

〈論文〉

The Structure of Hume's System of the Passions in the Second Book of the *Treatise* (Part 3)

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Chapter 4 The third subsystem: The will and direct passions

1 The structure of the third subsystem

Although it might be a common consent of the modern readers, as Anthony Flew writes, that Book II of the *Treatise* employed for the discussion of the passions is “the least rewarding”,¹ it must be admitted at least that of all the discussions constituting the *Treatise*, Hume's treatment of the will and action in Part 3 of Book II is most rewarding in the sense that it has a direct bearing on his theory of morals. Despite Hume's own remarks in Advertisement that Book III is “independent of the other two”,² Hume's ethical theory has sufficient sense and importance only when we understand what is propounded in his theory of the passions, and especially of will in Book II, as it is here the cardinal notions constituting his theory of morals are introduced and explicated for his later use.

There is another reason why Part 3 of Book II merits full discussions. Hume directly or indirectly attacks some influential ethical theories which are supported by eminent scholars of the Stoic tradition, Rationalists, Libertarians, Necessitarians, Determinists, or the Christian thinkers.³ By attacking these traditional or contemporary writers, Hume makes it clear wherein the “singularity” and “novelty” of the *Treatise* consists, and how his “bold” and “advantageous” attempts could “shake off the yoke of authority, accustom men to think for themselves, [and] give new hints, which men of genius may carry further, and by the very opposition, illustrate points, wherein no one before suspected any difficulty”, as claims in the Preface to *Abstract*.⁴ “It was the fact that he had drained the doctrine of necessity of metaphysics”, as James Harris observes, “that prompted him to claim...that he has put the whole free will question in a new, purely empirical,

¹ Antony Flew, *David Hume*, Basil Blackwell, 1986, p.122.

² He insists in the Advertisement attached to Book III of the *Treatise* that “*tho' this be a third volume of The Treatise of Human Nature, yet 'tis in some measure independent of the other two, and requires not that the reader shou'd enter into all the abstract reasonings contain'd in them*”.

³ It is well acknowledged that Hume inherits his theory of morals greatly from his predecessors, who are divided roughly into four three groups according to the ways in which they seek the source of moral distinctions: reason (Clarke, Hobbes, Locke), divine revelation (Filmer), consciousness (Butler), a moral sense (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson). The chief target of Hume's attack is the first position, the rationalism as is called, as his basic position is the last one, which holds that moral distinctions are derived from a moral sense, which we experience when we contemplate another's character trait from the common and objective point of view.

⁴ *Abstract*, p.643-4.

light”.⁵ It is no wonder if it be the thesis most commented on and discussed of all those of the *Treatise*, which, however, has produced a heated debate of critics' interpretation on it, especially on Section 3, “Of the influencing motives of the will. Hume's treatment of “the will and direct passions” has suffered from several serious misinterpretations or misunderstanding because of its notorious ambiguity both of his manner of exposition and of his employment of the division of calm and violent. There is indeed a whirlpool of controversy in critics interpretation on Hume's doctrine of “the 'calm passions”, in spite of their agreement that it belongs not only to the core of his theory of the passions but also his theory of morals. Among several possible factors which make Hume's treatment of the will controversial, I shall focus on the following two features as its chief causes in the rest of this chapter.

The most obvious and notorious of all factors must be the ambiguity of Hume's use of the division of calm and violent, which he has introduced at the outset of Book II of the *Treatise* only for the discussion of the will in Part 3 of Book II. And it is in effect on this division Hume's theory of morals is founded. Although this ambiguity has been witnessed and recognized by many commentators, they are somehow left unexamined. In the later section, I shall argue that it is this ambiguity that makes the chief cause of the controversy and misinterpretation on his doctrine of “the calm passions”, and show the way to the adequate interpretation on his theory of the motivation.

The second factor may be found in our difficulty to find intimate connections among those different subjects which constitute Part 3 of Book II. Hume assigns to the will some different aspects, and discusses them separately in separate sections without taking much trouble of explaining their mutual connection. Kemp Smith's well-known complaint that “Hume's discussion on free-will and necessity” delivered in the first two sections of Part 3 is a “lengthy digression” might well be considered to stem from his difficulty to see that the rest of his treatment of the will depends on this initial part of his discussion.⁶

From the very beginning of Part iii of Book II, Hume betrays our expectation that the direct passions is discussed as the new subject there. After having fully examined the origin of the indirect passions in the preceding two parts, he is now entering upon the illustration of the other kind of passions, we might assume, especially when he opens the new part with this announcement:

⁵ James A. Harris, “Free will”, *Continuum Companion to Hume*, ed. Alan Bailey, Don O'Brien, Continuum: London & NY. 2012, p.218.

⁶ Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume*, op.cit.p.161.

“We come now to explain the direct passions”. Against this announcement, however, the subject of the first eight sections is not the direct passions but the will, which is not, he tells us, properly comprehended among the passions.

Part 3 of Book II thus begins with the definition of the will, which is “nothing but the *internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perceptions of our mind*”(T2.3.1.2; SBN 399). The will, thus defined, is an impression, but not a passion, nor a faculty that enables us to make our choices. Hume seems to distinguish the will from “volition”, as he counts volition among the direct passions.(T2.3.9.2; SBN 438). Although the will plays no essential work in his theory of the mind, since it is the immediate effect of pain or pleasure, he says, the full understanding of its nature and properties is necessary to the explanation of the direct passions.

The will is distinct from the passions or from desire in that, while “DESIRE arises from good consider'd simply, and AVERSION is deriv'd from evil”, the will arises principally “when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain'd by any action of the mind and body”(T2.3.9.7; SBN 439). I may desire thousands of things in the world, but it is only when they are within my reach or have any possibility to obtain that the will operates. The arousal of the will is thus qualified, and subject to the likelihood of getting the pleasure or pain, whereas the arousal of the passions is not. Generally speaking, when we perceive good that may be achieved and evil that may be avoided, our passions will move us to act: desire and aversion do not excite the will unless we believe we can achieve the desired result by the activity of mind or body. Of all the topics regarding Hume's treatment of the will, this relation between the belief and the passions constitutes one of the most controversial issues, whose solution has been suggested in several different ways.

In our life we are always in need of choosing our action, when deciding our future profession, accepting the proposal of marriage, selecting a new handbag, and so on. The ordinary way to deal with this is to take all possible conditions into our consideration, compare, and make simulations about the result of our choice on the basis of our past experience, and imagine the possible effects of our choices, and so forth. We might here conclude that the will is essentially the matter of making our choice for action by means of this process of reasoning, and to set the mind in such a way as to produce relevant mental or bodily movements on the basis of it. But it is this method of reasoning, which is most powerfully and systematically propounded by the moral rationalists, that is the chief target of Hume's attack in his treatment of the will. Hume's main concern in his treatment of the will is to show the fallacy of the rationalist view by proving that

reason can neither cause nor hinder any act of volition, and to propose an alternative that choosing one thing over another is a matter of having a certain passion.⁷ It is not surprising in this respect that the will is discussed together with the passions, and not as a subject of a separate investigation, as the title of Part iii of Book II explicitly shows.⁸

We shall begin by giving a the rough survey over the structure of Hume's treatment of the will and passions, and by seeing how its constituting elements are connected together into such a unity as to reflect his intention. Let us first remark the following four subjects, and then see how their connection is prepared by Hume:

- 1 The liberty and necessity of actions: Section 1-2.
- 2 The combat of the calm and the violent passions: Section 3.
- 3 The cause and effect of the calm and the violent passions: Section 4-8.
- 4 The origin of the direct passions: Section 9-10.

A key to their connection is given at the end of Section 2 of Part iii of Book II:

Upon a review of these reasonings, I cannot doubt of an entire victory; and therefore,

⁷ Hume actually does not mention "choice" in his discussion of the will, except for the illustration for the illusion of choice. Charlotte Brown makes this point clear, and explains this situation ingeniously in her article, "Passions, Powers and Interests, presented in Hume Conference held in Tokyo, 2004. In this respect, it is rather misleading to generalize Hume's discussion of the will as a "psychological mechanism of our choices", as Penelhum does.

⁸ Penelhum is dissatisfied with this, and in his book "discuss it in its own right, in order to see how far those phenomena that other thinkers have treated separately are incorporated into Hume's description of the passions and their effect". And as Penelhum predicts that "such a separate inquiry soon reveals considerable untidiness and apparent confusion about details, obviously incomplete treatment...of the psychological mechanism of our choices", his separate examination of Hume's treatment of the will led him to regard it as "a fragmentary, vestigial doctrine of volitions"(p.111). For, since the will is, unlike the passions, not an entity nor even an impression with a continuous identity, it is an empty question to ask, 'Does the impression play an indispensable role in the initiation of actions, or can they occur without it?', as he ask. Penelhum leaves his investigation by observing that "[f]ar from volitions being postulated to fulfill theoretical requirements in Hume's philosophy, they are mentioned only to be denied any theoretical significance whatever"(p.113). Ironically this observation shows Penelhum's insight, as Hume's intention is to reduce the will to the operation of the passions, corroborated by reason, by holding that "the actions of the will to arise from necessity"(p.117). Terence Penelhum, *Hume*, Mucmillan 1975.

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having proved that all actions of the will have particular causes, I proceed to explain what these cause are, and how they operate.(T2.3.2.8; SBN 412)

We may here learn that the above alleged four subjects are intended to be the account of the following three aspects which constitute Hume's theory of the will:

- 1 All actions of the will have particular causes: Section 1-2.
- 2 The causes of the actions of the will: Section 3-4.
- 3 How they operate: Section 5-8

On the basis of this outline of Hume's treatment of the will, let us examine each subject, and see what is intended by Hume as the third subsystem of the passions.

2 The first subject: The necessity of the actions of the mind

We often complain how capricious or inconsistent human actions or desires are. Besides, how widely departs our own character and disposition are from one individual to another! An hour, a moment is sufficient to make us change from one extreme to another, and overturn what costs the greatest pain and labour to establish, as Hume observes (T2.3.1.11; SBN 403). In spite of this, he insists, there is a definite uniformity in human actions. "No union can be more constant and certain than that of some actions with some motives and characters", he points out, "and if, in other cases, the union is uncertain, it is no more than what happens in the operations of body"(T2.3.1.12; SBN 404). It is upon this constant union between actions and the situation and temper of the agent that Hume establishes the necessity of human actions.

Hume's first business is to show the fallacy of our common belief that human conduct is irregular and uncertain, and to establish the force of the *moral evidence*, viz. "the conclusion concerning the actions of men, derived from the consideration of their motives, temper, and situation"(T2.3.1.15; SBN 404)."⁹ His strategy is to show the analogy between the actions of the

⁹ "Moral evidence" is, according to James Harris, "a semi-technical term of art, widely used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to denote a kind of probability arising from observed tendencies of human nature". See, James A. Harris, *op.cit.* p. 217.

mind and the actions of matter in terms of the constant *union* and the *inference* of the mind, which are the only two particulars constituting the notion of necessity according to him. He first proves that actions have a constant union with the situation and temper of the agent, and maintains on this basis that “the same experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volitions, and actions, or figure and motives” (T2.3.1.17; SBN 406-7). Thus he asserts that we have good reasons to believe actions of the will to arise from necessity; wherever we discover these two particulars, viz. the constant union and the inference of the mind, we must acknowledge a necessity” (T2.3.1.4; SBN 400).¹⁰

Against this notion of the necessity of human actions, one might contend that, when we have performed any action, we can hardly persuade ourselves that we were governed by necessity, though we may confess that we were influenced by particular views and motives. We may feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions, and imagine that the will itself is subject to nothing, but it is precisely, because when, by a denial of it, we are provoked to try, we feel that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself even on that side on which it did not settle, according to Hume (T2.3.2.2; SBN 408). In this case, he continues, we may persuade ourselves that this image or faint motion could have been completed into the thing itself, as we find that it can upon a second trial. But these efforts are all in vain, he maintains, because whatever capricious and irregular actions we may perform, as the desire of showing our liberty is the sole motive of our actions, we can never free ourselves from the bonds of necessity. The false assumption that the idea of necessity implies something of force, and violence, and constraint, is originated from the confusion between the liberty of *spontaneity* and the liberty of *indifference*, according to him.¹¹ It is the first species of liberty, as opposed to violence, that concerns us to preserve, as it is the liberty we are supposed to feel whenever our actions are produced by our will without being forced to do what we do by external powers outside of us. It thus implies “*a power of acting or not acting, according to*

¹⁰ Hume’s position with respect to the will and action is said to be the determinism by John Laird. (Hume’s Philosophy of Human Nature, Archon Books, 1967, p.202)

¹¹ The distinction between the liberty of spontaneity and the liberty of indifference was taught in universities through the late Middle Ages to the early eighteenth century, Harris points out, and Hobbes, Locke and others had argued that the former kind of liberty is compatible with the determination of the action of the will, as Hume thought. James A. Harris, op.cit.p.219.

the determination of the will' (EHU 8.23) as Hume puts it.¹² Hume insists that this species of liberty is the common sense of liberty, which is compatible to the necessity of human actions, as it is enjoyed by everyone "who is not a prisoner and in chains".¹³

This liberty has been almost universally confounded with the second species of liberty, viz. the liberty of indifference, according to him, which implies the negation of necessity and causes. For, it very commonly happens that in performing the actions, we feel as if we were sensible of certain looseness or want of that determination which we feel in passing from one idea to that of the other. This looseness or want of determination is mistaken for a demonstrative, or even an intuitive proof of human liberty, he observes, though, in reflecting on human actions, we seldom feel such a looseness or indifference. We thus tend to imagine that we feel a liberty within ourselves, that the will itself is free from necessitating causes. This supposed looseness between motives and actions we may experience in our own case is the source of the false sensation or experience of the liberty of indifference, according to Hume, which leads us to assume that there is no motives which cause our will and action. It is evident, however, that the freedom in this assumption resolves itself into chance or randomness, which is "commonly thought to imply a contradiction, and is at least directly contrary to experience" (T2.3.1.17; SBN 407), so that free-will "has no place with regard to the actions, no more than the qualities of men" (T3.3.4.3; SBN 609). But human actions are not free in this sense.

