: "The passions of pride and humility being simple and uniform impressions, it is impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions"(T 277). What he attempts in the following discussion is therefore "a description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances as attend them"(T 277). Now in discussing the self, he is pursuing the same strategy, engaged only in the "description" of the self, instead of its definition, by means of the enumeration of such circumstances as attend "the

idea, or rather impression of ourselves”(T 317). And these circumstances in turn can be illustrated in terms of the circumstance in which pride and humility are produced, as it is when we are “actuated by either of these passions”(T 277) that the view always fixes “here” upon the “self”, or “that connected succession of perceptions, which we call self”(ibid.). Whatever objects may excite these passions, or produce the smallest increase or diminution of them, they are always considered with a view to ourselves: “when self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either for pride or humility”(T 277).

In the last section of Book I titled “Of personal identity” Hume has illustrated the rough sketch of his strategy for “a more close examination”(T 263) and “accurate anatomy” of the self to be given in the succeeding new work, by clearing away the general misunderstanding asserted by those philosophers “who imagine we are very moment intimately conscious of what we call our self; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence”(T 251). Hume has proved that he has a good reason to hold that our identity cannot “have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like objects”(T 259). And his purpose of this last section is attained when he has successfully demonstrated that “the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetable and animal bodies”(T 259).

So far as “we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and individual” (T 633), nothing is more natural for Hume to begin his new discussion with the set of passions of pride and humility, which, “being once raised, immediately turn our attention to ourself, and regard that as their ultimate and final object”(T 278). Hume’s business in the new book is to illustrate the circumstance in which the idea of the self arises in terms of the connection of different perceptions, since it is the connection of perceptions that gives rise to those passions which are “determined to have self for their object, not only by a natural but also by an original property”(T 280).

Hume explains this situation like this: “The first idea that is presented to the mind is that of the cause or productive principle. This excites the passion connected with it; and that passion, when excited, turns our view to another idea, which is that of self”(T 278). When I am proud of my own beautiful house, for instance, the first idea that is presented to my mind is that of the cause, viz, the idea of my beautiful house, which excites my pride; and this pride, when excited, turns my view to another idea, which is the idea of my self, according to Hume. Regarding this situation, Hume assures us: “Here then is a passion placed betwixt two ideas, of

which the one produces it, and the other is produced by it"(T 278). The passion of pride is "placed" between the first idea which "represents the *cause*"(T 278), viz. the house, and the second idea, the idea of the self, which is "the *object* of the passion"(*ibid.*), according to him. It is not difficult to see Hume's intention in placing the passion betwixt two ideas: the passion is produced as the outcome of the connection between two related ideas along which the imagination takes the easy passage.

But, why is it "betwixt two ideas," and not betwixt the impression and the idea, that the passion is supposed to be placed? When I appreciate the beauty of my house and feel very proud of it, it might seem that the cause of my pride is the sensation or delightful reaction caused or excited by my perception how beautiful it is. But, when Hume asserts that "my pride is between two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produced by it"(T 278), why is the first item an idea, not an impression? In order to understand this situation, it is necessary to recall Hume's definition of the impression of reflexion: "the impressions of reflexion are not only antecedent to their correspondent ideas, but posterior to those of sensation, and derived from them"(T 8). According to his definition, although passions are those "reflected" impressions of the original sensations, it can never been the direct derivative of the original sensation, but is a new impression derived from the ideas of the sensation copied by the memory or imagination. Pride is never the direct reaction of the beautiful house, being distinct from the original sensation caused by the beautiful object.

We know that in Hume's system no idea can ever be the "original" perception of the mind, or the immediate reaction caused by the excitement in our sense organs. Ideas, simple or complex, are the copies of impressions of the memory and imagination, as "our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions"(T 5). Similarly, no impression of reflexion is the "original" perception of the mind, but only is a "reflected" impression, or rather "descendant" of the original sensation. And what is crucial in this circumstance is that the impression of reflexion is not the immediate descendent of the original impression. Because, in order that an impression 'gives birth to' another impression, it needs to 'get married' or combined to an idea. However, a 'marriage' is allowed in Hume's system only between the same kinds of perceptions, viz. between ideas or between impressions. This is why an original impression must be copied at first as an idea in order to 'get married to' an idea of the self, or to 'give birth to' an impression of reflexion. The impression of reflexion may thus be compared to a child delivered by an original sensation who, after having modified or being mature into an

idea, got married to her partner, viz. the idea of the self. This is how “anything that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride”(T 288).

Once the mind finds anything that gives “the first motion of pride”(T 288), the passion of pride and consequently the idea of the self automatically arise, since we have those special organs “which naturally fitted to produce that emotion”(ibid.). “Nature has given to the organs of the human mind a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion, which we call pride: to this emotion she has assigned a certain idea, viz. that of self, which it never fails to produce”(T 287). “The organs are so disposed as to produce the passion; and the passion, after its production, naturally produces a certain idea”(T 287), viz. the idea of the self. It is always by means of these passions that we come to “think of our own qualities and circumstance”(T 287), which is the only available way for us to get the idea of the self or our own person. “It is evident we never should be possessed of that passion, were there not a disposition of mind proper for it; and it is as evident, that the passion always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances”(ibid.). It is the “contrivance of nature”(ibid.) that we have special organs which are so disposed to produce pride and that pride, after its production, naturally produces the idea of the self, just as “the sensations of lust and hunger always produce in us the idea of those peculiar objects, which are suitable to each appetite”(ibid.). “All this needs no proof”(T 287), as Hume assures us.

Hume had a good reason to begin his new book with the subject of pride and humility. So far as we have no “idea of self, after the manner it is here explained”(T 251), “a more closer examination”(T 263) of the subject of the self is possible only through the illustration of the circumstance in which the idea of the self arises. And this circumstance can be described only in terms of the connection of perceptions which gives rise to the passions of pride and humility, just because what we call self is nothing but “that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness”(T 272), and also because these passions are determined to have self for their object, not only by a natural, but also by an original property”(T 280). “It is always self, which is the object of pride and humility; and whenever the passions look beyond, it is still with a view to ourselves; nor can any person or object otherwise have any influence upon us”(T 280). It is evident that “this proceeds from an original quality or primary impulse”(T 280). And “unless nature had given some original qualities to the mind, ... it would have no foundation for action, nor could ever begin to exert itself”(T 280). “These qualities, which we must consider as original, are such as are most inseparable from the

soul, and determines the object of pride and humility”(T 280).

Hume maintains that pride and humility are produced by the special “organs of the human mind”(T 287) just as the nerves of the nose and palate are so disposed as in certain circumstances to convey such peculiar sensations as lust and hunger to the mind. However, in Hume's system, passions are distinct from original sensations, being entirely dependent upon the active operation of the imagination which takes the easy passage along related perceptions. In spite of Hume's assertion that pride and humility are “simple and uniform impressions” (T 277) of which we can never give a just definition, these passions are claimed to consist in two distinguishable kinds of quality, viz. “the peculiar object ... determined by an original and natural instinct”(T 276), and the peculiar emotions which “constitute their very being and essence”(ibid.). It is evident that either of these qualities alone cannot make the passion as it is: “when self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either for pride or humility” (T 277) on the one hand, and on the other “upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility”(T 286). This is the very circumstance in which the idea of the self arises: whenever there is anything “that gives the first motion to pride and sets those organs in action which are naturally fitted to produce that emotion”(T 288).

