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〈論文〉

U.S.-Japan Negotiations 2010& New International Political Developments in Asia

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Abstract

Previous research focused its attention on four issues: (1) the major characteristics of negotiating behavior of Japan's Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and the America President Barack Obama; (2) the process by which a series of U.S.-Japan bilateral negotiations conducted between the two countries in 2009; (3) the final outcome of the bilateral negotiations tracing back to the end of December 2009 with regard to the future location of US Marine Corps Futenma Air Base; and (4) U.S. foreign policy towards Japan within a framework of "Smart Power" was also analyzed.

This article took up six case studies which represented circumstances under which a series of U.S.-Japan negotiations pertaining to the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Base issue had been conducted—by paying attention to turning points and critical incidents which exerted an influence upon U.S.-Japan negotiations in 2010. It was found the current political upheaval—North Korea's military attack on a South Korean island *Yeonpyeong* on November 23, 2010, coupled with its new nuclear programs—clearly presented not only the United States, South Korea and Japan, but also U.S.-Japan relations with a new political threat and a massive strategic challenge in the Asia Pacific region. As a result of this, both the United States and Japan found themselves rolling a new ball again in 2011 as far as U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Base issue and negotiation are concerned.

Introduction

U.S. President Barack Obama visited Japan on November 12, 2010 to take part in the APEC meeting which lasted until November 14. In his written response, he stressed "The peaceful resolution of outstanding differences and respect for international norms and law are central to the goal of ensuring security, stability and prosperity in Asia." By the same token, he pointed out that "the United States looks to China to assume responsibilities for addressing regional and global

problems." (The Yomiuri Newspaper, November 12,2010), His responses are construed as an expression of caution against recent hegemonic behavior by China in the South and East China seas. Obama also emphasized on NHK's evening news on November 13 that China should abide by international norms and laws could be interpreted as a rejection of China's attempt to unilaterally change the status quo concerning the Senkaku Islands, which Japan controls and administers as part of Okinawa Prefecture--a fact that has been recognized as legitimate under international law. Obama also stressed that the United States would continue its policy of engagement with China. At the same time, however, he reiterated the need for discussions with Japan and other Asian nations over what kind of approach should be adopted in dealing with the rising superpower. "We will work with our allies and partners to shape the context in which China's rise is occurring; this is one of the pillars of my approach to China," he said. (The Daily Yomiuri "*China Must respect International Law*," Nov. 11, 2010)

Regarding the suspended six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program, President Obama said the nations involved are prepared to resume the negotiations "if North Korea will abide by the commitments it undertook in the 2005 Joint Statement and its international obligations under the U.N. Security Council Resolutions." In the joint statement, the reclusive state pledged to abandon its nuclear weapons program. The U.S. president did not provide a response to a question regarding the basic policy on trade recently adopted by the Japanese government, which calls for the commencement of consultations with the United States and other countries over the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

When it comes to the Japan-U.S. alliance and his thoughts on this year's 50th anniversary of the signing of the revised Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the mainstay of the alliance, Obama sees the alliance as the cornerstone of American strategic engagement in the Asia Pacific. He said, "I work closely with Prime Minister Kan on the challenges of upgrading and modernizing the U.S.-Japan alliance and we fully understand how important this partnership is."

Fifty years ago, American President Dwight Eisenhower described the U.S.-Japan relationship as an "indestructible partnership." His words were true then, at the height of the Cold War, and are borne out today as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of our alliance. The partnership between the two countries has endured the test of time. The partnership endures because it is based on deep friendship, mutual respect, and common goals and values. He was confident that our relationship would flourish over the coming fifty years. Here the author is reminded of a famous adage by Akio Morita, the former Chairman of Sony Cooperation in which he said "Being part of the solution to

the problem is what partnership is all about”(Mitarai [2010], *Lecture Notes*)

According to President Obama the U.S.-Japan alliance serves as the cornerstone of American strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific, because it has helped both the United States and Japan prosper in peace. As the two countries are broadening cooperation to reflect the changing environment of this century, Japan and the United States are expanding partnership and cooperating on a wide range of global issues, including nuclear nonproliferation and climate change. The close bonds and unity of vision between Japan and the United States will continue to guide the two countries together as they move forward in promoting stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. President Obama said the United States would maintain a strong and effective nuclear deterrent that guarantees the defense of our allies, including Japan, and expressed confidence the relationship between Japan and the United States will flourish over the coming 50 years.

However, he did not address specific issues that have caused friction between Tokyo and Washington, most importantly the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture. This is because the treatment of the relocation of the Futenma Air Station and other overall related bilateral issues such as the U.S. Guam base have already been discussed between Japan and the United States.

