

INTERCULTURAL NEGOTIATION & DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION

(異文化間交渉と外交コミュニケーション)

Re-examination of U. S.-Japan Backdoor Negotiations &
Matsuoka Diplomacy until December 1941

「1941年12月迄の日米秘密外交交渉と松岡外交の再検討」

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序 文

それは、1941年12月7日、日曜日の朝であった。アメリカの艦船は繫留波場に錨をおろし、いつものように、おだやかな陽光を浴びていた。1人の甲板長が遠方を旋回しながら飛んでいる飛行機群に気づいてはいたが、空襲訓練だと思い、さして気にもとめずにいたし、その他の乗組員達の大部分は、島民同様まだ眠りからさめずにいるか、教会の鐘の音を聞きながら朝食をとっているかのどちらかであった。その時、急降下爆撃機が鋭い金属音をたてて突入し、雷撃爆撃機がなだれこんできた。炸裂音が空気をつんざき全員配置のサイレンが鳴りわたったのである。一方首都ワシントンでは、大統領は書斎の机に坐って、ハリー・ホプキンス補佐官と戦争とはおよそ縁遠い問題を話していたし、ハワイから急電を受けとったフランク・ノックス海軍長官も、最初はオアフ島ではなくフィリピンの誤りであろうと、信じようとしなかった。1941年12月7日、ホノルル時間午前8時、日本海軍は、ハワイのオアフ島、真珠湾に奇襲攻撃をかけた。これは、12月8日F.D.ルーズベルト大統領の議会においての緊急メッセージ並びにコーデル・ハル国務長官からジョセフ・グルー駐日大使宛に送られた電報によると、宣戦布告なしの一方

的開戦であった。又、これは、まだ日米間の国交断絶もなされていない時の出来事であり、その為、12月7日はアメリカ人の心の中にも忘れる事のできない重大事として刻まれたのである。戦後主に、1960年代からは、それまで未公開であった特にアメリカ側の秘密文書や公刊史料が太平洋戦争研究者にも序々に手に入るようになってきた。しかしながら、アメリカの政治学者アトリー氏の研究に詳しい五味俊樹教授によれば、太平洋戦争に至る過程には、「はじめに日本の政策行動があり、それにアメリカ側がどう対応するかといった基本的構図があることは否められない。そうした歴史的経緯を反映してか研究分野においても同様の状況が展開してきている。太平洋戦争をめぐる日本のことを取り扱った研究は外国人によるものも含めて、数えきれない程の量にのぼる。ところがアメリカのことに関する研究となると非常に少ない状態である(20)。」と、指摘されているが、筆者も同感である。

ところで、日米両国の特に近代外交史を交渉学の観点から参照してみた際、日中事変を拡大させ、太平洋戦争を誘発した主な要因は、一般に1940年9月の三国同盟の締結、1941年7月の南部仏印進駐を頂点とする南進政策、そして1941年の12月までに至る「日米交渉」の挫折と決裂が考えられる*。そして、これ等三つの要因のいずれにも関与し第二次近衛内閣と、ともに指導的役割を演じたのは、長州出身の13歳から21歳まで米国で教育を受け外務省入りした松岡洋右外相であった。松岡洋右と言う名を聞く時一般的には、1933年(昭和8年)2月、ジュネーブで開かれた国際連盟の特別総会でリットン報告書に関する満州国の不認に対して、主席全権として、たくみな英語演説

* 尚、塩崎弘明教授の研究によれば「マジック論」だけで「太平洋戦争への道」を論ずることに無理があると同様「政策決定過程論」だけで「真珠湾への道」を論ずることに無理があるようである(p.56, 24その他5; 7; 10; 11; 13; 19; 20; 26; 30&31も参照されたし)。ただ、「マジック」には、しばしば重大な誤訳ないしは曲訳があり、日本政府の真意を歪曲し、限られた米国政府首脳に配布され交渉破綻の一因になった事も否定しがたい事実である(p.116, 12)。

で反論し、その席上から昂然と脱退して帰国した人物。そして又、日独伊三国同盟の締結を積極的に推進した人物〔ただし、ここで特筆すべきは、松岡も当初、対米交渉にあたって強い立場を確保する為に三国条約と日ソ中立条約との組合せを利用するつもりであったが、ドイツの対ソ攻撃によって彼の対米接近は挫折するのである。松岡の(1)アメリカ(2)大東亜(3)ソ連(4)ヨーロッパ(アフリカも含む)を合わせた四勢力圏バランス・オブ・パワー構想とヘンリー・キッシンジャーの(1)アメリカ(2)ソ連(3)西ヨーロッパ(4)中国、そして(5)日本を合わせた五権力圏バランス・オブ・パワー樹立の試みは時代こそ30年間の違いこそあるものの共通点があるようである。ルー教授もこの点に関して、1970年のキッシンジャー国務大臣は、ソ連との交渉の挺子に使う為、中国を利用しようとしたが、それ以前の1940年代において、すでに松岡外相はソ連に対抗する日本の地位強化の為、イデオロギー上ではなく地政学(geo-politics)上の観点からも、中国との戦争状態を終結しようと試みた。これゆえに松岡、キッシンジャー両氏には共通点があったと指摘している(p.287, 14)。〕と言うイメージと、そして「日米交渉」の妥結を妨害し東条英樹等と共に、敗戦へと導いた元兇の一人であると言う相反したイメージがあり、今日でも後者のイメージが強く、戦後40数年をへた今日までにも本格的な文化人類学的、社会学的、そして交渉学的なアプローチによる松岡外交の研究が少ない、という事にもあらわれている。マイナス面の松岡像は、戦後まもなく公表された近衛手記によって決定的なものとなったが、その後の細谷千博教授、入江昭教授、ルー教授をはじめとする研究者達によって松岡観は、次第に修正されてきている。例えば、「松岡洋右：悲劇の外交官」の著者、豊田穰氏によれば、近衛手記においては、A新聞社のMr.Kによっても記述されていたと発表され話題となった(pp.38-39, 29)。又、松岡洋右自身、東京裁判の判決を待たずに弁明書を残さないまま、1946年カトリックの洗礼を受け(オレゴン時代にはメソジストとして洗礼を受けたが)東大病院で死去し、悲劇の外交官の印象を強めた。さらに甥である佐藤栄作元首相の対米構想にも少なからず影響を与えたと、言われている。はたまた、イスラエル