Granted we feel a liberty or looseness as such within ourselves when we perform our action, Hume affirms, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper. Hume rejects the argument from subjectivity, or from agent-centered point of view, itself, as his basic standpoint is to determine the principles of human nature by observing people's behaviour. Whether it may be the actions of matter or of mind, the necessity of any action is "not properly a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent

¹² Hume's position is characterized as "compatibilism" about freedom and determinism, or "soft determinism", as it holds that liberty and necessity are compatible. He makes this position clear especially in *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* by claiming that he is propounding a "reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity" (E.p.95). But there is nothing revolutionary in this position itself since the variations of this position have been held by some Hume's contemporary philosophers, e.g. Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz.

¹³ This issue is ingeniously examined and discussed by Terence Penelhum in *Themes in Hume, The self, the Will, Religion*, Clarendon Press; Oxford, 2000, p.166-176, and Paul Russel.

being who may consider the action, and consists in the determination of his thought to infer its existence from some preceding objects”(T2.3.2.2; SBN 608), according to him.¹⁴ Insofar no one can deny that we can draw inferences concerning human actions on the ground of the experienced union of like actions with like motives and circumstances, he insists, necessity has universally been allowed to belong to the will of man, and placed on the same footing with the operations of senseless matter.

But why is Hume so concerned to prove the necessity of human actions, and to establish that they have causal regularities analogous to the actions of matter? The reason is that Hume's theory of freedom provides the foundation of his theory morals, and shows the way how he interprets responsibility and moral judgement. It is indeed evident that, without these causal regularities established in his discussion of the will in Book II, he cannot proceed to explain how to make our own decisions involving other people, nor to assign moral responsibilities to ourselves or to others for our or their actions, as Penelhum emphasizes.¹⁵ By establishing the theory of freedom on the third-person point of view, Hume prepares the way to claim that the real target of our approval and disapproval is not an action itself nor its effects, but something essential, though hidden, to the agent, which the observer needs to infer by the relation of cause and effect, or by the force of the moral evidence. There is nothing special or peculiar in judging the actions of men, as it depends on the inference which proceeds upon the same maxim as when we reason concerning senseless matters. Thus through the demonstration of the analogy between the necessity of the actions of the mind and the necessity of the actions, Hume intends to make it clear how “aply *natural* and *moral* evidence cement together, and form only one chain of argument betwixt them”(T2.3.1.17; SBN 406). It is indeed on the basis of this analogy and on “a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions” (ibid.) that he illustrates the circumstance of how a passion increases its strength in motivating us to action in the second half of his treatment of the will.

¹⁴ John Wright plausibly observes that on Hume view, introspection, even if it does not interfere with what originally went on in our own mind, may well fail to identify the desire which actually motivated us. For, when a motive becomes part of our character through custom and habit, it manifests itself without any emotional intensity, as we can see in Hume's notion of the calm passions (Wright, *op.cit.*,p.175-6).

¹⁵ Penelhum, *op. cit.*,p.170.

3 The second subject: The causes of the actions of the will

i The first issue: reason cannot produce volition

Establishing the theory of the will and action in Book II of the *Treatise*, Hume recognizes two obstacles which need to be abolished in order to enter into his main discussion. The first one is the prevailing doctrine of liberty¹⁶, proceeded chiefly from religion or from Libertarians. He has successfully rejected it by showing that the actions of the will to arise from necessity just as the actions of matter does. The second one is the common talk of the combat of passion and reason, which is typically and systematically propounded by the traditional and the contemporary moral rationalists, Clark, Wollaston, Balguy, as well as by Locke and Hobbes, who suppose moral standard or principles to be the consequences of reason. On the rationalist view, every rational creature is obliged to regulate his action by reason, and in order to attain virtue, he needs to conform himself to its direction. If any motive or principle challenges the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, till it be entirely subdued, or at least brought to a conformity with that superior principle. It is this assumption that is the target of Hume's constant attack. But, isn't the pre-eminence of reason above passions a commonly shared view among ordinary people as a preferable motive of the will? What is wrong with this common notion of our motivation?

In order to answer this question, we only need to recall that Hume's aim in the *Treatise* is to establish the science of man founded on this belief that "all sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that, however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another"(Intro. XV; SBN 4). Since Hume shares his view with the moral sense theorists who assume that we are made by human nature in such a way to seek good and to avoid evil as we are, his position in *A Treatise of Human Nature* is flatly against the rationalist position, which claims that the virtuous action depends on eternal principles of reason,

¹⁶ In the *Treatise* Hume denounces the doctrine of liberty as "absurd" and "unintelligible", but in *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, which was first published as *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding* (1748), he rather insists on the necessity to understand of the doctrine of liberty in order to understand the consistency of the necessity of our actions with the free-will. Despite of this difference, there seems no essential change of his positions in the two works, as is often pointed out. James Harris, however, claims that "much the same line of argument of context served in both places, but the change of context served to alter the larger significance of that line of argument". See (James Harris, "Free Will", *Continuum Companion to Hume*, ed. Alan Bailey, Don O'Brien, Continuum: London & NY. 2012, p. 214-226).

which exist independently from human nature. To hold that the passions are essentially irregular and unreliable, which need to be controlled by reason in order to attain virtue, is to encourage us to resist, and to behave, against the natural propensity originally embedded in human nature. Nothing therefore is more natural for Hume than to attack this rationalist position, as he finds “the greater part of moral philosophy, ancient or modern is founded”. He proves the impotence of reason in motivating us to action in terms of these three theses: that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will, that a passion is an original existence, or modification on existence, which does not contain any representative quality. Regarding the relation of reason and passions as the constituents of the motivating mechanisms, numerous number of detailed discussions and interpretations have been suggested by critics, creating a widespread disagreement. Although 'reason' is employed by Hume in several different ways as a faculty relevant to reasoning, belief, the understanding, the imagination,¹⁷ in the succeeding discussion I shall focus only one aspect of reason, which is relevant to the relation of beliefs and passions in motivating us to action. I shall thus begin by giving a rough sketch over the above alleged three subjects,

ii The second issue: reason cannot oppose the impulse of passion

Hume enters into the discussion by limiting the operation of the understanding only to these two domains, as it regards the abstract relations, and as it regards those relations of objects of which experience only gives us information. It is by demonstrative reasoning that we find abstract relation of ideas: it is by probable reasoning that we see the causal relations of objects in experience. “Demonstration and volition seem...to be totally remove'd, from each other”(T2.3.3.2; SBN 413), he points out, as “the will always places us in that of realities” whereas demonstrative reasoning deals with relations between ideas so that its proper province is the world of ideas. Demonstrative reasoning, which concerns our judging from demonstration, can never be applied directly to

¹⁷ Constantine Sandis points out that Hume “uses the term ‘reason’ in a number of interrelated senses, describing it as a faculty of discovery, an instinct, an equivalent to the general properties of the imagination, and ‘an affection of the very same kind as passions, and argues that “for Hume, reason is itself an affection, differing from passion only in its degree of tranquility”. (“Action, reason and the passions”, *Continuum Companion to Hume*, ed. Alan Bailey, Don O’Brien, Continuum: London & NY. 2012, p. 2058) Sandis is rather misleading, however, to enumerate affection in this list, and to contend that “for Hume, reason is itself an affection, differing from passion only in its degree of tranquility”.

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realities, and therefore has no direct influence upon volition or action, whose concern is with realities and impressions. Although this species of reasoning by itself cannot motivate us, its role in our action is useful and important: it assists the other species of reasoning in dealing with causal inference regarding the objects. The role of the first species of reasoning in our action is essentially to help the second species of reasoning, and to show means to satisfy our designed end or purpose.

Probable or causal reasoning does play a role in deciding what to do, but it cannot by itself initiate our action: it motivates us only via passions. Hume insists:

It can never in the least concern us to know, that such subjects are causes, and such others effects, if both the causes and effects are indifferent to us. Where the objects themselves do not affect us, their connection can never give them any influence; and 'tis plain that, as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connection, it cannot be by its means that the objects are to affect us.(T2.3.3.3; SBN 414)

If I am indifferent to certain objects, he says, discovering a causal relationship between them will never awake me from my state of indifference. Once I have a desire for a new house, I shall try to find the way to satisfy my desire by resorting to the reasoning of probability, or tracing the causal relation regarding the object, assisted by demonstrative reasoning. On this view, my serious recognition of the need of getting a new house, for instance, or my strong belief in the pleasure of owning it, can never move me to buy one unless I initially have a desire for the pleasure as such, or without my tendency for a pleasure in general. Neither demonstrative nor probable reasoning alone can initiate action.

Now, from the first thesis that “reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition”(T2.3.3.4; SBN 415). Hume deduces from this the second thesis that reason is “incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the reference with any passion or emotion”(ibid.). The only way to oppose or retard “the impulse of passion” is, according to him, to give rise to an impulse in a contrary direction. But this contrary impulse never arises from reason, because reason has no original influence on the will, and unable to cause nor hinder any act of volition. Since reason cannot withstand any principle which has such an efficacy, nor ever keep the mind in suspense a moment, “the principle which opposes our passion cannot be the same with reason, and is only called so in an improper sense”(ibid.). What we mean by reason when we talk of combat of passion and of reason is in fact “the calm desires or tendencies”, Hume maintains, which are confounded

with reason because they operate with the same calmness and tranquility as reason. The combat of passion and of reason as the determination of the will, strongly asserted by rationalists is thus insisted by him to be the combat of the calm and the violent passion. Hence comes his famous assertion: “Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them”(ibid.). This remark is meant not to deny that the importance of role of reason in our action, but to undermine the rationalist notion of the combat of passion and reason, which presupposes that both reason and passion are by themselves capable not only to cause or initiate our action. His point is that, though the exertion of the will depends on both reason and passion, they are assigned different functions from one another, so that they can never dispute with each other the preference regarding our action. On this view, the role of reason is subsidiary, as it only works out the probability to attain the goal or ultimate objects initially set by the passions.¹⁸

iii The third issue: a passion as an original existence

Lastly, Hume establishes the third issue with respect to the relation of reason and passion, by claiming:

A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. (T2.3.3.5; SBN 416)

Insofar as a passion is an impression, or the impression of reflection precisely, it is a unique existence, or rather “an original fact complete in itself”, representing no relation which may inform

¹⁸ Hume was much less revolutionary and intransigent in this respect than is commonly supposed, as Laird points out, as all he meant to do was to put Hutcheeson’s view pointedly and to reiterate Mandeville’s notion of reason as ‘the slave of the passions’(Laird, op.cit.p. 204). MacNabb also mentions that Plato defined justice as a harmony of the passions and desires under the direction of reason, and that Aristotle also admitted that “the understanding itself moves nothing”, while admitting that there was something called “the practical understanding,” consisting in the direction of desire to that which reason pronounced good, and capable of causing action (D.G.C. MacNabb, *David Hume, His Theory of Knowledge and Morality*, Basil Balckwell, Oxford, 1966, p.159).

us any other existence or reality.¹⁹ “‘Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason”, Hume reasons, “since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider's as copies, with those objects, which they represent”(ibid.). “It must follow, passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are *accompany'd* with some judgement or opinion”(ibid.). “A passion can never, in any sense, be called unreasonable, but when founded on a false supposition, or when it chooses means insufficient for the designed end” (T2.3.3.6; SBN 415). Since any affection can be called unreasonable only when it is founded on false suppositions or when it chooses means insufficient for the end, it cannot be contrary to reason if we prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. A passion must be accompanied with some false judgment in order for its being unreasonable; and even then it is not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but judgment (ibid.). I may desire a fruit of excellent relish, and try to get it. But since “my willing of the action” is only secondary, and founded on the supposition that my desired good is attained by the action, as soon as I discover the falsehood of that supposition, they must become indifferent to me, as he points out. “It is impossible”, Hume thus conclude, “that reason and passion can ever oppose each other, or dispute for the government of the will and actions (ibid.).

As regards the above argument, however, not a few objections have been raised, especially against Hume's remark that the passions are original existence that contain not any representative quality. According to Annette Baier, for instance, it is “a silly” remark which Hume later came to see its defect. For, this assertion has to somehow square with his earlier claim that the passions are secondary and often idea-mediated impressions, she says, and with his basic position that “the passions ...do involve the 'interposition' either of an idea or of a sense impression and some of them (respect, envy) involve complex relations both of ideas and of impressions of pleasure and pain”.²⁰ Hume's claim that they are original existence “does not give the impression of reflection itself any 'representative character’”, “but it would not be an impression 'of reflexion' except for

¹⁹ Kemp Smith, op.cit.p. 145.

²⁰ Baier argues:“The impressions of reflection do not 'without any introduction make their appearance in the soul', but are introduced by our thoughts about what is or is likely to become the case. The purely hedonic components in, say, pride, are, on Hume's analysis, two pleasures—one, the 'separate pleasure', an enjoyment of some fine thing, the other the pleasant glow of pride itself, of proud ownership. But for it to be pride, rather than some other passion, one must believe the fine thin to be one's own. The belief is crucial in identifying the passion of pride, and some idea must be present for it to be a passion rather than just a pleasure”. Baier, op.cit. p.160-166.

the fact that it has an idea to introduce it". Baier's criticism, however, is clearly unfounded, chiefly because, by taking 'pride' as the ground of her argument, she overlooked that Hume's remark in question is given in his discussion of the will and action, and failed to see, in the consequence of it, that what Hume chiefly speaks of as "passions" are the direct, but not the indirect passions. Only insofar as the indirect passions are concerned, Baier is justified to claim that "the belief is crucial in identifying the passion", and that some idea must be present for it to be a passion rather than just a pleasure",²¹ but it is not the case with the direct passions. On Hume's account, the direct passions are mostly motivating passions, and some of the direct passions, e.g. benevolence, anger, hunger, lust, arise from "a natural impulse or instinct", and proceed without being mediated by beliefs, even without being preceded by pain or pleasure (T2.3.9.8; SBN 439). So far as the direct passions are concerned, there is therefore nothing extraordinary for Hume to speak of a passion as being an original existence.²² For, Hume indeed had a crucial reason to assimilate the direct passions to instinctive sensations such as lust, hunger, thirsty, as I shall discuss later.

iv Motivating beliefs

So far we have seen how Hume has worked out for the clear distinction between the two domains relevant to reason and passions in motivation, and shown how the common view of the determination of the will arises from confounding the one for the other. This division between the two roles of passion and of reason in performing action is clearly pictured by Hume in terms of the following circumstance:

'Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. 'Tis also obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with

²¹ Baier, *op.cit.* p.161.