This is not, however, the whole story. Hume assumes that the asserted circumstance relevant to the self must include another circumstance in which the idea of the self of another person is involved. And this new circumstance can be illustrated again only in terms of the origin of a set of passions, viz. love and hatred, whose immediate object is “some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations, we are not conscious”(T 329). Hume plainly admits the difficulty in forming the “exact systems of the passions”(T 332) of love or hatred, or in making “reflections on their general nature and resemblance”(ibid.). But he simply assumes that such a system is not necessary, since “without such a progress in philosophy, we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular, but are sufficiently guided by common experience, as well as by a kind of presentation, which tells us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves”(T 332). All that is required for him is therefore the concentration upon the subject of “what we feel immediately in ourselves”(T 332), and the establishment of the system concerning pride and humility with “a full and decisive proof”(T 331). Hume does not enter into the discussion of this new set of passions, being so sure of “the same success” in applying “the same method” of reasoning he has formed concerning pride and humility to the discussion of these passions. But it is a mistake to suppose that what Hume suggests is

the mere application of one's own case to the case of others by the analogy between these two cases. When he maintains that "if love and esteem were not produced by the same qualities as pride, according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others, ... nor could men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person with those themselves have entertained"(T 332), what is intended by Hume as the system relevant to another self is to establish a very powerful principle in human nature, namely *sympathy*, as he calls it.

Chapter III: *Sympathy*

In discussing passions, Hume specifically marks as "a most remarkable quality of human nature"(T 316) "that propensity we have to sympathise with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to, our own"(*ibid.*). He names this propensity *sympathy*, and establishes his system of passions as well as the system of morals on the basis of this "very powerful principle in human nature"(T 577, 618). It is upon this principle called *sympathy*, according to him, that not only our whole affective experiences but also our moral and aesthetic evaluation are entirely dependent.

Once or twice in our whole life we may indeed have such a deep sympathy with others as to have a share of their opinions or affections. However, during the rest of time, we seem to be quite indifferent or even unsympathetic with others. Most of our troubles are caused by the lack of this sympathetic propensity asserted to exist so emphatically by him. It may make us puzzled, therefore, to find that Hume could rely upon such an unreliable principle and establish it as the basis of his system.

However, when he propounds the propensity as the source of "our taste of beauty"(T 577) or as the principle from which "our sentiment of morals in all the artificial virtues"(T 578) issues, we may find that what is referred to as sympathy by Hume is something more fundamental or technical than the one which we often refer to as sympathy. Let us call the former *sympathy*, and try to see Hume's intention in involving it as the core of his system of passions.

(1) The structure of *sympathy*

It is in the course of his quest for the origin of the indirect passion of pride and humility that *sympathy* is introduced, rather abruptly, as "the secondary cause" of the passions of pride

and humility like this: "beside these original causes of pride and humility, there is a secondary one in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the affections"(T 316). "Our reputation, our character, our name, are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride, virtue, beauty, and riches, have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others"(T 316). *Sympathy* is thus claimed to be a secondary but universal cause from which not only our own affection but also our moral or aesthetic evaluation are derived.

But what could be the mark of *sympathy* it is identified with? When and how does it affect our experience? Our questions are answered by Hume in the following way:

(1) *When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it.* (2) *This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection.* (T 317 My numbering)

This rather awkward expression of Hume's can be rephrased like this: *sympathy* is known only by its mark, (1) which appears at first in my mind as the idea of another person's affection, and (2) this idea of another person's passion is always followed by an equal emotion as the original affection. As numbered above, this sympathetic phenomenon may be divided, then, into the first process of entertaining the idea of another person's affection and the second process of entertaining the impression of the same affection. The first process depends upon the causal relation between another person's behaviour and his affection whereas the second upon the conversion of an idea into an impression. What Hume intends to illustrate as *sympathy* lies in explaining how the former process in which we entertain another person's affections necessarily involves the latter in which new passions arises "in conformity of the images we form of them"(T 319).

Sympathy begins with the perception of "those external signs in the countenance and conversation" of another person's affection. Hume maintains that "when I see the effects of passions in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion"(T 576). Regarding this first half of the sympathetic process, Hume apparently finds nothing special to be commented. No critic seems

to find any problem in his assertion regarding the causal inference founded upon the intimate relation between a passion and its correspondent behaviour. Why should they indeed? After the establishment of the system of ideas in Book I, there seems nothing which requires his additional observation regarding the causal process in which “these movements appear at first in our mind as mere ideas ... as we conceive any other matter of fact”(T 319).

Philip Mercer’s discussion, for instance, begins with the presupposition of the connection between another person’s internal experience and his behaviour like this: “when we observe the outward signs or ‘effects’ of another’s affection and so form an idea of this affection (*Sympathy and Ethics* 7) ...” Mercer proceeds to argue: “Initially, my perception that another is, say, feeling anxious is an idea. But if I am to sympathize with this other person then this idea of anxiety must somehow be converted into an impression, or passion, of anxiety”(*Sympathy and Ethics* 26). Mercer seems to assume that what is worth his investigation is the second process, since it is only the application of the same system established for the ordinary causal inferences in Book I that is required for the illustration of the first process in which “we are convinced of the reality of the passion with which we sympathise”(T 320). Commentators’ concern is directed invariably to the second half of the process or rather to the problem how the conversion of an idea into an impression is possible at all.

It is well-known, however, that, for all its seeming simplicity, the first process involves a notoriously intractable problem often referred to as ‘the problem of other minds.’ There is indeed a definite difference between these two causal inferences involved in the case in which “we are convinced of the reality of the passion with which we sympathise”(T 320) and the case in which “we conceive any other matter of fact”(T 319). It is only in my own case that I know there is an intimate connection between passions and behaviour whereas “no passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind”(T 576). I am completely deprived of the way, therefore, to know directly or to justify that it is the same with others. Hume might seem quite indifferent to this crucial difference between my own case and others’, and suggests quite innocently that “I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person”(T 317) as if he overlooks the so-called privacy of other mind. Is it conceivable that such a crucial difference never occurred to him when he contends that “when I see the effects of passion in the voice of gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion”(T 576)?