では松岡は満鉄を利用し、多くのユダヤの人々がヒットラーの暴政から逃げる時、手を貸したとし「建国の友」としても評価されている。

本稿では「日米交渉」の決裂が直接日米開戦につながっただけに、日米交渉それ自体にプレリュード的な影響を与えたバックドア・ネゴシエーション(秘密外交交渉)を取り上げてみたいと思う。この秘密外交交渉は、ビュート教授が名づけた通称「ザ・ジョンドゥ アソシエイツ」(これは二人のアメリカ人カトリック教会のドラウト神父ーウォルシュ司教と井川ー岩畔両氏の四人からなるグループ)が中心となって行った。このグループは後に、近衛首相、ルーズベルト大統領、野村大使、松岡外相そしてハル國務長官、対日ハト派のグルー大使はむろん、対日タカ派のスティムソン陸軍長官、ノックス海軍長官、H. イキス内務長官、R. マックスウエル輸出管理局長、モーゲンソー財務長官などを巻き込んで1940年の11月末から日米間の私的秘密バックドア交渉活動を行うのであった(pp.179-185, 31&24)。又、本稿では1973年から1986年の期間に筆者が自ら行ったアメリカ西海岸と山口、兵庫両県におけるインタビューを含むフィールドワークに基づき、松岡外交を中心にその推移を異文化交渉と外交史の枠内で位置づけてみたい。特に強調したい点は、「日米交渉」は、日米戦争という重大悲劇を引き起こした要因と見なされているが、もしも、1940年11月から始まったバックドア交渉が、成功裏に終わっていたならば、50年前の真珠湾攻撃は防げたのではないか、という筆者の考えである。戦後50年、日本は戸惑いの中で経済的にも大国に、申し上がったが、外交や政治面では孤立化し「外圧」の中で守勢に立たされている様に思えてならない。お互いの表層的な両国間の物質的な「モノ」に対する知識は量的に増えていると言えよう。しかしながら、深層に横たわる文化的・心理的な対人コミュニケーションや交渉を通じての相互理解は50年前と比べて深まったであろうか? たとえば、スーパー301条の適用を見る際、気づく点は、301条の真意とは、よく言われるように、これ迄は、日本を同盟国と見なしていたアメリカが急に competitor (競争相手)として日本を認識したことの現われであり、これ迄はお互いに信頼し合い、もちつもたれつの

相互依存関係の日米同盟国が、相互不信の関係に陥ってしまった事である。日米同盟の要であった日米安全保証条約は、東西冷戦体制の崩壊後、今日においては、もはやかつてのように必要条件でなく、それに代わるものとして、故E.O.ライシャワー教授も時あるごとに強調されていた様に、政治面のみならず、経済、外交面における交渉力こそ、日本とアメリカそして、他の民族国家の将来を決定づける要素である。その為にも過去の教訓と経験に学ぶべきではなかろうか。

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Introduction

It was on Sunday Morning, December 7, 1941 (Honolulu time) that hundreds of Japanese carrier-launched airplanes suddenly attacked the bulk of the U. S. Pacific Fleet on the berth at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese surprise attack on the day in Hawaii prompted Franklin D. Roosevelt to deliver an urgent message to Congress the following day, which read :

Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message.

While this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or armed attack. . . . I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December seventh, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

THE WHITE HOUSE, DECEMBER 8, 1941 (p. 793-794, 4).

On December 8, 1941, Cordell Hull dispatched the following telegram to Joseph Grew:

From Hull, Washington

To Grew, Tokyo

The Department has been informed by the War Department that at 8 a. m. today (Honolulu time) 50 or more Japanese dive-bombing planes, presumably from an air-craft carrier, dropped bombs in and around Honolulu. According to unconfirmed radio reports, the Japanese Government has declared war against the United States and Great Britain (p. 296, in Section II, 7).

From that moment on, U.S.-Japan diplomatic relations of the interwar years ended in ultimate tragedy. The tragedy was preceded by several years of "cold war," yet neither Washington nor Tokyo favored war. Post-war scholarship also supports the view. Irie spells out in his book "Nichibei Sensō" that the two countries stood for opposite principles. Roosevelt, for instance, indicated to Lord Halifax that if Japan did thrust into British territories in Southeast Asia, a powerful blow aimed at Japan might be made jointly by England and the United States. However, government officials in Washington and Tokyo had been engaged in

persistant efforts to prevent the outbreak of war in the Pacific (pp. 41-42 & p. 50, 11). Conry also commented along these lines "In Washington the Roosevelt administration did not want war; and in Tokyo,... many influential elements of the Japanese Government, including Konoye [Matsuoka, Nomura and others] and the Emperor, were anxious to avoid a military confrontation with the United States (p. 298, 3)".

Seen in retrospect, some argue that because of the conflicting interests particularly over the China question ("Japan's Monroe Doctrine" versus "The U.S. Open Door Policy"), economic restrictions operating against Japan,¹ the outbreak of war in Europe in September

1 On July 26, 1939, Franklin Roosevelt quite dramatically announced that the United States intended to denounce the Commercial treaty of 1911, and Secretary Hull sent its formal notice to Tokyo. The document read... The Government of the United States, acting in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article XVII of the treaty under reference, gives notice hereby of its desire that this treaty be terminated, and having thus given notice, will expect the treaty, together with its accompanying protocol, to expire six months from this date by Cordell Hull (p 189,4). The announcement came to the Japanese as a tremendous shock. This is when Japan had to expect a variety of economic blows. The two items "oil" and "scrap iron" were put under embargo on September 26, 1940.

At that time, for Japan the United States was the single most important supplier of goods. 33.6% of her total import in 1937, 34.4% in 1938, and 34.3% in 1939 were from the United States. Japan, therefore, stood at the cross-roads : whether she should fall under the economic power of the Roosevelt administration and discard her expansionist policies abroad, or whether she should cling to the existing policies and enter into negotiations with the United States from the position of strength. The Japanese Foreign Office chose the latter.

Nonetheless, when Japan's decision on a Southern advance policy

1939, Japan's Southern advance in August 1941, and what is termed "Japan's block policy" normally known as the Tripartite Pact of September 1940, both the United States and Japan preferred war to the acceptance of the existing atmosphere and conditions the otherside did seek to impose. Therefore, the eruption of war in the Pacific on December 7 (Honolulu time) was unavoidable. Yet there are some others who proclaim that should the last peace effort through negotiations between the Roosevelt Administration and the Konoe Government bear some fruit or prove to be successful in terms of decisional/communication, the war in the Pacific might have been averted.

The official U. S.-Japan diplomatic negotiations during the inter-war years started in February with the appointment of Kichisaburō Nomura as Ambassador to Washington and lasted until December 1941. In a period of approximately ten months, the following three Ministers of Foreign Affairs—Yōsuke Matsuoka, Sadajirō Toyoda, and Shigeharu Tōgō—were appointed under the second Konoe Government and the Tōjō Cabinet. A significant point to be stressed here is the fact that prior to Nomura's departure for Washigton, certain unoffical, yet secret, backdoor negotiations had been carried out primarily by two American Catholic priests and two Japanese. Albeit a few accounts of or stories about their activities (the Drought-Walsh, Ikawa-Iwakuro talks involving other people and Yōsuke Matsuoka) have been available, all too often there has been little effort in the study of how their communicative activities usually operating outside conscious awareness, and involvement in policy formulation and decision-making in 1940-1941, altered the

was made, it met the American's opposition. And Japan's action prompted the Roosevelt administration to send the American navy all the way to Pearl Harbor (pp.84-85, 12; 201,13& pp.256-262,19).

subsequent course of the official U. S.-Japan diplomatic negotiations. The purposes of this paper are to: explore the circumstances under which they became involved in the secret backdoor negotiations and how they tried to set a stage for the official negotiations in the winter (November and December) of 1940 with particular reference to Matsuoka diplomacy; and portray briefly certain features of the diplomatic negotiations after the winter of 1940, focusing on the scope of the John Doe associates' activities and, what Dean C. Barnlund terms "critical incidents" associated with interpersonal communication within each administration as well as between the two governments in the postscript section.

