

ポーツマス講和条約交渉の再考察

多国間交渉・ミディエーション分析&小村 寿太郎の一側面

Re-examination of the Portsmouth Treaty:
Multilateral Negotiation & Mediation Analysis &
Unknown parts of Jutaro Komura

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ポーツマス講和条約交渉が行われたポーツマス海軍工廠（筆者資料）

本稿は、平成17年にスペインで開催された国際紛争管理学会で行った研究発表の一部を基に大幅に加筆されたものである。なお、本稿で紹介された未公開資料や写真に関しては、ウィーン国際戦略研究所のInternational Institute for Applied System Analysis委員でジョンズ・ホプキンス大学国際高等研究科のI.ウイリアム・ザートマン教授とニューハンプシャーのポーツマス海軍工廠の協力を得た。ここに謝意を表したい。

要 旨

ポーツマス講和条約交渉とは、今から百年前にロシア皇帝が賠償金支

払いを拒否し、樺太南部の割譲というロシア側の案を受諾する形で1905年9月5日、ロシア全権セルゲイ・ユリエウイッチ・ウイッテと日本全権、小村寿太郎の間で締結された和平条約交渉として知られている。

ポーツマス講和条約を巡っての歴史文献は数多く存在する（吉村、岡崎、日本外交文書、金山、黒木）。また、それらの文献では、二国間のテーブルを挟んでの講和会議の成り行きについては多くのページが費やされているが、講和条約締結に至るまで「水面下」で繰り広げられていた「多国間交渉」、それに講和条約交渉の成り行きに影響を与えた要因、加えてポーツマス講和条約交渉のプロセスに関して政治学と歴史学を統合させた学際的アプローチに基づく研究や文献は皆無に等しい。

これらの問題点について、国際交渉研究の分野で世界的に著名な研究者であるマイケル・ブレイカーも次のように指摘する。

Most of the literature on pre World War II Japanese diplomacy and foreign policy is the product of the historian; few works on the subject in either Japanese or English reflect the political scientist's concern with identifying and analyzing political processes and patterns.

…Few works on the subject in either Japanese or English reflect the political processes and patterns. All too often, studies dealing with Japanese diplomacy have been, at one extreme, mere chronicles with lists of treaties or, at one example, mere interpretive, usually quite biased short accounts of dubious scholarly values (Blaker,1977).

「(ポーツマス講和条約交渉を含め)日本の外交交渉を扱った研究は、条約を並べた単なる年表的なものか、あるいは学問的価値が疑われるようなきわめて偏った解釈のものか、どちらかであった。内容的に優れたものは緻密ではあっても、特定のケースだけを取り上げたもので、近代日本外交の研究で政治学と歴史学の双方をうまく織り交ぜたものは、見当たらない。」

また、ポーツマス講和条約の研究に関しては、次のような様々な疑問点も残る。(1)ポーツマスにおける日露講和会議の日本全権、小村寿太郎は「和平の立役者」であったのか、「主戦論者」であったのか。または、

小村はリアリストな外交官であり、しかも戦略型の「紛争解決型交渉者」であったのか。(2) ポーツマスにおける交渉は、日露の間で繰り広げられた二カ国間、すなわち「日露交渉」であったのか、それともマルチ・レベルの「多国間交渉」であったのか否か、(3) 米国以外にポーツマス講和会議の紛争調停(mediation)を行う国が存在していなかったのだろうか。(4) また、セオドー・ルーズベルト米国大統領以外にミディエーターとなりうる人物が当時の欧州には存在しなかったのだろうか。(5) セオドー・ルーズベルトが日露間のミディエーター（調停者）を引き受けた動機と真の理由とは何であったのか。また、その要因とは何か。(6) また、ルーズベルトの「日本びいき説」は、地政学的発想に基づく「外交政略論」であったのか、それとも「国防理論」に基づくものであったのか否か、または、それ以外のナイーブな定説論、すなわち「親日論」に基づくものであるのか等である。

今年（2005年）は、ポーツマス条約交渉が締結されてから数えて百年目にあたる節目の年である。しかし、両国の間では、未だに十分解明されていない国際交渉に関連する諸問題 (issues)、それに紛争処理・管理問題が存在する。

以下では、上記の問題提起の中から特に (3) と (4) とに焦点をあて、I. ウィリアム・ザートマンの説く「多国間交渉」(multilateral Negotiation) とミディエーション (Mediation) 理論に基づいて分析を行い、追記として小村寿太郎の生い立ちの一端——寿太郎が書き残していたにもかかわらず、これまで未公開とされていた本人の青年時代の英文書簡——を紹介してみたい。

Abstract

Negotiation, in general, is an essential aspect of politics and international politics in particular. Negotiation is often described as one identifiable mode of joint decision-making-distinguished from coalition, when the choice is made by numerical aggregation, and judication, when the choice is made hierarchy by a judge who aggregates conflicting values and interest into a single decision (I. William

Zartman).

A treaty signed between Japan's Foreign Minister, Jutarō Kokura and Russia's Imperial Secretary of State, Sergius Witte, in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, terminated the Russo-Japanese War on September 5, 1905. In the treaty Russia acknowledged Japan's supreme interests in Korea, transferred to Japan its lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and the railways it had built southern Manchuria, and ceded the southern half of Sakhalin in lieu of an indemnity.