It is true that the whole mechanism of Hume’s sympathy is founded upon the fact that our

affections are related intimately with our specific signs or behaviour. However, Hume's seeming indifference to the problem of other minds implies, it seems to me, his serious concern to the problem rather than his carelessness in identifying its importance. *Sympathy* is at first introduced, as we remember, with such a clumsy expression: "When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, by those external signs in countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it"(T 317). We may easily perceive how Hume tries to avoid the employment of the possessive cases in his expression. The queerness or lispiness of Hume's terminology in this quotation must be derived from his omission of the direct reference of a person to which the experience in question belongs. By dispensing with those necessary possessive pronouns in his sentence, Hume tries, it seems to me, to avoid the involvement of the notorious problem of other minds, just because it is the very problem he intends to illustrate in terms of *sympathy*.

It is remarkable in the following passages how hurriedly he passes over and tries to spare only a minimum space for the discussion of the first process, avoiding the involvement of these problems: how I perceive another person's behaviour as the outward signs of his internal experience, or which signs or factors could operate as the trigger of the sympathetic mechanism, and carry our mind to another person's affection:

So close and intimate is the correspondence of human souls, that no sooner any person approaches me, than he diffuses on me all his opinions ... (T 529)

A good-natur'd man finds himself in an instant of the same humour with his company ... (T 317)

When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, ... (T 576)

In these quotations, it is worth our attention how Hume emphasizes the simpleness, vagueness, automatic-ness, and instantaneousness of the first process of the sympathetic mechanism. A complete stranger I happen to be with in a pub or in a train, or I pass by in the street, may be the authentic starter of this mechanism. Such sophisticated elements like the

knowledge or details about the other person, or a relation with him which are weighed so much by Adam Smith as the condition for sympathy seem completely irrelevant to Hume's sympathy. But if so, why does he try to get rid of these intellectual or cognitive elements, and defining *sympathy* as something quite primitive, primitive enough to be observed "thro' the whole animal creation"(T 363)?

The main subject of *sympathy* is, I think, the problem how it is possible for us to entertain the idea of another person's affection, in spite of the fact that we can never have a direct access to his mind. Hume's strategy for this problem is to illustrate the first process in which "these movements which appear at first in our mind as mere idea, and are conceived to belong to another person"(T 319) in terms of the second half of the process in which "the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent"(*ibid.*), or rather as the process in which "the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them"(*ibid.*). He seems to suggest that to have a new "equal emotion as an original affection"(T 317) is the only available way for us to get an access to another person's mind or mentality. His investigation on "the nature and cause of sympathy"(T 319) is thus meant to be the illustration of "the manner [by which] we enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them"(*ibid.*).

Humean sympathy is therefore nothing but the experience of forming the idea of another person's affection, which, crucially, is accompanied by a new but equal passion. It may not be entirely absurd to suggest in this sense that the only way by which another person's affection appears in my mind is, broadly speaking, not as a mere idea but as "a kind of passion"(T 353). This is the special feature which distinguishes the perception of a person from the perception of a material object, the former of which is discussed in Book II whereas the latter in Book I.

It may then be suggested that our initial division of *sympathy* into two different processes was rather misleading: so far as the perception of a person is concerned, no perception appears in our mind as a mere idea, without the attendance of its correspondent impression. To put it the other way round, Hume's intention in his discussion of *sympathy* lies in demonstrating not only "the exact correspondence"(T 320) between the case in which we form the idea of the affection of others and the case in which "we conceive any other matter of fact"(T 319), but also the distinction of the former from the latter in that the former "contains something more surprising and extraordinary"(*ibid.*), namely the production of a new but "equal emotion as an original affection"(T 327). And more crucially, the attendance of this *ad hoc* passion is meant to

be the proof of the solidity of the latter's system, as we shall see in our later argument.

It is necessary to examine if Hume is really tenable in holding that the first process in which another person's affection necessarily involves the second half of the process in which "this idea is presently converted into an impression"(T 317). Because, Hume's strategy for demonstrating the analogy between the system of the understanding and the system of the passions is to prove the necessary connection between the first and the second process which compose *sympathy*, by illustrating how a new passion arises "unavoidably" when we entertain the idea of another person's affection in the first process.

Regarding the second half of *sympathy*, Hume contends: "the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very passions they represent, and ... the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them"(T 319). The conversion happens, according to him, when the relations of resemblance and contiguity join to "assist" "the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinced of the reality of the passion with which we sympathise"(T 320). He assures us that "a great resemblance among all human creatures"(T 318) "must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others, and embrace them with facility and pleasure"(T 318). His account for the situation in which "resemblance converts the idea into an impression"(T 354) runs like this.

According to his theory of ideas, ideas and impressions are in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity with which they appear in our mind. And since "the lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression"(T 319), "it is no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion may by this means so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion"(*ibid.*). We may easily conceive how the three relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation, when united together, would convey the vivacity from an impression to the related idea "so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition"(T 320) that "these relations can entirely convert an idea into an impression"(*ibid.*). "Resemblance and contiguity are relations not to be neglected; especially when, by an inference from cause and effect, and by the observation of external signs, we are informed of the real existence of the object, which is resembling or contiguous"(T 317/8), according to him.

It is mainly this part of his contention that invites critics' objection against his theory of *sympathy*, because it is plainly absurd to assume that an idea, even enlivened enough, can be altered into an impression. Besides, it is one thing to hold that the lively idea of any objects

always approaches its impression, and it is another to assert that an idea is converted into an impression by acquiring such a degree of force and vivacity as to become the very impression itself. It is evident that the latter issue does not follow from the former. The second process of *sympathy* thus becomes the object of critics' wonder if he really "intends us to believe that in sympathy an idea is actually converted into an impression" (*David Hume* IV 430). In a short paper titled 'Sympathy, Belief, and the Indirect Passions,' Tweyman tries "to establish that in sympathy Hume does not intend that an idea is converted into an impression, despite the fact that he often speaks as though this is what does occur when we sympathise with the feelings and sentiments of others" (*David Hume* 430).

Tweyman's discussion consists of these two themes: that Hume does not intend "us to believe that in sympathy an idea is actually converted into an impression" (*ibid.* p. 430), and that "the belief that Hume is employing force and vivacity as the criteria for distinguishing impressions from ideas arises through misunderstanding what is inferred through sympathy" (*ibid.* p. 434). We might expect in general that Tweyman would establish the first issue by means of the second: that "in sympathy Hume does not intend that an idea is converted into an impression" (*ibid.* p. 430) because Hume is not employing force and vivacity as the criteria for distinguishing impressions from ideas against our general understanding. However, Tweyman adapts the opposite method, and try to establish the second issue in terms of the first, and concludes: "If in the case of sympathy an idea is not converted into an impression, then it follows that his discussion of sympathy sheds no light on the distinction between impression and ideas" (*ibid.* p. 430).

Tweyman argues in the following way. To begin with, Hume's insistence upon the conversion of an impression into an idea is founded upon his belief that "sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding" (T 320). And so far as the parallel between belief and sympathy holds as Hume believes, it is clear that no real impression of someone else's affection is claimed to be involved in the conversion, because what is claimed by the conversion is not the alteration of an idea into a real impression, but, by the analogy, only the conception of the idea "in the strongest and most lively manner" (T 318). To put it the other way round, the conversion is not dependent upon the degree of force and vivacity, or upon the way how it acquires vivacity, since an idea cannot be changed into an impression. It follows, Tweyman concludes, that Hume "resists treating force and vivacity as the criteria for distinguishing impressions from ideas" (Tweyman 429), intending to distinguish between them "in

some other manner”(ibid.), contrary to our general opinions.