The Beginning of Backdoor Negotiations

The unofficial backdoor negotiations got under way with the arrival of Bishop James E. Walsh, Super General of the Catholic Foreign Mission Society of America at Meryknoll, New York and his second in command, Vice General Father James M. Drought on November 25, 1940.

When interviewed by reporters from the English press, Bishop Walsh stated that the first aim of their trip to Japan "is the creation and development of a Japanese clergy to minister to the Japanese people. Therefore, it is the culmination of our efforts and our greatest triumph when... a Japanese Superior can be placed over missionaries and assume full responsibility... After all, we work to perpetuate the Faith, not ourselves (pp. 73-74, 2)." Shiozaki's study reveals that the main aim of Walsh's visit to Japan was to inspect a church (affiliated with Maryknoll) in Kyoto and to celebrate its 50th anniversary (pp. 47-48, 24). However, contrary to his publicly-made remarks, Drought held a diametrically different elusive scenario — a secret diplomatic scheme for a Japanese-American rapprochement without using the official channel of

communication. In other words, he had an ardent desire to rectify the American public's perceptions and opinions, which had long been characterized as misunderstandings and biases, and to capture the attention of the American public — the matter which should have been left in the hands of President Roosevelt. While it was Mr. Setsuzo Sawada, former Ambassador to Brazil, who briefed influential Japanese government and business leaders on their trip, he was not well informed about Drought's scheme through his close friend Robert Cuddihy.² In looking into Lu's study, Sawada was led to believe that the purpose of their visit to Japan was to address goodwill or peace-mission message to the Japanese. Drought's revolutionary and highly political plot was not brought to Sawada's attention at that time (pp. 330-331, 14).

The essence of tact that Walsh should be brought into play was also made by Drought, although it was Walsh's belief that politics and religion were two separate things. During the month that followed, Walsh found himself drawn into a series of meetings with both government and business leaders where topics of the conversation revolved around the war in China, German affairs, and American-Japanese diplomatic relations.

One of the principle reasons for Drought's involvement in matters outside his religious task derives from his studied firm belief that he had fostered during his stay in the Far East. Drought himself wrote, 'after

2 Sawada's family members were all Catholic and frequent visitors to Maryknoll. They became acquainted with Cuddihy, a benefactor of Maryknoll, whose concern lay in world peace there while he was stationed in New York as Consul General. Cuddihy was also president of *The Literary Digest* at that time and had been closely connected with Drought (p. 237, 23; pp. 77, 2 & pp. 44, 24).

years of experience in the Far East, that the ordinary American attitude on things Japanese is a serious obstacle to a diplomatic and commercial development that could bring power and profit to the United States'. There was 'too much of the Big Wolf psychology' in current American comment on the orient, 'and not enough intelligent American self-interest (p. 50, 2).'

As previously mentioned, it was primarily through Sawada that Drought and Walsh developed a variety of contacts in Japan so that they could have easy access to Kunihiro Hashida (the Minister of Education), Shunroku Hata (former Army Officer), and others, including Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka.³ Their first move or one of their highlights in Japan was to come into contact with Mr. Matsuoka (pp. 4-5, 26 & p. 174, 5).

The following letter Drought wrote to Frank C. Walker, who served as Postmaster General under the Roosevelt administration, reveals his intention:

It would be extraordinarily helpful if we could have from yourself a personal letter of introduction to Mr. Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister of Japan. I do not desire at all any letters from our State Department if such formal introduction would give a diplomatic color which I am anxious to avoid. I do not know what the practice of Mr. Roosevelt may be... that our effort, which may yield so much during years to come for the

3 Sawada got in touch with Matsuoka on November 1, 1940, and informed the Foreign Minister of their upcoming good-will mission or visit to Japan. Matsuoka took an interest in Sawada's proposal, and expressed his desire to meet them. However, he was not aware of Drought's extraordinarily planned secret ploy (p. 895, 8).

spread of our Catholic Faith, would be sharply facilitated if Mr. Roosevelt would commend us personally to the Premier of Japan (p. 73, 2).

However, to make an appointment with Matsuoka upon their arrival, the first maneuver which had to be undertaken by Walsh and Drought was to convince Sawada and furthermore Vice Minister Chūichi Ohashi who worked as Matsuoka's right-hand man at the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Being asked by Walsh and Drought, Sawada called on Ohashi to inquire into their appointment with Matsuoka. Ohashi consented to Sawada's request and met with the two priests at his official residence. In his talks with Walsh and Drought, they told him something to the effect that "there is a good chance of resuming a friendly relationship between the United States and Japan even nullifying Japan's participation in the Tripartite Pact. All this could be done with the help of the Foreign Minister." They also mentioned that "we already had a talk with President Roosevelt about the matter (p. 107, 21)." Ohashi heard their remarks with caution, but complied with their solicitation.

Matsuoka at that time, contrary to popular belief, was seeking the American aid in bringing about peace in the Pacific by means of a special treaty. That was the main goal Matsuoka kept in mind. Drought, on the other hand, sought the aid of Japan. And to achieve the goal, (as Hosoya, Irie, Trezise, and others proclaim), Matsuoka justified the Tripartite pact to prevent war across the Pacific by maintaining a firm stand.⁴ For Matsuoka, the Tripartite treaty was a "defensive policy" in nature (not an offensive one as many people contended) to keep the United States out of war and furthermore, "to facilitate a settlement with the USSR (p. 287, 27)." Irie, for example, enlarges on the point by stressing:

Matsuoka seems to have been completely sincere in stat-

ing again and again that the Axis alliance and Japan's non-aggression pact with Russia, both part of the block policy, were designed to prevent war between Japan and the United States. America's influence in Asia and hostility to Japan were such, he thought, that only presenting a determined stand would America be deterred from entering the war against Japan. Matsuoka's view of America is revealed in an informal statement he made in September 1940 (p. 209, 10).

However, it holds true that Matsuoka's indication that Japan could turn either toward the European war or away from it was not explicitly communicated to others. And his pivot idea was often, because of his defiant behavior, interpreted to mean that the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy was the foundation of Japanese diplomacy (p. 312, 2 & pp. 111-113, 23).