It is quite true that, for many people at large, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty is simply the story of negotiations between Russia and Japan; but if one takes a close look at the preparation for peacemaking in terms of mediation, it is not just the story of two nations. Rather, it is a story of international dimensions, for when it comes to the question of who hosted the peace conference or the peace making effort, no one disputes that it was the Americans, led by American President Theodore Roosevelt, since he hosted the treaty negotiations in such a way as to put the United States' own stamp on the final outcome. While President Roosevelt was sincere in his desire to step in and assist the Japanese in peacemaking, he was at the same time did not wish Russian power destroyed in East Asia.

In sum, Theodore Roosevelt as president of the United States was bargaining with Japan and Russia to meet several significant but indirect interests.

The Eventual Reluctance of European Nations as Mediators

Of the Western powers, France was greatly concerned over the unexpected development of the War, which was unfavorable towards her ally, Russia, and it was France who first made unwelcome and unsuccessful attempts to mediate in the course of the Russo-Japanese negotiations. It was again France who later initiated efforts to consummate peace between Russia and Japan.

As early as December 14, 1904, Bompat, the French Ambassador to Russia, visited Japanese Minister Motono in Paris and offered his offices for the purpose of initiating peace negotiations, but Japan politely rejected the offer on the ground that Japan did not have any intention of asking for the intervention of a third

Power, and that Russia, if she sincerely aspired for peace, ought best to negotiate directly with Japan.

Meanwhile Port Arthur capitulated, and the surrender of that famous stronghold was interpreted as a death blow not only to the interests but also to the ambitions of Russia's East Asian policy. Yet while peace proposals were suggested by many countries, no nation desired to act as mediator. The most interesting talks were held at Berlin, proposing that Germany, France, and the United States should unite in an attempt to force peace on Japan, to separate Japan from Great Britain, and to effect a new alliance between Russia and Japan since this might help isolate Great Britain from Japan. When the news reached London, the British government hastened to send Cecil Spring-Rice to Washington, D. C., and to St. Petersburg, so as to keep the United States from joining such a ridiculous project.

As President Roosevelt and Cecil Spring-Rice had known each other for more than twenty years, the President trusted Cecil Spring-Rice, it seemed likely to the British that the President would receive him in the nation's capital, which he did.

The visit of Spring-Rice to Washington, D. C. first accomplished the mission for which he was sent, and second it also clarified in the President's mind the contemporary European complications. It was right after this memorable visit that President Roosevelt began to take a direct interest in effecting peace between Japan and Russia.

On the one hand, President Roosevelt took advantage of having previously stood aloof from European politics; on the other hand, he was extremely concerned over the developments taking place in East Asia. As President Roosevelt began to take a strong interest in the future prospects of East Asia, he emerged as a leader with an eager interest in peace. Roosevelt first conceived the wisdom of approaching Russia before Japan and suggested through French Ambassador Dousserant in Washington the advantage of an appeal to Russia for peace. Dousserant, in his ambassadorial capacity, also transmitted the same idea to the Tsar through the French President via a similar channel, but the Tsar rejected

the friendly advice as he was determined to continue the war against Japan. This was mainly because the Tsar firmly believed that Russia's Baltic Fleet could single handedly defeat Japan. Germany immediately suspected that President Roosevelt had been working for the benefit of Japan. President Roosevelt, however, became convinced that it was better and necessary to wait for the final result of the battle of Mukden and the fate of the Baltic Fleet before proceeding further, and dropped the matter for the time being.

Japan's triumph at Mukden on March 10 marked one more step toward peace. Public polls taken in the world at that time read in the battle of Mukden the last hope of Russia on land crushed beyond repair. Even the pro Russian papers began to advise an immediate termination of the War as the only way of saving Russia's face. At home in Russia, there emerged a new rising tide towards a peace settlement. On March 14, the then Finance Minister Witte, in a memorandum to Tsar Nicholas, insisted on the financial difficulty of continuing the war and argued the wisdom of pursuing peace before Russia was completely defeated on the battlefield in Manchuria. French Ambassador Soussaran in Washington, D. C., called upon President Theodore Roosevelt to learn Japan's terms of peace. The German Ambassador in Washington, meanwhile, tried hard to convince the Japanese Ambassador Takahira, as well as President Roosevelt that Tsar Nicholas was prepared for the continuation of the War for another year, but that Japan would not be able to endure for that period.

Therefore, President Roosevelt again set out on the trial of mediation. To do so, Roosevelt had several meetings with Ambassador Takahira and strongly urged Japan to take advantage of the favorable position of the Japanese army in Manchuria to conclude peace, while he also tried to learn in confidence Japanese terms, especially her intention as to the obtaining of any indemnity. But Jutaro Komura insisted that although Japan was very grateful to President Roosevelt for his gesture of friendship towards Japan, it was a tall order for Japan not only to offer her terms before the peace talks were organized, but also to clarify Japan's position pertaining to the question of indemnity. Of course, Japan was justified

in demanding indemnity in the event of the victory in the War against Russia, citing numerous precedents in similar cases.

In this connection, while President Roosevelt revealed a proposal supported by France and Russia for an international conference to decide the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, but he rejected the idea because he believed that the issues should be decided by the two nations themselves. Roosevelt was of the opinion that such an international conference was so detrimental to China's territorial integrity that it would do more harm than good. By the same token, Great Britain and Germany also supported Roosevelt's viewpoint. Komura was in complete agreement with the President's views and insisted on direct negotiations with Russia.