²² Lilli Alanen interprets to this effect: "When calling the passions original, Hume's focus is on the act-aspect of the secondary impression, and the manner of liveliness in which it is had. This act-aspect, considered separately, does not, qua psycho-physical fact or mode, contain any representative quality, yet it may be described as a bodily (physiological-cum-behavioral) state, abstracting from its other features (causes and objects), just as one can give a description of thirst in terms of a dryness in the throat and a lack of liquid in the body." (Lilli Alanen, "The powers and mechanisms of the passions", in *Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise*, ed. By Saul Traiger, p191.

its original one by the relation of cause and effect. (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414)

It must first be noted that this motivating mechanism pictured above depends on the connection of these three elements, viz. the prospect of pain or pleasure, the emotion of aversion or propensity, reasoning from cause and effect, and that none of them alone is sufficient to initiate or to pursue our action. What pulls the trigger of this motivating mechanism is the prospect of pain or pleasure, which gives rise to the emotion of aversion and propensity. But what is the prospect of pain or pleasure as such? Hume's answer of this question is prepared in his former discussion, "On the influence of belief", delivered of Book I in the following way:

There is implanted in the human mind a perception of pain and pleasure, as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions. But pain and pleasure have two ways of making their appearance in the mind; of which the one has effects very different from the other. They may either appear in impression to the actual feeling, or only in idea, as at present when I mention them. ...

Nature has, therefore, chosen a medium, and has neither bestow'd on every idea of good and evil the power of actuating the will, nor yet has entirely excluded them from this influence. Tho' an idle fiction has no efficacy, yet we find by experience, that the ideas of those objects, which we believe either are or will be existent, produce in a lesser degree the same effect with those impressions, which are immediately present to the senses and perception. The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions. This effect it can only have by making an idea approach an impression in force and vivacity. (T1.4.10.2-3; SBN 119)

Hume first makes it clear that "the chief spring and moving principle" of all the actions of the mind is a perception of pain and pleasure, and that this perception is the most fundamental and original capacity of the mind, determined by the natural property or instinct. We must here learn that this passage tells us the following two fundamental facts on which Hume's system of the will and action is founded. In the first place, the first sentence of this quotation explains why the will is "the immediate effect of pain and pleasure", and why the full understanding of its nature and its properties is necessary to the explanation of the passions in spite of that the will not comprehended

among passions (T1.4.10.2-3; SBN 119). The will is the immediate and direct effect of pain and pleasure in the sense in which it begins with, and originate from, a perception of pain and pleasure, which depends entirely on the original and primary instinct, viz. “the chief spring and moving principle”. In this case, we need to see that this perception of pain and pleasure itself cannot be identified with “the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any motion of our body, or new perception of our mind”(T2.3.1.2; SBN 399) as he defines the will. For, a perception of pain and pleasure functions only as the initial factor which triggers the mechanism, by producing motivating passions as well as motivating beliefs, it may fail to cause the will, or move us to act, when it is not successfully followed by its successors which are necessary to constitute the mechanism.

In the second place, Hume tells us there are different notion of belief from those reached through reason²³ in the following way. Although a perception of pain and pleasure makes their appearance either as an impressions or as an idea, nature has assigned to neither of them the power of actuating the will, as their influence on our actions are too extreme in different ways. If impressions alone were to influence the will, we should be subject in every moment of our lives to the greatest calamities, because, while foreseeing their approach, we were not provided by nature with any principle of action to avoid them. Or, if every ideas should influence our actions, the images of goods and evils were always wandering in the mind, and idle conceptions of this kind would keep our mind without any momentary peace or tranquility. Nature has therefore chosen a medium between these two extremes, and attributed beliefs such a power to influence the will, by rendering them similar to impressions, and by making them imitate the latter's influence on the mind. “Belief, therefore, since it causes an idea to imitate the effects of the impressions, must make it resemble them in these qualities, and is nothing but *a more vivid and intense conception of any idea*.(T1.4.10.3; SBN 119-120).

The effect then of belief, is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions”(ibid.).

²³ Sandis contends that “there are no textual reasons to suppose that when he [Hume] states that belief includes a motivating capacity, he is working with a different notion of belief to that explored so far”(Constantine Sandis, *op. cit.*, p. 209). But the quoted paragraph from the section “Of the influence of belief” on the passions and the imagination provides the sufficient evidence for it as we have seen.

The Structure of Hume's System of the Passions in the Second Book of the *Treatise* (Part 3)

As belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions, so the passions, in their return, are very favourable to belief.(T1.4.10.4; SBN 120)

We may here learn that a mere idea of pain or pleasure cannot pull the trigger of the motivating mechanism, and that belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting of our passions. The ideas of pain or pleasure, only by becoming so enlivened as to be beliefs, he insists, can *imitate* the effects of the impressions on our actions.

It is known that all our beliefs are for Hume not the conclusions of reason alone, not always reached through reason, and that he does not equate belief with reason. These beliefs of pain or pleasure as contrived by nature as a mediate of impressions and ideas are not the products of reason, nor founded on the causal reasoning, but are rather the direct effects of a perception of pain and pleasure, which is the chief spring and moving principle of all actions of the human mind. If we call them 'motivating beliefs', Hume's point is that these motivating beliefs alone cannot initiate actions, but only via the production of the passions, and that in this respect the immediate causes of actions of the will are passions. This view that motivation depends on a belief-desire pair is often identified by commentators as Humean theory of motivation.

v The indirect passions are not motives of the will?

According to Hume's official account, it is only the direct passions that could move us to act. Rachel Cohon or Constantine Sandis, for instance, points it out as a "mystery", or as puzzle why the indirect passions are not motivate.²⁴ The solution of this puzzle is quite simple: that the indirect passions are not motives of the will, precisely because motivating beliefs can produce only the direct passions, but not the indirect.²⁵ For, although the direct passion may arise directly from motivating beliefs, as all that is needed for the production of a direct passion is a pleasurable or painful sensation to constitute the essence of the passion: a motivating belief cannot give rise to the indirect passions, as they are constituted of a pleasurable or painful sensation as well as the idea of self or the other self, In order to produce the indirect passion, there must be the source of

²⁴ Sandis, op. cit., p. 205. Rachel Cohon, "Hume's indirect passions", *Companion to Hume*, ed. Elizabeth Radcliffe, Blackwell Publishing, 2008, p.172-3.

²⁵ Sandis' answer to this puzzle is that "the answer lies in his notion that a person desires to act (or omit from acting) in relation to perceived good and evil which he seems to equate with pleasure and pain".

these two kinds of ingredient²⁶, but a motivating belief cannot function as such a source because it is a direct effect of a perception of pain and pleasure, and not something reached through reason.

It must here be noted, however, that against Hume's official claim that the indirect passions themselves are not motives to the will, he actually prepares two ways for the indirect passions to move us to act. The first way is explicitly announced by Hume in this way:

The passions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoin'd with benevolence and anger. 'Tis this conjunction, which chiefly distinguishes these affections from pride and humility. For pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action. But love and hatred are not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion, which they produce, but carry the mind to something farther. Love is always follow'd by a desire of the happiness of the person below'd, and an aversion to his misery: As the hatred produces a desire of the misery and an aversion to the happiness of the person hated.(T2.2.6.3; SBN 367)

Pride and humility are “only pure sensations, without any direction or tendency to action”(T2.2.9.2; SBN 382), because there is no original connection with benevolence or anger. But love and hatred, though they themselves are pure and non-motivating, are not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion which they produce, but carry the mind further to action due to the primary connection with “appetite or desire”, according to Hume. It is true that “benevolence and anger are passions different from love and hatred, and only conjoined with them by the original constitution of the mind”(T2.2.6.6; SBN 368), love and hatred are ample to produce volition, and to excite us immediately to action, owing to this natural connection with benevolence and anger. The importance of the connection between the two sets of passions cannot be too exaggerated, in view of that the two different systems relevant to the indirect and relevant to the direct depends chiefly on this connection.

Hume prepares the second way in terms of the compound passion, viz. pity, malice, respect, envy, contempt, or the amorous passions. Although the compound passions are counted by Hume as the indirect passions,²⁷ they are motives of the will as they include benevolence and anger into

²⁶ Cf. Haruko Inoue, “The cause and the origin of the indirect passions”, *Hume Studies*, Volume 29, No.2, November, p. 205-221.

²⁷ “I can only observe in general, that under the indirect passions I comprehend pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependents”(T2.1.1.4; SBN 276-7).

their components. He spends as much as five sections for the discussion of these passions, and for the illustration of how these indirect passions arise from a mixture of love and hatred with other affections. No wonder that some of these passions, e.g. pity, are often treated by critics as the direct passions.²⁸ Hume explains this process by sympathy, and by the “*original and primary*”(T2.2.9.4; SBN 382) connection between these two sets of passions, viz. benevolence and anger, with love and hatred. So far as the compound passions are concerned, Hume allows the indirect passions to be motives of our actions.

vi Instinctive passions as the exception to Humean theory of motivation

It also merits our attention that the Humean theory of motivation allows the following crucial exception

Besides good and evil, or, in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections.(T2.3.9.8; SBN 439).

Hume explicitly recognizes that there are some motivating passions which do not always presuppose motivating beliefs, nor even a perception of pain or pleasure. But isn't it really extraordinary for him to assert that those passions do not proceed from pain or pleasure, but rather produce pain or pleasure. For, what makes Hume's system of the passions as it is is this basic definition of the passions, as we remember, that “both direct and indirect, are founded on pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an affection of any kind, it is only requisite to present some good or evil”(T2.3.9.1; SBN 438). Obviously these instinctive passions are flatly against his fundamental position regarding the passions that “[u]pon the removal of pain and pleasure, there immediately follows a removal of love and hatred, pride and humility, desire and aversion, and

²⁸ Elizabeth Radcliffe treats the compound passions as the indirect passions, whereas Roco Vitz seems to take them as the direct passions, for instance. (Elizabeth Radcliffe, “Love and benevolence in Hutcheson's and Hume's theories of the passions”, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 12(4) 2004:631-653.)(Rico Vitz, “The limit of benevolence”, *Hume Studies*, Vol. 28, No.2, 2002, p. 271-295)

of most of our reflective or secondary impressions”(ibid.). Thus Kemp Smith proposes a separate category called “primary passions” in his classification of the passions, and classifies these “sheerly instinctive passions” or “natural appetites, upon which so many of our pleasures depend” into it in order to distinguish them from all other passions.²⁹ But, what made Hume enumerate those instinctive affections as passions at the risk of violating his basic rule or definition?

Benevolence and anger, or “the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends”, are the key affections in Hume's system, because of their “*original and primary*”(T2.2.9.4; SBN 382) connection with love and hatred. In other words, since the passions are two kinds, indirect and direct, they must be connected in some way in order to corroborate with each other way. Here lies the reason, it seems to me, why Hume included the instinctive passions, viz. benevolence and anger, hunger and some other bodily appetite, into the passions. His reason lies in his need to assign two different roles to benevolence and anger: they are expected to function not only as a passion but also as an instinct or appetite in order to function as a mediator of the direct and the indirect passions as we can see in Hume's discussion of the compound passions.

vii The impulse of passion

We have seen how the motivating mechanism is triggered by the prospect of pain or pleasure, which gives rise to the aversion or propensity for the object. In Hume's example, when a suit of fine clothes produces pleasure from its beauty, although this pleasure causes both an idea and an impression of the pleasure, it is a motivating belief, or rather the mixture of these two effects of the original pleasure, that actually triggers the mechanism of motivation, as we have seen. This motivating belief (prospect) is nothing but the vivacious idea of this pleasure, but has the similar influence of the latter as it imitates the latter effect, and produces a desire (propensity) to get the pleasure.

But as we know from our own experience, this desire alone is not sufficient, Hume tells us, to move me to get it. Although “DESIRE arises from good considered simply; and AVERSION

²⁹ Kemp Smith, *op.cit.* p.164. Kemp Smith revised Hume's classification of the passions, and prepared an ad hoc category for those passions which are “sheerly instinctive, passions, arising from a natural impulse or instinct not founded on precedent perceptions of pleasure and pain; viz. the bodily appetites, such as hunger and lust, together with benevolence, resentment, love of life, and parental love. He called this division “primary”, and classified all the rest of passions into the category of “the secondary”.

is derived from evil”(T2.3.9.7; SBN 439), the WILL does not exert itself until we have a *belief* that “either the good or the absence of the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body”(ibid.), or that there is any available means for me to get it. But, is this belief the same as the initial motivating belief? This belief is different from the motivating belief in that the motivating belief is not the product to reason whereas the new belief arises from the probable reasoning founded on the relation of cause and effect about the object. My desire moves me to get it only through the negotiation with this reasoning, e.g. if the suit is really worth of all my trouble for getting it. Thus we need to examine the second connection between a desire or aversion and the second belief, and see how this new belief is considered by Hume to be connected with actions, and what role is assigned to it.

Let's here recall that Hume described the relation between the second belief and passions in terms of this circumstance: “when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are *carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction...* this emotion rests not here, but, making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect. But, in this case, the *impulse* arises not from reason, but is only directed by it”[my emphases]. By calling the emotion of aversion or propensity an “impulse”,³⁰ Hume urges our attention to this former issue which has already established in his

³⁰ Hume employs ‘impulse’ in various ways, not as a technical concept but as a common ordinary ways, meaning physical operations (an impelling force, motion, thrust, impetus, the change in the momentum of a body as a result of a force acting upon it for a short period of time), or mental ones (an instinctive move, drive, urge, a sudden desire, inclination, tendency, current, tend). He writes on the one hand that “[M]otion in one body, in all past instances that have fallen under our observation, is followed upon impulse by motion in another”(T2.3.1.16; SBN405). On the other hand, he says that “the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable”(T2.2.6.3; SBN 367). “A natural impulse” is here employed as an instinctive drive or natural inclination of the mind. He also mentions in his account of the principle of a parallel direction that “one impression may be related to another “when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent”, which, however, “cannot take place with regard to pride and humility: because these are only pure sensations, without any direction or tendency to action”(T2.2.9.2; SBN 381-2). Impulse is here meant to be the “direction or tendency” to action, which constitutes the property of the direct passions. He also mentions in his discussion of pride: “Those principles which forward the transition of ideas here concur with those which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse”T2.1.4.4; SBN 284). An impulse is thus used not only for the transition of an impression but also for the transition of an idea.

former discussion: “’tis not the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure, which determines the character of any passion, but the whole bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end”(T2.2.9.2; SBN 381). It must here be reflected that on Hume account the direct and the indirect passions are distinct in that the direct passions are more like dispositions or propensities rather than peculiar mental state, whereas the indirect passions are “only pure sensations, without any *direction or tendency to action*”(T2.2.9.2; SBN 382)[my emphasis]. Since Hume's treatment of the will depends on the direct passions, “Hume's analysis of motives or passions as causes is also a dispositional analysis as Nicholas Capaldi points out.³¹ “Motives or passions for Hume are not simple occurrences”, Capaldi writes, “and although he does describe them as impressions and thereby gives the reader the notion that passions as motives are occurrences, ...Hume also describes the passions as occurring under certain circumstances, and also as being influenced by general rules”.³² Capaldi is quite plausible to insist on the importance of seeing that Hume's analysis of belief is dispositional. Since an impulse for Hume does not imply any existence of power, nor source from which any power is derived, the “impulse of passion” is meant by him merely as a property or inclination of a passion which is originally embedded in the passion.³³

Granted that the direct passions have “impulses and directions” to carry the mind to action, the question then is, how is it possible for these emotions to sustain this impulse, and keep extending themselves? For even if these emotions are originally set by nature to have an impulse to develop by themselves, these natural development is possible only when there is a favorable

³¹ Nicholas Capaldi, *David Hume*, Twayne Publishers; Boston,1975, p.146. Barry Stroud also stresses this feature of Hume's treatment of the passions and actions. Barry Stroud, *Hume*, Routledge & Kegan Paul; London, Henley and Boston, 168

³² Capaldi, *ibid.* p.168.