This article: (1) examines a series of negotiations conducted between Japan and the United States from January through December 13 in 2010 by paying its attention to six cases as to how the two leaders, President Barack Obama and two Prime Ministers Yukio Hatoyama and Naoto Kan, tried to tackle the one major sticking points in negotiation—the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Base in Okinawa by (2) investigating and analyzing turning points and critical incidents which affected the process of U.S.-Japan negotiations which took place in 2010; and (3) describes new political factors which have exerted an influence upon on-going U.S.-Japan negotiations and the future US.-Japan relations.

Case (1): Two Alternatives were in sight on March, 18, 2010

The United States maintained its position that the 2006 Camp Schwab coastal plan involving V-shaped 1,800-meter runways was the only option that can be realized. According to several government sources, the Japanese government on March 17, 2010 decided to propose to the United States two plans to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station within Okinawa Prefecture, hoping that the final choice will be one of the two options. One option involved building a short runway or a 1,500-meter runway in Camp Schwab spanning Nago and Ginozason, while the other

was the reclamation of an ocean area off a U.S. Navy facility at White Beach in Uruma.

The White Beach facility is located on the Katsuren Peninsula in the center of the prefecture's main Okinawa Island. At the earliest, the government officially conveyed the two options at a meeting between Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton held later in March. With either plan, however, the administration of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama disappointed the people of Okinawa Prefecture as the Futenma base functions would remain within the prefecture. The administration in late December nullified the relocation plan agreed between Japan and the United States in 2006 to move Futenma's functions to the coastal area of Camp Schwab in the Henoko area of Nago, declaring it aimed to lighten the burden on Okinawa Prefecture residents. It was highly likely that the general public in the prefecture, as well as the Social Democratic Party in the Democratic Party of Japan-led coalition, would strongly oppose the two options. The argument for relocating the Futenma facility out of Okinawa Prefecture or even out of the country gained momentum in the prefecture. The SDP strongly supported these arguments.

Both plans that were put forward by the government surfaced in past bilateral negotiations, but had been turned down by the U.S. side. Observers said both of the government's options faced and found difficulties. The proposals posed a risk Hatoyama's premiership by the end of May, his self-imposed deadline for settling the Futenma issue. The Camp Schwab land-based plan consisted of two sub-options: one to construct a short, 500-meter-level runway or helicopter takeoff-landing strip near the coast within Camp Schwab, while airfield functions was moved to Tokunoshima island and Magejima island, both in Kagoshima Prefecture; the other involves constructing a 1,500-meter runway within the camp but located further inland.

Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa reportedly believed the Camp Schwab land-based plan might obtain the U.S. side's understanding, since it was geographically close to the 2006 plan. The White Beach offshore reclamation plan also had two sub-options: one involved reclamation of an ocean area between the facility and Tsukenjima island off the base; or reclamation of an ocean area between Miyagijima and Ukibarujima islands off the Katsuren Peninsula.

Case (2) :Hatoyama& Obama agreed to relocate Futenma Base,But

During the brief conversation which took place on April 19,2010, between Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and U.S. President Barack Obama, Obama directed him a straightforward question regarding the Futenma issue by saying : Can you "follow through?" What matters is that the U.S.

President had expressed doubt over Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's pledge to resolve the dispute over the U.S. Marine Corp's Futenma Air Station in Okinawa Prefecture by the end of May 2010, so Obama directed Hatoyama a question by asking , "Can you follow through?"

According to diplomatic sources. Obama made the remark at an unofficial meeting with Hatoyama in Washington on the evening of April 12, during which Hatoyama asked for Preseident Obama's cooperation in settling the Futenma base relocation issue by the end of May. The point is that during the meeting, Obama also expressed his discontent concerning the lack of progress on the Futenma issue because the decision took more time than Obama anticipated. The revelation came at a time when many in the U.S. government apparently held a deep-rooted distrust of Hatoyama. Hatoyama and Obama held the 10-minute unofficial talks during a dinner meeting of the Nuclear Safety Summit. According to the sources, Hatoyama explained to Obama that he was making efforts to conclude the issue by the end of May 2010 with a proposal that combines the relocation of the air station's functions to a land-based section of Camp Schwab and other plans. Then, Hatoyama asked U.S. President for his cooperation.

President Obama, however, expressed his discontent by saying that though Hatoyama told him, "Trust me," at their summit meeting in November, there was no progress on the issue. Obama then asked Hatoyama, "Can you follow through?" indicating his deep doubt about the Japanese government's handling of the issue. Hatoyama then gave his explanations to Obama that Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos had been holding negotiations over the issue. But Obama showed no reaction, the sources said. Obama's remark is believed to indicate his distrust of and frustration over Hatoyama because the process of consensus-building had not been progressed at all on the Japanese side despite the prime minister's promise to settle the issue at an early date by saying, "Trust me," at the November meeting. The U.S. government also cancelled a visit to Japan by Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, that was planned for April. The Obama administration at that time did not regard the proposals presented by the Japanese government as an official governmental plan—rather they took the proposal as a rough draft.