Although on April 5, France, through the efforts of Delcasse, tried to step in to help Russia, Ambassador Takahira obtained reliable information on the Russian desire for peace negotiations if Japan waived such strong demands as the territorial cession of Sakhalin or any indemnity payment. Komura's position remained firm and unshaken and the French overtures failed again. (Yoshimura, 2001, pp. 7-75 & Okazaki, 2003, Chapters 3-8)

Japan's Position & Komura's Actions

In the light of the attitudes of the Western Powers, Japan found herself in a position to be able to decide on a fundamental policy for facing the issues of war and peace. On April 8, the Japanese Cabinet adopted the following resolutions:

That, (1), a plan should be formulated on the basis of the further prolongation of the War; that, (2), Japan's military position should be strengthened by solidifying the places already occupied and stepping up its efforts toward the assured attainment of a predominant position; (3), that necessary steps be taken diplomatically to bring about satisfactory peace conditions as far as circumstances permitted (Blaker, 1975 on Komura and the Portsmouth Treaty, Chapter 2).

Komura confidentially communicated the aforementioned decision to Great

Britain and then to the United States, after which President Roosevelt wrote to Taft, the Secretary of War, telling him that peace negotiations ought to be conducted directly between Japan and Russia.

Roosevelt also placed an emphasis on the point that Japan was prepared to uphold an Open Door Policy in Manchuria and to return Manchuria to China. Komura assured President that Japan was in one hundred percent agreement with his ideas. Having heard Komura's remarks, Roosevelt made a proposal for a preliminary meeting between Russian Ambassador Cassini and the Japanese Ambassador Takahira. But contrary to the President's suggestions, Komura first instructed Takahira to point out from financial and military standpoint that the tide of events at the moment was moving in favor of Japan-even in the face of the approaching Baltic Fleet in the Far East. Thereafter, Komura indirectly made a proposal to President Roosevelt by assuring him of Japan's desire to meet Russia if Tsar Nicholas expressed his intention of effecting peace; and, at the same time, Komura stressed the point that the success of such a move was totally contingent upon the sincerity of the Tsar's desire for peace.

President Roosevelt, meanwhile, realized that Russia would not consider peace until after the destiny of her Baltic Fleet's mission became known, and it would be to the best interest of Japan to negotiate for peace before the fated meeting of Baltic Fleet and the Japanese Navy, the outcome of which he seems to have regarded with mixed feelings and apprehensiveness. The Japanese leaders, including Komura, were well aware of the fact that Japan was moving towards a diplomatic breakthrough in its efforts to attain satisfactory peace terms and made a decision about taking the first step in that direction after a careful deliberation of the whole status quo at that time. Thus, on May 31, Komura responded swiftly and gave direct instructions to Ambassador Takahira first to get in touch with President Roosevelt, and second to question him about his hopes for peace, suggesting that it would be President Roosevelt who could directly and entirely of his own initiative invite Russia and Japan to come together at the negotiation table, and that should the President be disposed to undertake the mediation



小村寿太郎と日本代表。S.ウィッテとロシア代表(ポーツマス海軍工廠史料館所蔵)
The delegates led by Jutaro Komura & Sergius White

work, Japan would leave to his discretion the course of the procedure and the matter of consulting with the other Western powers. Thus, on June 1, President Roosevelt accepted without reservation the invitation that had been extended to him. (Yoshimura, 2003, pp. 1-42 & Okazaki, Chapters 4-6)

At the Negotiation Table in Portsmouth

The Japanese delegation was led by Foreign Minister Jutaro Komura and Kogoro Takahira—Japanese Ambassador to the United States. The Russians, meanwhile, were represented by the Imperial Secretary of State Sergius White and Roman Rosen—Russian Ambassador to the United States. It has been reported that as a mediator President Theodore Roosevelt dominated the run-up to the conference with his energetic attempts to get the two sides together; but once the negotiations were underway, he held aloof, avoiding the trip to Portsmouth. (Kimura, 1991, pp. 68-72)

President Roosevelt favored Japan. He perceived Japan as young and active and far more likely than the corrupt, decadent Russians to contribute to the development of East Asia. Theodore Roosevelt himself was also a firm believer in the balance of power, which he thought would be better served by a preeminent Japan than by a dominant Russia.

Whitte came to Portsmouth determined to play a major role by wowing the American press corps and took good advantage of the American tendency to be overawed by the aristocracy.

President Roosevelt, though, was rather unimpressed with Whitte's brusque attitudes, while Whitte looked down his nose at the President's republican origins. Whitte's reaction to a meeting with Roosevelt at the President's summer home on the Long Island is symptomatic.

Whitte's impression of President Roosevelt's summer home was that it was an ordinary summer house of a burgher of small means. The luncheon served was not digestible, and, moreover, what made Whitte especially unhappy was that there was no wine, not even a tablecloth. Whitte had no appreciation of Roosevelt's efforts to be charmingly informal.

The Japanese delegation was also struck by Roosevelt's informality, his style of interpersonal communication, and the luncheon menu. But no mention was made of this at the time.

Other behavior which baffled Whitte was Roosevelt's style of mediation for when Roosevelt greeted the two delegations together at his home, Roosevelt slighted the Russians by toasting the Japanese delegation before their Russian counterparts, which in turn not only disturbed Whitte and the Russian delegation but also signified to the two delegations that the President might be on the Japanese side during the upcoming negotiations in Portsmouth.

The Portsmouth negotiations in the end boiled down to an argument over the cession of Russian territory and payment of an indemnity to Japan. The Russian delegation was adamantly opposed to the cession of any land or payment of any money at all. Their claim was that they had not lost any Imperial Russian

territory, and therefore, that they were not a defeated power.

The Japanese delegation had taken care of the first issue by seizing Sakhalin in July, 1905, just before the peace negotiations began, thus creating a bargaining counter.