³³ This impulse is generally taken by critics as “a push” to action. Barry Stroud writes, for instance, that “in order for reason to conflict with passion in the direction of the will, reason would have to be ‘pushing’ the agent or creating an impulse in a direction opposite to that in which passion is ‘pushing’ the agent”.Stroud argues: “In order for reason to conflict with passion in the direction of the will, reason would have to be ‘pushing’ the agent or creating an impulse in a direction opposite to that in which passion is ‘pushing’ the agent. And if reason is perfectly inert, and cannot produce any impulses at all, then obviously it cannot be opposed to passion in the production of action.” Stroud, *op.cit.* p. 158. Stanley Twyman uses the impulse as the synonym of desire or aversion itself: “Hume does not hold that the impulse to act stems only from the prospect of ‘my’ pleasure or pain”: “desire and aversion can stem from the prospect of my pleasure or pain”, (Stanley Twyman, *Reason and Conduct in Hume and His Predecessors*, Martinus Nijhoff/ The Hague;Belguim, 1974, p. 133.)

circumstance which allows or supports their natural extension. It is evident that this circumstance must satisfy these two conditions. In the first place, it must prepare the way for the emotions to pursue, as it is plain that nothing can proceed a way without a passage to follow. In the second place, it must supply force or energy to these emotions so that they could sustain themselves, and go on extending by themselves. For, it is clear that, insofar as an impulse is by nature a momentary push or sudden drive, the emotion needs to be fed somehow in order to sustain the impulse, and to go on developing to attain the desired object. Let us now see how Hume explains the circumstance in question in such a way as to make it satisfy these two required condition, and shows by that means the intimate connection between desire and action.

This circumstance in which the emotion of aversion or propensity extend themselves is described by Hume in this way: "this emotion rests not as they are, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect. ...Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our actions receives a subsequent variation"(T2.3.3.4; SBN 414). He answers the first question of how the emotion finds the way to proceed, by claiming that reasoning takes place to discover this relation, and prepares the way for the emotion by connecting related ideas, and thus by directs its impulse.

But, isn't it the imagination, and not an emotion, we may here object, that make a transition along related ideas, according to Hume's foregoing principle? Yes, it is, he answers, as it is evident that an emotion cannot proceed the way, nor extend itself, without the assistance of the imagination. Although so far Hume has not mentioned even a word about the role of the imagination in his discussion of the will, he considers it as a necessary constituent of the motivational mechanism, and assigns to it the crucial role as a medium between reason and passions. It is not the emotion but the imagination that makes the transition along the way prepared by the relation of the causes and effects of that object as it is pointed out to us by reason and experience. But it does not matter in moving us to action, whether it is actually the imagination or the emotion that makes us cast our view on every side, and comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect, because

the imagination and affections have a close union together, and that nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the latter. Wherever our ideas of good or evil acquires a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the

imagination in all its variations. Whether this proceeds from the principle above mentioned, *that any attendant emotions is easily converted into the predominant*, I shall not determine. (T2.3.6.1; SBN 424)

Owing to the close union between the imagination and affections, Hume insists, the emotions of aversion or propensity keep pace with the imagination, and in accordance with the transition of the imagination, extend themselves to the cause and effects of the object in question as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience. It is in the last part of his discussion of the will that Hume dwells on the detailed illustration of the crucial role of the imagination in his motivating mechanism by means of the experimental demonstration how a passion increases its force in carrying us to action according as the increase of the force of the imagination. He seems to have saved the discussion of the most essential part of the motivating mechanism in which he illustrate the crucial role of the imagination as a medium between reason and passions for the conclusion of his discussion of the will, or rather of Book II of the *Treatise*. The five sections of his treatment of the will in which he examines the causes of the violent passions are fully occupied with this illustration this situation of the object which “has a considerable effect on the imagination, and by that means on the will and passions”(T2.3.7.4; SBN 429).

The second condition of the circumstance in question, viz. the source of force or energy to feed the impulse of the aversion or propensity for its extension, is found in the close union between the imagination and the passions. Since wherever our ideas of good or evil acquires a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations, it is no wonder that whatever “favours the imagination, and makes it conceive its object in a stronger and fuller light”(T2.3.7.7; SBN 431) also favours the passion, and makes it stronger and forceful. For, whatever has an effect on the imagination, “must have a proportionable effect on the will and passions” according to his reasoning (T2.3.7.3; SBN 428), so “that lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination”(T2.3.6.9; SBN 427). “In this respect, as well as others, the force of the passion depends as much on the temper of the person as the nature or situation of the object”, that is, on the imagination (*ibid.*). He here refers back his former issue:

I have already observed that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression. This vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the calm as well as the violent; nor has a mere fiction of the imagination any considerable

influence upon either of them. It is too weak to take any hold of the mind, or be attended with emotion.(ibid.)

We may here learn why Hume was so emphatic on the importance of beliefs in our motivation, or why a mere fiction of the imagination has no considerable influence upon the will and passions: the vivacity of beliefs is a requisite circumstance to the exciting the imagination, and by that means to the exciting our passions. It may now be concluded that the emotions of aversion or propensity derives their force or energy to sustain their impulse for extension from the vivacity of beliefs, though obliquely via its effect on the imagination.

But in order to hold that the force or energy to feed the impulse is derived from the vivacity of beliefs, Hume needs to show how the close unity between the imagination and the passions must be so strong as to entail that wherever our ideas of good or evil acquires a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations. Hume does not take the trouble of explaining how he is justified to claim this issue, but he suggests instead that a clue lies in his foregoing principle that “any attendant emotions is easily converted into the predominant”, as we have seen. But there is another principle which also needs to be considered in order to understand the close union between the imagination and the passions: “no object is presented to the senses, nor image formed in the fancy, but what is accompanies with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion'd to it”(T2.2.8.4; SBN 373).

From these two principles, we can derive the close union between the imagination and the passions, that the transition of the imagination along related ideas may be followed by the transition of passions, in the following way. We have good reasons to suppose that, insofar as “every object is attended with some emotion proportion'd to it”(T2.2.8.7; SBN 374), these emotions attending ideas are connected together according as the imagination takes its way along the related ideas. Although “[t]he mind has always a propensity to pass from a passion to any of other related to it”, “this propensity is forwarded when the object of the one passion is related to that of the other”(T2.2.2.16; SBN 339). When the transition of the passions thus involves the transition of the imagination, “[t]he two impulses concur with each other, and render the whole transition more smooth and easy”(ibid.). In order to understand why the transition of the mind to it must be rendered so much more easy and natural, we need to see that in this case the connection of ideas is reinforced by the connection of the passions which attend the ideas, and that the connection of the passions takes place owing to this principle that “[w]hen two passions

are already produced by their separate causes, and are both present in the mind, they readily mingle and unite”(T2.3.4.2; SBN 420).

It is important to see that on Hume account, although ideas are only capable of forming a compound by their conjunction, this conjunction is strengthened by the conjunction among the passions, because the passions are connected with each other not by forming a compound, but by their mixture. For, the conjunction of ideas is for Hume not “of a total union” because ideas “are endowed with a kind of impenetrability by which they exclude each other”, whereas the conjunction of impressions and passions “are susceptible of an entire union, and, like colours may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself” into a new passion (T2.2.6.1; SBN 366). It is the transition of the imagination that guides the passions to their conjunction as we have seen above, but it is the conjunction of the passions that makes the transition of the imagination more easy and natural. This is how “those two faculties of the mind, the imagination and passions, assist each other in their operations when their propensities are similar, and when they act upon the same object”(T2.2.2.16; SBN 339), according to Hume. Hume thus proves that wherever our ideas of good or evil acquires a new vivacity, the passions become more forceful and violent.

Hume's account of the second condition of the motivating circumstance is thus given to this effect: the emotion of aversion or propensity extend themselves according as the “easy progression of ideas favours the imagination, and makes it conceive its objet in a stronger and fuller light”(T2.3.7.7; SBN 431). Hume makes it clear that the motivational mechanism depends on the corroboration of reason and passions, and that neither alone cannot move us to act. Annette Baier argues that “Hume does not exactly subscribe to a 'belief + desire' analysis of motivation, since desires are only among the passions and sentiments which lead to action,³⁴ and for him a main role for belief is to cause passions, as well as to instruct us on how to satisfy them”.³⁵ Humean theory of motivation as commonly understood supposes that beliefs are assigned by Hume only these two roles, to produce motivating passions, and to show them the way to proceed, as Baier writes. But

³⁴ If “desire” is used by Hume as a general name for motivating passions, rather than for a particular passion, Baier seems to have no justification to hold this point. He mentions, for instance, “certain calm desires and tendencies”, to refer to some instinctive affections. When he writes that “desire arises from good consider'd simply”, desire may be taken to be the general name of motivating affections.

³⁵ Annette Baier, “Hume”, *Death and Character, A Companion to the Philosophy of Action*, (eds) T.O' Connors, C. Sandis, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p.513-20.

this common view fails to describe the full contribution of beliefs to the operation of the motivating mechanism: it overlooks their great function to supply the imagination with their vivacity, and to support by that means the impulse of the aversion or propensity. In this respect, we seem to have a good ground to hold a belief + desire pair, and to claim that both belief and desire have the same importance in motivation.

Regarding the relation of beliefs and actions, numerous interpretations have been suggested, creating a widespread disagreement among critics. Rachel Cohon suggests, for instance, that Hume “seems to assert very plainly that some causal beliefs do cause motivating passions, specifically beliefs about pleasure and pain in prospect”.³⁶ By contrast, Elizabeth Radcliffe argues that on Hume's account beliefs could never motivate alone.³⁷ I am more or less sympathetic with the former view, though my position is to hold that motivating beliefs, which triggers the motivating mechanism by producing a aversion or propensity, are conceived by Hume to be different from causal beliefs, which take care of the impulse of the aversion or propensity to extend. Let us take Hume's example and examine the relation between beliefs and passions:

...a suit of fine clothes produces pleasure from their beauty; and this pleasure produces the direct passions, or the impressions of volition or desire. Again, when these clothes are consider'd as belonging to ourself, the double relation conveys to us the sentiment of pride, which is an indirect passion; and the pleasure which attends that passion returns back to the direct affections, and gives a new force to our desire or volition, joy or hope.(T2.3.9.14; SBN 439)

Although it is the first kind of motivating beliefs that triggers the motivating mechanism, the second kind of causal beliefs is also involved later not only as the navigator but also as the cultivator of the impulse of the emotions of aversion or propensity. It may be natural to suppose that while these emotions pursue their way to the desired end, some new desires may be aroused and become confounded with the original emotions, causing the increase of the force and violence of the original

³⁶ Some commentators argue that Hume admits motivating beliefs to initiate our action in some case, e.g. Rachel Cohon.

³⁷ Elizabeth Radcliffe, “Hume on the generation of motives: Why beliefs alone never motivate”, *Hume Studies* 25 (1), 1999, p.101-22.

ones.³⁸ My original desire for the suit may produce another relevant desires, e.g. to get it reduced, to get the smaller size, which are preceded probably by each relevant motivating belief of pain or pleasure. It is also quite natural to suppose that, according as the new desires are conjoined with the original one by the principle of a parallel direction,³⁹ those new motivating beliefs should be confounded with those causal beliefs, which are on their business of guiding the original emotions, and are often mistaken to be of the same kind. The point of Hume's teaching in the above quotation seems to lie in that, although not only the two kinds of passions, direct and indirect, but also the two kinds of beliefs, motivating and non-motivating, are in principle different from each other, it is not easy in our ordinary experience to distinguish the operation of one kind from other, as they take place and reinforce each other in such an intimate and inseparable connection in motivating us to action.

4 The division of calm and violent

i Two ways by which the calm/violent division is used⁴⁰

Hume's account of the treatment of the will delivered in Part iii of Book II of the *Treatise* is divided into three procedures, in which he discusses these three subjects: 1)all actions of the will have particular causes, 2)what these causes are, and 3)how they operate(T2.3.2.8; SBN 412). In the first procedure, he has attained his desired result by proving that human action is necessitated and at the same time free (T2.3.1.15; SBN 405). In the second procedure, he has shown that the causes of our actions are the passions, and not reason. This is, however, only a half of the object intended in the

³⁸ "When two passions are already produced by their separate causes, and are both present in the mind, they readily mingle and unite, though they have but one relation, and sometimes without any. The predominant passion swallows up the inferior, and converts it into itself. The spirits, when once excited, easily receive a change in their direction; and it is natural to imagine this change will come from the prevailing affection"(T2.3.4.2; SBN 420). "This new emotion is easily converted into the predominant passion, and increases its violence..."(T2.3.4.5; SBN 421).

³⁹ "One impression may be related to another, not only when their sensations are resembling...but also when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent"(T2.2.9.2; SBN 381).