High-handed Action, Vicissitudes, & Matsuoka Diplomacy

They captured an opportunity of meeting with Matsuoka on three occasions. Their first encounter with Matsuoka took place on December

4 For further information, see Hosoya's "Nihon Gaikō No Zashō (pp. 74-75, 9)," Irie's "Nichibeī Sensō (pp. 41-42, 11)," Trezise's "Our Two Countries (p.5, 30)," Lu's "Taiheiyō Sensō No Dōtei (pp. 139-143,13)", & "Matsuoka Yōsuke To Sono Jidai (pp.230-252, 14)", Toland's "The Rising Sun (pp. 72-74, 28), Miyake's "Nichi-Doku-I Sangoku Dōmei No Kenkyu (pp.293-300, 15)," Saito's "Azamukareta Rekishi (pp. 22-33, 22)," and Yoshii's "Matsuoka Gaiko No Tenkai To Sono Zasetu (32)," Moore's "With Japan's Leaders (pp. 185-188, 18)" and Miwa's "Matsuoka Yōsuke, Sono Ningen to Gaikō (pp. 167-174, 17)." Additionally, "Taiheiyō Sensō Eno Michi, Vol. 5" edited by Kokusai Seiji Gakkai (20) offers a great deal of information on the Tripartite Pact.

5. On December 19, they spent most of their time on hearing his views at the America-Japan Society luncheon because Matsuoka was to deliver an farewell address at the luncheon in honor of Nomura, newly appointed Ambassador to Washington. However, prior to that date, Drought had already made another move by drafting out a special address for either Premier Konoé or Foreign Minister Matsuoka, and his move had gone unnoticed. The special address Drought prepared for either one of them contained some of the major elements which were based on the "working analysis." Once he was informed that Matsuoka would be a keynote speaker at the luncheon, Drought started to negotiate directly with Sawada and Ohashi whether he could obtain a substantially acceptable commitment or assurance from the Japanese Government with regard to the content of the special address. Having cleared the matter at the Foreign Ministry, Sawada gave Drought a rather favorable answer by indicating that "Matsuoka might be disposed to offer assurances of the type desired when he addressed the America-Japan luncheon on December 19." Then Drought replied that "as soon as the assurances were given he would cable his friend Frank Walker in Washington. In this way it would be possible to get the Foreign Minister's remarks before the American people prior to Christmas(p. 92, 2)."

To get further assurances, Drought negotiated with Ohashi and urged him to present the special address to Matsuoka. Ohashi gives his reminiscences of the day when Drought called upon him by saying that it was around the middle of December... Mr. Drought suddenly called on me, and he came on very strong. Then he asked me whether the Foreign Minister could deliver an address he had drafted at the farewell party for Mr. Nomura on December 19. He added that the speech manuscript contained something valuable which in turn could open an avenue for a

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friendly relationship between Japan and the United States. When I handed it out to the Foreign Minister, he skimmed through the manuscript and put it away in a miff. Of course, he did not accept Mr. Drought's offer (pp.108-109, 21). Drought's very assertive style of communicative pattern did not turn out to be an asset.

The third meeting was held at his private residence over lunch, and other invited guests, besides Walsh and Drought, were Setsuzo Sawada, Tadao Ikawa, and Kaname Wakasugi. Of the three meetings, a look into the December 5th meeting is necessary on the ground that it offered, what this author terms, "initial vicissitudes" they were to experience in the year ahead.

Walsh and Drought took the liberty of meeting with the Foreign Minister Matsuoka on December 5 at his residence. As Walsh recalls, they presented Matsuoka a copy of personal memorandum on policy and strategy known as a "working analysis" prepared by Drought, together with a summary of the main point. Part of the working analysis (written as if the writer had been a Japanese) states in effect that "Japan is so far distant, its actions have been grossly misinterpreted, its policy so badly understood, its incidents of diplomatic conflict so frequent. . . ." It also stressed that "We must keep in reserve and make no present concessions on our military and political position in China and our Axis Alliance; in East, Central, and North China we can, without any loss whatever, permit the Americans to talk of some sort of political structure which would leave our position unchanged but which could be presented acceptably to American opinion". The main point it declared was that "It should be our aim to dispose affairs that the calling of a plenipotentiary Japan-United States conference at Tokyo, or at Honolulu (but not at Washington) would seem reasonable and desirable in the mind of American public

opinion, if not in the mind of the Roosevelt Government (p.82, 2).” From the beginning, they placed their cards on the table at Matsuoka’s residence, acting as though they had been liaisons representing the U. S. Government. The same memorandum which contains the “working analysis” was later to be distributed by Ikawa to Premier Konoe on December 14 (p.94, 2).⁵

Drought took command of the negotiation and tried to pump his diplomatic scheme into Matsuoka. According to Matsuoka’s chief secretary, Shunichi Kase (who was present at the meeting), Matsuoka showed interest in the product of their proposal. Yet he was not so definite about the terms of peace treaty. Drought, on the contrary, assumed that Matsuoka committed himself to the peace diplomacy when the Foreign Minister mentioned “if he had an opportunity of meeting and talking with President Roosevelt for an hour or so, improvements and the diplomatic breakthrough for peace would be made between the two countries” and also when he asked them “to convey his message to Mr. Roosevelt (p.25, 12 & p.174, 5).” Kase’s observations coincide with Walsh’s. To Walsh’s recollection, “Matsuoka asked us to report President Roosevelt that he wanted to improve relations with the United States, but his attitude of mind toward the actual terms of an agreement was not definite (p. 7, 26).” And Matsuoka later notified Yokichiro Suma, who accompanied Walsh and Drought on the way to the United States, that “until he obtains the full support from the Japanese side, the arrangements for a meeting with President Roosevelt should be withheld.” When Suma informed Walsh of the matter on February 1, 1941 in New York, the Bishop was rather

5 Ikawa, who was so close to Premier Konoe, later joined the Walsh-Drought force along with Hideo Iwakuro.

beset by the gist of the news (p. 7, 26). It appears that it was Drought who took what he had been communicated by Matsuoka at face value and thought that he had received assurances, though the Foreign Minister did not disclose overtly what he had in mind as far as a bargaining lever in negotiation with Roosevelt was concerned. It can be conjectured that Drought failed to read Matsuoka's nonverbal communicative cue. An important point taken into consideration here is that while Matsuoka remained unconvinced for fear of leakage of the information at the meeting, it had been, as Hosoya and Lu point out, his long cherished dream to negotiate with President Roosevelt (p. 215, 13 & pp. 81-82, 9). However, Mr. Ikawa, who also encountered Walsh and Drought at Matsuoka's private residence over lunch on December 23, later passed the information onto Premier Konoe. Ikawa stepped up his efforts to seek a definite commitment from Konoe with regard to Konoe-Roosevelt negotiation meeting getting Matsuoka out of the way.