The source also said that if Campbell visited Japan as scheduled, the Hatoyama administration misunderstood that the U.S. government had beend willing to hold talks on the issue, stressing that the U.S. government had no intention of holding negotiations with Japan at the stage on April 18,2010. To put it differently, U.S. President Barack Obama's use of extraordinarily harsh language in his informal talks with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in Washington over Hatoyama's

incompetence in addressing the Futenma relocation issue can only be interpreted as indicating the lapse of trusting relations between the Japanese and U.S. leaders. Obama's wording—"Can you follow through?"—when asking Hatoyama about the Japanese leader's avowed goal of settling by the end of next month the issue of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station in Okinawa Prefecture, could be interpreted as the President's direct expression of distrust of the prime minister.

WASHINGTON-- US distrusting Japan Sharply accelerating

Considering the severity of the words that multiple informed sources quoted Obama as saying to Hatoyama during the brief talks at a dinner during the Nuclear Security Summit meeting, the U.S. administration as a whole was most likely to further intensify moves to distance itself from the Hatoyama government. One Obama administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Hatoyama should have apologized at the informal talks for his failure to major up his promise to settle the Futenma issue at an early date, and committed anew to solving the problem on his own responsibility. Instead, the official went on to say, Hatoyama appeared to think of the problem as if it had been other people's business, even having the nerve to say he would leave the matter up to consultations between Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and U.S. Ambassador to Japan, John Roos. In this situation, President might have felt his patience being tried to the limit, the official explained.

In the past, Japan-U.S. summit meetings, including those on issues such as the bilateral trade frictions of the 1990s, there occurred instances in which both sides' views clashed head-on, with the top U.S. leader criticizing Japan's way of dealing with particular matters of contention. It is exceedingly unusual, however, for a U.S. President to directly use such words of distrust during the meeting with a Japanese prime minister. Before the revelation of Obama's words to Hatoyama in their informal talks, both the Japanese and U.S. governments were keen to keep such information from being leaked to outside parties, which in turn gave rise to speculation that Hatoyama might have received quite a tongue-lashing from Obama.

As there was little progress in the process of gaining consensus for relocating Futenma's functions among local communities in possible candidate areas as well as within the ruling coalition parties, interest had intensified within the Obama administration about what really was happening in Japan's political world, especially in connection with this summer's House of Councillors election. "Instead, we've paid much attention to what may evolve in Japan over the next three months—in May, June and July," the source noted. On U.S. government moves to distance itself

from the Hatoyama administration, some analysts said Washington deems Tokyo as trying to have the United States sit down at the negotiating table although the U.S. side knew fully well that the Hatoyama government's current Futenma's relocation plans had been far from feasible. Washington harbored suspicions that the Hatoyama government had a mind to pass the buck to the United States after failing to solve the Futenma problem, by dragging Washington into negotiations that have no prospects of bearing fruit, the analysts said. When Okada made a request anew for Ambassador Roos on April 14, to start working-level talks on the Futenma issue, the ambassador declined to meet Okada, telling him via phone it was not necessary to have talks at this time. Ambassador Roos' rejection of Okada's entreaties, and the cancellation of a planned trip to Japan by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell on April 4 that had been previously scheduled for this month, can be considered pointing to the United States acting out of its sense of distrust of the Hatoyama administration.

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama visited Tokunoshima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture to brief residents on the possible relocation there of a unit from a major U.S. Marine base in Okinawa Prefecture, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano said April 12. Hatoyama acknowledged the same day that a weekend rally by the residents was an "expression of popular will" against the idea, telling reporters that "I should understand it as signifying one expression of popular will that so many Tokunoshima people gathered."The government seriously considered a relocation site for the Futenma Air Station while studying the popular will, he said, but declined to say whether the government plans to formally propose moving the unit to the local governments on the island.

Hatoyama's remarks were believed to indicate that the government would contemplate his visit to the island after carefully considering the intentions of those in Kagoshima and Okinawa. "There was such great energy," Hatoyama also said, referring to the April 11th rally in which organizers said about 15,000 people took part to protest against the possible move. Tokunoshima, which lies about 200 kilometers northeast of Futenma on the main island of Okinawa, has a population of about 25,000.