It may be worth our present inquiry to ask with Tweyman if Hume really intends that an idea is converted into an impression, leaving the other problem regarding the distinction between impressions and ideas for another discussion. Is it really tenable to assert with Tweyman that *sympathy* is proposed by Hume merely as a form of belief in another person's affection? If not, we need to see how far the asserted analogy between *sympathy* and the belief is tenable. Let us now investigate what process is actually claimed by Hume as the conversion of an idea into an impression.

(2) *Sympathy* as a form of the belief

Regarding the first process, Hume maintains that “when we sympathise with the passions and sentiments of others, these movements appear at first in our mind as mere ideas, and conceived to belong to another person, as we conceive any other matter of fact”(T 319). *Sympathy* with other person's affections or passions begins, according to Hume, with the perception of “those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it” (T 317). Nothing essentially different is involved, therefore, between these two cases, for instance: I perceive something in the roadside, which, when approaching, turns out to be a rubbish-bag on the one hand and a crouching person on the other. In the former case, it is by the relation of cause and effect that in the former case I am convinced of the reality of the rubbish which is contained in the bag. And also in the latter I am “convinced of the reality of the passion with which I sympathise”(T 310) by the relation of cause and effect, if we follow his argument.

Capaldi, marking that “again and again Hume shows that his theory of the passions with respect to sympathy is analogous to his explanation of belief”(Hume's Theory of the Passions 264), points out like this: “it is the failure to see and to emphasize that sympathy is a form of inference ‘exactly correspondent to the operation of our understanding’ which obscures”(HTP 266) Hume's real intention. Because, as Capaldi explains, “belief is the conversion of an idea into an impression by means of vivacity, and for that reason belief has such an influence upon behaviour”(HTP 264). It is exactly the same with the case with passions, according to him, that “since the causes of the passions are ideas, these ideas can affect us only by becoming like impressions”(HTP 264). Regarding the conversion, Capaldi thus shares, though not entirely, the same opinion with Tweyman, who concludes that the idea of another person's affection remains a liveliest idea at most.

Hume speaks in fact as if the conversion of an idea into an impression can be explained by the analogy with the belief we form from causation, holding like this:

“The different degrees of their force and vivacity are, therefore, the only particulars that distinguish them: and as this difference may be removed, in some measure, by a relation betwixt the impressions and ideas, it is no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion may by this means be so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion”(T 319).

So far as we judge from this assertion, it seem not entirely gratuitous in holding that the conversion of an idea into an impression is meant to be an emphasis that in the opinions and affections of others we are carried to such an extent as to “conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner”(T 318). It may follow, as Tweyman suggests, that Hume does not “intend us to believe that in sympathy an idea is actually converted into an impression”(Sympathy, Belief, and the Indirect Passions 430).

There is no room to argue if “sympathy is intended by Hume as a form of inference”(HTP 266), judging from his own assertion that “sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operation of our understanding”(T 320). This analogy is important for him, just because, as he explains, it gives “the strong confirmation to the system of the understanding, and consequently to the present one concerning the passions”(T 319). Now, in order to hold the analogy between *sympathy* and the belief, he has to prove that the former case satisfies the condition of “a present impression and a related idea,” since “in all judgments of this kind ... the present impression gives a vivacity to the fancy, and their relation conveys this vivacity, by an easy transition to the related idea”(T 290).

Nothing is more obvious that the necessity of the present impression in *sympathy* which is supposed to be involved in the initial movement of my mind which, at the presence of the effects of passion, “immediately passes from their effects to their causes”(T 576). In the last section, we have noted how Hume emphasises upon the immediateness of the first half of the sympathetic process by holding: “no sooner any person approaches me, than he diffuses on me all his opinions, and draws along my judgment in a greater or lesser degree”(T 592). It is a mistake, as we have seen, to suppose that this casual treatment of this initial process implies his indifference to, or the negligence of the present impression. What is suggested by the instantaneousness of the first process is the primacy of the present impression or of the pres-

ence of "such materials as to take fire from the least spark"(T 354). Because Humean sympathy entirely owes its essential feature to "our natural temper [that] gives us a propensity to the same impression which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion" (T 354). It must be agreed at first that the present impression is crucial for *sympathy* in so far as the first process depends upon "the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinced of the reality of the passion with which we sympathise"(T 320).

We might naturally expect then that, when he asserts that this idea of another person's affection, inferred by this causal relation, is "presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself"(T 317), what pulls the trigger of this second process must be the vivacity conveyed from the present impression with which I am convinced of the reality of his passion. Against our expectation, it is the vivacity of "the impression or consciousness of our own person"(T 318) that is claimed to be conveyed to enliven the idea of another person's affection to such a degree as to make the conversion possible.

As he suggests, "the idea, or rather impression of ourselves"(T 317) may be a proper candidate for the present impression, for which the present-ness and the liveliness are required, as it is "always intimately present with us, and ... our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our person, that it is not possible to imagine that any thing an in this particular go beyond it"(*ibid.*). But how could it happen that such an obviously extraneous element as the idea or impression of myself may have such an influence over the causal process in which I form the idea of my friend's satisfaction? Hume's answer to this problem is that, as we have seen above, at the presence of resembling materials, this relations of cause and effect necessarily involves the relation of resemblance and contiguity, which prepares the easy passage for the imagination to "convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions or others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner"(T 319). Here is an exact analogy, as he believes, with the belief we form from causation in that "whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves, must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception, according to the foregoing principles"(T 317).

Here may be an analogy, as he suggests, between the present process and the belief, as it depends upon the vivacity of the present impression with which the related idea is enlivened. But there is nevertheless a definite difference between these two cases, since the former presupposes the relation between the object and myself which is entirely irrelevant to the latter.

Hume seems quite indifferent to this difference, but more concerned to the analogy by holding that “this lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression; these two kinds of perceptions being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity” (T 354). But why is it only in this affective case, and never in our ordinary casual inference, that the related idea, when enlivened enough, cannot remain a vivacious idea, but is converted into an impression?

Hume’s answer is given like this: the idea of another person’s affection is converted into an impression by acquiring “such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself”(T 317). He sounds like suggesting that the conversion entirely depends upon the degree of force and vivacity with which the idea of another person’s affection is enlivened. *Sympathy* is special, he seems to suggest, in that the vivacity is conveyed to the related idea “so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition”(T 320) by all these three relations of causation, resemblance and contiguity, which are relevant only to the affective case in question. Because “the stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person”(T 318).

