Chapter 4 The third subsystem: The will and direct passions

5 The causes of the violent passions

(1) The impulse of passion

The will is for Hume like the direct passions: it is the immediate effects of pain and pleasure. In this respect, it is not surprising to find Hume mention it together with passions as “the will and passions”, or even enumerate it (though as volition) among the direct passion (T2.3.9.2; SBN 438), in spite of his assertion that the will is not, properly speaking, a passion (T2.3.1.2; SBN 399). It also is no wonder that on his view what motivates us to act is not reason but passion, or that the will depends on the combat of the calm and violent passions rather than on the combat of passion and reason as the rationalists believe. When Hume teaches us that strength of mind implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent (T2.3.3.9; SBN 418), what is in his mind is the Hutchesonian distinction of the calm and violent passions: the calm passion often leads us to act with the view of the greatest possible good whereas the violent with the present short term interest.

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1 This paper is intended to continue to my former paper issued in the last Sapporo University Journal Vol.34, 2012.

2 "The understanding exerts after two different ways," according to Hume, "as it judges from demonstration or probability; as it regards the abstract relations of our ideas, or those relations of objects of which experience only gives us information" (T2.3.3.2; SBN 413).

3 For, it is only the impulse in the contrary direction that could dispute the impulse of passion, which is not within the domain of reason, because the proper domain of reason lies only in the relation of ideas.
It is this supposed preeminence of the calm passions above the violent that is asserted by Hume when he comments that “there is no man so consistently possessed of this virtue as never on any occasion to yield to the solicitations of passion and desire” (ibid.). If I resist against a desire to drink alcohol by reflecting my doctor’s direction, for instance, my action is determined by the combat between my love of life and my desire for wine. Since the former passion is calm whereas the latter violent in this case, the influence of passions on the will is not in proportion to their violence by Hume’s definition at T2.3.3, or disorder they occasion in the temper: a passion, when corroborated by reflection, or rendered into a settled principle of action, is able to control our action against a gust of passion, though it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation (T2.3.4.1; SBN 418). It is this aspect of the will which is often described in terms of the combat of the calm and violent passions that is discussed in Hume’s famous section, “Of the influencing motives of the will” at T2.3.3.

But, do we always act through a combat as such? It may be a struggle of the calm and violent passions that makes us choose our action in some cases, but in the rest of our everyday life we act according as we are carried by the aversion or propensity in such a way as to avoid and embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. It is this aspect of the will that is asserted by Hume in the following passage:

’Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. ’Tis also obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But ’tis evident in this case, that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. ’Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience. (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414)

This passage tells us that, when we are motivated to act, we go through the following three processes. First, the aversion or propensity arises from the prospect of pain or pleasure from an object. Secondly, the emotions of aversion or propensity extend themselves to the causes and effects
of that object. Thirdly, reason and experience are summoned up by these emotions of aversion or propensity as a navigator of their way. Although all these three processes are necessary for any object to motivate, what Hume’s focus in this passage is the impulse of passion by which we are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us a pain or pleasure. For, whether or not reasoning takes place in the third process depends on the impulse involved by the emotions of aversion or propensity on the one hand, and on the other, the force and violence of this impulse varies according as this reasoning changes. If I am to be motivated to buy a big house, for example, I first need to desire for it. I desire to get the house if I find it good for my purpose: “Desire arise from good consider’d simply; and aversion is derived from evil” (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414). This first process is discussed by Hume in his section, “Of the influence of belief” at T1 3 10. In the second process, my desire increases or diminishes by the increase or diminish as I come to see the merit of the house. My desire “pursues good, and avoid evil”, and is “encreas’d or diminish’d by the encrease or diminution of the good or evil” (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419). Although the force and violence of my impulse to get the house is thus determined by the good or evil I expect to get from the house, it is still clear in this case that the impulse arises not from reason, but from the aversion or propensity. But “the same good, when near, will cause a violent passion which, when remote, produces only a calm one” (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414), as I am motivated to get the house only when I find it attainable. When I find its price beyond my reach in the third process, my impulse would become too weak to carry me any further, though my desire for the house remains the same. “The will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain’d by any action of the mind or body” (ibid.)