Meanwhile, Hirano said he does not expect Hatoyama to be forced to step down as prime minister, even if he fails to resolve the matter by the end of May as promised. "As long as he was still willing to live up to the public's expectation in carrying out policies, it would not be a question of whether or not he should resign," Hirano stated at a news conference. Asked if Hatoyama needs to visit a potential host to provide explanation, the top government spokesman said, "While naturally envisioning such a thing, we have our position unchanged that the government will ask

what it should and explain what it should." The government apparently intends to negotiate with the United States mainly over the Tokunoshima relocation plan, which is reportedly favored by Hatoyama, while leaving other alternatives as options.

But it appears likely to be difficult to obtain the local agreement Washington has called for prior to Tokyo presenting it with a plan. Still, Hatoyama's reference to the "one expression of popular will" can be interpreted to mean that he does not see Sunday's rally as amounting to one that represents all local voices and completely rejects the government's efforts to relocate the Marine unit to Tokunoshima.(Mitarai [2010], *Lecture Notes*)

Also on April 12, Akihisa Nagashima, parliamentary vice minister of defense, cast doubt on the possibility of finding a relocation site on Tokunoshima, telling reporters, "It looks tough because the numbers (of participants in the rally) represent more than half the residents on the island." An agreement reached between the two countries in 2006 seeks to move the helicopter functions of the Futenma base from the crowded city of Ginowan to an airfield to be built in a coastal area of the Marines' Camp Schwab in Nago, also on the main Okinawa island.

But Hatoyama's Democratic Party of Japan-led government, launched last September, reexamined the current relocation plan with the aim of reducing the burden on the people of Okinawa, and has set the end of next month (May, 2010) as the deadline for resolving the matter. (*International Politics*, April 19,2010,Mainichi)

Case (3) Hatoyama Expressed Moving Futenma out of Okinawa Difficult

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama on May 3 told Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima that it is not feasible to relocate all the functions of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station outside Okinawa Prefecture, citing the importance of maintaining the Japan-U.S. security alliance and U.S. deterrence in the Asian region. "In terms of deterrence, I have determined that transferring all of the functions at Futenma outside the prefecture or abroad is difficult," Hatoyama told reporters after meeting with Nakaima at the prefectural office in the Okinawa capital of Naha. Hatoyama, on his first trip to Okinawa since taking office last September, said he told the governor that he came to Naha to ask Okinawa to continue to bear the burden of hosting the facility, but denied he mentioned any specific sites.

With less than a month left before his self-imposed deadline of May 31 for settling the Futenma issue, it is the first time that the 63-year-old Japanese leader has publicly announced his intention to transfer part of the facility within the prefecture. During the talks, part of which were open to the

media, Hatoyama also offered an apology to the people of Okinawa for having caused confusion and concern because of his handling of the issue, while saying he had yet to finalized a plan on where to relocate the Futenma airfield.

Nakaima, for his part, asked Hatoyama to press ahead with reducing the burden on Okinawa in "a visible way," specifically calling for the consolidation of U.S. military bases, including the Kadena Air Base and other facilities located to the south of it. "Calls for Futenma to be transferred outside the prefecture are growing in Okinawa," the governor said to Hatoyama. "I would like the government to take them seriously and make efforts to remove risks (posed by Futenma)." Nakaima later told reporters that there is a "gap" between the central government and Okinawa residents but expressed hope that the prime minister would consider the matter further based on his pledge during last year's general election campaigns to try to move Futenma "at least" outside Okinawa or abroad. Hatoyama saw a plunge in support ratings due partly to the base dispute. Lawmakers in the opposition camp and even some fellow Diet members in his ruling bloc had pressured him to step down if he fails to end the months-long feud by the May-end deadline. On May 3, Hatoyama also took a look at the Futenma Air Station, which sits in the center of a densely populated residential area in Ginowan, from the rooftop of a nearby elementary school. During a dialogue event with local residents afterward, Hatoyama faced a barrage of complaints about noise pollution and risks caused by jets and helicopters stationed at Futenma and was harshly criticized for having reneged on his campaign promise. While jets were flying overhead, a schoolteacher complained that her students were unable to concentrate on studying because of the noise, handing him their letter asking him to lessen the number of U.S. bases in Okinawa. In response, Hatoyama vowed again to settle the problem by the end of May as it is a promise he has made to U.S. President Barack Obama, while calling for their understanding toward his plan to move part of Futenma within Okinawa.

