

INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION :  
U. S.-Japan Cross-Cultural Studies [Ⅲ]  
U. S.-Japan Negotiations & the Mills Bill  
1969-1970 [Research Notes & Reminiscences]  
『異文化間コミュニケーション：日米異文化研究 [Ⅲ]  
日米交渉とミルズ法案 1969-1970』 [史的研究ノート]

By Shoji Mitarai  
(御手洗 昭治)

本稿は1989年度(平成元年)札幌大学研究助成費による研究の一部である。今回の研究に必要な参考資料のうち、特にウォールストリート・ジャーナル—*The Wall Street Journal*—の1969年度から1970年発行のものが、あいにく(学術雑誌総合目録も参照してみたが)道内の主要大学及びアメリカンセンターを含む官立図書館では入手不可能であったところ、研究助成費を受ける事ができ、米国の研究所及び大学図書館において調査する機会が持てたことは喜びにたえない。しかも、アジア版ではなく米国本国発行の当時のウォールストリート・ジャーナル及びその他の文献資料にも接する事ができた点も、加筆しておきたい。改めて札幌大学に対し感謝の意を表するものである。

## 序 文

37代目アメリカ合衆国大統領リチャード・ニクソン氏は1968年(昭和43年)、アメリカ大統領選挙のキャンペーン中に南部の繊維産業界のリーダー達に対し、日本の繊維製品の対米輸出から業界を守ると公約した。又、同大統領は1969年11月18日、沖縄返還問題(核抜き本土並み)で佐藤栄作首相との日米会談の際、佐藤首相の「何とか善処しましょう\*。」の発言から日本側が繊維問題に関しては、しかるべき措置を取るものと非言語(ノンバーバル)的に了解していた。それは、アメリカの沖縄施政権放棄に対しての見返り条件、つまり裏工作

と考えられていたが、一方、佐藤首相は日本国内の繊維業界と国会を、その方向で同意させる事ができず、アメリカ側と長期にわたるタフ・ネゴシエーションを重ねた末(1971年10月)ようやくアメリカ側の要求を受け入れる事になった。いわゆる第三のニクソンショックである。そして20年たった今日の新聞紙上等マスコミで毎日の如く使用され問題視されている日米間の「貿易摩擦」「報復措置」「ジャパン・プロブレム\*\*」その他両国の経済面に見られる「危機」「コリジョンコース」という言葉が表面化したのも1969年の日米繊維交渉においてであった。一方「日本ブーム」を報ずるアメリカ国内の新聞の数も増えた事も確かであり、又、米国国内の対日認識に変化を与えたCBS制作でハーバード大学のライシャワー教授の解説で好評であった1時間番組「ザ・ジャパニーズ」が放送されたのも1969年の4月であった。本稿では、アメリカ側から見た日米繊維交渉過程(1969年から1970年迄の期間)、特にミルズ法案に焦点をあて、異文化間コミュニケーションと交渉史のフレームワーク内で分析を試してみたい。

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\* 佐藤首相の発言はジョージ・パッカード氏の英語では... "take care of" the textile problems in Japan by getting Japanese textile-makers to agree to voluntary export controls in 1970 and 1971.... (pp. 140-141, 12). と訳されている。佐藤首相は又、ワシントン出発の際にもニクソン大統領との日米繊維交渉には「ニクソン氏と私は深い仲なので話し合い三分、腹芸7分で対処する。」の発言は、日米の対人異文化コミュニケーションの相違の例として、よく引合いに出されている。

\*\*近年ではKarel G. van Wolferen氏のForeign Affairsの中での小論文のタイトルが「The Japan Problem」であった為、「ジャパン・プロブレム」という言葉自体が「ジャパン・バッシング(日本たたき)」と同じく頻用されるに至っているが、氏は... "Japan Problem", as the fundamental conflict has become known, is already many years old. と述べている(p. 288, 22)。尚、アメリカにおける日本製品に対する「保護貿易措置」は1930年代に酷似しているかどうかの分析は、Wolferen氏によっては、なされていない。又、最も近年の貿易面での「ジャパン・プロブレム」に関してはAdvisory Committee For Trade Policy and Negotiations報告の"Japan Trade Problem"(1)又、交渉学研究の重要性については、藤田 忠氏の「交渉力の時代」(4)を参照の事。