Hutcheson writes: ‘The Apprehension of Good, either to ourselves or others, as attainable, raises Desire: The like Apprehension of Evil, or of the Loss of Good, raises Aversion, or Desire of removing or preventing it’. (Hutcheson, ibid. p.50.) It may not be an exaggeration to suggest that Hume’s overview is a copy of Hutcheson’s account that joy, desire, or sorrow arises in correspondence respectively to these different circumstances, viz. good objects are present/ certain, doubtfully expected, or lost. Hutcheson writes: ‘Good Objects excite Love, evil Objects Hatred: each of these is subdivided, as the Object is present and certain, or doubtfully expected, or certainly removed. To these three Circumstances correspond three Modifications of the original Affections; viz. joy, Desire and Sorrow. Good present, raises Joy of Love, or Love of Joy; Good in suspense, the Love of Desire; Good Lost, Love of Sorrow. Evil present raises Aversion of Sorrow; Evil expected, Aversion or Hatred of Desire; and Evil removed, Aversion of Joy. The Joy of Love, and the Joy of Hatred, will possibly be found nearly the same sort of Sensations, tho’ upon different Occasions; the same may be said of the Sorrow of Aversion and thus this Division will amount to the same with that of the Stiocks’ (ibid. p.50). This is the division adapted from Malebranche, according to Hutcheson.
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On this view, “the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will” (T2.3.8.13; SBN 437) involving stronger impulse. Upon this supposition, Hume expects to discover the key to his question of the will in “those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent” (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419).

(2) The structure of Hume’s theory of the will

It may not be amiss to reflect here that Hume’s treatment of the will in Part 3 of Book 2 of the Treatise is divided into three stages, in which he discusses three different subjects: “all actions of the will have particular causes, what these causes are, and how they operate” (T2.3.2.8; SBN 412). Having spent the first two sections of Part 3 for the discussion of the first subject, and the third section for the second, Hume discusses the third subject in the last five sections of Part 3, and attempts to explain how the causes of the actions of the will operate. Hume’s theory of the will and passions may thus be taken to consist of three aspects relevant to “the cement of moral and physical evidence”, the combat of the calm and violent passions, the causes the violent passions. Critics’ concern is chiefly with the second subject, or rather with his section, “Of the influencing motives of the will”, in which Hume expresses his anti-rationalist position clearly by propounding the notion of “the calm passions”. The first stage of his treatment of the will in which he discusses the free-will and necessity has not attracted so much attention as the second stage, and was labeled by Kemp Smith, for instance, as “a lengthy digression” which should be placed in Book 1 rather than in Book 2. Critics pay much less attention to the third stage, and treat it perfunctory. They find “rather desultory”, for instance, probably because they regard that since these sections assigned for the treatment of the third stage are claimed by Hume for the discussion of the causes of the violent passions, they are meant for the illustration of those undesirable circumstances which should be avoided as they lead us to act disregarding our greatest possible good. It is true that the subject of

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6 This aspect of the will is interpreted by commentators as “the enumeration of “many of the conditions that tend to make passions violent”, absence of which leads to more tranquil emotions (Jane McIntyre, "Strength of mind: Prospects and problems for a Humean account", Synthese, 2006, p. 397), or as the descriptions of the unfortunate case in which we are led by a distorted view or inadequate ideas, or by inappropriate circumstances (Rachael Kydd, op.cit.131-5). Laird dispensed with discussions of those five sections in which the second aspect is discussed only by giving this desultory comment: "the remainder of Hume’s examination of the passions was rather desultory" (Laird, op. cit., p. 205). Commentators fail to see the importance of this aspect of the will, partly because they hesitate to take Hume’s assertion
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his discussion in the last five sections of his treatment of the will is the causes the violent passions, but what is intended there is to give a unity to the first two books of the Treatise, as we shall see below. It is unfortunate, as Livingston complains, that “there is yet no commentary on the account in part 2 [=T2.3.7-8]” in spite of that it “is by far the most important for understanding Hume’s view on the nature of time”.7

There are a few discussions, however, which insist that what constitutes the core of Hume’s system is illustrated in the third stage of Hume’s treatment of the passions as the subject relevant to the notion of space and time, to subjectivity, or to belief, rather than as the subject directly relevant to the will, as we shall see in my later chapter. Annette Baier, for instance, urges our attention to the importance of Hume’s section, “Of the influence of the imagination”, in relation to Book 1’s section, “Of the influence of belief”, and claims, though leaving his subsequent two sections uncommented, that “Hume here discusses the factors, determining patterns of attention, thought and the relative salience of different evaluative judgments which we have accepted, only some of which, however, on any given occasion have ‘lively’ or vivacious enough to affect our will”.8 The same section also attracted Deleuze’s attention, and was commented by him that “the core of [Hume’s] problem is to be found in the relations between the passions and the imagination”.9 This relation constitutes “the true originality” of Hume’s theory of passions”,10 as well as the notion of the self or subjectivity:Deleuze writes, “That which constitutes now the self is the synthesis of the affection and its reflection, the synthesis of an affection which fixes the imagination and of an imagination which reflects the affection”.11 Donald Livingstone has shown convincingly how Hume’s discussion