President Roosevelt, at this point, stepped in to get the two sides to reach an agreement. He persuaded the Russians to give up the southern half of Sakhalin (which was retaken by the Russians in 1945, along with the Northern Territories), and then talked Japan out of seeking an indemnity payment for the war.

It was a state of affair that both Japan and Russia found unsatisfactory and which both had many years earlier tried to rectify by gaining exclusive control over the island of Sakhalin. The Japanese had first appealed directly to St. Petersburg in 1862 and 1867, pressing their claims on the basis of historical rights. When this failed, they had proposed arbitration by the United States in 1870 and 1890, but with equal lack of success. Russia rejected Japan's pretensions to Sakhalin by citing her own historical associations and warning Japan about British designs. Russia and Japan each offered to buy out the other's rights to the island. But both intimidated the other by dispatching troops and colonists to rub shoulders on the disputed acreage. Although neither side showed any inclination to relinquish Sakhalin, both expressed willingness to concede part of the Kurils. A series of negotiations between 1862 and 1884 found themselves agreed to disagree on Sakhalin.

The result of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was construed as a personal achievement for Theodore Roosevelt, and it led directly to his winning the Nobel Peace Prize. Theodore Roosevelt had established the United States as a major force in Great Power diplomacy.

His feat was not appreciated in either Russia or Japan, though, and the Tsar nearly repudiated the treaty as an affront to the empire and only acquiesced after Witte's adroit persuasiveness and timely forgetfulness of telegrams ordering him to retract his argument to the Treaty.

The Tsar's control was then shaken by the revolution of 1905, a foretaste of

1917-18, and Witte could not be certain if the imperial system would still be in place upon his return to Russia.

In Japan, the John Q citizens and mobs roamed the streets of Tokyo in outrage over Japan's inability to win an indemnity and hundreds of people died during the riot. The Japanese government, however, followed a time-honored custom still practiced by the LDP today: they kept silence and hoped the uproar would die down, which it did eventually.

Jutaro Komura, like a good old warrior, was resigned to dying at the hands of the mob when he landed at Yokohama, but Itoh Hirofumi, who was Komura's patron, arranged for Komura to land at a pier reserved for the Emperor, thus avoiding any unpleasantness at the main landing point; and he headed for Tokyo.

In short, Jutaro Komura was a negotiator who was less compromising than Tokyo. Like the relatively conciliatory diplomats, he was quicker than Tokyo



小村とウイッテ条約に調印の瞬間と調印の際に使用された万年筆。

(Komura, left, watches Witte sign the treaty documents on Sep. 5, 1905. From PHC. There Are No Victors.)

to conclude the other side had exhausted its concessions, and his messages via telegraph evaluating Tsar's firmness at each negotiation stage, especially near the end, were an important element in the process of policy adjustment back in Tokyo.

Theodore Roosevelt appears to be a weaker mediator. His intervention, however, was effective not because it converted the forces of power but because it interceded to decision-making processes already underway in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

追記*Post Script* (研究資料)

以下では、青年時代の「小村寿太郎の人となり」についての一研究資料を紹介したい。小村 寿太郎は現実主義派の外交官であり交渉者でもあった。小村をポーツマス講和会議や他の国際交渉の舞台で怯まない交渉者と認めさせた要因は、彼が幼年、青年時代に培った当時の世界情勢を観る複眼力と英語を通して身につけたアングロサクソン型思考法によるものである。むろん、「小村流交渉術」は、同氏の米国留学時代とニューヨークの法律事務所滞在期間に、独自の努力で磨かれ養われたものである。

小村寿太郎の幼年・青年時代記録

小村寿太郎が生まれたのは、江戸時代の末期の1855年である。その年の二年前には、ペリリ提督率いる黒船来航事件が記録されている。ペリリ提督は、これまで内向き社会で鎖国中の日本に開国を迫り、遂に日本は、二百年以上も続いた鎖国に終止符を打ち、島国日本はパニック状態に陥ったものの、国際社会の一員となったわけである。古い封建時代が終わり、新時代を迎えようとした、そんな激動の時代に寿太郎は生まれたのである。

小村寿太郎は、四男三女の長男として宮崎県に生まれた。小村家は、十八石徒士の小禄ではあったが、代々商業や林業、大阪方面や中国地方との交易を管轄する藩の「本町別当」役であった。父の寛は下級武士で

あったが、財政通であった。明治維新以後、商社を起こしたが事業に失敗したため、寿太郎は父の負債に大変な苦勞を強いられることになるのである。寛の寿太郎に対する夢は「製材業を起こしてほしい」ということであった。

母の梅子は男勝りであったが良妻賢母な夫人であった。梅子は病弱なところもあり、寿太郎が生まれた時には母乳が出ず、近所にもらい乳をしたり、重湯を飲ませたりして育てられたという。寿太郎が生来ひ弱で瘦せぎすであったのは、そのせいでもあるかもしれない。

少年時代の寿太郎を可愛がったのは、これまた勝気な性分の持ち主であり、潔癖な祖母の熊子であった。熊子は、ひ弱であった寿太郎を、たくましい人物にさせようと、鶴戸神宮や八幡神社に寿太郎を連れお参りを続けたのである。熊子はまた、暇を見つけては寿太郎に、昔話を聞かせた。例えば、豊臣秀吉の出世話や小さな牛若丸と大男弁慶との一騎打ちの勇ましい話などを面白おかしく聞かせたという。このような祖母から受けた感化が、寿太郎の無邪気な心に正義感の強さや誠実な心が自然と育まれていったに違いないといわれている。