Nonetheless, at one pole, the December 5th meeting offered Drought a new ray of hope, for it permitted him (instead of stopping him) to put his secret ploy into "high-handed diplomatic action (Dokudan Sen'kō Gaikō⁶)" later in Tokyo and Washington, involving not only Premier Konoe and President Roosevelt but also such people as Ikawa, Iwakuro, Nomura, Mutoh, Walker, Hull and others on both sides of the Pacific. It particularly never occurred to Ikawa and Iwakuro that their decision to involve themselves in the secret scheme behind the scenes was to add a new dimension to the whirlpool and the tragedy of U.S.-Japan diplomatic negotiations, which in the final analysis changed the event of world

6 The term "Dokudan Sen'kō" is translated as either "high-handed action" or "arbitrary action" by Blaker meaning action without government authorization or approval (p. 123, 1).

history. At the other pole, however, the first meeting put Matsuoka in a very awkward position since little did he dream that the meeting with Drought would result in his resignation from the second Konoe Cabinet (on July 16, 1941) —collapse of Matsuoka diplomacy. Ironically, “Japan’s southward expansion policy was carried out on July 28 and 29—twelve days after Matsuoka’s resignation(p. 71, 32),” despite he opposed the High Command’s southward occupation scheme at the Liaison Conferences held several times in June and again on July 2 at the Imperial Conference. He was the only person who was against the advance policy at the Imperial Conference by warning Japan’s further movement of military forces southward would leave no room for further negotiations with the United States(the negotiations between Secretary of State Hull and Ambassador Nomura on the basis of draft proposal “Nichibei Ryokaian” had started on April 14th and 16th, 1941 in Washington, D. C.). However, such a warning was underscored at the Imperial conference(pp. 143-146, 39; pp. 47-56, 33; & pp. 233-234, 13). It should be noted that Germany’s sudden attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 in fact triggered a turmoil in Japan and in the Far East and also created a dilemma for the Roosevelt administration. It was a severe blow to Matsuoka who had concluded the Neutrality Pact in the presence of Starlin on April 13, 1941 at the Kremlin in Moscow for the purpose of: first keeping the United States from tying up with the Soviet Union; second giving Japan a more secured position when undertaking negotiations with the United States from a position of strength; third denouncing Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s continued resistance; and fourth allowing Japan to move southward without fear of being attacked by the Soviet Union from the back (p. 182, 13; & pp. 378-381, 34). However, the Konoe Memoirs, which is said to have also be written by Mr. “K” of “A”

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newspaper company, summed up Matsuoka's policy right after the German invasion into the Soviet Union as follows: "We must attack the Soviet Union. Although we must try to avoid war with America, in the event that America does enter the war (against Germany), we must fight her, too (p. 211, 5).

The United States, meanwhile, deciphered Japanese decision to move into southern Indo-China through "magic" in the early part of July. And on the morning of July 24, the President had a talk with a home defense group under the leadership of Mayor LaGuardia and expatiated on the administration's policy as to how best to take effective action against Japan—the effect of an oil embargo and a freezing order. Pearl Harbor Hearings part 19, and other sources, for example, wrote to the effect that not only the president but the Acting Secretary of State Sumner Wells who had been accused by Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau as being pro-Japanese, and even Secretary of State Hull were not first in complete agreement with the treasury's proposal "all assets be frozen" mainly detailed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Because they thought such action would lead to war. Due primarily to poor handling of information and both verbal and nonverbal warnings, interpersonal communication difficulty multiplied between the President and particularly such hardline sanctionists as Dean Achesons, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, the Department of State, Colonel Russel L. Maxwell, Henry Morgenthau and Henry L. Stimson (pp. 3500-3501, 38; p. 110, 3; p. 98, 39; & Chapter 8, 31). Feis, in this connection, offers the following analysis:

... the President did not worry over the outcome of an embargo as much as some of his military aides. ... The Acting Secretary did not clarify our intentions. Nor did the other officials of the

Treasury and State Departments. On the evening of the 25th they met the press together. Asked whether licences would be issued under the freezing order, Foley, General Counsel of the Treasury, answered that... the effect of the freezing order would probably be to restrict American-Japanese trade. Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson protested the description of the action as an 'embargo.' But he did not explain how far short of one it would be. He had made himself a nuisance to Wells and the White House.... The President was—as he had hinted he would to the cabinet on the 24th —leaving the matter in obscurity.... In an informative message which Admiral Stark sent to the Commandars in Chief of the Pacific, Asiatic, and Atlantic Fleets on July 25, he said 'It is anticipated that export licenses will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products, cotton, and possibly other materials... (pp. 241-242, 5).'

More alarming was the fact that the following morning, the New York Times, in sharp contrast, carried a diametrically different story and branded the issue:

President Roosevelt tonight froze all Japanese assets in the United States, thus virtually severing trade ties with the empire and dealing it the most drastic blow short of actual war (37).

Thereafter, England, Australia, the Netherlands, and the British colonies one after another followed the United States in freezing Japan. And Great Britain wished the United States to fight Japan if the Japanese troops took another step southward. Notwithstanding the President's warning—"if the Japanese Government would withdraw such forces (military forces occupying Indo-China),... Japan would be afforded the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring herself of the source of food supplies and other raw materials in Indochina which she was seeking

secure(p.529,4),” the Japanese Government(as previously described) decided on sending its troops to Indo-China. It was on August 1, 1941 that the American Government announced it would halt Japanese imports of vital war materials from the United States. The public polls and newspapers showing the American public reaction to the economic sanctions against Japan revealed that close to 80 per cent supported the act unless Japan refrained from its southward expansion policy. The Washington Post was in favor of the Roosevelt administration’s policy (40). The following comments released by the New York Times tells something about it, “ ... any action by Japan that threatens a legitimate American interest in the Far East should be met at once by efforts on our part to deal Japanese finance and industry and trade deadly blow(36).” American-Japanese relations, thus, entered a critical phase early in August after Japan’s southern garrison.

Final Remarks

As we have seen, Matsuoka looked upon the tripartite pact as stepping stones to later negotiations. Such a diplomatic strategy, which had been taken seriously before the tripartite pact, was later construed as a reassertion of warning by President Roosevelt and as a threat by Secretary of State Hull, who interestingly enough, believed in the efficacy of the “get tough” approach in negotiation.

Having dealt for years with Americans who are culturally conditioned to use dialectic argumentation(In this method, conflict arises often from the presence of a devil’s advocate) and sometimes a threat as a means of persuasion when communicating and negotiating with others, many political scientists and historians thus far have pointed out that Matsuoka, as a result of growing up on the West Coast in America during

the character-forming period of youth and young manhood (from the age of thirteen as a school boy to the age of twenty one—until his graduation from the University of Oregon's law school in Portland in 1900), fought his way and therefore became a man by character disposed to employ dialectic argumentation skills and also the "get tough" approach in negotiating with Americans. Their reports have been helpful, yet no one has ever researched into the importance of the character-forming period of Matsuoka which took place in his childhood in Chōshū (Yamaguchi Prefecture) and its effect on his character-forming period of young manhood by drawing together many vistas of insights and research findings from many academic disciplines such as anthropology, psychology, and sociology. The author's research findings by visiting both Portland, Oregon as well as Yamaguchi Prefecture and Hyōgo Prefecture in the 1970s and in the middle of 1980s have shown that Matsuoka, prior to his departure for America, had already acquired the aforementioned behavioral patterns and personal traits.⁷

For example, it was found that he was a proud Chōshūite who took the pride of others. Cultural anthropologists have described that Chōshūites are, in contrast to people residing in the Northern regions, tend to be argumentative and straightforward in their personal dealings — Chōshū Kishitsu (Chōshū character).⁸ Matsuoka was no exception. Therefore, in the future, more research into Matsuoka's psychological

7 The study is based on anthropological fieldwork, which includes a series of interviews, research at libraries in 1970's in Oregon, and again in Oregon and Stanford in the summer of 1985 and in Yamaguchi Prefecture and Hyōgo Prefecture in 1986.