The trade negotiations in the very late sixties were initiated by the United States particularly soon after President Richard Nixon pledged during his 1968 election campaign to find some relief for the American textile industry hard hit by imports from Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The chief goal was a voluntary curb of Japanese exports of synthetic and woolen textiles to the United States (similar to the cotton textile agreement implemented under the Kennedy administration). Such terms as "trade friction", "retaliatory measures", "the Japan problem", "threat", and "crisis" that we frequently come across in the newspapers today were, for instance, begun to be used two decades ago to describe the economic relations between Japan and the United States. The threat of a mandatory quota program was almost always in the background in the late 1960s. Dr. Reischauer, currently Professor Emeritus at Harvard University, addressed the issue:

One other aspect of looming crisis with the United States was growing friction over economic relations. . . While textiles in the early sixties were put under a more formal agreement applying to other countries as well as Japan, 'voluntary controls,' or 'orderly marketing' as they came to be called as a euphemism, still applied in many fields, and as the Japanese began in the late sixties to invade the American market in steel, automobiles, and other products of heavy industry, they began to be applied in these fields, too (pp. 330-331, 10).

Thus, the public at large heard of the increasing strain or

crisis in U.S.-Japan relations right after the discord on the textile negotiations which were tied in with Okinawa negotiations. However, it was also in the late 1960s that the United States began to enjoy rapidly expanding cultural ties with Japan more than ever before. The general reader at least saw in the newspapers reports on the "Japan Boom." In April 1969 CBS televised an hour-long program entitled "The Japanese" in prime time. The narration was given by Professor Reischauer in a tone rather favorable toward Japan, and the program was warmly and widely received. Those who watched the program from coast to coast sensed a change in their views or images of Japan—an adjustment of old images and perceptions to the new realities—and the new realities came to most of the viewers in shock waves. According to the Federal Communications Commission, "more Americans learned something useful about Japan during that one-hour presentation than in all the lectures and college classes to date in American history (p. 321, 11)".

The major objectives of this research paper are to : (1) investigate U.S.-Japan textile negotiations conducted between 1969 and 1970 ; and (2) analyze and report on the way in which the negotiations developed particularly around the Mills Bill within the framework of intercultural communication and negotiation history.

First of all, it is essential to look into the Mills Bill (H. R. 18970) from a historical viewpoint. Using this technique, one can see the intense political overtones involved in the formation of this bill. It started off with President Richard Nixon

who was traditionally a free trader. However, during his campaign of 1968, he realized that he was in great need of help and support from the South. During the 1968 election campaign, Richard Nixon once remarked, "Jack Kennedy stole North and South Carolina from me in 1960. It's not going to happen again (p. 61, 14)". With that in mind, Nixon promised textile manufacturers some kind of relief from the Asian imports that were affecting the sales of their industry.

Richard Nixon was campaigning hard in the South. When he met with several Southern leaders on May 31 and June 1, 1968, their discussions revolved around such subjects as school desegregation, Supreme Court appointments, busing, and textile protection. Republican senator, Strom Thurmond, had the opportunity to ride in Nixon's car as he was riding to the airport. Senator Thurmond was in a good position to bargain with Nixon at that time because Ronald Reagan looked as though he had taken away some of the Southern states at the Miami convention. During this meeting between Thurmond and Nixon, Thurmond stated, "Nixon promised him that the South would be treated equally with other parts of the country -most notably on school desegregation and voting rights; and that the Southern textile industry would get help in its fight on imports (p. 162, 13)". So here people can envision the beginnings of an international political bargain. Nixon, who traditionally believes in free trade, bargained this conviction for Southern votes at the Miami convention. What makes this study of the U. S.-Japan trade negotiations intriguing is that there was political bargaining from the beginning until the end.

Three weeks later, Thurmond led the South Carolina delegation into the Nixon camp. During the Republican convention in Miami, Nixon was again reminded of his pledge to textile manufacturers by Thurmond. Just after his election, Nixon suggested that a group of industry leaders brief him on their plight. They did consult with Nixon a few weeks later. Those who presented at the meeting were Harry Dent (South Carolina G. O. P. Chairman) ; Roger Milliken, ; Charles F. Myers, Jr., of Burlington Industries ; Frederick Dent, who led Mayfair Mills and was the industry's most articulate expert on imports ; and Robert Jackson, executive vice president of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute. Soon after that, Nixon pledged his support in writing.