On May 3, Hatoyama toured the Marines' Camp Schwab further north on the main Okinawa island and meet with Nago Mayor Susumu Inamine. Sources said Hatoyama intended to follow in principle an existing deal signed by Tokyo and Washington in 2006 and to relocate the base to an area off the coast of Camp Schwab in Nago with some alterations to the design of a new runway. Hatoyama was considering construction of a pile-supported platform in shallow waters off the coast of Nago—instead of reclaiming a large area of land from the sea nearby—to reduce damage to the local marine environment, according to the sources. Hatoyama's visit follows a large demonstration in Okinawa on April 25 calling for the Futenma base to be moved outside of the prefecture.

To highlight his efforts to reduce the burden on the prefecture of hosting U.S. bases, Hatoyama is also apparently planning to transfer part of the helicopter unit or some of the drills at Futenma to the Kagoshima Prefecture island of Tokunoshima, about 200 kilometers northeast of Okinawa. But the idea had been met with opposition from Tokunoshima residents, and officials in Washington had also taken a negative stance on the removal of the helicopter unit, citing the necessity for operating the unit and the Marine ground troops in Okinawa in an integrated manner. Later the mayors of three towns on Tokunoshima visited the prime minister at his office to convey their strong opposition to hosting any U.S. military facility. "I would like to explain my thinking to them," Hatoyama told reporters. Meanwhile in Tokyo, Japan and the United States launched full-fledged working-level talks on the Futenma issue.

The U.S. base row involved a 2006 bilateral deal agreed on by a previous Liberal Democratic Party-led government with the United States to relocate the Futenma base to the coastal area of Camp Schwab by 2014 as part of a broader realignment of U.S. forces stationed in Japan. The deal is aimed at alleviating the burden on Okinawa, which hosts the bulk of U.S. forces in Japan, and removing risks posed by the Futenma base.(Sources on May 4, 2010)

Case (4) Hatoyama's Visit Lost in Okinawa

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama made little progress in resolving the Futenma base relocation issue on a crucial visit to Okinawa Prefecture on May 3. During his first visit to Okinawa since he became prime minister last September, Hatoyama formally made public the government's plan to relocate U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma functions to another location in the prefecture as well as to Tokunoshima island in Kagoshima Prefecture.(The Asahi Shinbun, May 5,2010)

According to sources, the government is considering construction of a pier-type runway off Henoko in Nago, Okinawa Prefecture, as well as relocating up to 1,000 of Futenma's 2,500 Marines to Tokunoshima. The plan breaks a pledge, made by Hatoyama's Democratic Party of Japan during the Lower House election campaign last summer, to move the Futenma air station outside the prefecture, if not abroad. Hatoyama told Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima on May 3, "Realistically, it's difficult to move everything outside the prefecture." "Although there were talks about overseas relocation, when we contemplated the Japan-U.S. alliance and Japan's relationships with neighboring countries, we thought pursuing the idea would be difficult from a deterrence standpoint," Hatoyama said.

Hatoyama also said, "I have to ask people in Okinawa to share the burden, too." Nakaima urged

Hatoyama to cut down on the accident risk at Futenma and to reduce the burden on Okinawa. The governor told Hatoyama that expectations were rising among Okinawa residents toward relocating Futenma outside the prefecture. After meeting with Hatoyama, Nakaima told reporters: "I think there is a wide gap between what the prime minister says and what Okinawan residents think." Though Hatoyama told reporters he did not discuss specific relocation sites with Nakaima. But later in the day on May 3, the prime minister met with leaders of the Okinawa prefectural assembly and said, "I'm visiting (Okinawa) to ask for understanding and cooperation from people in Okinawa and Tokunoshima on the Futenma relocation."

This marked the first time Hatoyama publicly acknowledged that there are relocation sites being considered in Okinawa and Tokunoshima. Hatoyama also met with Susumu Inamine, mayor of Nago, where relocation was being discussed. Saying it was not possible to move the Futenma air base too far because of U.S. operational requirements, Hatoyama sought the city's understanding in a revised Henoko plan. But the mayor flatly rejected the idea, saying, "We cannot possibly accept Henoko as the relocation site." On May 7, Hatoyama was expected to meet in Tokyo with the mayors of Tokunoshima's three towns, who were all against moving some of Futenma's functions to their island. Hatoyama had set a deadline for resolving the relocation issue: the end of May. On the afternoon of May 7, Hatoyama had a glimpse of the Futenma air station from a nearby Japanese elementary school, as well as meeting with Futenma residents there. He explained to residents that after taking power he came to better understand the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance in light of the environment in Northeast Asia. (Mitarai [2010], *Lecture Notes*)

Case (5) Promises or Not on Futenma relocation

Is it acceptable for a prime minister to make promises to lightly? We have seen promise after promise being broken on the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station. On May 13, Hatoyama claimed that he would 'do as much as he can' regarding his self-imposed and oft-repeated deadline to settle Futenma issue by the end of May. He also added on May 13, however, that if there was a need to push the issue back to June or later, he would make an effort effectively suggesting that he had given up on his own deadline. The Futenma relocation had experienced numerous delays from the start. Hatoyama initially indicated to U.S. President Barack Obama that a decision on the issue would be made by the end of last year, and when that proved impossible, Hatoyama declared that we would see an end to the confusion by the end of May this year. (The Asahi Shinbun, & The Yomiuri Shinbun, May 14) He postponed a late-March decision on a government proposal, promised

Obama that a resolution would be reached by late May, and told the public that the "resolution" he promised implied an agreement among the U.S. government, the site the base would be relocated to, and the ruling coalition.