8 For further information, see Sofue's book "Ken'min Sei (pp. 185-187, 25)".

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past to find out whether his “get tough” approach in negotiation (in comparison to the Secretary of State Hull, who spent his youth and young manhood in rather strained circumstances and in fighting his way and studied law in the state of Tennessee) is inherited or environmental or whether it was acquired in Japan or in America or both, is necessary.

Another point needs to be reiterated here is the myth asserted by many people that Matsuoka had played a major part in leading Japan into the Pacific war. While Japan’s path to Pearl Harbor poses a number of problems for which there are no definite answers, many people, particularly after his death on June 24, 1946 (before the trial was concluded), put the blame on him by believing his blitzkrieg diplomatic strategy influenced by his conception of America helped set Japan on the path of world aggression. They have blamed Matsuoka without justification. In this connection, Trezise, a former senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, addressed the issue:

Matsuoka’s conception of America played a part, but only a part, in the drift to war in the Pacific. On both sides, in Washington as well as in Tokyo, there were numerous and frequent misunderstandings, and

9 For further details of communication and communications problems, see the section “Postscript”. Ambassador Grew and the entire staff members were very often dissatisfied with the way Washington handled communications channels between the two countries as well as the way American officials dealt with the Japanese counterparts. Graebner wrote that “Grew argued for modification of the official hard-line approach to Japan as reflected in the views of Stimson, Knox, Morgenthau, Hornbeck, and Hull. . . Grew explained why ambassadorial views, especially on important issues, were often ignored. . . the chief stumbling block in perfecting machinery for exchange of information on policy lies in a certain reluctance in the Department to place on the

miscalculations, blunders, even mistranslations key documents (p.5,30).⁹

Today, nearly fifty years after the end of the Pacific war, it appears that the United States and Japan are, because of the trade situation, drawn into confrontations. There is a real danger here. As the author wrote somewhere, the relationship between the two countries has reached a new level of realism in which Japan must understand the United States in new ways and vice versa. This can be done through communication in human terms, and the contemporary political scene between the two countries in today's changing world makes the need for improved problem solving techniques among negotiators vitally important. Without fine tuning in communication among negotiators, there is little hope to work together for achievement of stability, peace, and prosperity on both sides of the Ocean, Asia, and throughout the globe. To put it differently without it, as the late Dr. Edwin. O. Reischauer of Harvard used to warn us, both countries might plunge into another period of disaster.¹⁰ The author hopes this paper, which is far from complete, can serve as a stepping-stone for future researchers.

Postscript

By the spring of 1941, the unofficial overtures seemed to bear some fruit. The meeting with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State

official records matters which are still in flux and which have not yet reached a decision (pp.xv-xvi,3).” He also continued that “Forbes, backed by the entire embassy staff in Tokyo, warned Washington that Smimson’s ‘constant nagging’ would lead to war between the United States and Japan (p.xv,3)”.

10 As for the important skills in negotiation in today's world, see Fujita's books “Kōshōryoku Ken'kyū I & II (6).”

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Hull, which Farther Drought and Bishop Walsh had sought, took place on January 23, 1941 at the White House, and it was arranged with care to avoid publicity. While their talk centered around the possibility of U.S.-Japan rapprochement, Father Drought did not specify the “Walking Analysis(Nichibei Kaigi Sōan or Wahei Teian)” a proposal he wrote in Tokyo from a Japanese point of view. Both the President and the Secretary of State accepted their proposal, but never learned that Drought had already offered his personal blue print for peace to leaders of the Japanese Government. And the stage for the John Doe Associates’ activities was set on March 30 when Walsh, Ikawa, and Iwakuro were reunited in New York and when Drought joined them in Washigton on April 2. For Drought and Ikawa, Matsuoka—who was hoping to assume guardianship of the official negotiation with President Roosevelt through the effort of Mr. Kaname Wakasugi, Minister in Washington—became a nuisance (p.55, 24 & pp. 117-118, 2).

It was on April 5 that the first “Draft Proposal for Understanding (Nichibei Kyōkai Sōan),” which had been made up by Father Drought and the Ikawa-Iwakuro group, was presented to Nomura, and it was then submitted to the Secretary of State Hull. Hull was desirous of knowing: “how much Nomura knew about the document received by the State Department on Aprril 9 from those Americans and Japanese who were collaborating as individuals in an effort to make some sort of contribution to better relations between the two countries (p. 161, 2)”, and also whether the Japanese Government wanted to submit the document officially to the American Government as a first step in negotiations with the American counterpart. The Ambassador’s reply was positive. However, Utley’s research, to say nothing of other studies done by Butow, Sudō and others indicate that Ambassador Nomura did not forward the full text of the

proposal for understanding to the Japanese Government (p. 161, 2 ; pp. 211-212, 13 ; Chapter 8, 31). Thereafter, the news — Japan had concluded the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union on April 13 — reached Washington.

Having met with Hull on April 16, Nomura conveyed Hull's main questions of April 14 and the four principles — (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; (2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries; (3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; and (4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means — to the Japanese Government (p. 407, 4). While April 16 is known as the day the official negotiations got underway, miscommunication and misconception went hand in hand between the two governments. To cite an example, Hull told Nomura in a form of precaution that they were in the early stage of informal preliminary talks and they had in no sense reached the stage of negotiations. Hull also reminded Nomura that the draft proposal be strictly treated as a foundation which did not reflect commitments or viewpoints of the U.S. Government whatsoever. Nonetheless, Nomura sent the Secretary's four principles together with the draft proposal prepared by the John Doe Associates. The trouble was that Nomura failed to cable the two vital points raised by Hull. People in the Kono Cabinet, including Matsuoka, oftentimes felt later that the Ambassador Nomura did not pass along to the State Department even half of what he was supposed to convey to the Secretary of State Hull (pp. 55-58, 12; pp. 177-178, 5; pp. 211-213, 13; pp. 126-127, 26; & pp. 235-236, 2).