Once his administration was under way, Nixon made his pledge to textile manufacturers and opened up negotiations with the Japanese in the hopes of getting them to limit their products voluntarily. However, talks became deadlocked.

On April 6, 1970, Strom Thurmond decided to do a little talking himself. This must have overjoyed his supporters, but it came to the protocol-minded Japanese as a great shock. He asked the Japanese Ambassador Takeso Shimoda to pay a visit to his office in the Senate Office Building. There he gave a lecture on his people's ties to textiles and also delivered a 3 - page letter :

It is natural for a smaller nation, such as yours, to look upon the United States as one big, wealthy country," read the communique. "I must say that the U. S. is not one, but fifty states, whose economics are

basically independent, although interrelated at many levels... South Carolina's economy is in the same position as that of a developing country and is in no position to make drastic revisions in its industrial development. . . . We speak to you in human terms and human costs, rather than in the cold language of trade and profits (p. 161, 13).

Nothing ever came out of this letter inasmuch as the content of his letter seemed like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky. Senator Thurmond probably hurt his cause more.

On April 20, 1970, Wilbur Mills (Democrat, Arkansas), Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, introduced a bill that would "boldly roll back imports of wool, man-made textiles and shoes to levels they reached in 1967-68 (p. 56, 8)". Mills told reporters that he was not going to "Let importers push Americans around (p. 56, 8)". Nixon, Thurmond, and Mills were all trying to accomplish the same thing. That is, they were trying to scare the Japanese and Europeans into voluntary action; none of them, Nixon, Thurmond, or Mills, offered the Japanese anything in return for their self-imposed restrictions. Under the circumstances, many Americans did not blame the Japanese for not reacting to the American demands at the time.

On May 11, 1970, testimony began concerning the proposed trade legislation. Speaking before the House Ways and Means Committee were Cabinet members William P. Rogers, Clifford M. Hardin, and George P. Shultz. Also speaking before the Committee were Secretary of Commerce Murice H. Stans, Special Trade Representative Carl J. Gilbert, and Secretary of

the Treasury David M. Kennedy. Although President Nixon and his Secretary of Commerce had spoken in favor of the proposed barriers, William P. Rogers demonstrated a split in the Administration when he stated that he supported action that would reduce all trade barriers for the simple reason that an "affirmative trade policy is an indispensable part of an effective foreign policy (6)". Rogers stated the general view of most educated people; that is, he hoped that the present trade legislation would not pass. He went on to add that instead of voting on such a vital matter at this time:

The legislation should be deferred because of the size of the United States in world affairs—we account for 40% of the world's gross product—any movement by the United States away from its historic trade policy would have adverse consequences around the globe... This does not mean that we should sacrifice our economic interests to the requirements of foreign policy. We must ensure that others too follow an open policy, permitting us to export as freely to them as they to us . . . (6).

It is quite apparent that what William P. Rogers was trying to convey was that the United States was a free-trade nation and would continue to be a free trader only if other countries responded or reacted in a similar fashion. Rogers was, perhaps, apprehensive of what might happen if an import quota were passed. He was well aware of the consequences and he wished this awareness to be known.

However, during the week of June 27, 1970, the delicate



negotiations that had been going on between Japan and the United States for eighteen months broke down. This put heavy pressure on Congress and the Cabinet to pass the legislation before them concerning trade quotas on textiles and footwear.

Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans, who was leading discussions for the U. S. in the Japan talks, was due to speak before the Mills Committee on June 18, 1970. Two days before the deadline, Tokyo announced that Kiichi Miyazawa, Minister of International Trade and Industry, and Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi would leave for Washington in a last-minute bid to conclude a voluntary agreement and head off the Mills Bill. The three-day talks between Miyazawa and Stans, which ended in failure, was reported as follows:

Stans' appearance before the committee was put off, and he and Miyazawa met privately three times on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, while Aichi and Secretary of State William Rogers kibitzed from the sidelines. But Miyazawa held to a granite-hard position on an offer totally unacceptable to the U. S. He offered to curb Japanese exports of synthetic textiles for one year to 12% to 15% above the level of the last five to 10 years, and on woolen textiles to 1% above the level of last year. He also asked the U. S. not to negotiate for an extension of the agreement at the end of the year. This was an ocean away from Stans' demand for a five-year hold-down on exports of both synthetic and woolen textiles to a growth rate equal to that of U. S. consumption.