If it really is Hume’s answer, he is plainly mistaken, as it is evident that an idea, most enlivened, can never be altered into an impression. He is misleading indeed in his assertion that “we must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full perfection”(T 320). Critics’ confusion regarding the conversion is invited mostly, it seems to me, by his mislaid emphasis upon the degree of force and vivacity with which the related idea is enlivened.

It may here be useful to ask Hume again what is meant by the conversion of an idea into an impression.

“The lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression; and it is certain we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by often thinking of it. But this is most remarkable in the opinions and affections; and it is there principally that a lively idea is converted into an impression. Our affections depends more upon ourselves, and the internal operations of the mind, than any other impressions; for which reason they arise more naturally from the imagination, and from every lively idea we form of them. This is the nature and cause of sympathy; and it is after this manner we enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others,

whenever we discover them' (T 319).

We may find in this quotation that the conversion claimed to be involved in *sympathy* is suggested as, though "most remarkable," one of those cases in which "we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by often thinking of it." And so far as Hume holds the analogy between the belief and *sympathy*, the enlivened idea of another person's passion must remain an idea, or like impression at most, even after the conversion. It must then be concluded that, even an idea of a sentiment or passion, when enlivened enough, can never become the very impression, however nearer it may approach. Tweyman is thus tenable in holding that "in sympathy Hume does not intend that an idea is converted into an impression, despite the fact he often speaks as though this is what does occur when we sympathize with the feelings and sentiments of others"(David Hume 430).

It does not follow, however, that *sympathy* is not merely the form of inference by which we conceive the idea of another person's affection in the strongest and lively manner, as Hume claimed definitely that "the affections of others are converted into the very impression they represent"(T 320). Capaldi's solution might probably be most acceptable for Hume in explaining his intention regarding the conversion: by *sympathy* Hume intends to illustrate such specific cases in which "not only do we believe in the minds of others, we feel the analogous emotion"(HTP 264). But this assertion of Capaldi must not be taken to imply that *sympathy* consists in these two processes of entertaining the idea of another person's affection and the production of a new but equal emotion.

Because Hume's intention in illustrating in terms of the conversion a productive system of new impressions which depends "more upon ourselves, and the internal operations of the mind, than any other impressions"(T 319) or sensations received through our sense organs. Although we cannot "enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others," we enjoy as a sort of compensation "an equal emotion as an original affection." After having guessed the whereabouts of Hume's intention in holding the conversion of an idea into an impression, two problems are still left to be answered: what made him employ such a misleading expression as the conversion, and how is the conversion of an idea into an impression claimed to be possible at all.

(3) *Sympathy as emotional infection*

Hume holds: “in sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression” (T 319). Critics often maintain that it is plainly a mistake to suppose that there could be “conversion” as such, so far as “conversion” is meant literally. And here lies one of the main causes which discourages critics from seriously inquiring into Hume’s theory of passions, since the conversion belongs to the core of the system of passions. But in spite of its difficulty, Hume proposes his theory of sympathy with considerable pride and confidence, maintaining: “That science can only be admitted to explain the phenomena[=the conversion]; though at the same time it must be confessed, they are so clear of themselves, that there is but little occasion to employ it”(T 320). My problem in this section is to illustrate why and how Hume had to involve such an apparently obscure concept of conversion in establishing his theory of passions.

It is plain that he could have made his theory of passions more intelligible if he had hold simply that in *sympathy* the idea of some one else’s affection produces “an equal emotion as an original affection”(T 317) as “the effects of belief, in influencing the passions and imagination” (T 626), without this notorious insertion that “this idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself”(ibid.). But why was it necessary for him to contend that “the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent, and that the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them”(T 319), instead of claiming simply that the idea of the affections of others causes the passions in conformity to the images we form of them?

As we have already seen, it is not only for *sympathy* but for the whole system of the passions that “conversion” is regarded to make the heart of the entire mechanism. Neither is “conversion” meant to refer only to the case in which the alteration of the idea into an impression happens: “conversion is mentioned by Hume wherever a transformation of a perception into another occurs. For instance, regarding “the true system”(T 286) from which the indirect passion is derived, Hume observes: “the one idea is easily converted into its correlative; and the one impression into that which resembles and corresponds to it”(T 286/7). Or, regarding the direct passion, he claims: “it is a remarkable property of human nature, that any emotion which attends a passion is easily converted into it, though in their nature they be originally different from, and even contrary to, each other”(T 419).

It is important to remember that “conversion” is employed by Hume as a technical concept which refers to a sort of “motor” of his dynamic system of passions relevant not only to the indirect but also to the direct passions. It is necessary, therefore, to make it clear what kind of role is assigned to the conversion in his theory of passions, in order to get a full understanding of Hume's intention in Book II. It is easy to suggest that Hume is careless in establishing the theory of *sympathy* upon this seemingly absurd supposition that an idea is converted into an impression. But, what is required for us is to try to see why it was necessary for him to introduce such an obscure concept of conversion into his system of passions. What would it have been like indeed if he established his theory of passions without involving conversion as such, and have explained, for instance, simply that “an ideas of the affections of others produce the passions in conformity to the images we form of them”(T 319) merely as “the effects of belief, in influencing passions and imagination”(T 626)?

To answer the last question is easy, since Hume published later “The Dissertation on the Passions” as the revision of Book II of the *Treatise*, in which he dropped all these crucial elements such as the conversion, the double relation of impressions and ideas, and even *sympathy* itself, which make the core of his theory of passions. What we find instead is a rather dry theory which is hardly adequate for the illustration of the dynamism with which the human mind is constituted. And to answer the former question seems unavoidable, since Hume's intention in involving the conversion as the heart of his system of passions has something to do with the fundamental structure of his theory of ideas.

As we have seen in Tweyman's argument, when Hume contends that “the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent”(T 319), no one would dare to accept such an extraordinary contention at face value, as it is clearly against our ordinary experience. The only way to make his assertion intelligible is to take *sympathy* as one of these psychological cases like emotional infection or emotional identification, in which someone else's sadness, for instance, is often claimed to be my own. It is our familiar experience, as Philip Mercer points out, that “we all have the tendency to adopt, or at least be affected by, the mood of our immediate neighbours”(*Sympathy and Ethics* 13).

Hume's sympathy may be best characterised as emotional infection, as Mercer suggests. In emotional infection, “when A has been infected by B then what, on the face of it, has happened is that a particular feeling initially felt only by B has somehow been transferred to A with the result that he can be said to be experiencing a feeling similar to B's”(*Sympathy and Ethics*

13), according to Mercer. Mercer's definition of emotional infection describes the specific feature uppermost in most of Hume's examples like this: "A good-natured man finds himself in an instant of the same humour with his company; and even the proudest and most surly take a tincture from their countrymen and acquaintance"(T 317). It is plain that, when Hume calls our attention to "the force of sympathy thro' the whole animal creation"(T 363) or to "the easy communication of sentiments from one thinking being to another"(*ibid.*), the affection communicated from one individual to another has no inherent connection to its cause or object, just as it is with the case of emotional infection in which "infection does not presuppose a capacity for self-consciousness in those who are infected"(*Sympathy and Ethics* 14). "We may often find ourselves "as cheerful or as angry as our companions without knowing why they are cheerful or angry or even that they are cheerful or angry"(*Sympathy and Ethics* 14), just as Hume describes: "A cheerful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind; as an angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden damp upon me"(T 317).