But now there's going to be another delay.

Hatoyama kept changing his mind about the relocation site. He pledged during his Lower House election campaign last year that he would, "at the very least," relocate the base outside of Okinawa Prefecture, and continued to emphasize this intention well into 2010. Claiming that he came to understand that a base in Okinawa was necessary as he "learned more about deterrence," he reversed course, seeking relocation within the prefecture. His earlier vow not to transfer the base to Henoko in Okinawa's Nago City — where the Japanese and U.S. governments decided to move the base in 1996 — was merely proven to be an empty promise.

The biggest concern was that Futenma would remain in Ginowan, where it is currently located, and the safety risks and noise that local residents face every day would go unresolved. The elimination of these problems was the starting point for relocation, but a solution was nowhere in sight. During bilateral working-level talks, Japanese officials suggested a revision to the current plan, in which Futenma would be relocated to the Henoko area, where a Quick Installment Platform (QIP) method would be employed to construct a runway. U.S. officials, meanwhile, appreciated the Japanese government's reconsideration of the plan to relocate to Henoko, but expressed reservations about the QIP method. With the city of Nago refusing to host the relocation, the likelihood that the current use of Futenma in Ginowan will continue has increased. This, in turn, implied a collapse of the preconditions for the transfer of 8,000 Marines to Guam.

The Japanese government was at that time considering measures to counter the burden of U.S. military bases on Okinawa Prefecture, including a partial transfer of Futenma Air Station functions to Tokunoshima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture, the dispersal of U.S. Marine training sessions to various Self-Defense Force bases, and environmental countermeasures against soil contamination. Providing relief to overburdened Okinawa was a must. But the prospects of Tokunoshima Island or any other location agreeing to host a base were grim. The main cause of the numerous delays and confusion lied in the lack of Hatoyama's problem-solving capabilities. He wasted the past eight months, repeatedly advocating base relocation out of Okinawa without engaging in serious deliberation, and exhibiting no signs of leadership. He found himself bearing a heavy responsibility for breaking his own promises and increasing the public's distrust of politics.

Japan's five opposition parties were seeking an intensive deliberation on the Futenma issue in the budgetary committee meetings of both legislative houses. Hatoyama was in a position to comply with this appeal, and provide the public with a clear-cut explanation on the current situation and the government's policy on the Futenma relocation issue, the deterrence of U.S. military forces in Japan, and his own responsibility for the whole fiasco.

Case Study (6) At Another Negotiating Meeting

On May 25, 2010, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and U.S. President Barack Obama decided to agree as early as May 27, Thursday to relocate U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to the Henoko district of Nago, Okinawa Prefecture. The two leaders were expected to hold telephone talks on the evening of May 27 at the earliest and confirm that the two governments would cooperate in promoting the plan to relocate the base to an area around U.S. forces' Camp Schwab in Henoko. Both government also decided to issue a joint statement on the accord—approving its policy on the issue at a Cabinet meeting on May 28. Hatoyama then held a news conference later in the day and declared that the government would make efforts to reduce Okinawa's burden of hosting U.S. bases.

The Japan-U.S. joint statement was thought to clearly identify: the relocation site as an offshore area of Camp Schwab; that the environmental assessment on the planned reclamation should not be delayed; and that Tokyo and Washington were able to consider joint use of the facility by the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Marines. Thus, the two countries thought they could determine the relocation plan by September while seeking to reach agreement on the method of building a substitute facility by August. Moreover, the joint statement also called for the shifting of part of the training site for helicopter units at Futenma base to areas out of Okinawa Prefecture, if possibly to Tokunoshima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture, in an effort to help reduce Okinawa's burden of hosting U.S. bases. Hatoyama stated that the relocation would be only a temporary measure and that the government would make efforts to move the base out of the country in the future in a desperate bid to persuade the Social Democratic Party (SDP) to stay in the ruling coalition.