⁴⁰ A part of this section is discussed in my paper delivered at 35th Hume Conference, 2008, as "How does the division between the calm and the violent function in Hume's system of the passions in the *Treatise*".

second procedure. After having proved that reason alone cannot move us to action, nor oppose our passion, Hume attempts to show that what we commonly call the combat of reason and passion is, properly speaking, the combat of the calm and the violent passion, and that strength of mind implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent. Only then he proceeds to the third procedure, and tries to illustrate in the last five sections how a passion increases its motivating force in terms of the situation of the object which render a passion calm or violent. Thus we may find that Hume's strategy in the second half of his treatment of the will depends on the division of calm and violent. We shall begin by examining what is intended by the calm/violent division, and how it is employed by him in his treatment of the passions.

Despite its importance of the calm/violent division, it is repeatedly recognized by critics that there is an obvious ambiguity in Hume's use of this division. This ambiguity is so definite that it leads them to complain that "Hume seems rather equivocal as to whether the distinction between calm and violent affections is to be taken seriously",⁴¹ or that his use of calm and violent as a means of classifying the reflective impression is rather "controversial".⁴² "What makes Hume's notion of cam and violent so ambiguous is chiefly the fact that, as Imerwahr points out, he uses

⁴¹ Rachel Cohon, "Hume's moral sentiments as motives", *Hume Studies*, Vol. 36, No.2, 2010,p.211.

⁴² John Immerwahr, "Hume on tranquillizing the passions", *Hume Studies* XVIII, No.2. p.295. The similar point regarding Hume's employment of the calm/violent division is raised by several philosophers. James Baillie points out that "[a] token [of] passion is calm if it has a low felt intensity; a *type* of passion is calm if its tokens are typically like this", though "a passion that is typically calm can, on occasion, be violent" (James Baillie, *Hume on Morality*, Routledge; London, NY, p.100.) Loeb states that the calm/violent division is not exact as it is "applicable to types rather than to individual emotion" (Loeb Louis E., "Hume's Moral Sentiments and the Structure of the *Treatise*", *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 1977, p. 403). Loeb's point is that an impressions which is claimed to be calm in the former sense may be violent in the latter sense, and vice versa: the calm/violent division applied in the former cannot be exactly applied to the latter. When Kydd points out that "our passions are *materially* calm without being formally so", this distinction between 'material' and 'formal' calmness may be taken to correspond to the distinction in question. For, she implies by this distinction these two descriptions respectively: their being materially calm, their being calm in terms of feeling quality. Kydd, *op.cit.* p. 144. On the same line, Tito Magri points out that "calm and violent passions are differentiated by Hume not only in causal, but also in normative terms" (Tito Magri, "Hume on the direct passions and motivation", *A Companion to Hume*, Blackwell Publishing 2008, ed. by Elizabeth Radcliffe, p.196-7. Mercer also recognizes this distinction when he claims that "[t]he calmness or violence of a passion refers to the *intensity* with which the passion is felt rather than to its mode of origin"(Philip Mercer,*Sympathy and Ethics*, Oxford University Press, London, 1972, *op.cit.* p.23.)

the calm/violent division for two related purposes: to signify the kind of passion that is being experienced, and to refer to the way passions are experienced. Hume's notion of the 'calm passions' seem paradoxical", John Wright maintains, "because the very concept of a passion seems to imply high emotional intensity, as well as a receptive or passive state of mind".⁴³ Elizabeth Radcliffe also remarks that "[h]ow Hume makes the distinction between calm and violent passions is not entirely clear", because "[s]ometimes he names the calm and violent passions, and at other times he suggests that any passion can be calm or violent, depending on whether it is a resolute disposition of one's character or an episodic occurrence".⁴⁴

The direct effect of the ambiguity of this division is the notorious controversy regarding Hume's notion of 'the calm passions', which is generally acknowledged by critics as the core notion of Hume's theory of the will. It is a common acknowledgment that "the 'calm passions' doctrine is exceedingly difficult to understand", and that "[c]ertain of his remarks about the nature of the distinction between the calm and violent passions seem to conflict with others".⁴⁵ "The calm passions seem like a rather mixed bag", says Jane McIntyre, and "Hume may not even be fully consistent about where they fall in his classificatory scheme".⁴⁶ Hume's section 'Of the influencing motives of the will' in which Hume mentions the calm passions is the one most commented on and discussed of the *Treatise*, as John Wright observes, only to create "widespread disagreement on its interpretation".⁴⁷ All this criticism originate chiefly from the ambiguity of Hume's use of the calm/violent division, as we shall see below.

What seems to me rather curious is the fact that this ambiguity involved in Hume's employment of the calm/violent division, witnessed and recognized implicitly or explicitly by so many critics in several different contexts, has been somehow left unexamined, and not recognized to be the subject which merits their serious attention. While urging our attention to this ambiguity, they seems to have a share of Immerwahr's assumption that "this ambiguity does not infect what follows".⁴⁸

⁴³ Wright, John, op.cit. p.231-2.

⁴⁴ Radcliffe, Elizabeth, "Love and benevolence in Hutcheson's and Hume's theories of the passions", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 12 (4) 2004, 639,

⁴⁵ Rachael M. Kydd, *Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise*, Thoemmes:Bristol 1990, p. 141.

⁴⁶ Jane L. McIntyre, "Strenght of mind: Prospects and problems for a Humean account", *Synthese* (2006) 152, p.393.

⁴⁷ John P. Wright, , *Hume's Treatise of Human Nature*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2009, p.217.

⁴⁸ Imerwahr, op.cit. p.295.

But, what could be the ground for their assumption? Against Immerwahr's assumption, I argue, this ambiguity *does* infect what follows. In the succeeding discussion, we shall see that the great part of those conflicts alleged regarding his notion of "the calm passions" resolves into the mere confusion between the two ways calm/violent division is employed.

If this ambiguity of Hume's expression of the 'calm passions' is derived from the fact that "[i]t can mean a passion that is usually calm (like the love of beauty) even if it is being experienced violently, or it can mean a passion that is usually violent (such as anger) that is being experience at a low level of emotional intensity"⁴⁹ as Immerwahr points out, it may be useful to characterize the former use as a *type*-distinction and the latter as a *token*-division.⁵⁰

It is entailed by this distinction that the type-distinction means an absolute separation between calm and violent passions whereas the token-distinction a continuity between them. The distinction between a type-determined calm and a type-determined violent distinction, or a calm-type and a violent-type [henceforth I shall call C-type and V-type respectively] passions, is definite and absolute in the sense that any variation in the degree of their emotional disturbance would nowise allow them to change their type or status. A type-determined calm passion or C-type passion can never be classed as a V-type no matter how it increases its violence, and it is the same with a type-determined violent passion or V-type passion. When Hume says that a passion may appear in the mind either calmly or violently, he is taken to mean that C-type passions may appear in the mind violently without violating their type: in the same manner, V-type passions may appear calmly while still remaining as V-type one. There is nothing paradoxical nor redundant to speak of a violent C-type passion nor of a calm C-type one, and the same is true with the case of a calm V-type passions or of a violent V-type one.

By contrast, so far as the token-division of the calm/violent division is concerned, "there is a continuity between calm and passions and violent ones".⁵¹ It is this continuity or changeableness

⁴⁹ Immerwahr, *ibid.* p.294.

⁵⁰ Cf. Kydd's distinction: "A token passion is calm if it has a low felt intensity; a type of passion is calm if its token are typically like this", though "a passion that is typically calm can on occasion, be violent" Kydd, *op.cit.*, p.100.

⁵¹ Wright points out that a crucial difference between Hume and Hutcheson is that Hutcheson differentiates these general desires for our own good or that of others from passions themselves because on Hutcheson's account the passions themselves contain 'a *confused Sensation* either of Pleasure or Pain, occasioned or attended by some violent bodily Motions...' which often keeps our attention focused on 'the present Affair', and keeps us from '*deliberate Reasoning* about our

of calm-token passions into violent-token ones [henceforth C-token and V-token], or vice versa, that enables Hume to claim at the outset of Section 4 of Part iii of Book II that “[t]here is not in philosophy a subject of more nice speculation than this, of the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions”(T2.3.4.1; SBN 418). His discussion in the succeeding five sections of “the situation of the object [which]... will be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other”(ibid.) depends entirely on this continuity between calm and violent passions, and on that “a calm passion may easily be changed into a violent one” (T2.3.8.13; SBN 438).

On this view, it may be useful to see that Hume's treatment of the will consists of two aspects which depend respectively on the different uses of the calm/violent division as a type-distinction and as a token-distinction. It is these two contrasting aspects of Hume's treatment of the will which depend respectively on the “stability”⁵² or normativity⁵³ of calm and violent passions on the one hand, and the continuity and causal changeableness of calm and violent passions into each other on the other hand, that contribute to making Hume's theory of the will rich and revolutionary as well as notoriously intractable.

Critics seem to be more interested in the first aspect of the will, by assuming that here is prepared by him an alternative to rationalism in terms of the combat of calm and violent passions. It indeed is unfortunate that there is obviously less coverage of the second aspect discussed in terms of “the situation of the object”,⁵⁴ not only because what is intended by Hume an alternative

Conduct” according to Wright. So, although “Hutcheson comes very close to anticipating Hume's claim that reason itself can never be opposed to our passions”, Wright affirms, “he still makes the sharp distinction between calm rational desires and passions which Hume himself rejects”. This observation holds good for the one aspect of Hume's treatment of the will, as we have seen, but Hume clearly adapts Hutcheson's distinction for the illustration of the other aspect relevant to the type-distinction between calm and violent passions.(John Wright, *op.cit.* p.232-3)

⁵² Loeb, by highlighting “stability” as the key concept for understanding the *Treatise*, argues: “Hume's distinction between the calm emotions and violent passions may be interpreted as appearing to a difference in volatility, rather than mere intensity. Artificial justice is a system of conventions in the interest of stability of possession”(Louse E. Loeb, *Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise*, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.1)

⁵³ Tito Magri calls our attention to these two uses of the calm and the violent division, by claiming that “calm and violent passions are differentiated by Hume not only in causal, but also in normative terms”(Tito Magri, *A Companion in Hume*, e. d. by Elizabeth Radcliffe, Blackwell, 2008, p.197).

⁵⁴ In spite of that Hume spends as much as five sections of Part 3 of Book II for the examination of “the situation of the circumstances and situation of the object, which render a passion either calm and violent”, this subject seems to have received no proper attention from critics. Laird's comment on the five sections in which the second aspect is discussed is so surprisingly brief and negligent as this: “The remainder of Hume's examination of the passions was rather desultory.

to rationalism can be fully understood only by taking both aspects into our consideration, but also because what is intended by him as something novel and revolutionary is propounded in his discussion of the second aspect, rather than of the first.⁵⁵

ii The opening section of Book II

It is true that the division of calm/violent is employed only for the discussion of the will and direct passions in Part iii of Book II, but I must go back to the outset of Book II, and begin by examining how the division is first introduced for the classification of the impressions of reflection into two kinds, viz. calm and violent. For, it is the disparity involved in the critics' interpretation of this section, I argue, that provides the original source of the alleged muddle created by critics' discussion of the 'calm passions'. The calm/violent division is introduced there in a manner of definition in the following way:

“The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the *calm* and the *violent*. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external object. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly call'd *passions*, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible. But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, these

He discussed the violence of passion, the pleasure of a moderate and the staleness of an excessive habituation, the effect of the imagination upon the passions with special reference to Time's Arrow and to the way in which distance, height, and the golden aura of the past induced the sentiment of sublimity". (Jon Laiard, *Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature*, op. cit. 203.) Wright mentions the "circumstances and situations of the object" as the "factors which can... change the calm passions back into violent one", but he leaves the subject only with a rather loose brief comment, which clearly disagrees with Hume's intention.(Wright, op.cit.p.227) Tito Magri pays a rare attention to the "situation of the object" in his article, "Hume on the direct passions and motivation", and raises an important point, by claiming that "the causal principle that has the greatest influence on the calmness or violence of the direct passions has to do with the "situation of the object".("Hume on the direct passions and motivation", *A Companion to Hume*, ed. Elizabeth Radcliffe, Blackwells, p.197).

⁵⁵ It is often pointed out that there is nothing entirely new nor remarkable that Hume's compatibilist account or doctrine of "the calm passions" themselves, as they can be taken to be the direct or indirect outcomes of the influence of his predecessors and contemporary philosophers.

impressions have been commonly distinguish'd from each other. The subject of the human mind being so copious and various, I shall here take advantage of this vulgar and specious division, that I may proceed with the greater order; and, having said all I thought necessary concerning our ideas, shall now explain those violent emotions or passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects.

When we take a survey of the passions, there occurs a division of them into *direct* and *indirect*. (T2.1.1.3-4; SBN 276)

The natural reading of this passage tells us that Hume claims that the impressions of reflection are classified into two kinds, viz. calm and violent, in reference to their intensity. Ardal thus insists that “[t]he *fundamentum divisionis* seems to be emotional intensity, ‘the disturbance in the soul’ as Hume sometimes puts it”.⁵⁶ But it is clear to see that, against Ardal's insistence, this classification of impressions into calm and violent does not actually depends on the emotional intensity with which an individual impression arises in the mind. Ardal is mistaken to claim that “the distinction between calm and violent passions [in this passage is drawn] in terms of emotional intensity”,⁵⁷ since Hume's point in the above teaching is that a calm affection, no matter how violent it may become, is never converted into a violent affection, nor is a violent affection into a calm one even where it becomes so tranquilized as to be imperceptible. It is evident that the distinction in terms of feeling quality is not fundamental in this classification, but is used “only symptomatic of some more fundamental difference which is constitutive of the difference between calmness and violence”, as Kydd points out⁵⁸. In this respect, we must be very careful in taking Hume's official claim literally, and in assuming that the impressions of reflection is divided into calm and violent in reference to their felt intensity.

What then does Hume mean by claiming that this distinction is “far from being inexact” Ardal suggests that “[t]he division is not exact, in this sense: that a passion classified as calm can, upon occasion, be violent—witness the reference to the raptures of poetry and music”.⁵⁹ But since the classification of impressions into calm and violent does not actually depends on the

⁵⁶ Ardal, Paul S. Ardal, *Passion and Value*, Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh 1966, P.94.

⁵⁷ Ardal, *ibid.* p.103

⁵⁸ Rachael Kydd, *Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise*, *op.cit.* p.142-3.