Stans made it clear that his demand was negotiable. Miyazawa made it equally clear that his was not, reflecting the fiercely nationalistic emotion that has focused in Japan on textiles (p. 38, 3).

What was especially embarrassing and detrimental to the Administration's position was that Assistant Secretary of Commerce Kenneth N. Davis, Jr. made a statement before the press announcing his support for the proposed import quotas. He also charged that certain White House aides were misinforming President Nixon on the import issue. This happened on the eve of the arrival of the Japanese Ministers Miyazawa and Aichi. Upon making this statement, Davis was asked for his resignation immediately (p. 75, 9).

The threat of mandatory quotas forced the Japanese to reconsider their trade position with the United States—however, at a considerable cost in terms of U. S. esteem among the Japanese. "The Japanese public is up in arms over what many consider to be a crude and arrogant American stand (p. 74, 15)".

During the first part of July, in response to the breakdown in talks with the Japanese, Commerce Secretary Murice Stans was called before the Mills Committee. Stans, speaking for President Nixon, announced that the Administration would pledge its support with certain exemptions, the Mills Bill provision that would propose a roll-back textile imports to the 1967-68 average unless exporting countries agreed to voluntary restraints. Business Week, for instance, spelled out the issue as follows:

As soon as Mills heard that the talks had broken

down, he telephoned Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans and asked him to appear before the committee the next day, ahead of the original schedule. Stans conferred immediately with Nixon and Administration trade experts. A decision was reached in a matter of hours and the next day, as expected, Stans told the committee that the Administration would support, with certain exemptions, the Mills bill provision that rolls back textile imports to the 1967-68 average unless export countries agree to voluntary export restraints.

In Tokyo, Toshiro Oishi, chief of the textile section in the Ministry of International Trade & Industry, said if the Mills Bill becomes law Japan's next step would be to refer the textile issue to the General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade (P. 17, 2).

Nixon was thus trying to force the Japanese into giving up everything that they had gained in the last few years without conceding anything himself. In order to reach an agreement, both parties must go away happy or at least must assume that they completed a good deal; however, it seemed that Nixon did not wish to concede anything.

Speaking in terms of the U. S. trade picture, if the Mills Bill confined itself to textile quotas, not too much damage would have been done to the international trading system built up since World War II. Faced with a 30% drop in textile exports that soared to \$2.3 billion dollars last year, the Japanese might opt for a broad voluntary agreement that would be permitted under the Mills Bill.

It appears that President Nixon got himself into a trap when he agreed to support textile manufacturers' demands of trade quotas. Congress seemed resolved to impose quota restrictions on imported clothing and footwear, and the Nixon Administration appeared powerless to prevent it, even though the President disclosed a year earlier that "such a policy of trade restriction would add to domestic inflation (p. 7,7)". The basic theory was, if Wilbur Mills made the motions of putting the "screws" on Japanese textiles, the Japanese would voluntarily cut back their sales. When they didn't, the Administration was killed with its own threats. As this became apparent, the President let it be known that he would only accept a trade bill similar to the one that he proposed. On October 12, 1970, Secretary Rogers appeared before the Senate Committee of Finance and stated that the "President has indicated his willingness to accept provision for restrictions on certain textile imports because our efforts to find other solutions to problems in our textile trade have thus far been unsuccessful (p. 557, 16)".

It appeared as if President Nixon had been anxious to teach the Japanese a lesson. If this was the case, he did it very "undiplomatically."

During the last week of October, President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato agreed to start discussions again in an effort to settle the U. S.-Japan trade negotiations. Japan adopted a conciliatory attitude both on the textile question and on trade generally. On the textile matter, Japan sent one of its most experienced and skillful trade negotiators, Kogoro Uemura, to discuss the textile issue with Nixon's aide, Peter Flanigan.

Prior to his departure for Washington, Mr. Uemura persuaded some of the textile manufacturers in Japan to offer some form of voluntary limitation of their shipments in return for U. S. forbearance on a trade bill (p. 16, 17).

The Administration was under the assumption that it had won an important political battle, but be assured that the Japanese were very disturbed at the forced restrictions the administration was going to make.