Hatoyama was, in fact, seeking to incorporate a future review of the new base in the bilateral joint statement and intended to negotiate the matter with Obama. However, SDP leader Mizuho Fukushima, who served as state minister for consumer affairs and gender equality, refused to sign the government's policy on the issue at the Cabinet meeting. Nevertheless, Hatoyama expressed optimism about keeping the SDP in his administration. Futenma.

U.S. Navy's Decision for Guam Relocation

In the meantime, there was a new movement going on in the United States. On September 7, 2010, the Department of Navy made a sudden announcement on the release of the record of decision (ROD) on the Guam and Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Military Relocation Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) which affects the future US-Japan relations and negotiations as well. Their action was much quicker than people in Okinawa and Japan expected—one big issue is that Okinawans and Japanese are not well informed about U.S. Navy's decision for Guam relocation announcement. To gain knowledge and information of U.S. Navy's decision on the relocation of a part of American Air Base, it is vitally important to take a look at The ROD document. The ROD, a document required at the conclusion of the environmental review of a federal project or program, outlines the decisions the Navy has made to implement the proposed realignment actions and specifies associated with the mitigation measures.

The aforementioned decisions grew out of thorough consideration of public and resource agency comments on the EIS, interagency discussions, and ongoing discussions with the Guam and CNMI communities and leadership. However, they did not specify reactions from the Japanese Government. The ROD includes the Navy's decision to implement the preferred alternatives as identified in the FEIS for the main base, aviation and waterfront operations for approximately 8,600 Marines and their 9,000 family members who will relocate from Okinawa to Guam. If this action was taken, it will alter the future U.S.-Japan negotiations and relations as well.

The U.S. Army has decided to implement its preferred alternative for placement of an air missile defense task force should it be assigned this mission on Guam.

As stated in the FEIS, the Navy will defer a decision on a specific location for a transient nuclear powered aircraft carrier berth in Apra Harbor and will voluntarily collect additional data on marine resources in the two alternative site locations.

The Navy has also deferred a decision on the location of training ranges for the Marine Corps forces pending completion of the Section 106 consultation process under the National Historic Preservation Act. "The decisions in the ROD begin the long-term strategic realignment of U.S. forces on Guam," said Jackalyne Pfannenstiel, assistant secretary of the Navy for energy, installations and environment, who signed the ROD. He indicated that "in reaching these decisions, we carefully considered the many comments received throughout the EIS process. We recognize that there are issues remaining to be addressed and we look forward to working with the people of Guam and CNMI to implement the military relocation in a way that will benefit the community

at large – both military and civilian.” In turn, this decision will affect on-going U.S.-Japan negotiations, particularly, with respect to Okinawa’s Futenma base issue. (*Navy Releases Record of Decision for Guam / Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands Military Relocation, Spt. 7, 2010*)

Final Remarks

As incumbent Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima was re-elected in the gubernatorial race on November 28, 2010, sweeping out two opponents including former Ginowan Mayor Yoichi Iha, Prime Minister Kan had no choice but to reconsider an alternate relocation plan, on the premise that Futenma would remain where it was for the time being. The election's biggest focal point was the issue of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, with Iha calling for its relocation outside the country, and Nakaima pledging to have the base moved to a location outside Okinawa Prefecture. (With Okinawa’s leadership in Place, time for PM Kanto stop dodging challenges, Nov. 29, 2010).

As Nakaima had previously expressed a willingness to follow through with a Japan-U.S. bilateral agreement on the relocation of the air base to the Henoko district of Nago, and did not take an explicit stand against relocation within the prefecture in his election campaign, some in the Japanese government were optimistic that Nakaima's re-election would lead to a breakthrough in the current standstill and gridlock. The situation, however, was not as simple as some would like to believe. Following his re-election, Nakaima voiced his conviction that implementation of the Japan-U.S. agreement would be difficult, expressing "Relocation within the prefecture would be impossible. It must be relocated outside the prefecture." Moreover, according to public opinion polls taken by the Okinawa newspaper Ryukyu Shimpo and others a week before the election, approximately 75 percent of Okinawa residents said that they were against relocation within the prefecture. The Nago mayoral election this past January resulted in putting in power a mayor against relocation of the base to the city. In September 2010, pro-mayor candidates came out victorious in the Nago city assembly election. Nakaima's seemingly flexible stance was an indication that with government subsidies to stimulate Okinawa's economy on the line, he wanted to avoid losing the option to negotiate with Tokyo. The fact remained, however, that Nakaima promised to have the air base relocated outside the prefecture during his campaign, and it was unlikely that he would turn against the wishes of voters and the city of Nago anytime in the near future.