seriously that the actions of the will depends on the violence of a passion. For, this remark seems to contradict his former assertion that “passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence”, or that on the contrary a calm passion is the predominant inclination of the soul by becoming a settled principle of action. But there is no contradiction nor inconsistency involved in these assertions, as we have seen. This may be taken as one of the serious effects of the ambiguity of Hume’s use of the calm/violent division. Tito Magri mentions the ‘situation of the object’ as a factor of the causal principle that has the greatest influence on the calmness or violence of the direct passions, though he treats it as a part of Hume’s discussion of the combat of reason and passion.(Tito Magri, “Hume on the direct passions and motivation”, A companion to Hume, Blackwell, 2008, ed. Elizabeth Radcliffe, p.197).

9 Deleuze, p. 62.
10 Deleuze, p. 63.
11 Ibid. p.64.
in the last two sections “Of contiguity and distance of space and time” is intended to supplement and reinforce his former discussion delivered in Book I, and contribute to the full understanding not only of Hume’s sections on spatiotemporal contiguity, but also of Hume’s notion of the self in so far as “tensed ideas require essential reference to the self”\(^{12}\). Livingson envisages ingeniously that the “causal explanation in the moral science” delivered Hume’s discussion on the causes of the violent passions is meant to establish the analogy with that in the physical sciences, or rather “the cement of the natural and mental evidence”.

There seems justification to suppose that Hume’s treatment of third stage is meant for the unity of Books 1 and 2 of the *Treatise*, through the demonstration or confirmation of the main maxims established in his foregoing discussion in both books, as Baier, Deleuze, or Livingstone points out. We can agree with Livingston, for instance, that “Book II is a study of the self through an examination of its passions”\(^{13}\) when we see in Hume’s discussion of spatiotemporal contiguity how the self is revealed as the presupposition which makes the moral world as it is, or that “it is the order of these passions that constitutes the moral world”\(^{14}\). It also merits our attention that no one has ever attempted to explain the will in terms of the unity of the imagination and the passions. Hume has reason to be proud of his originality, by claiming in his *Abstract* of Books 1 and 2 of the *Treatise* that he has “put the whole controversy in a new light” (*Abstract*, p.415-6): his theory of the will and passions is innovating in that it consists of three aspects relevant to the cement of moral and physical evidence, the combat of the calm and violent passions, the causes the violent passions.

In the third stage of his treatment of the will, which is the subject of our present discussion, Hume’s concern is to explain the circumstance in which the aversion or propensity carries us to avoid or embrace what will give us pain or pleasure, as we have noted. Where the will and action depends on the impulse of passions which extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, it is certain that “when we wou’d govern a man, and push him to any action, ’twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions” (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419). Hume’s treatment of this aspect of the will makes a clear contrast with the other aspect of the will which depends on the combat of the calm and violent passion: in the former Hume assumes that “the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will” (T2.3.8.13; SBN 437) whereas in

\(^{12}\) Livingston, op.cit. p.118.

\(^{13}\) Ibid. p.119.

\(^{14}\) Ibid. p. 126.
the latter “passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence” (T2.3.4.1; SBN 418). So far as the former aspect of the will is concerned, “[w]e ought to place the object in such particular situations as are proper to increase the violence of the passion”, as “all depends upon the situation of the object, whose variation in this particular will be able to change the calm and violent passions into each other” (ibid.). But if “[b]oth these kinds of passions pursue good, and avoid evil, and both of them are encreas’d or diminish’d by the encrease or diminution of the good or evil” (ibid.), Hume proceeds to ask, why does it happen that “the same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one” (ibid.)? It is this situation that he attempts to explain in terms of these factors: the borrowing of force form any attendant object, custom, the exciting of the imagination.

(3) The causes of the force and violence of passion
Hume enters into the discussion of the third stage of his treatment of the will with this observation: “There is not in philosophy a subject of more nice speculation than this, of the different causes and effects of the calm and violent passions” (T2.3.4.1; SBN 417). Apparently this initial observation contains Hume’s confidence that he can attain a desired result in his succeeding discussion on the causes of the violent passions. His resuming observation given after five sections of his investigation of this subject, however, seems to have an air of resignation as it reads: “Both the causes and effects of these violence and calm passions are pretty variable, and depend, in a great measure, on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual” (T2.3.8.13; SBN 437). In this resume, he makes it clear that there are two factors which make this whole affair “uncertain”. In the first place, although the violent passions have generally a more powerful influence on the will, “it is often found that the calm ones, when corroborated by reflection, and seconded by resolution, are able to control them in their most furious movements” (ibid.). In the second place, “a calm passion may easily be changed into a violent one, either by a change of temper, or of the circumstances and situation of the object” (T2.3.8.13; SBN 437-8). Hume is here prepared to accept that the contribution of his inquiry into the causes of the violent passions is quite limited, and that there is a definite uncertainty concerning the will, not only because the force of a passion is not always in proportion to its violence, but also because the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual changes easily a calm passion into a violent. But this uncertainty is not too drastic for Hume to establish his system as it is evident that the causes of the violent passions more or less depends on “the circumstances and situation of the object”. His business is to explain “those circumstances
and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent” (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419) by
the universal principle, viz. association: by the borrowing of force form any attendant object, by
custom, or by exciting the imagination.