On November 19, 1970, the House voted procedural issues that would have blocked passing of the controversial trade bill. And on November 20, 1970, the House passed that controversial trade bill by a margin of 215 to 165 (p. 3, 19). Representative Byrnes of Wisconsin, ranking Republican on the Ways and Means Committee, stated that the bill's quota provisions would modify the sharp growth in textile and shoe imports. . . (p. 3, 19). He also stated that if the bill were not passed, the U. S. wouldn't have any strength from which to negotiate voluntary agreements in the current textile talks with Japan (p. 4, 18). On December 1, 1970, the Senate Finance Committee completed its action on trade legislation, and tentatively decided against setting quotas on shoe imports which was in the House bill. And on December 2, 1970, the Senate Finance Committee reversed its tentative decision and decided to include quotas on shoe imports in its pending trade legislation. By December 29, 1970, Japan decided to approve plans by three major Japanese textile companies to form joint ventures with U. S. firms to produce textile products in Japan (p. 3, 21). The government made the decision, it was understood, because medium-sized

and small Japanese textile firms were ready to face competition from foreign firms.

On December 30, 1970, Chairman Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee said in an interview that he might oppose renewed efforts next year (1971) to enact controversial quotas on shoe and textile imports (p. 6, 20). His support was considered essential if such legislation was to pass. Mr. Mills indicated that his attitude about future trade legislation would depend almost entirely on the outcome of U. S. negotiations with the Japanese on voluntary limitation of textiles. He "informed both sides that they have until March to come up with something (p. 6, 20)".

His style of communication based on the "get tough" approach at that time was interpreted to mean that the United States was again using the high handed forceful measures to force the Japanese to come around to the U. S. way of thinking. Many foreign observers did not blame the Japanese for being upset with U. S. actions.

The textile agreement was made in October 1971. However, since it was handled rather insensitively, both sides came to a loggerhead and criticized each other. There was a certain deal involving textiles and the Okinawa issue. Therefore, from the American point of view, it can be said that Prime Minister Sato, who stated the textile negotiations would be three parts talk and seven parts tacit or nonverbal form of communication called "haragei," was too insensitive to understand how important the textile negotiation was to President Nixon. Indeed, President Nixon had to walk a very narrow course in these

negotiations at a great risk. Prime Minister Sato was at the same time put in an awkward position. His faith, with the two "Nixon shocks," was placed between two conflicting principles in terms of national interests — textile or Okinawa.

By the mid-1970s the United States had lost its consumer electronics industry and had also been forced to protect its textile and steel industries. Then in 1981, the United States asked Japan to restrain auto exports. Today nearly fifty years after the end of the Pacific War, it appears that Japan and the United States are again, due to the trade situation, drawn into confrontations. The relationship between the two countries with regard to trade has reached a new level of realism in which Japan must understand the United States in new ways and vice versa. They say that the era of American stewardship has ended, yet neither Japan nor the United States has fully recognized what this means. But one thing is clear, that is Japan, rather than being a follower and reactor, has been asked to grope for a new role in the world today. In other words, Japan has been asked to make much greater proportionate contributions to the solutions of the problems of today's interdependent world than its mere size dictates.

日本製品が繊維を皮切りに電家製品、鉄鋼、農産品、自動車などの市場分野に流入するにつれ、しだいにアメリカの人々が抱いていた不満や不安が恐怖に変わっていった事も事実である。細谷氏も1969年の繊維交渉にまつわる当時の日米関係（協調と軋轢）を以下のように指摘している。

1969年11月の佐藤・ニクソン共同声明は沖縄の施政権の日本への返還を明確に約束した。かくして戦争の後遺症であった沖縄での米軍統治は1972年から清算され、日米関係に突きささっていたトゲが抜かれることになる。このように、日米関係は平等なパートナーシップへの脱皮していくが、軍事次元においては対等性は名目にすぎない。しかし、経済次元においては60年代後半になると両国関係は対等性への接等で協調面とともに摩擦面を次第に拡大させる。象徴的な事件は1969年から71年にかけての「日米繊維紛争」であり、日本の繊維製品の輸出規制問題は、両国の議会や政府をまきこんでの《政治問題》化し……この貿易紛争は、やがて70年代以降日米関係にとかく不協和音をもたらすカラーテレビ、鉄鋼、農産品、自動車などの商品をめぐる貿易紛争の予兆としての意義をもっていた（pp. 26-27, 5）。

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