Another attention had been given to the significance of the deterrence power of U.S. troops in Japan in light of recent developments and incidents, such as China's military expansion policy, the collision of a Chinese fishing ship and Japan Coast Guard vessels in the waters off the Senkaku

Islands, and North Korea's sudden attack on the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong. However, such developments should not undermine the original purpose of Futenma's proposed relocation, that of removing danger from the lives of residents currently living nearby.

Lightening the burden on Okinawa would help increase the likelihood of relocation proposals being approved. At the same time, if the transfer of military drills out of Okinawa – as stipulated in the Japan-U.S. agreement as a measure to relieve some of Okinawa's burden – was implemented in Futenma, it would reduce some of the risk and damages that local residents currently endure. Six months have already passed since the Kan administration assumed the office, and during those six months, no progress has been made over Futenma's relocation. Now that the gubernatorial election is over and Okinawa's leadership is in place, Prime Minister Kan must take a step forward. He must stop dodging challenges. Meanwhile, his administration is now calling for the U.S. government to take a flexible approach toward a resolution.

Meanwhile, on December 3, 2010, the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. military conducted the joint exercises at various locations in and around this country. The large-scale maneuvers, being conducted at SDF and U.S. bases in Japan as well as in surrounding waters, involved about 45,000 personnel from the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military. Their aim was to demonstrate united collaborative actions between Japan and the United States amid tensions on the Korean Peninsula that had grown since North Korea's artillery attack on a South Korean island last month. The South Korean military for the first time sent observers to the Japan-U.S. joint exercises, a move aimed at facilitating collaboration between the three nations in dealing with military tensions in this region. The maneuvers continued until December 10 involving the mobilization of about 60 military vessels and 400 aircraft from the SDF and the U.S. military. The USS George Washington, which took part in a recent U.S.-South Korea drill in the Yellow Sea, was mobilized. The exercises included ballistic missile interception training in the Sea of Japan, and maritime and aerial drills west of Kyushu and east of Okinawa Prefecture.

Although the joint drills were arranged before North Korea's November 23 artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island, they provided Japan and the United States a chance to demonstrate to North Korea that they could form a united front on military issues. The drill was also construed as an attempt to discourage China, which had been increasing its naval forces, from pursuing excessive ambitions. The United States and Japan find themselves in a situation where both must work to prevent the Futenma issue from sabotaging the bilateral alliance as a whole. Both the Obama administration and the Kan administration must not hinder the efforts being made to deepen the

relationship between the two countries ahead of the joint declaration on the Japan-U.S. alliance which is to be issued in spring 2011.

The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier George Washington participated in a joint drill with the Maritime Self-Defense Force of Okinawa on November 23,2010, and it later took part in a four-day joint drill with South Korea in the Yellow Sea. After that, State Department spokesperson Philip Crowley told a news conference that the United States and Japan engaged in Okinawa's leaders such as reelected Governor Hirokazu Nakaima and others to help them understand the importance of the US presence in Okinawa. (The Japan Times,Nov.24,2010,p.2). He also indicated that "we've produced a shared game plan on the way forward, and we will continue to work with Japan to carry it out." Thus, the outcome of the gubernatorial race was expected to affect the on-going pending issue of the relocation negotiations between Japan and the United States.

Although new political developments came to the fore on November 23,2010, one thing which irks people today—particularly right after North Korea's military attack on South Korean Island *Yeonpyeong* November 23,2010—is that especially in the Asia Pacific region, the state of global politics is getting more unstable and may be moving in the wrong direction unless political leaders in the world pay direct attention to *what must not be allowed to happen*. As Zbigniew Brzezinski put, "Recognition of the notable acceleration in the velocity of our history and the uncertainty of its trajectory is the necessary point of departure for my argument," but in reality it is for our argument before global change becomes out of control(Brzezinski,1993). The aforementioned new political developments are likely to affect on-going U.S.-Japan negotiations and the future U.S.-Japan relations.* Hence, leaders in both the United States and Japan will be again in a position of rolling a new ball in 2011 so far as US Marine Corps Air Futenma Base issue is concerned.

*December 17,2010, Prime Minister Naoto Kan—whose public support ratings have sunk to nearly 20 percent since he took office in June—flew over to Okinawa and offered apologies and financial aid to Okinawa. While he sought support for keeping U.S. Air base on the island telling governor Nakaima that the central government was preparing special funds to help develop Okinawa, Nakaima stood firm in opposing Kan's offers. On the one hand, the row over Futenma issue is threatening to preserve U.S.-Japan alliance, both Washington and Tokyo tried to ease tensions as they have been working together to respond to regional political tensions and threats, including an unpredictable North Korea.

Both Japan and the United States condemned the North Korea's November 23rd military attack on a South Korean island and share wariness and concern over a rising China's military power in the Asia Pacific region.

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