It may be true that, as Mercer suggests, "most of time Hume sees sympathy as a kind of emotional infection"(*Sympathy and Ethics* 21), as *sympathy* is defined indeed as "the natural course of disposition"(T 354), rather than as a system or hypothesis, which is so primitive or basic as "to take fire from the least spark"(T 354) at the presence of such resembling materials. When Hume mentions "an easy sympathy"(T 354) or "a certain sympathy which always arises betwixt similar characters"(*ibid.*), *sympathy* is assimilated to such a "very remarkable inclination in human nature to bestow on external objects the same emotions which it observes in itself"(T 224). But does it follow that *sympathy* is nothing but an emotional infection? The answer of this question seems in the negative, since this interpretation of Mercer's seems no contribution to the solution of our present problem: what is Hume's intention in involving such an obviously problematic process as the conversion? If *sympathy* were nothing but an emotional infection, he could have simply asserted that "this idea of the affection of other person produces an equal impression as an original affection," without inserting such a vulnerable assertion that "this idea is converted into an impression and becomes the very passion itself."

In order to solve our puzzle regarding *sympathy*, it may be useful to suggest that *sympathy* has two aspects relevant to the first and the second process. The former aspect which depends upon the relation of cause and effect is highlighted by Tweyman who concludes, as we have seen, that "in sympathy, Hume does not intend that an idea is converted into an impression" (*SBIP* 430), so that the related "idea in sympathy, when converted, remains an idea" (*SBIP*

431). Because, as he reasons, "if sympathy is 'exactly correspondent' to the operation of belief, then here, too, there should be an inference to an idea through the natural relation of causality, and an enlivening of this idea"(Sympathy and Belief, and the Indirect passions 431). The latter aspect which depends upon the relation of resemblance, on the other hand, is spotlighted by Mercer, who defines *sympathy* as a kind of psychological phenomenon like fellow-feeling or emotional infection. And, to our great annoyance, Hume himself seems to oscillate between these two positions.

It is no doubt the former aspect relevant to the relation of cause and effect that makes the basis of Hume's sympathy, because his original intention in Book II lies, as we have argued, in proving the solidity of his hypothesis he has established as the theory of ideas in Book I, by demonstrating the analogy between the system of the understanding and the system of the passions. This is the reason why he occasionally asks us to compare "the true system"(T 286) from which a passion is derived with the system of the understanding, and emphasises the "great analogy"(T 290) as "the despicable proof of both hypotheses"(*ibid.*). And *sympathy* is regarded as the typical case in which this productive system of the double relation of impressions and ideas is illustrated.

So far as he holds "exact correspondence"(T 320) between these two operations of the mind, there is no room to argue regarding the primacy of the first aspect relevant to causation. And when he insists that "sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding; and even contains something more surprising and extraordinary"(T 320), he plainly assumes that what is referred to as "something more surprising and extraordinary" is "a despicable proof" of the consistency of his hypothesis regarding the belief that "the lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression"(T 319). Since "the relation of cause and effect alone may serve to strengthen and enliven an idea"(T 320), as he reasons, we may easily conceive what would happen when other two relations of resemblance and contiguity join to assist the causation: "the stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person"(T 318). Hence his conclusion: "it is no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion may by this means be so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion"(T 319).

The second aspect of *sympathy* relevant to the relation of resemblance is thus introduced when he calls for "something more surprising and extraordinary" as an *ad hoc* process entailed

by the first aspect relevant to causation. There is an evident difficulty, however, in his claim of this *ad hoc* process as the natural consequence of the analogy between the belief and *sympathy*, because there is a definite gap between these two issues: that “the lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression”(T 319) and that “an idea of a sentiment or passions may be this means so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion”(T 319), as we noted before. When he claims that “these relations can entirely convert an idea into an impression, and convey the vivacity of the latter into the former, so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition”(T 320), he might be taken to suggest that it is mainly for the “perfect” transportation of the vivacity to the related idea that “we must be assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity”(T 320), only when we can “feel the sympathy in its full perfection” (*ibid.*).

He may have a good ground to suggest that the stronger the relation is, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey the vivacity to the related idea. But it is nevertheless not for this reason that this conversion depends upon resemblance. Resemblance is important for the conversion, just because “this conversion arises from the relation of objects to ourselves”(T 320). It is mainly by the relation of resemblance that “the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of my own person” is conveyed to enliven the idea of my friend’s satisfaction. It is true, as he points out, that “we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by often thinking of it”(T 319). But he is misleading here again in holding that “this is most remarkable in the opinions and affections; and it is there principally that a lively idea is converted into an impression”(T 319). Because, he over-emphasises the second aspect by assimilating *sympathy* too much to such a psychological cases as emotional infection or feeling sickness from imagination. It is impossible, not only as our normal or ordinary experience but also as the logical consequence, that the conversion of an idea into an impression happens by the mere removal of the difference between ideas and impressions.

Among the two aspects which *sympathy* consists in, it is obviously the first relevant to causation that is propounded as the basis of the affective phenomenon. *Sympathy* owes its basic structure to the entire dependence of the second aspect relevant to resemblance upon the first. And the intimate connection between the first and the second aspect must guarantee the analogy between *sympathy* and belief. The conversion of an idea into an impression is marked by Hume as a proof of this connection between these two aspects, or rather of the dependence of

the second on the first by which “we are informed of the real existence of the object, which is resembling or contiguous”(T 318). In order to understand this circumstance, it is necessary to recall Hume's discussion of the origin of the indirect passions of pride and humility.

Sympathy is intended, as we have seen, as the typical case in which a new but equal passion as the original one arises by the double relation of impressions and ideas. And “the true system” from which a passion is derived consists in these two kinds conversion, as we remember: “the one idea is easily converted into the correlative; and the one impression into that which resembles and corresponds to it”(T 286/7). Nothing is more natural, therefore, that *sympathy* has these two aspects relevant to causation and relevant to resemblance, as both aspects are derived from the two kinds of “conversion” or association among impressions and ideas. We may easily conceive how, among these two kinds of association thus asserted, the first aspect of *sympathy* relevant to causation owes its feature to the former association whereas the second to the latter. And when he maintains that “resemblance converts the idea into an impression ... by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea”(T 354), this conversion must be asserted to presuppose the connection between the two kinds of associations of impressions and ideas, if he sticks to the analogy between the systems of the understanding and the passions.