From the standpoint of interpersonal-intercultural communication, the following can be said on the presumption that Nomura's inadequate

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handling of reports produced misconception leading to a communication breakdown which in turn wrecked the process of the diplomatic talks. However, one significant point we should not overlook is that the misconception might have derived from the difficulty Nomura and Hull had in communicating with one another in English. Nomura, who spoke English with a peculiar Wakayama accent, very often found it difficult to understand Hull who spoke English with a soft southern Tennessee accent and vice versa. J. W. Pratt once commented that Hull also "had a slight speech which transformed r's into w's." This combined with his gift for profanity, led President Roosevelt to inquire on occasion. "Was this one of Cordell's Chwist days? (p. 299, 3)," Therefore, an assertion made by political scientists—Nomura's communication inability was inadequate for the government task—is a hypothetical question (Some maintained that he had a smattering of English although he lived in Washington in 1915 and became acquainted with Mr. Roosevelt. Hull's observations were that Nomura spoke a certain and sometimes an uncertain amount of English, but could get hold of points better than Mr. Kurusu who spoke good English and whose wife was an American. Kurusu later arrived at Washington on November 15 for the last-minute negotiations with Hull and the President). Political scientists normally describes the way in which Ambassador Nomura handled the flow of information and manipulated the transpacific communications channels between Washington and Tokyo in 1941 as follows: April 16—Twisted meaning of Ryokaian (Points of Understanding or Proposal for Understanding) so that it appeared to be an American draft, which it was not; May 3—Although instructed by Foreign Minister Matsuoka, failed to present "Oral Statement" to Secretary of State Hull, explaining that the document contained many erroneous matters; May 13—Failed to trans-

mit Matsuoka's May 13 cable to Secretary Hull as instructed; May 15—When ordered to do the same, refused again; June—Presented to Hull a “Japanese Plan” without Tokyo's knowledge; June 21—Asked Hull, on his own initiative, for permission not to cable U.S. June 21 proposals to Tokyo; July 15—Failed to present Japan's counterdraft to American June 21 draft; August 27—Changed, without authorization, wording in Japan's proposal for a Konoe-Roosevelt summit meeting; September 4—Presented, as a “personal draft”, government instructions to have the U.S. mediate in the Sino-Japanese conflict and declared Japan's willingness to accept the U.S. June 21 draft, except for section dealing with China; September 10—Withdrew the September 4 draft; September 13—Failed to deliver an incoming message for ten days; and November 18—Presented Japanese fall-back positions prematurely, without authorization (pp. 126-127, 2). In view of the concept of time which influences cultural values and communication modes, what irked the American side, in the words of Hull, was; “the American officials” sat down to await the Japanese reply. To wait, but not, as will be seen, with hands in lap. The wait was to be almost a month, for Nomura's message evoked great disputes within the Japanese Government. It arrived while Matsuoka was on his way home from Moscow with his head full of other plans, and as the Japanese Army and the Navy were getting ready to take over the rest of Indo-China. Now the separate strands of Japanese diplomacy which ran east and west, south and north, became tangled with one another. The answer was received on May 12. . . . It is illuminating to trace back what had been happening within the Japanese Government during those months of 1941 so far traversed (pp. 178-179, 5). “Iwakuro, in his words, “felt jittery awaiting the reply from the Japanese Government.” He put a blame on Matsuoka and Premier Konoe by saying “The

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problem is their attitudes and their handling of the matter after April 18 (p. 230, 35).” The point Hull and Iwakuro made above seems to hold water because at the time when the agreement on the Draft Understanding was reached between Hull and Nomura, Foreign Minister Matsuoka was on a journey to Europe and the Soviet Union. After concluding the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union on April 13, his next move was, as indicated above, to begin official negotiations with President Roosevelt (and possibly including Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek). Matsuoka sent a personal message to President Roosevelt through the U. S. Ambassador, Laurence L. Steinhardt in which he proposed to open negotiations. He also communicated to his personal friend Mr. Roy Howard of the United Press to look into possibility and asked Father Drought and Bishop Walsh to convey a message to President Roosevelt. While Matsuoka was on the Trans-Siberian train, he received potentially good news from Steinhardt stating that the President was desirous of meeting the Foreign Minister. A message from Mr. Roy Howard of the United Press also arrived during his visit to Berlin (Hosoya spelled out that while Matsuoka was in Rome) saying that Matsuoka should come to the United States. As the story goes, a specially arranged plane “China Clipper” by Mr. Howard was ready to take off from Lisbon, Portugal for the confidential meeting with the President of the United States (pp. 81-83 and pp. 94-95, 9; 217, 13; & p. 178, 17). However, when the train pulled into a Manchurian railway station, another message from Vice Minister Chuichi Ohashi awaited Matsuoka. The message indicating—certain U.S.-Japan negotiations dictated by Premier Konoe had been carried out in Washington—came as an enormous shock as well as a great setback to Matsuoka (pp. 82-83, 9). By the time he returned to Japan, Premier Konoe, the major factions in the Cabinet, army and navy approved the Draft Proposal Understand-

ing. An important point taken into consideration in terms of diplomatic communication between Washington and Tokyo was that not only did the Japanese Government leaders believe the proposal, which had been drafted by the John Doe Associates, was composed by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, but they approved the proposal in Matsuoka's absence and without his knowledge (p. 57, 24). Moreover, "... the (so-called) Walsh-Drought draft was well regarded, if not approved, by the American government (p. 192, 5)."

The Foreign Minister returned to Japan on April 22. Premier Konoe was at Tachikawa airport to inform him of the news and also coax him into accepting of the proposal in his car. Matsuoka was, however, in no mood of meeting the Premier. Furthermore, both of whom were separated from each other by the crowd, and Matsuoka did not ride to Tokyo in the Premier's car. The fundamental mistrust and misconception became a tangled growth and later exerted a profound influence on the process of the official negotiations. The breakdown rather than breakthrough piled on another breakdown in interpersonal communication between the Premier and Foreign Minister and within the Japanese Government. As the weeks wore on—particularly during the next month and June, both the United States and Japan found themselves engaged in a series of verbal disputes. Each accused the other of hiding behind fuzzy generalities. The communication barrier between Matsuoka (who signaled Nomura the maintenance of "firm stance" against the United States) and the Ambassador (who handled Matsuoka's message differently) prompted Hull to question the sincerity of Japanese motives in continuing the informal negotiations with the U. S. . Foreign Relations of the U. S. illustrated that Nomura assured Mr. Hull that Japan desired a fair settlement of its Far Eastern Problems. In spite of this assurance,

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Japan was unable to accept the American proposal (pp. 446-456, 4). Nomura handed out two documents to Hull on May 12. One was called a "Draft Proposal (Soan)", that being a revision of what was referred to as the "Drought-Walsh Text" which had originated in Washington. The other was termed "Oral Explanation for Proposed Amendments (May 12—Taian ascertained by the Foreign Minister)" to the original draft.

During the whole period—April through August, the argument went on within the Japanese and American Governments over the meaning of national interests and national policy. Between May 12 and July 13, both Hull and Nomura were under tention. Hull was a bit wary and suspected the sincerity of talks because of Japan's southern advance although they were some 26 lengthy talks in Washington alone. Feis wrote that "Nomura brought papers, took them back, left others, and was not able to answer questions about their meaning" (p.199, 5; & pp. 145-150, 31). By the same token, Iwakuro and Ikawa felt it difficult to continue to negotiate with the American counterparts after June 22 (p.235, 35).