⁵⁹ Ardal, *op. cit.*, p. 94. Penelhum also infers Hume to believe that this division is ‘vulgar and specious’ because it “hides the fact that one and the same emotional experience can be either intense or mild”(Terence Penelhum, *Hume*, Mucmillan, 1975, p. 97)

emotional intensity which an individual impression causes in the mind, Ardal's suggestion is clearly untenable. If, as Hume says, a calm affection is never converted into a violent affection, nor is a violent affection into a calm one even where they increase or decrease their intensity, the calm/violent division as the type-distinction is exact in the sense in which a passion can never change its type even if it changes its intensity. On the contrary, the calm/violent division as the token-distinction is inexact in the sense in which its criterion depends on felt intensity or introspection, which is unreliable as it easily varies according to the mental or bodily states or conditions of each individual.⁶⁰ But it is not in the latter context, as we have seen, that Hume mentions the division “far from being exact”.

I infer Hume to mean simply in the following way. This division is not exact in the sense that, although the division between the two kinds of impressions of reflections is exact and absolute, the calmness or violence itself is not an exact criterion to judge when we try to tell by means of introspection or of its felt-intensity whether an impression in question is of the C-type or V-type, because impressions appear in the mind calmly or violently irrelevant to their type.

Granted that Hume's classification of the reflective impressions into calm and violent in the opening section of Book II is given on the basis of the type-distinction, it commits him to the following three standpoints.

- (1) The impressions of reflection are divided into calm and violent, which correspond respectively to these two kinds of impressions: the sense of beauty and deformation in action, and external objects, and the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility.
- (2) It is the second kind of impression that are “properly called the *passions*”, which is the subject of Book II. The first kind is left aside for Book III to be discussed as the subject relevant to his theory of morals.

⁶⁰ This distinction is recognized by many critics, as I noted above. Ardal also insists on this distinction by claiming: “We must distinguish between ‘calm passions’ as a particular occasion, and as the characterization of a passion occurring on a particular occasion. If we take the first interpretation, the class includes more than approval and disapproval. If we take the second interpretation, many passions, even those that are commonly the most violent, may be calm on particular occasions, although they do not arise from a ‘distant view and reflection’”. Ardal, *op.cit.* p.104.,

(3) The distinction between direct and indirect is drawn within the second kind of impression, viz. the passions, so the direct/indirect division is not relevant to the impressions of reflection as a whole, nor does it cut across the calm/violent division.

From these three standpoints, another two ones follow:

(4) The impressions of reflection, except calm impression, viz. the sense of beauty and deformation in action, and external objects, are all violent impressions, which include “the calm desires and tendencies” mentioned in his later section (T2.3.3.8; SBN 417).

(5) The aesthetic and moral sentiments, which are identified as calm impressions, are not “passions”, so that they are excluded from the treatment of Book II.

No consensus of critics, however, is established regarding these five points. It is not because there is any room for different interpretations to enter, but because Hume’s teaching in this section seems to contradict to his assertion of “the calm desires” given in his later section, “Of the influencing motives of the will”. Critics are puzzled not because there is any ambiguity in his definition of calm and violent impressions as the type-distinction in the first section of Book II, but because Hume seems not to adhere to this definition strictly in his later discussion,⁶¹ when he claims that there are “the calm desires”. For, this claim of the calm desires is obviously contradictory to this definition that the passions as the type-determined violent impressions. Critics common reaction is to consider that in his later section Hume modified his initial definition of the passions as the V-type impressions in such a way as to allow some calm passions. Philip Mercer describes this situation clearly in the following way:

Hume’s initial classification of the passions...is, despite its prominence, a somewhat misleading statement of his views. ... Now why his section is misleading is because from what Hume goes on to say the reader might be led to believe that the secondary impressions are divided into the calm and violent passions and that in turn the violent are subdivided

⁶¹ Rachel Cohon observes, for instance, that “Hume does not always restrict the term passions to violent reflective impressions; sometimes he speaks of calm passions”, *Hume’s Morality, Feeling and Fabrication*, Oxford University Press, 2008, p.33.

into the direct and indirect passions. In fact, though, from later statements it is clear that the violent/calm classification is a dichotomy which cuts straight across the direct/indirect classification. The calmness or violence of a passion refers to the *intensity* with which the passion is felt rather than to its mode of origin.⁶²

Mercer confesses that he is dismayed by Hume's later remark on the calm desires, which seems to contradict to Hume's initial definition of the passions. It chiefly is this puzzle that leads critics to interpret erroneously that in the later section Hume modified or recanted his initial definition of the passions in order to allow some passions to be essentially calm, as we can see in Mercer's solution.⁶³

It may also be added that critics are not in entire agreement even with regard to the third standpoint that the direct/indirect distinction is drawn within the class of the violent impressions of reflection. Ardal insists, for instance, that "the division of passions into calm and violent cuts across Hume's distinction between primary and secondary passions"⁶⁴, whereas Loeb argues that "[o]n Hume's principles, no passion, whether indirect or direct, can generally be calm; consequently, the clam/violent distinction does not even partially cut across the direct/indirect distinction".⁶⁵ All these disputes are derived in a great measure from the disparity in critics' interpretation on the opening section of Book II, and from a misinterpretation that Hume's two remarks of calm impressions delivered in two different sections are based on the distinction of the same class of division, as we shall see below.⁶⁶

⁶² Philip Mercer, *op.cit.*, p. 22.

⁶³ The real cause of the critics hesitation of taking the initial distinction between C and V impressions lies perhaps not in Book II but in Book III, in which Hume is taken to identify the moral sentiments with the main indirect passions, by claiming that they are the species of love or hatred, or that "our approbation or blame...is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred". For, it is clear that Hume's initial distinction of the moral sentiments from the passions in the opening section of Book II contradicts to his assertion, if we are to take his words literally, that the moral sentiments are species of love and hatred.

⁶⁴ Ardal, *op. cit.* p. 97.

⁶⁵ Loeb, *op.cit.*, p. 398.

⁶⁶ James Baillie, *Hume on Morality*, Routledge, NY, p.100, John B. Stewart, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume*, Columbia University Press; NY & London, 1963. p. 76, Terence Penelhum, *Hume*, Macmillan Press; New York, Dublin, 1975, p.93. Jane McIntyre is rather ambivalent about this point, by claiming on the one hand that the calm passions include the sentiments of moral approval and disapproval on the one hand, and on the other that the calm passions involve moral sentiments in her article, "Strength of mind: Prospects and problems for a Humean account, *Syntheses* (2006).

A typical example of this misinterpretation is found in Ardal's famous "guesswork" that Hume's teaching in the opening section of Book II is given as "a summary" written after the completion of the bulk of the book, in which "the main distinguishing characteristic of a calm passion is correctly stated".⁶⁷ This guesswork is justified, Ardal thinks, by the fact that Hume later gives the longer list of "a fuller, more complete account of the author's meaning" regarding the calm passions in Section 3 of Part iii of Book II. Many philosophers seem to subscribe to this guesswork, implicitly or explicitly,⁶⁸ and to assume that these two accounts of the calm impressions delivered in the different sections are meant for the illustration of one and the same kind of affection.⁶⁹

Baillie writes, for instance: "At the start of Book II, Hume takes calm passions to include "the sense of beauty and deformity in action,... Now, in this later section, he describes them as 'either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures.... The latter discussion makes it clear that calm passions are to be regarded as general tendencies of character ...". John Stewart also notes: "An illustration of the passions that ordinarily are calm, Hume says, in one passage, is 'the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition [of music and poetry], and external objects'. In another passage, he says that they are of two kinds, such as benevolence and ...". Terence Penelhum, seeing no distinction between those calm impressions alleged in the opening section and those calm desires alleged in Part iii, enumerates both impressions as "examples of calm passions Hume mentions" including moral approval and disapproval.⁷⁰ Wright is no exception to this general trend.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Ardal, *op.cit.*, p.94.

⁶⁸ Even Loeb quotes this passages in his article, expressing his agreement with Ardal in spite of his disagreement with Ardal's view regarding Hume's the moral sentiments. Loeb, *op.cit.*, p.195.

⁶⁹ This is most explicit in Penelhum, who includes the aesthetic/moral sentiments into the list of the "calm passions" together with benevolence, the love of life. (Penelhum, *op.cit.* p. 93)

⁷⁰ James Baillie, *Hume on Morality*, Routledge, NY, p.100. John B. Stewart, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume*, Columbia University Press; NY & London, 1963. p. 76. Terence Penelhum, *Hume*, Macmillan Press; New York, Dublin, 1975, p.93.

⁷¹ Wright maintains: "An illustration of the passions that ordinarily are calm, Hume says, in one passage, is 'the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition [of music and poetry], and external objects. In another passage, he says that they are of two kinds, 'either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd as such'. Normally these passions exert their influences without much turmoil or perturbation; but that they are genuine passions is shown by the truth that occasionally they become moving" Wright, *op. cit.* p.76.

But so far as the natural reading of Hume's passage in the opening section of Book II goes, it is evident, as we have established above as the second standpoint, that the passions are the type-determined violent impressions, among which “the calm desires” mentioned in the later section are, being “real passions, included. It is also evident that those initially defined type-determined violent impressions are subdivided again into calm and violent, which also is a type distinction, and that it is to the former subdivided calm division that the calm desires mentioned in the later section belong. Let us now examine Section 3 of Part iii of Book II in order to see what leads critics to assume that Hume's reference to “the calm desires” really conflicts with his initial definition of the passions as the V-type impressions.

iii The first aspect of the will: the combat of the calm and violent passions

In the section entitled “Of the influencing motives of the will”, the calm desires are asserted in the following way:

Now 'tis certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, tho' they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. These desires are two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such. When any of these passions are calm, and causes no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason, and are suppos'd to proceed from the same faculty, with that, which judges of truth and falsehood...

Beside these calm passions, which often determine the will, there are certain violent emotions of the same kind, which have likewise a great influence on that faculty. (T2.3.3.8; SBN 417)

Hume maintains that “there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, tho' they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind”. These calm desires are important in his discussion of the will, because they are motivating passions, and intended to be the candidates to compose the combat of calm and violent passions. In the next sentence comes Hume's famous claims that the common view of the combat of reason and passion, which is most powerfully propounded by moral rationalists as the determination of the will, must be taken properly as the combat of calm and

violent passions, because this common view is founded on the mistake of taking the calm passions for the determination of reason owing to the similarity of the calmness of their operation.⁷²

When Hume emphasizes that the calm passions are so calm as to be “imperceptible”, we must not be misled to take that these motivating passions are calm by a token distinction. He makes it clear that they are calm by their type, not by their token, by specifying these two kinds of passions as the “calm desires or tendencies”: “either those instincts, such as benevolence, resentment, the love of life, kindness to children, or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, considered as such” (T2.3.3.8; SBN 417). Benevolence or love of life is calm in general, but may appear in the mind violently, while remaining a type-determined calm passion. We must always remind ourselves that these “calm desires”, though causing little emotion in the mind,⁷³ are still the initially defined V-type impressions, and therefore distinct from the initially defined C-type impressions. To repeat, the initially defined V-type impressions are subdivided again into the type-determined calm and the type-determined violent passions, and it is the first kind that is specified by Hume as “the calm desires” in the present section. It follows that we do not need to suppose that in his later section Hume does not adhere strictly about his initial definition of the passions as the V-type impressions, nor that he modified his initial definition of the type-determined calm and violent impressions when he later asserted “the calm desires”.

These “calm desires” are specifically important for Hume, as they are motivating passions,

⁷² It is known, as Wright points out, that “it was Hutcheson who first argues that it is the opposition between calm desire and passions, which led philosophers to set reason ‘in opposition to what flows from *Instinct, Affection, or Passion*’ in his *Essay on the Passions*.(p.175) (Wright, op.cit. p.234).

⁷³ Terence Penelhum worries that Hume’s notion of the calm passions puts him in a difficulty by classing the calm passions as impressions, as “he has earlier distinguished impressions from ideas on the basis of their force and vivacity and has even used the very word “violence” in doing so”(Terence Penelhum, o. cit. p.127.) James Ballie raises the same point by arguing: “Hume’s account of the calm passions highlights a deep tension in his theory. On the one hand, as we have seen, he needs the distinction between calm and violent passions in order to reinterpret what is going on when salient passions are overruled. On the other hand, in doing so he makes calm passions ‘in a manner, imperceptible’, thereby clashing with his ‘official’ phenomenological model of the passions, by which they are constituted by their subjective qualities. Hume would seem to need an *independent* way to show that the calm passions exist, but it is hard to see how he can provide it in a way compatible with his official theory”. (James Baillie, op. cit. p.102.) But there is nothing extraordinary nor problematic for him to claim that C passions are “in a manner, imperceptible” or to maintain that they “are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation”, since the felt intensity of a passion in question has no influence on its effect.

which lead us to act with “the view of the greatest possible good”. It is known that Hutcheson distinguished between calm and violent passions, and associated the first kind with human welfare whereas the second with misery.⁷⁴ To be motivated by calm passions is for him to act with the view of the greatest possible good, whereas to be moved by violent passions implies to act with a short-term or immediate interest which lacks considerations of pleasure and advantage to ourselves. Hume, as the successor of this Huchesonian tradition, claims that strength of mind implies “the prevalence of the calm passions over the violent”(ibid.), and that to be virtuous is a matter of getting the calm passions override the violent ones, rather than a matter of tranquilizing violent passions.⁷⁵ It is evident in this case that what is relevant to strength of mind is type-determined calm and violent passions, rather than token-determined calm and violent ones: strength of mind is not a matter of the difference of the emotional intensity of passions, but is a matter of the difference of their type or kind. We must here remind ourselves again that Hume's notion of “calm desires” is founded on the type-distinction, and that the combat of calm and violent passions is meant as the struggle between the C-type and V-type passions, which is the subdivision of the initially defined V-type impressions. This situation may be confirmed by the following discussion.

After having introduced the calm desires, Hume proceeds to argue, as we see in the above quoted passage, that “there are certain violent emotions of the same kind, which have likewise a great influence on that faculty”. This assertion allows at least the following two interpretations. The first interpretation is to take these emotions as the C-type desires, though violent in their intensity, whereas the second one is to take them as the V-type versions of the calm desires. It is the first interpretation, as we shall see, that is commonly held, implicitly or explicitly, among critics, but the adequate interpretation I suggest is the second one. The difference between these two interpretations is important, because it decides what is intended by Hume as the combat of calm and violent passions, which is asserted immediately after the last remark cited in the above quotation. Let us examine these two interpretations closely in order to see which fits better for Hume's intention, and to identify the legitimate candidates of the this combat as the determination of the will.