However, according as he develops his discussion into the subject of another set of indirect passions, viz. love and hatred, it seems that Hume gradually loses his interest in his original design, or rather in the analogy between *sympathy* and the belief. In the later part of his discussion of Book II, the dependence of the second aspect upon the first, proposed as the strict condition for *sympathy*, becomes so loose as to allow the possibility of *sympathy* without the first aspect. This possibility is most explicit when he maintains regarding “the love of relations” that the conversion happens not only where people “remark the resemblance betwixt themselves and others”(T 354), but also “where they do not remark it”(ibid.). In the former case, the resemblance “operates after the manner of a relation by producing a connection of ideas” (T 354), whereas in the latter, the resemblance operates by “some other principle”(ibid.), namely by “the natural course of the disposition, and by a certain sympathy which always arises betwixt similar characters” (ibid.). In both cases, resemblance converts the idea into an impression: “by means of the relation, and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea”(T 354) in the former case, and in the latter “by presenting such materials as to take fire from the least spark”(ibid.). Hume's intention in distinguishing these two kinds of *sympathy* is

examined in the later discussion of “love and hatred.” And it must also be added that in his discussion of the direct passions, Hume becomes even more generous enough to allow the “proper limitations”(T 419) of the double relation of impressions and ideas, and admits that the production of a passion is possible where there is “but one relation, and sometimes without any”(T 420). We shall try to see in the following chapters what has caused a change in his strategy as well as what is brought about by this change.

This gradual shift of Hume’s position from the first aspect to the second in the course of his discussion of passions seems to be the main source of critics’ confusion. Mercer and Tweyman are both plausible in pointing out each of these two aspects *sympathy* consists in. But it must be admitted that they fail in full illustration of Hume’s intention, just because the intimate connection between the two aspects is missing in their argument. Our last business in this chapter is to inquire what made Hume hold such an obviously difficult assertion of the conversion of an idea into an impression.

(4) The production of a passion in conformity to the images we form of another person’s affection

In order to understand the circumstance in which the conversion relevant to *sympathy* happens, it is necessary to recall that in Hume’s theory of ideas the mind is supposed to have a definitely ordered sandwich-structured system constituted of impressions and ideas which appear alternately in the mind. The first layer which the entire structure is based upon is, as we remember, established as “the impression of sensation” when “an impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger or pleasure or pain, of some kind or other”(T 7/8). What makes the second layer is the idea of the pleasure or pain, namely the copy of this first impression, which remains after the impression ceases. And when this idea of pleasure or pain returns upon the soul, the new impressions of desire and aversion or hope and fear are produced to make the third layer. These passions, desires, and emotions belonging to the third layer are derived from ideas, so that they are called “the impressions of reflexion.”

It is because of this circumstance, as we have seen, that passions are virtually “complex” even by Hume’s definition, being constituted of “these two established properties”(T 286), viz. “their object to which the view always fixed when we are actuated by”(T 277) them, and their sensation “which constitute their very being and essence”(T 286). In spite of Hume’s asser-

tion that passions are "simple and uniform impressions"(T 277), they may properly be called the 'hybrid' impressions rather than the "complex," as they are composed of these two different kinds of perceptions, viz. sensations and the ideas.

When I am proud of my friend's success, for instance, my pride is therefore different from the impression of sensation such as a mere pleasure or pleasurable reaction which "arises in the soul originally from unknown causes"(T 7). The latter belongs to the first layer whereas the former is not only antecedent to its correspondent idea but posterior to the latter sensation, forming the third layer. And what Hume tries to clarify in terms of the conversion of an idea into an impression is the connection between the second and the third layer, or rather the mechanism by which the impressions belonging to the first layer are altered into the impressions belonging to the third layer after having gone through the modification into their correspondent ideas which form the second layer. For all its seeming obscurity, there is nothing "surprising" or "extraordinary" therefore, in the conversion of an idea into an impression itself.

What Hume tries to illustrate as *sympathy* is the mechanism by which the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of another person's affection. It is not Hume's concern whether, when we entertain the idea of another person's affections, the affection I experience as the outcome of the conversion is actually "an equal emotion as an original affection." When he maintains that in *sympathy* with others we "receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments"(T 316), his intention does not lie in holding that we actually receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, but in that we are involved "so deep into the opinions and affections of others, whenever we discover them"(T 319) that a new passion is produced in conformity to the images we form of them.

When I feel pleasure finding my friend satisfied, it may generally be asserted that the former pleasure of mine is *sympathy* or the effect of my belief in his satisfaction. But Hume does not argue that I feel pleasure because I believe that my friend feels satisfaction, and asserts instead the direct causal connection between my pleasure and his satisfaction, simply because he had to explain *sympathy* in a way that makes it parallel to the case in which the indirect passion of pride or humility arises. According to his reasoning, my pleasure is not the effect of my belief in his satisfaction, but rather it itself is partly the belief, vivacious enough to be a real impression.

Sympathy is suggested as one of those cases in which a passion is produced by the double relation of impressions and ideas, or by "the true system"(T 286) established for the illustra-

tion of the origin of pride and humility. Our present example in which I feel happy finding my friend satisfied is explained by Hume as the affective case in which the idea of my friend's satisfaction gives rise to my happiness by the double correspondence of impressions and ideas between the two components which constitutes these two passions. My *sympathy* depends upon the double relation between the following two pairs of simple impressions and ideas which constitute these two 'hybrid' perceptions of my friend's satisfaction and my pleasure: these two components of his satisfaction, viz. (i) the agreeable sensation and (ii) the self or person of my friend himself, correspond respectively to these two components of my happiness, viz. (iii) the pleasurable emotion and (iv) the self or my own person. Hume's strategy is to illustrate the origin of the two components of the latter passion in terms of the two kinds of components of the latter affection.

"When I see the effect of passion in the voice and gesture" of my friend, what pulls the trigger of the sympathetic mechanism is the movement of my mind which "immediately passes from these effects to their cause, and forms such a lively idea of the passion"(T 576). It is thus the connection between (i) and (ii) by the relation of cause and effect that makes the basis of *sympathy*. And so far as this movement which appears at first in our mind "as mere ideas" are "conceived to belong to another person, as we conceive any other matter of fact"(T 319), there is nothing which distinguishes my present case of forming (i)'s idea from the case, for instance, in which I form the idea of the rubbish when seeing a dustbag. There is, however, a definite difference between these two kinds of idea: it is logically impossible to experience (1)'s impression.

It follows that, in spite of Hume's assertion that the former idea is "converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself"(T 317), there is no way available for the former idea to "become the very passion itself." Hume's main business therefore is to illustrate how it "acquires such a degree of force and vivacity," as to "produce an equal emotion as an original affection"(T 317) instead. What is intended by *sympathy* is, as we have noted, not the illustration of the problem whether the sympathised emotion is identical or equal with the original one, but is the confirmation of "the true system" he has established regarding the indirect passions of pride and humility through the demonstration how the former is derived from the latter.