寿太郎の将来を開くため積極的な役割を演じたのが小倉処平である。小倉は、藩から宮崎の「西郷」と称され、後にイギリスとフランスに留学し経済学を修め、副参議それに政府の高官に選抜された官僚となった人物である。小倉は、また明治二年の春、寿太郎が13歳の時に辰徳堂を卒業し、藩費留学生としての資格を得た時に、寿太郎を長崎の英語学校に引率した先輩でもあった。小倉は寿太郎に「これからは英語の時代」と藩主に進言し寿太郎の長崎留学を実現させるばかりか、宮崎の小藩でも大学南校に入学できるよう制度改正を政府に働きかけてその制度も実現化させた。そのお陰で寿太郎は「貢進生」入学することになったのである。

同年（明治二年）の五月に小倉は、小村ら藩費留学生を引率して長崎まで向かったが、彼等が目指していたフルベッキ先生が、明治政府の招きで東京の開成学校に着任した後であった。一行は、出鼻をくじかれたが、寿太郎は「英語一人案内」を買って独学で、当時の国際社会へと視

野を広げてゆくのである。

開国以来、関税自立権のない不平等な取り扱いを受けていた後進国の日本は、小村寿太郎が外務大臣の時に条約改正に成功し、遂に先進国の仲間入りが可能となった。

ところで、宮崎日日新聞の長友 貫太郎氏は、小村寿太郎は「歴史上の著名人」ではあっても、「身近な著名人ではない」という見方が強いと指摘したことがある。例えば、以下の当時18歳であった寿太郎が残した英文の自叙伝の一端は、その空所を埋め、より身近な存在とする新発見の資料と言える。それはまた、18歳の寿太郎がつづった青春の自画像といえる記録書である。以下の記録書は、特に、寿太郎が青年時代に観察した幕末から明治に移行する激動の時代の日本の社会の様子、歴史観を知る上で貴重な資料と言えよう。

祖父の善四郎からは「旅をして外を観察する目」、父の寛からも「外国語習得」の大切さを教えられた寿太郎であったが、当時18歳であった青年 小村の英語表現力は、新渡戸稲造（米国人のメアリー夫人が武士道の英文編集に関与する。）の英語力にも勝るとも劣らないものがある。

I. My Autobiography

I was born in a solitary rural town, about three years after the memorable visit of Commodore Perry. I had hardly breathed when the whole country felt a great shock which proved more disastrous in its effect than any ever experienced in Japan. While yet a child, the feudal system existed both in its spirit and form, though in a fast declining state. I was early impressed therefore with those early ideas of feudality. Although I passed my childhood amid the scenes and circumstances incident to feudal life and received my early education among the superstitious mass of the country population, I am living under an improved condition and cultivating myself in the light of science and philosophy. Thus reflecting upon my past life, I can not hesitate to divide it into two periods; the first that of rural life and the second that of city life. In the former, I observed man in his local manners and in the latter, I have * * * ing man in his general

nature. Locality and generality are what characterize the respective periods of my life as far as it goes.

I was home-bred until your years old. At the age of five I began to attend a private school and continued to go there until I was put into a public school. Unfortunately for me, in early childhood, I had very delicate health and wanted to take medicine "every alternative day" as my grand-mother used to say. This circumstance prevented me from making hard study and I made so little progress in the private school, that in point of memory I was far below those under my age. My early education was, therefore, neglected and imperfect.

At the age of twelve, I entered the public school, where I studied the Chinese Classics and learned a bit of history of Japan. Every-day lessons were, on the whole, easy and simple, although I found sometimes difficulties in composing poems. It was the circumstance of school to have it opened on the eleventh of the first month. On that particular day, all the school-boys and school-masters congregated together, the head-master read some speeches (usually selected pieces taken from the Classics) and we were required to bow down before the image of Confucius or Koshi as we call him. On those days I felt very strange, I remember to find boys of seven or eight years of age dressed up like men above fifteen. These boys lost their fathers and were obliged to pretend they were in majority, that is, above fifteen, for it was feudal law that no minor could succeed his father and on the failure of male heirs, a part on the whole of his hereditary income should escheat to his load.

From early childhood, I enjoyed the benefit of associating with men of different orders. I was enabled to form impressions on teas, agriculture and knighthood. This was the effect of my peculiar situation. I took up residence in the town. Looking up northward from my residence, I could see a castle standing on a rock ... ng in nature. Immediately outside the castle, there were the mansions of the chief vassals. There comes the town population and finally, the villages scattered all over the county. During the days, I spent my time in the school filled by (with) boys belonging to military rank. There I had companion

of the military society and was animated with romantic spirit and chivalric honor, the subject of every conversation being the stories of the old heroes. When I was at home, my associates were town-boys having the profession of trade in view. They would not study anything like the Classics or history, but devoted themselves particularly to the study of arithmetic. I used to go to and from with an abacus in hand and learnt a bit of arithmetic. It was considered, however, a disgraceful thing for an aristocrat to study the art of arithmetic, and in the school its study was not allowed. Nay, it was even disgraceful to know how to count money. One who should think two and two do not make four was considered more noble than one who knew two times two make four. Trade was regarded as a mean business, and very naturally so, because traders were ignorant and knew no other means of gaining money than by defrauding buyers. If they got money, they knew not how to save it, but by keeping it in a strong box. The term merchant was synonymous to the term either liar or miser. At present, on the contrary, merchants are getting into importance in the social position, and the military class is considered to consist of idle creatures, who earn their living not by their labor, but by that of farmers, laborers and traders; that is, they live by hereditary incomes. Now, to turn to my agricultural employment. I had an uncle who possessed a large farm in the vicinity of the town. When it was a farming season of the year, I used to go to his farm and assist him with hard labor. While I was working hard on the farm, I was sometimes discovered by some of my class-mates who happened to pass the by-road and they often laughed at my low employment as they considered it, but I was quite indifferent. I was here that I had companion of villages. Although the peasants were subject to heavy burden and consequently obliged to work very hard, yet nothing like poverty existed among them. Each family had, if not in the time of bad crop, an annual supply sufficient to support all its members and none lived by beggary. They were not, however, allowed to sell or lease their lands, until very lately when the government declared that their lands should be their own. They are now absolute proprietors of the soil which they cultivate. This policy was right and expedient, I consider this to be the true,

that if the farms are large, alienation should be free in order that they may be subdivided and if small, in order that they may be united.