⁷⁴ Immerwahr gives an ingenious description of this situation in his article. *op. cit.*p. 294-5.

⁷⁵ Hume departs from Hutchesonian tradition, however, by preparing the other way to determine the will in the second half of his treatment of the will, and by suggesting that we can more or less control our action by placing “the object in such particular situations as a re proper to increase the violence of the passion”(T2.3.4.1; SBN 419). It is in this part of his discussion that he prepares something novel and revolutionary, as we shall see later.

The first interpretation may be to infer Hume to claim that, although “the calm desires” are calm in general as their being the type-determined calm passions, they may appear in the mind violently when they increase their intensity. Hume's example might be taken to support this interpretation: “When I am immediately threatened with any grievous ill, my fears, apprehensions, and aversions rise to a great height, and produce a sensible emotion”(T2.3.3.9; SBN 418). Hume's point in this example seems to lie in that, as Annette Baier observes, these calm desires “may be calm in good conditions, but as Hume goes on to note, they certainly have their violent moments--resentment can turn to disorderly anger, when, as it often is, it is in conflict with other desires”.⁷⁶ We might be thus led to assume that, although the felt intensity of such a motivating passion as the love of life or kindness to children is calm *in general*, it may become violent in the presence of a *particular* object appropriate for each motivational disposition or by the close relation of the object to ourselves. While “the general appetite to good and aversion to evil” may be generally calm in its intensity, and cause no disorder insofar as it is “considered merely as such”, it could be violent where there is any impending object relevant to each circumstance. The calm passions are thus not necessarily calm in their intensity, and may appear with great emotional disturbance in some occasion. The similar point is made by Wright, who observes: “while I naturally and instinctively feel kindness to the young children of strangers who I meet, my feelings of kindness for my own children are full of emotional intensity. The same instinctive passion operates in both cases, but it is only calm when considering children who are not close related to me”.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Annette Baier, *op.cit.* p. 167.

⁷⁷ Wright, *op. cit.* p. 229 .Wright sees that Hume's assertion of “certain violent emotions of the same kind” is the reflection of his view that “there is a continuity between calm passions and violent ones”, and insists that this idea of the continuity between calm and violent passions is important for Hume's philosophy. As the ground of this interpretation, Wright quotes Hume's letter written to Francis Hutcheson three years after the publication of Book I of the *Treatise*, in which Hume criticizes him for drawing an absolute distinction between the ‘calm desire of happiness’ and violent passions such as ‘lust, ambition, anger, hatred, envy, love, pity, or fear’, and insists that any of these latter passions can also be calm: ‘There is a calm Ambition, a clam Anger or Hatred, which tho’ calm, may likewise be very strong, & have the absolute Command over the Mind.’ Thus it is clear, Writes says, that Hume thought he was making an important point about human psychology in claiming that any passion may be calm and at the same time become the predominant inclination which influence a person's will”(Wright, p. 232). This interpretation of Wright's seems to be founded on the confusion regarding the two ways the CV division is employed by Hume, because there is indeed a continuity between calm and violent passions as the token-division, but not as the type-distinction.

But this interpretation does not fit for present purpose nor for the context at issue, which, however, does not mean that there is anything wrong or mistaken in the first interpretation itself. On the contrary. The point of this interpretation is exactly what Hume intends to establish in his later treatment of the second aspect of the will in terms of the token-distinction of the calm/violent division, and belongs directly to the core of his discussion of “the causes of the violent passions” delivered in Section 4 and in the succeeding four sections. But it must here be recalled that Hume's present focus is on those “calm passions”, which are “typically calm, and so presumably typically secure, unconflicting, regularly satisfied and demanding no sacrifice of contiguous to remoter goods”,⁷⁸ and therefore on the type-determined calm passions. It follows that “certain violent emotions of the same kind” mentioned by Hume in the same context must also be taken to be the type-determined violent passions. The inadequacy of the first interpretation lies thus in confounding this context relevant to the type-distinction of the calm and violent passions with the other one relevant to the token-distinction, which Hume intends to discuss later. This inadequacy is clearly expressed in Baier's difficulty, which is asserted in the following way:

Among these violent-inducing factors is conflict of motivation. If such conflict is enough to make the conflicting desires violent, then Hume really has no explanation of how the rationalists can falsely believe in a combat of reason and passion. He can explain how they can mistake passions for reason, but only so long as the passions in question remain calm. The moment there is any conflict of motivation, there will be the danger that all parties in the soul will become violent. How then can any of these passion appear emotionless and calm?⁷⁹

By admitting that the type-determined calm passions become violent at the presence of violence-inducing factors, Baier seems to interpret Hume view of the combat of the calm and violent passions to be the fight which takes place between a token-determined calm and a token-determined violent ones, which are both the same C-type passions though different in their intensity. Baier's difficulty begins when, by following Hume's teaching of strength of mind which consists of the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent, we try to attain virtue by keeping the calm passions overriding the violent, as we find ourselves in this paradox: the calm passions cannot

⁷⁸ Baier, *op.cit.* 168.

⁷⁹ Baier, *op.cit.*p.168.

remain calm while fighting, because it cannot counteract the violent ones without becoming violent, or without resorting to counter-violence. “The moment there is any conflict of motivation”, she points out, “then there will be the danger that all parties in the soul will become violent”. Baier thus worries that this would “threaten to make nonsense of his own previous talk of calm passions counteracting violent ones”, and is led eventually to this implausible observation: “the most that could be expected to occur would be that a typically calm passion counteracts a typically violent one, by becoming briefly violent during the time of opposition”.⁸⁰

Baier's difficulty clearly stems from her mistaken assumption that the combat of the calm and the violent passions takes place between the calm passions and the violent ones, which are both C-type passions. This assumption is originally derived from the first interpretation of taking “certain violent emotions of the same kind” to be the C-type desires of violent emotional intensity.

We now turn to the second interpretation, and see how it fits for Hume's present purpose. It may be useful to begin by giving a clear contrast between the first and the second interpretation. When Hume states that “there are certain violent emotions of the same kind”, he may be interpreted to assert that there is a violent version of the calm desires, as we have seen. In Hume's example, resemblance is generally so calm as to be “imperceptible”, and counted by Hume among the calm desires. But resemblance may appear in the mind violently. When I receive any injury from another, for instance, “I often feel a violent passion of resentment, which makes me desire his evil and punishment, independent of all considerations of pleasure and advantage to myself”(ibid.). Now the latter (violent) resentment may be interpreted in two different ways according to the first and the second interpretation.

On the first interpretation, the latter resentment is a C-type desire with considerable emotional disturbance, viz. a violent C-type resentment. In this case, the former and the latter resentment are both the type-determined calm desires, and differ only in their intensity, as we have seen. By contrast, on the second interpretation, the latter resentment is a V-type desire, distinct from the former resentment, viz. the V-type resentment. In this case, the former and the latter resentment differ in their type or kind: the former resentment is a type-determined calm desire, typically motivating us with the greatest possible good whether it may be calm or violent in its intensity, whereas the latter is a type-determined violent desire, which moves us to act independent of all considerations of pleasure and advantage of ourselves or of others. This difference between

⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 168.

the two interpretations is clear and definite again in Hume's another example. Love of life is among those "calm desires" which lead us to act with the view of our greatest possible good, and therefore is a typical type-determined calm passion, viz. love-of-life of C-type. But when we are threatened by a grievous ill, what moves us to act is a type-determined violent passion, which, though of the same affection, viz. love-of-life of V-type, leads us to act by a present uneasiness independent of all considerations of my real pleasure or happiness, according to the second interpretation. These two types of love-of-life are the same species of affections with the similar features and characteristics, with the only exception that they have opposite tendencies and directions, which is essential for *motivating* passions.

These two type of passions fight against each other, disputing the prevalence over the other, precisely because their impulses are opposite in their direction: a fight as such would not take place where these two parties are opposite only in their emotional intensity. We may here learn that, when Hume states that strength of mind is a matter of prevalence of the calm passions above the violent, the legitimate candidates of the combat of the calm and violent passions are type-determined calm and violent passions, rather than the token-determined calm and violent ones as it commonly believed, as we have already seen. We may also learn that Hume's purpose in this part of his discussion is to assert type-determined *violent* desires as the counterpart of type-determined calm desires in order to claim that "both of these principles operate on the will; and where they are contrary, that either of them prevails", and that "strength of mind implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent"(T2.3.3.9; SBN 418). We may here be convinced that the second interpretation fits for this purpose.

We must remind ourselves again not only that what is relevant to strength of mind is the type-determined calm and violent passions, but also that these two types of passions are the subdivided impressions of the initially defined the V-type impressions. Since the two parties of this combat are both type-determined passions, and therefore typically stable, not easily subject to change by themselves, Hume may well have reasons to deplore that "there is no man so constantly possessed of this virtue as never on any occasion to yield to the solicitation and desire" (T2.3.3.9; SBN 418).

We have seen so far that none of the five standpoints we have attributed to Hume on the basis of his definition that what is asserted in the opening section of Book II is the distinction between the C-type and the V-type impressions, has any conflict with his assertion of the calm passions given in his later section. There may then be fairly good grounds to conclude that critics' controversy

regarding Hume's notion of 'the calm passions' is derived largely from their failure to see that the subjects of Book II are the type-determined violent impressions, which are subdivided again into C-type and V-type, and that the calm passions mentioned in his later section belong to the latter subdivided type-determined violent impressions.⁸¹

iv The second aspect of the will: The violence of a passion

Granted that, as Hume maintains, what is erroneously asserted by rationalists as the combat of passions and reason is the combat between the calm and violent passions, and that strength of mind is a matter of the prevalence of the C-type desires above the V-type ones, does it follow that we have no effective way to control this struggle to attain our virtue?⁸² Hume seems to be rather pessimistic as regards the struggle between C-type and V-type passions when he observes that “there is no man so constantly possessed of this virtue as never on any occasion to yield to the solicitations of passion and desire”(T2.3.3.9; SBN 418), as we have seen. He leaves the question, how we could keep the prevalence of the calm passions, unexplained, by assuming that it depends on “the *general* character or *present* disposition of the person”(ibid.). Hume, however, is obviously optimistic as regards our possibility to control the will and action in terms of the struggle between C-token and V-token passions. He is well-prepared to explain this aspect of the will, which is relevant to the token-

⁸¹ The deeper source of the critics' controversy lies, I suspect, in the conflict between Hume's teaching in Book II and in Book III regarding the moral sentiments. That is, what makes critics hesitant to take the initial distinction between C and V impressions seriously seems to lie not in Book II but in Book III, in which Hume is taken to identify the moral sentiments with the main indirect passions, by claiming they are the species of love or hatred, or that “our approbation or blame...is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred”. For, it is clear that Hume's initial distinction between the moral sentiments from the passions in the opening section of Book II contradicts to his assertion, if we are to take his words literally, that the moral sentiments are species of love and hatred.

⁸² Jane McIntyre observes, that there is indeed “no systematic discussion of strength of mind in the *Treatise* or the *Second Enquiry*”.(Jane McIntyre, op.cit. p. 395.) In her paper, she argues that “the calm passions typical of moral sentiment become strong through sympathetic communication”, and that “[s]trength of mind is therefore dependent on the operation of the social force of sympathy” (McIntyre, op.cit p.400). But Tito Magri suggests that Hume shows the way how we could keep prevalence of C passions over V ones in his discussion of “the situation of the object” which causes passions to be calm or violent. For, “the circumstances of objects that cause direct passions to be *calm* are the *same* that cause them to respond to *real value*, so as to induce a grasp of, and a preference from the greatest good”, according to him(Magri, op.cit. p.197).

distinction of the calm/violent division. He thus begins the next section with this confident remark;

There is not in philosophy a subject of more nice speculation than this, of the different *causes* and *effects* of the calm and violent passions. 'Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of the soul, it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation. As repeated custom and its own force have made everything yield to it, it directs the actions and conduct without that opposition and emotion, which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion. We must, therefore, distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion; betwixt a violent and a strong one. But notwithstanding this, 'tis certain that, when we wou'd govern a man, and push him to any action, 'twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions, and rather taken him by his inclination, than what is vulgarly call'd his *reason*. We ought to place the object in such particular situations as are proper to encrease the violence of the passion. For we may observe, that all depends upon the situation of the object, and that a variation in this particular will be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other. (T2.3.4.1; SBN 418-9)

This opening passage of a new section, "Of the causes of the violent passions", is rather notorious, as some of his teachings, as expressed above, are obviously conflicting with each other. In the first place, while holding that passions do not influence the will in proportion to their violence, Hume holds that we should appeal to violent passions, rather than clam ones, in order to push a man to action. In the second place, he stresses on the one hand that a calm passion, by becoming the predominant inclination of the soul, directs our actions against any momentary gust of passion, and on the other hand, he insists that we ought to place the object in such particular situations as are proper to increase the violence of the passion.⁸³ In the third place, in spite of his assertion that

⁸³ McIntyre suggests this solution: since the calm passions, including the sentiments of moral approval and disapproval, are often weak, "those seeking to gain the cooperation of others will far better if they appeal to passions such as avidity and love of fame, as politicians, and orators know. But when we want to govern our *own* actions, we need not slaves to these violent passions". McIntyre's solution is thus to take Hume's appeal to the violent passions as the determination of the will is made for the case of others. Jane McIntyre, *op.cit.* p.392.

passions do not influence the will in proportion to their violence, he declares in the same paragraph that all depends on the situation of the object which will be able to change calm and violent passions into each other. In the succeeding discussion, we shall see that these seeming contradictions may be solved only by seeing that, on entering into this section, Hume has switched his former strategy, which depends on the type-distinction of calm/violent division, over the new one, which depends on the token-distinction of the same division.

In order to understand this situation, we must begin with Hume's following observation, in which we can see his basic strategy for the will and action:

'Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. 'Tis also obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but, making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect. (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414)⁸⁴

This observation is followed by his comment that the "impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it"(ibid.). When he proceeds to argue that "[n]othing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse" produced by the same affective principle (T2.3.3.4; SBN 415), his teaching may be construed to the effect that the determination of the will depends on the impulse by which "the emotions of aversion or propensity extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object" (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414), and that this "impulse of passion" may be opposed by another impulse of a different direction.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Hume allows such motivating cases which take place without the involvement of this situation, as we have seen. Some instinctive passions, such as benevolence, anger, lust, hunger, may arise directly even without the mediation of a prospect, or motivating belief, of pleasure or pain, as "these passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections"(T2.3.9.8; SBN 439).