The month of July witnessed the prudent "wait and see diplomacy" by Hull. The formation of the third Konoe Cabinet with Admiral Sadajiro Toyoda as new Foreign Minister replacing Matsuoka was officially approved by the elder statesmen on July 18. The Japan's southward expansion in late July complicated the Hull-Nomura communication making it more muddled or bungled they would otherwise have been (p. 320, 2 & pp.269-270, 19). The Iwakuro-Ikawa team left for Japan on July 31 [Their arrival date at Tokyo was on August 15.] (p, 236, 35). The activities or the machinations of the John Doe Associates' working behind the scenes became visible by fall—by the time they got involved in establishing a Konoe-Roosevelt meeting. Drought was annoyed with the

Department's handling of negotiation because they tried to halt the negotiation until it fell into their hands. An Imperial Conference on September 6 gave the green light, if the diplomatic negotiations in Washington should fail, on the full scale operation against the United States (pp.117-120, 33 & p.279, 19). "But it was not until mid-October that hesitance over the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Yamamoto's approval was finally overcome and the Pearl Harbor attack plan given formal approval (p.279, 19)." In the mean time, with Bishop Walsh rejoining the Iwakuro-Ikawa team in Tokyo, the John Doe associate's effort for peace continued until October 16, 1941. Walsh left for the United States via China and Philippines on October 15. The sudden resignation of Konoe made their communication activities—in the matter of helping to get messages to and from the State Department and to and from the American Embassy in Tokyo—hopeless (p.236, 35; & p. 282 and p.302, 2). And the Cabinet headed by General Hideki Tojo as Premier assumed the office replacing Prince Konoe.

On November 26, 1941, Hull gave Nomura the following "Oral Statement" and his ten point program called—"Hull Note (an Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement between the United States and Japan)." Due largely to Hull's reluctance to enter into negotiations, the note started with "Strictly Confidential and Tentative and Without Commitment":

Oral

Strictly Confidential

November 26, 1941.

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire

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Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and Pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary *modus vivendi* would be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing.

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out

a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.

Strictly Confidential

Tentative and Without Commitment

November 26, 1941.

INTERCULTURAL NEGOTIATION & DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION

Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan.

Section 1.

Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial design in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

- (1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
- (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
- (4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following

principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

- (1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
- (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
- (3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
- (4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
- (5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

Section 2.

*Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States
and by the Government of Japan.*

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.
2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thai Governments an

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agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.

Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any Government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both

countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement (pp. 283-292, 12).

Hull remarked to Stimson: "I have washed my hands of it, and it (the situation) is in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy (p. 321, 5)." This is when their inner thoughts were one way or the other changed from the tactics of negotiations to the tactics of war. One day prior to the Hull Note's arrival, the Japanese naval forces, which had been gathered at the Iturup's Hitocup Bay, awaited the outcome of the diplomatic negotiations in Washington. On November 21, the naval fleet made up of twenty seven submarines had already cast anchor and was ready to sail out of the bay toward Pearl Harbor. Other forces headed for their destinations and were brought together in Indo-China, Taiwan, and Hainan island. The consensus made at the Liaison Conference on November 27 was "going to war." The decision represented the only

alternative to committing national suicide in such a situation. The Emperor could not effectively set himself against the men who made this decision; the President's appeal could not trigger a reversal of the consensus that had already been made (p.308, 2)." And the message the Combined Fleet received the same day also read "Climb up Mt. Niitaka—Attack Pearl Harbor (pp.372-373, Vol. 5 : 20; pp.264-265, 34; & pp. 279-280, 19).

Meanwhile, the Ambassador Saburo Kurusu's arrival gave another last-minute opportunity to get the wheel of peace effort moving. It should be added that the former Ambassador to Germany, who had been on the same plane with Bishop Walsh from Manila on November 15, worked out some bold plans with Nomura as to how to reach a practical settlement with the United States as far as the acquisition of and the cancellation of freezing order were concerned. In their diplomatic communication with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull on November 17, both the President and the Secretary stressed that Japan's withdrawal from Indo-China would pave the way for the settlement and Japan's major source of oil would be furnished. Inasmuch as their move was not an authorized one, the new Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō, having read their message, furiously rejected their proposal (pp.734-738, 4 & pp. 271-273, 12). Afterwards, Japan's policy towards the United States became one which involved the maximum diplomatic risk, and the political situation became tense between Tokyo and Washington. Both Kurusu and Nomura urged Bishop Walsh, Rev. E. S. Jones, Postmaster General Walker to persuade the President to wire a warning message to the Emperor of Japan. However, on Hull's advice—(1) The Emperor is only a figurehead; (2) It will anger the Tojo Cabinet; and (3) It will be taken as a sign of weakness—the message was postponed until the

attack had all but started (p.457, Vol. 5 : 20 & p.335, 5). The following message reached Tokyo on December 7 (Japan time). From President Roosevelt to Hirohito of Japan [Washington] December 6, 1941:

Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers, have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities. The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me

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that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seems essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

More than a year ago, Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this spring and summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into southern French Indo-China for the common defense of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon Indo-China nor that any has been contemplated.

During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.

Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that peninsula it is only reasonable that the Philippines, of the hundreds of islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of the Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.

I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear inasmuch as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look

askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn from there.

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Government of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

I address myself to Your Majesty so that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world(pp. 784-786, 4).

Ambassador Grew also learned the news through the radio. However, the warning message, which had been addressed to a throne, was held up by the Tokyo Central Telegraph Office for approximately ten hours at the request of an officer of the army staff. The Emperor received the message at 10 : 30 p. m.. The delay piled on another unanticipated delays, so to speak, and the staff members at the Japanese

Embassy bungled the processing of the following "Memorandum":

MEMORANDAM

I. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

II. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year, Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabiliza-

tion of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its Protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China, both America and British Governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possessions and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

III. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present Cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the

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American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress. Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions, which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

- (1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the South Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
- (2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
- (3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

- (4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
- (5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area : and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its

readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek ; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

IV. From the beginning of the present negotiation, the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third

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Powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation. It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula though recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a utopian ideal, on the part of the American Government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

2. The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third Powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates, in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the War. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy —two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations, pressure by economic powers. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as

it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Government of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or uncondi-

tional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

V. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

VI. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and

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Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

VII. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have notify hereby the American Government that, in view of the attitude of the American Government, it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations (pp.302-312, 12).

It took them so long to select and work on a few-last minute revisions through typing. Both Nomura and Kurusu "could have snatched what was ready and kept their one o'clock engagement with Hull but they put it till the typed message was in fair shape (p. 341, 5)." By the time they arrived at Hull's room at two twenty for the last-second negotiations, the Secretary had already read the magic version of the message delivered more than an hour after the time specified by Tokyo. And as Kase once commented that "a number of the messages communicated through 'magic' which permitted a small group of officials in Washington to read often carried distorted information, and thus the

magic stood sometimes in the way of freer negotiations between the two countries (p.116, 12),” but this time Hull had received the message right through the magic and a phone call from the President informing the Secretary that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor. The hapless Japanese envoys found no adequate words when Hull uttered: “I must say that in all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions. . . on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them (pp.787, 4).” Then, Nomura and Kurusu took their leave without any comment but with their heads down. One year earlier in 1940, the unofficial backdoor negotiations had started on Japan’s shores, and the maneuvers for peaceful retrieve—the U.S.-Japan rapprochement—appeared to be in prospect. Yet, in the final analysis, neither the United States nor Japan could; (1) resolve the deep-rooted clash of national interests; and (2) find a way out of the impasse or, in the words of Shakespeare, the “*Tempest*” even through the time-honored method of diplomatic negotiations.

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