The latter part of this rule is the case with Japan. Here, the farms are too much subdivided, and large farms are beginning to appear on consequence of free alienation and demand for lands by rich nobles and merchants. These large farmers will, I hope, introduce machines and try experiments for agricultural improvements. On the whole, the peasants are at present in a more comfortable and happy situation than they used to be. Nevertheless, they rise up in insurrection in some parts. Some may ask, if they had been [are] in a better condition, what made them rise up? This may be ascribed to the legislation in advance of the character of people, to the misapprehension on their parts of certain Imperial proclamations and finally, to the strict taxation, the last of which has not been noticed by many persons. The indiscriminate taxation by special custom or on account of a particular privilege granted by the lord. At present, all are equally taxed. Feudal privileges or local customs are not regarded and justly so. Local laws giving way for general or national laws, local inconveniences naturally arise, but we can do nothing to help this.

Now that I was brought up three years in the school, I began to feel patriotic emotions, through patriotism arising from a mere local prejudice. About this time, the country was in agitation with the question of foreign intercourse. The anti-foreign party was formed. The poor were suffering from famine and the rise of prices on commodities. Popular clamor was loud against foreigners and the government of Yedo. Cholera also broke out and swept away thousands of men. The people thought nature and man combined in the scheme of national destruction. The Shogun's government weakened and powerful Daimios divided in their views, there was no hope of increasing national strength. At the same time, the country stood exposed to the extreme danger of foreign invasion. Under the circumstances the chief Daimios saw the necessity of centralizing power in one sovereign in order to expel the common danger with united efforts and to promote national prosperity. They persuaded, therefore, the Shogun that he should give

us his long enjoyed political power and he followed their patriotic advice. This was the immediate cause of the civil war which burst upon the country. The principal threatens of this war being confined to the north, my own province enjoyed perfect tranquility, save that military preparations were alive everywhere. I remained calm in the school and continued the course of study. Much of my time, however, was absorbed by military exercises which became then universal. All men, in spite of their profession or condition, were required to serve in the army. My uncle joined a company of a few hundred soldiers sent to serve in the Imperial army. I was exceedingly desirous of going with him, not as a common soldier, but as a drummer, for I had acquired by this time some skill in beating the drum. The school-boys were inspired with ambition for military distinction and many of them left school and entered the army.

My aspiration for literary distinction was fortunately greater than military ambition and I did not neglect my education. I was very anxious, however, of traveling abroad for the purpose of observing the condition of people in different places, but I did not accomplish that object till some years after the close of the war. This desire for travel arose from the circumstance that my grandfather was a great traveler and he infused my mind with interesting ideas which he formed by observing peculiar local customs.

Scarcely a year had passed when the war was at an end.

The immediate effects of the war were the Imperial declarations. His majesty promised the people more just and equitable government and announced them to establish foreign intercourse on a more firm basis. The Emperor proclaimed the celebrated "Five Maxims" which he and his advisers took oath to maintain and have ever since observed so far as expediency allowed them. The substance of these maxims may be expressed with the following few words: Representative government, National Unity, Liberty, Civilization and Promotion of knowledge. Thus his present Majesty has begun his prosperous reign with the promise of liberty for the people and free intercourse with foreign nations, reign hopeful as happy for the people at home and honorable for the nation abroad.

Shortly after the end of the war, I set out on journey for Nagasaki with the purpose of studying English, for that city was once considered the best place for learning foreign languages. On my departure, I met with difficulties. Many old-fashioned friends of mine did not indeed oppose to my going, but tried to let me change my design. My father who was then in Osaka had sagacity to foresee the importance of acquiring the knowledge of one of foreign languages, the study of which has become afterwards universal throughout the Empire. He wrote me that I should not change my design under whatever circumstances. I could not, of course, see the growing importance and usefulness of the new course of study I was about to enter and I had a strong inclination to continue the study of Classics. It was hard for me to determine whether I would take the advice of my friends or my father's, and I was wandering between the two until when I made up my mind to follow the latter's advice on the instance of a friend of mine to do so. This friend was then in Nagasaki. He sent me a letter in which it was stated that nothing would be more foolish to take the blind advice of old-fashioned gentlemen who knew nothing about foreigners and their countries. I started therefore, for Nagasaki, leaving a letter to my friends with the following words: "I can not defer, my dear friends, to your opinion on this matter, for I made up my mind to know everything about foreigners and judge them accordingly." After the journey of fifteen days, I arrived at Nagasaki, but to my disappointment, I found no good school there. The seat of foreign education had already been transferred to Tokyo, where I am living now. The names of Keio-gi-juku or Fuku-zwa's private school and Kai-sei-jo were eminent. I resolved to enter one of these schools. After sojourning for a couple of months at Nagasaki, I embarked for Yokohama with a company of four friends. I spent five days for the voyage on the board of P. M. S. the N. York, and arrived at the port and soon came up to this city. Having entered at once in Kai-sei-jo, I took up for the first time the study of English. At this time, the system of instruction and modes of discipline were quite different from what they are at present. Instruction was given mostly by native tutors and we had reading classics only once or twice a-week with English or American