⁸⁵ An "impulse" is used by Hume in various ways in various physical and mental context. What is most relevant to the present context is an impulse as a "direction or tendency to action", which is employed in this assertion: "One impression may be related to another, not only when their sensations are resembling... , but also when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent. This cannot take place with regard to pride and humility: because these are only pure sensations without any direction or tendency to action"(T2.2.9.2; SBN 381-2).

In his preceding discussion, Hume has explained how the determination of the will depends on the conflict between the two impulses with the opposite directions, by means of the type-distinction of the calm/violent division. Hume's concern in the present section, is to explain the circumstance in which the impulse of the passion carries us to action, by means of the token-distinction of the same division. So far as the first aspect is concerned, strength of mind is the matter of the prevalence of C-type passions above V-type ones, which cannot be controlled as easily as we wish. Hume seems to assume, however, that insofar as the second aspect is concerned, there is a sufficient room to control our decision concerning the actions and resolutions of men. We know by experience that we have a good chance to govern others as well as ourselves by placing "the object in such a particular situations as are proper to increase the violence of the passion"(ibid.) as he argues, because our action is more or less a matter of the force of "the impulse of passion" which depends on the relation between ourselves and the object. In this respect, "all depends upon the situation of the object...[which] will be able to change the calm and the violent passions into each other"(ibid.), according to him.

It must be noted that Hume's strategy for the illustration of the second aspect of the will is founded on his basic premise that what determines the character of any passion is not only "the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure" but also "the whole bent or tendency" (T2.2.2.9; SBN 381). It is true that in the case with the indirect passions, and some of the direct passions (e.g. hope or fear), it is "their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul" that constitute the very being and essence of a passion, but in the case with most of the direct passions, especially with those instinctive ones which "produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like other affections"(T2.3.9.8; SBN 439), it is chiefly "the impulse or direction" that contributes to the differentiation or identification of the passions. It is principally the first property of a passion, viz. sensations, that Hume's hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas depends on, whereas it is the second property, viz. direction, that the motivating circumstance mainly depends on, as it is this property that makes the transfusion of passions possible by the principle of a parallel direction.⁸⁶ It is thus essential to see that Hume's system of the will and

⁸⁶ Laird thinks that this type of "association seems quite extravagant" for Hume's system. For, on Laird's view, it needs not be fundamental nor original, in the similar sense that, in spite of his assertion that "custom has two *original* effects upon the mind", viz. in bestowing a facility and a tendency or inclination, the former "is the only 'inexplicable' fact that he needed, whereas the latter is but a "hypothesis" to account, illegitimately, or the recurrent of 'facility'.(Laird, op.cit. p.201).

passions depends on “two different causes from which a transition of passion may arise, viz. a double relation of ideas and impressions, and, which is similar to it, a conformity in the tendency and direction of any two desires, which arise from different principles”(T2.2.9.12; SBN 385). Hume's chief concern in his illustration of the second aspect of the will is thus with the motivating circumstance, which depends on the corroboration of these two causes or principles.

Although both calm and violent passions “pursue good, and avoid evil; and both of them are increased or diminished by the increase or diminution of the good or evil”, Hume observes, “the same good, when near will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one” (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419). “As this subject belongs very properly to the present question concerning the will”, he continues, “we shall examine it to the bottom...some of those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent”(ibid.). His strategy to explore the determinations of the will is thus to give a systematic explanation of these causal factors which differentiate the passions into calm or violent. Critics' general interpretation of the succeeding five sections in which he gives a detailed examination of this “situation of the object” is to regard it as “the enumeration of “many of the conditions that tend to make passions violent”, absence of which leads to more tranquil emotions (Jane McIntyre), or as the descriptions of the unfortunate case in which we are led by a distorted view or inadequate ideas, or by inappropriate circumstances (Rachael Kydd).⁸⁷ Laird dispensed with all discussions of those five sections, in which the second aspect of the will is discussed in terms of the situation of object which increases or decreases the violence of a passion, only by giving this desultory comment: “the remainder of Hume's examination of the passions was rather desultory”.⁸⁸

But what made critics depreciate Hume's discussion of the second aspect of the will, which occupies as much as five sections of the last or concluding part of his discussion of Book II? Part of reason may lie in their hesitation to take Hume seriously when he maintains that the actions of the will depends on the violence of a passion. This hesitation stems from a seeming contradiction which arises in the following way. The section “of the different causes of the violent passions” begins with Hume's assertion that “passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper”, and that “we must, therefore, distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion; betwixt a violent and a stronger one”. And immediately in the next sentence, he insists on

⁸⁷ Jane McIntyre, *op.cit.* p.397. Kydd, *op.cit.*p. 131-5.

⁸⁸ Laird, *op.cit.* 205.

this apparently contradictory issue that “when we would govern a man, and push him to any action, 'twill commonly better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions”, as we have seen. Since the intensity of a passion is initially claimed to be irrelevant to its strength in such a definite and persuasive manner, we may naturally take his later assertion dubious when Hume maintains: “Generally speaking, the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will”(T2.3.8.13; SBN 437).

But Hume is not inconsistent in making these assertions, as we have seen, because these assertions are made in reference to the different employment of the calm/violent division. So far as the token-distinction of the calm/violent division is concerned, we know by experience that, in order to move others or ourselves to a certain action, we should appeal to violent passions, or to a violent gust of passion, rather to calm passions, which is hardly perceptible even to ourselves. But so far as the type-distinction of the calm/violent division is concerned, “passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or disorder they occasion in the temper”, as passions, once become a settled principle of action, have a predominant influence on the will, and, in spite of their calmness, direct all actions and conduct against the opposition of the violent passions. On this view, it is evident that, when Hume insists on the necessity to distinguish between the violence and force of a passion, he speaks on the basis of a type-distinction, whereas his assertion that all depends upon the situation of the object which renders a passion either calm or violent is made on basis of a token-distinction of calm and violent passions. Hume's strategy for the second aspect of the will is thus to explain the determination of the will in terms of the causes which render a passion either calm or violent, rather than in terms of the combat of calm and violent passions. In this strategy, calm and violent passions are interchangeable as their emotional intensity varies, because they are differentiated not by their type or value but by their present emotional disturbance. Since “a calm passion may easily be changed into a violent one”(T2.3.8.13; SBN 437) as Hume observes, there cannot be a combat, though there may be a contrast, between calm and violent passions. How can one affection combat with the other where both are so concessive to each other? Insofar as a combat as such is irrelevant, there is no room to worry that “if opposition usually leads to violent combat, then the victors will be as guilty of violence as the vanquished”.⁸⁹

So far as a type-distinction of the calm/violent distinction is concerned, the force and strength of a passion cannot be identified with the violence, as we have seen, as a passion has a

⁸⁹ Annette Baier, *A Progress of Sentiments*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994, p.168.

stronger influence on the will when it becomes calm by being a predominant inclination of the mind through habit or custom, or cooperated by reflection or resolution. But in the remainder of his discussion which is relevant to a token-distinction of the same division, the force or strength by which a passion moves us to act is claimed by Hume to have an intimate connection with the violence of a passion. Hume last task is to explain how we could control the determination of the will in terms of the causes and effects of the violence of a passion.

The intimate connection between the violence and the strength of a passion is clearly illustrated in his account of “contrary passions” in the following way:

....an opposition of passions commonly causes a new emotion in the spirits, and produces more disorder than the concurrences of any two affections of equal force. This new emotion is easily converted into the predominant passion, and increases its violence beyond the pitch it would have arrived at had it met with no opposition. ...

The same effect follows, whether the opposition arises from internal motives or external obstacles. The passion commonly acquires new *force and violence* in both cases. The efforts which the mind makes to surmount the obstacle, excite the spirit and enliven the passion.(T2.3.4.5; SBN 421)[my emphasis]

This situation in which the passion increases its force and violence is explained by Hume in terms of these three procedures. First, the opposing passions are transfused with each other by this principle that “passions, however independent, are naturally transfused into each other, if they are both present at the same time”(T2.3.4.3; SBN 420). Secondly, the transfusion of passions into each other makes a new passion, due to this property of the passions: passions are “blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression which arises from the whole”(T2.2.6.1; SBN 366).⁹⁰ Thirdly, this new passion contributes to the

⁹⁰ Laird urges our attention to that “Hume spoke of ‘association’ in two fundamentally distinct senses, viz. (a) clustering of unmodified entities, and (b) a fusion where the constituents lost their former identities and became indistinguishable in the new total fact”. (Laird, *op.cit.* p.201), This is due to this difference of the two kinds of perception: ideas are, like physical atoms, never admits of a total union, being endowed with a kind of impenetrability by which they exclude each other, whereas impressions and passions are, like colours, blended so perfectly together as to transfused into each other. It is the latter association, often led by the former association, that chiefly contributes to the increase of the strength of a passion.

increase of the predominant passion, because “[t]he predominant passion swallows up the inferior, and converts it into itself”(T2.3.4.2; SBN 420). This is how, wherever there is an opposition of a passion, the original passion commonly acquires new force and violence, whether the opposition arises from internal motives or external obstacles, according to Hume. Since the effort which the mind makes to surmount the obstacle, excites and enliven the passions, “we naturally desire what is forbid, and take a pleasure in performing actions, merely because they are unlawful”(ibid.). By the same reason, “security diminishes [the force of] the passions” as “it removes that uncertainty which increases them” (T2.3.4.8; SBN 421).⁹¹ One of the common way by which a passion increases its “force and violence” is, Hume suggests, thus found in terms of the association of passions, viz. by swallowing up a new passion.⁹²

Hume's assertion of the intimate connection between the violence and the force of a passion is established with a full strength in the section “of the influence of the imagination on the passions”, in which he establishes that “the imagination and affections have a close union together, and that nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the latter”(T2.3.6.1; SBN 424). If whatever has an effect on the imagination “must have a proportional effect on the will and passions”(T2.3.7.3; SBN 428), all he need to explain is the cause of the vivacity of ideas, and to show how such a particular instance as distance in space and time, for instance, “has a considerable effect on the imagination, and by that means on the will and passions”(T2.3.7.4; SBN 429).

Baier plausibly insists on the importance of this section in which Hume establishes the close union between the imagination and the passions, by pointing out that “those who have written about 'Of the influencing motives of the will' have neglected 'Of the influence of the imagination on the passions'”.⁹³ Baier also urges our attention to the connection of this section to his former

⁹¹ It is Hume's basic way of reasoning that “[t]he mind, when left to itself, immediately languishes, and, in order to preserve its ardor, must be every moment supported by a new flow of passion”, as he explains(T2.3.4.8; SBN 421).The same thesis is given forcefully in his former section, “Of the love of relations”(T2.2.4.4; SBN 352).

⁹² It is indeed this circumstance, according to him, that entails the close union between the imagination and the passions, which is asserted by Hume in two sections later, where he refers back to this principle, “that any attendant emotion is easily converted into the predominant.”(T2.3.6.1; SBN 424).

⁹³ Annette Baier, op.cit. fn. 310. She calls our attention to the importance of this union by quoting Deleuze's issue that “the fixing of 'les rapports' between passion and imagination is what constitutes the originality of Hume's theory of the passions”.

discussion delivered in Section 10 of Part 3 of Book I, in which Hume has maintained this core theme: “A belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions, so the passions, in their turn, are very favourable to belief; and not only such facts as convey agreeable emotions, but very often such as give pain, do upon that account become more readily the objects of faith and opinion”(T1.4.10.4; SBN 120). In Book II, Hume himself insists on their intimate connection by referring back to his former issue, delivered in Book I and by reiterating that “belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression”, and that “[t]his vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions, the calm as well as the violent”(T2.3.6.10; SBN 427). For, “lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination”, he points out, and “in this respect, as well as others, the force of the passions depends as much as the temper of the person as the nature or *situation of the object* (T2.3.6.9; SBN 427)[my emphasis]. After establishing that “[w]herever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination”(T2.3.6.9; SBN 424), Hume spends the rest of his account of the will and passions for the examination of this “situation of the object” which “favours the imagination, and makes it conceive its object in a stronger and fuller light”(T2.3.7.7; SBN 431).

I have argued that the chief cause of the controversy regarding Hume's treatment of the will lies in an ambiguity of the way Hume uses the calm/violent division with respect to impressions of reflection. At the beginning of Book II, Hume uses the division of calm and violent to distinguish kinds of impressions of reflection: there are the violent impressions of reflection, called *passions*, which are the subject of Book II, and there are the calm impressions of reflection, moral and aesthetic sentiments, which are the subject of Book III. This is a type distinction. But in discussing the passions, he again subdivides the passions into calm and violent, which also is a type distinction. Furthermore, within each class of passions, he wants to distinguish between the way two occurrences of the same type of passion can occur: one token of a certain type of passion can occur violently whereas another token calmly. What makes the Hume's treatment of the passions complicated is the fact that the passions are cut across by these two-fold divisions, viz. a type-distinction, and a token-distinction, so that the widespread disagreement on the interpretation of Hume's notion of “the calm passions” can be settled more or less by making the distinctions clear, as we have seen.

In order to avoid the confusion involved in Hume's use of the two different distinction, I suggest to distinguish Hume's treatment of the will into two aspects, each relevant to the calm/

violent division as a type distinction and as a token-distinction respectively. As the first aspect, the combat of calm and violent passions is discussed as the determination of the will in reference to the type-distinction, and as the second aspect the cause of the violence of a passion is discussed in terms of the situation of the object which renders a passion either calm or violent on the basis of the token-distinction.⁹⁴ It is the first aspect of the will, as is commonly assumed by critics', that Hume expresses his anti-rationalist position clearly, and therefore is worth their serious examination. By contrast, the second aspect is desolately poor, as they think, because it is intended for the illustration of those circumstances which we need to avoid, as they increase the violence of a passion. Contrary to this common view, it is rather the second aspect that Hume prepares something original and revolutionary. We cannot overlook that the alternative to the moral rationalist view is intended by Hume as the integration of the two aspect of the will, as we shall see in the next section.

⁹⁴ I have discussed this aspect in my paper delivered at 36th Hume Conference, 2009, "Is Hume's account on the subject of free-will and necessity really a 'lengthy digression?'"

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