In the case in which I am proud of my beautiful house, the beautiful house is composed of the agreeable sensation (I) and the idea of myself (II), whereas pride of the pleasurable sensa-

tion (III) and the idea of myself (IV), as we have seen in the foregoing chapter. The 'hybrid' passion of my pride is produced, according to Hume, through these two kinds of association, the association of ideas between (II) and (IV) and the association of impressions between (I) and (III). "When one idea is present to the imagination, any other, united by these relations [of contiguity, causation, or resemblance] naturally follows it, and enters with more facility by means of that introduction"(T 283). It is also evident, according to him, that "there is an attraction or association among impressions"(T 283) which are resembling to each other. "The true system" by which a new passion arises is thus accounted for in terms of "the double impulse" (T 284) bestowed upon the mind by the concurrence of these two associations which forward the transition of ideas and those which operate on the passions.

Let us follow the same method of reasoning, and try to examine the derivation of my peculiar sensation (iii) which constitutes the "very being and essence" of my pleasure. Plainly the only possible source of my peculiar sensation (iii) is the pleasant sensation (i) which composes my friend's satisfaction. To put it in Humean way, (i) "transfuses"(T 290) itself into (iii), supplying my happiness with the ingredient of one of its constituents. It then follows, as it might seem, that Hume's only business is to show the connection between (i) and (iii) by which the ingredient is conveyed from the former to the latter.

The difficulty involved in this strategy lies in accounting for the correspondence between (i) and (iii), since the former sensation appears in my mind as an idea whereas the latter as an impression. In the case in which I am proud of my beautiful house, we may easily conceive how the agreeable impression (I) excited by the house "transfuses" into another pleasant impression (III) which composes my pride, according to the principle of association between resembling impressions. However, there is a difficulty in *sympathy* for (i) to be "transfused" into (iii) so as to be united with (iv) to compose my happiness, since the former is the idea inferred from (ii) by the relation of cause and effect. And it is this peculiar process that Hume finds worth his special comment by referring it as the conversion of an idea into an impression. In order to pursue his strategy he employed for the illustration of the origin of pride and humility, he has to explain what makes the alteration or "conversion" of the idea into the impression possible.

Hume assumes that this problem can be solved by means of this peculiarity of the circumstance which distinguishes *sympathy* from any other affective experiences: in *sympathy* the relations of resemblance and contiguity between (ii) and (iv) join to assist the relation of cause and

effect. It is these new relations, especially resemblance, according to him, that converts the idea into an impression “by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea”(T 354). However, the relation of resemblance is plainly involved in the association of impressions as well as in the association of ideas from which the indirect passions are derived. Why is it only in the case with *sympathy* that “resemblance converts the idea into an impression”(T 354), and not in the case in which pride or humility arises?

It may be true that the addition of these new relations contribute to the reinforcement of the relation, so that these relations, when united together, can convey the vivacity to the related idea “so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition”(T 320). This is not, however, the only contribution of the new relation to the process in which (i)’s idea acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion as an original affection”(T 317). Resemblance is important, just because it is the only universal relation which connects objects to ourselves owing to “the great resemblance among all human creatures”(T 318). And once the relation between (ii) and (iv) is established so firmly by this resemblance, this relation, together with other two relations, conveys “the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner”(T 318).

Hume may not be entirely gratuitous to hold that “whatever is related to us is conceived in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object”(T 353), since, “the idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object to which we are related”(T 354), according to him. But how does it follow that “this lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression”(T 354), as he assures us?

In order to understand his strategy for illustrating this difficult situation, it is necessary to remember that the entire process of *sympathy* depends upon the causal connection between (i) and (ii), since (i) appears in my mind as a mere idea, conceived to belong to (ii), just as I conceive a rubbish contained in the dustbag. It is how (i) is connected with (ii), composing the idea of my friend’s satisfaction. It is also important to remember that (iii) and (iv) are intimately connected to each other, composing my happiness. Now when there are these two sets of component altogether, (i) and (ii) on the one hand and (iii) and (iv) on the other, nothing is more natural than the combination of (i) with (iii), once the relation between (ii) and (iv) is established owing to the “great resemblance among all human nature.” This is the way in which the

ingredient is conveyed from (i) to (iii) to compose my happiness.

However, Hume's problem still remains: this ingredient derived from (i) is yet short to compose my happiness, for which it must be converted into an impression. However, once (iii) is united with (iv) to compose a hybrid impression, the former, though an idea, is naturally enlivened with the vivacity of its partner, owing to its inseparable connection with the latter. It is evidently irrelevant, for the production of my happiness, whether (i) itself is actually altered into an impression, or whether (iii), as one half of the component of my passion, is an idea or an impression, since my happiness is a hybrid impression composed of an idea and an impression. "Whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves, must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception"(T 317), as he explains. And so far as (iii) composes one half of the hybrid impression, Hume may be justified in holding that the idea of my friend's satisfaction "is converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produces an equal emotion as an original affection"(T 317).

But what made him employ such a misleading expression as "conversion" to refer to this productive process, when (i)'s idea itself is not, to be exact, converted into an impression? It must still be admitted that (i)'s idea is converted into an impression in the sense in which it becomes one of the component of a hybrid impression: (i)'s idea is altered into (iii) by changing its partner from (ii) to (iv), and then enlivened by its new partner. And he could also hold the analogy with the belief, since in order to compose a hybrid impression, (iii) needs to be enlivened by the vivacity of its partner. Or, to put it the other way round, it is only when (i) acquires "such a degree of force and vivacity" from (iv) that (i) alters into (iii), and becomes one of the components of my happiness. If so, Hume is not entirely gratuitous to maintain that the idea of someone else's affection is converted into "an equal emotion as an original affection" (T 317), since the ingredient of the latter affection is directly derived from the idea of the former original affection. This is the way in which, when we have the idea of another person's affection, a new passion arises "in conformity to the images we form of them"(T 319).

Hume has established the system of ideas in Book I and illustrated our experience in terms of two kinds of perceptions, viz. impressions and ideas, which arise in our mind with the definite order of appearance: the former causes the latter. Hume's main business in Book II is to apply this same method of reasoning to the mental causation, namely to the mechanism by which the impressions of reflection or passions are derived from ideas. At the very beginning of Book II, he has successfully illustrated the origin of the indirect passions, pride/humility and

love/hatred in terms of the double relation of ideas and impressions. He is obviously proud of his success in explaining the cause of the passions by the analogy with the hypothesis he has established regarding the belief attending the judgments which we form from causation, and claimed that this “analogy must be allowed to be no despicable proof of both hypotheses” (T 290).

And *sympathy* is marked by Hume as the typical case in which this “true system”(T 286) of the production of a passion is explicitly demonstrated. Because, if “the lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression”(T 318), as he assumes misleadingly enough, “an idea of a sentiment or passion may by this means be so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion”(T 319), since all the “relations, when united together, convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner”(T 318). Through the examination why and how he had to involve such an obviously obscure process as the conversion of an idea into an impression, we can see, I hope, the vulnerability of his basic strategy in illustrating the system of the passions by the analogy with the system of the understanding.

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