teachers. The chief work of students consisted in translating English into Japanese and trying to understand the meaning of text-books and we never tried to commit to memory any important facts or principles in them. Such systems of instruction was of course very imperfect and some improvement was necessary. By-and-by, an important reform was effected. By this reform, the curriculum of foreign colleges was introduced with the name Sei-soku in contradiction to the collegiate course in the old system which was called Hen-soku. I believe Mr. Katsuzuki (Katsuki), of Saga, was of one the first who proposed the plan of reform. Thus, the new words Sei-soku and Hen-soku had their origin in Kai-sei-jo. Kai-se-jo adopted exclusively the seisoku, while Fukuzwa was the defender of the hensoku, but lately he has changed his views and is now rather inclined to the seisoku. About this time, the study of foreign languages became universal. The superiority of European politics, literature, philosophy, science, and arts excited admiration of those who studied anything about the subject. Translation of miscellaneous useful books by Fukuzawa. Uchida and others, and versions of law books by Mitsuzukuri (Mitsukuri) and others had certainly a great influence upon the Japanese mind.

In the same year that there was a great change in the college, we witnessed a great political revolution. I mean the final abolition of the feudalism. Although its form had been abolished some years before, its spirit still existed in reality. Local views and feelings of local interest being still prevalent, nothing was more necessary, in order to increase national strength and to promote national prosperity, than the entire overthrow of the feudal system and consequent centralization of power. The object was accomplished by the bloodless revolution. In relation to the power of taxation, the military force and the administration of justice, government was centered in the imperial hand. Society was also, to some extent, consolidated to form a Japanese nation. There appeared the Japanese patriotism. National interests and general ideas have ever since taken the possession of every intelligent mind. By this revolution, Japan has done what European nations did in the fifteenth century. Towards the end of the century

European nations began the process of centralization, and in the beginning of the sixteenth century, Europe witnessed the commencement of diplomacy, treaties, alliances, and wars and the rise of international trade. Japan established more friendly intercourse with other nations, when the feudality was broken down and power was centralized then, both in Japan and Europe, centralization and foreign intercourse began both at the same time. There is, however, a difference between Europe of the fifteenth century and Japan. In Europe, foreign intercourse was the effect of civilization and in Japan it was the cause of centralization. For instance, England began to interfere more regularly in foreign affairs and to establish intercourse, after the nobility was annihilated and consequently the royal power was increased. On the contrary, in Japan foreign intercourse being once opened, centralization of power was necessary to defend the country against foreign foes and even indispensable to keep its independence. But did England or France or any other country of the middle ages break down feudalism without bloodshed? In England, centralization was the result of the long wars of the Roses. In France, the feudal system was substantially overthrown in the fourteenth century, but it was not until the revolution of 1789 that the oppressive exactions entailed upon the peasantry were finally removed. In Japan, it was overthrown without any scene of bloodshed. This success is owing to the combined efforts of the people and the government. Previous to the revolution, many Daimios resigned their offices and surrendered their territorial rights simply from patriotic motive. There were indeed, obstinate Daimios, but foreseeing their fate, they were not disposed to oppose. Letters were sent to the Great Council and memorials were presented to the Shugi-In or the deliberative assembly advising the real centralization. The policy of the government was indeed sanctioned by the public spirit of the age.

With the political change, my mind underwent an entire revolution, I was no longer bound with local prejudices. My patriotism far from being a mere prejudice, I suffered it to be sanctioned with reason. This is the natural effect of traveling, for it gives freedom to the mind. I was still loyal to my old prince, but when he was removed from the office, I rejoiced at it rather than lamented

for national patriotism was greater than loyalty to him. It was a strange thing how few foreigners can understand why so quietly the Daimios gave up their feudal rights. They say the high officers were once the subject and Ka-ros of the Daimios and it is strange how they undertook the ruin of their masters. They can easily understand, if they remember that the officers felt patriotic emotions more deeply, as I did myself, than loyal feelings toward their former masters.

Now, I shall close my autography, pointing out the subjects which I promise you to write upon a future opportunity. These are my observations in Kiu-siu during the last tour over it, the change of ministry in the close of the last year, and the late outbreak in Saga.

Written by Justice, in the year 1874.

Kaisei-gakko, Tokio, Japan

II. Contrasts in Historical Works

When we inquire into History about the great nations of antiquity and the enlightened countries of modern times, it will tell us how such a great empire, as that of the Romans, came into existence, how it flourished, how it began to de come to cay and finally why it fell, it will tell us also how the most civilized nations of the present time have come to be what we see today. This inquiry in History is most important and interesting to us, and consists in seeking the relation between causes and effects. It is far more difficult to find out this relation than to describe mere visible facts, but we should do so, because, by inquiring into this relation, we understand the vital essence of History. Now let us sees the merit of containing this immortal portion of History or what is called the philosophy of history. English histories have certainly, in my view, this merit. We find through in almost every page of an English history. On the other hand, Japanese histories are most excellent in the correct statement of visible facts and in accuracy of details. English histories treat of a subject in more systematic forms than ours. The great defect in our historical works is that we take often a great pain to find out what page we must look in to obtain the description of a certain

event or a person. They seldom contain exact contents of subjects; they never have an index.

If I am required to make comparison between a Japanese and English historian, I will compare them thus. A Japanese historian has the merit of stating facts with correctness and without much prejudice; an English historian has the skill of generalizing these facts. A Japanese historian has perhaps judgment of an English historian, but has no skill. The glory of the former lies in the power to resist the dominion of prejudice; the glory of the latter lies in the skill of generalization.

Such are, if I judge correctly, the striking features of contrast. The defects of our histories are to be remedied by future historians when they become familiar with the philosophical & scientific treatment of the subject. Their excellences, combined with remedies supplying their wants, will produce a perfect history.

By Komura

以下の小村寿太郎（当時19歳）の時に残したrare collectionで重要な英文自叙伝の記録は、開成学校（東大の前身）のお雇い外国人英語教師であったW. E. グリフィスが1874年7月19日に帰国後、ラトカーズ大学に保管していた資料に基づくものである。

III. Cambridge Set. 23, 1875

Dear Sir:

I am now happily situated in this pleasant city of Cambridge. I am here, boarding with a respective family, all the members of which treat me as their friend and companion. The house in which I live is located in a very pleasant street within a stone's throw from Harvard College, and I am surrounded by a crowd of students who live in the boarding houses or families in my neighborhood so that it is unavoidable to remain unacquainted with them.

The condition of the Law School gives me a great satisfaction. In examining the catalogues I find that 4/5 of all the students in Law School are graduates of

this or some other colleges and I am very glad to find this, for I doubt not my future intercourse with young students of superior intelligence will prove a great benefit to me. The Law library and college library are open to Law students and they can take out any books from either.

In short, my expectation here is what I expected or anyone could expect to be. A respectable family, the intelligent neighborhood, and a good library will, I hope, serve my purpose of studying, besides Law and its application, America and Americans from the physical, moral, social and political points of view.

I have read your contributions to the *N. A. Review* over and over again with more than an ordinary interest and pleasure. Of course, I do not pretend to criticize your literary merits, yet I cannot but express my admiration for the soundness of your judgments and the accuracy of historical facts on which your judgments are based. When any of your future contributions or lectures is published, please let me know where I can get it. I like to get all your writings on Japan, for these writings give a Japanese student special advantages, besides those which are to be derived from the intrinsic value of literary merits. I now stop, hoping that you will be most successful in the lectures of the coming season.

Always & Truly Yours,

J. Komura

c/o Mrs Barnard

46 Trowbridge St.

Cambridge, Mass.

小村寿太郎は、大学南校在学中に在学中の明治七年（1874年）に、恩師であったウィリアム・エリオット・グリフィスの授業で“*My Biography*”（「私の自叙伝」）というタイトルで英作文を書いている。

グリフィスは、青年、寿太郎の英文によるつづり、文法力、論理力に驚いたと記録されている。上記の英文の記録書は、小村寿太郎が英語を思え始めてわずか五年目に書かれた貴重な資料である。現代人には想像もつかない勉強ぶりや成果であるようだ。これまで、小村による自筆資料は皆無と伝えられていたが、内容といい執筆年代といい、極めて貴重

な資料である。特にグリフェイスを驚かせたことは、寿太郎の英語力以上に、この青年の洞察力と考えの深さだったであった。

寿太郎がこの自叙伝を書いたのは、日本が明治維新を向かえた年から六年後であった。また、廃藩置県はそれより三年前であった。

ほんの昨日まで、廃藩置県体制と門閥制度に縛られて、言い換えれば武士階層の独裁制の基にあった明治日本が、身分差別や上意下達の政治を打ち破って、新たに国民国家への転身を図ろうとした時代を小村は、つぶさに観察していた若者であった。

話しは戻るが、寿太郎は、翌年の1875年に第一回文部省派遣留学生としてハーバード大学法学部に入学する。寿太郎は成績が優秀であったため、予科を経ずに本科に入学。寿太郎の日頃の素行が外国人留学生の間でもよく、頭脳明晰で、また立ち振る舞いも落ち着いており、考え方も堅実で風格が自然に備わっていたという。寿太郎は弁護士を志望していたため、法律学部を卒業後は、ニューヨークにある法律事務所で二年間、実務研修を行った。

又、ポーツマス講和条約の期間とその前後に小村をミディエーターとして支えた金子 賢太郎は、ハーバード大学で一年後輩で寝食を共にした親友である。金子は小村が首席全権としてポーツマスに赴いた際に、同窓であったセオドー・ルーズベルト大統領との間を取り持つとともに、グリフェイスとも連携し、対米世論工作に尽力し小村をサポートした。

On William Elliot Griffis

William Elliot Griffis was an educator, clergyman, and author of numerous books and articles vis-à-vis Meiji Japan and the Meiji Restoration. While he was a student at Rutgers University, from 1865 to 1869, Griffis tutored several Japanese students who were among the first to study in the United States. In 1870, Griffis was given a position to teach science at a school in Echizen (present Fukui Prefecture). But after less than a year he resigned there and took up a position to teach Nanko-that was later to become Tokyo University. Among his students were future prime ministers, ambassadors, business entrepreneurs and educators. Jutaro Komura was one of the topnotch students of his. Griffis' notable

contributions was his voluminous writing on Japan, including 18 books, several hundred articles, and hundreds of public lectures. Griffis left Japan in 1874 and in 1876 published *The Mikado's Empire*, an early firsthand account of things Japanese. He was twice recipient of the Order of the Rising Sun. Throughout his life he kept up with Japanese affairs and toward the end of his life, he revisited Japan.

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