It must be noted that Hume’s use of calm and violent in his discussion of the causes of the
violent passions is distinct from that in his former discussion of the combat of the calm and violent
passions. When Hume mentions a violet passion in the former, he means it to have sensible disorder
and agitation, but in the latter, he means something more than that: it serves as an undesirable
motive that leads us to act with a short-term interest(T2.3.3.9-10; SBN 418). Since Hume’s
discussion of the causes of the violent passions is given in the former use, it is not intended for
the illustration of those undesirable cases which should be avoided in order to keep us virtuous,\(^\text{15}\)
but rather the illustration of those factors which “excite the spirits and enliven the passion”. An
opposition of passions is discussed as one of these factors, which “causes a new emotion in the
spirits, and produces more disorder than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force”
(T2.3.4.5; SBN 421). The reason why security diminishes the passions is, according to him,
that “it removes that uncertainty which increases them” (T2.3.4.8; SBN 421). On Hume’s basic
method of thinking, to keep a passion violent implies to keep the mind lively and active, and this
is essential and desirable when it is kept moderate, as “[t]he mind, when let to itself, immediately
languishes, and, in order to preserve its ardour, must be every moment supported by anew flow of
passion”(ibid.).\(^\text{16}\) Since on Hume’s account the causes of the violent passions are meant to be the
causes of the excitement or agitation of the mind, it is not surprising that Hume’s concern in his
discussion of the causes of the violent passions is with “the force and violence” rather than with
the violence alone on the one hand, and on the other with the contrast between the increase and the
diminish of a passion rather than with the contrast between calm and violent.

Hume’s strategy is to explain “the force and violence” of a passion in terms of a particular
situation in which an “easy progress of ideas favours the imagination, and makes it conceive its
object in a stronger and fuller light”, and to hold that “from this effect of it [=this situation] on
the imagination is derived its influence on the will and passions”(T2.3.7.7; SBN 431). In this

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\(^{15}\) See footnote 6..

\(^{16}\) It must here be recalled that in his foregoing discussion on love, Hume owned that the mind is so
insufficient of itself to keep it active that it falls into the languid state, and that in order to sustain
the mind by some brisk and lively emotion, we need some foreign objects which may produce a
lively sensation, and agitate the spirits (T2.3.4.5; SBN 352-3).
discussion, Hume tries to show that his hypothesis of the transference of vivacity is applicable to the account of the will and passions, and to demonstrate by that means “how aptly natural and moral evidence cement together, and form only one chain of argument betwixt them” (T2.3.1.17; SBN 406). It is plain on this view that the first stage of Hume’s treatment of the will is far from being “a lengthy digression”, but is connected importantly to the third stage, which is meant for the demonstration of those maxims established in the first stage in Section 1 of Part 3 of Book II. More importantly, the causal system established between the imagination and the passions is meant for the final confirmation of Hume’s central theme, that “[t]he subjects of the understanding and passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves”, expressed in his Advertisement to Books 1 and 2.

(4) The situation of the object which renders a passion either calm or violent

Let us now view briefly over Hume’s discussion of those circumstances and situation of the object, in order to find the whereabouts of his intention in his discussion on the causes of the violent passions.

(1) The association of passions

The first principle which increases the violence of a passion is the association of the passions. It is a remarkable propensity of human nature, according to Hume, that any emotion which attends a passion is easily converted into it. The association of impressions has been mentioned by him partly in his discussion of a double relation of impressions and ideas, and partly as the principle of a parallel direction (T2.2.9.9; SBN 384). Impressions or passions transfuse themselves into each other where they are related either by a relation or by a parallel direction, as they are, unlike ideas, susceptible of an entire union, and, like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression which arises from the whole” (T2.2.6.1; SBN 366). Hume now proceeds to argue that “[w]hen two passions are both present in the mind, they readily mingle and unite, though they have but one relation, and sometimes without any” (T2.3.4.2; SBN 420).

17 It is claimed here that the original passion of pride or humility is transfused into love or hatred as the imagination makes transition from one object, viz. myself, to another, viz. the other person (T2.2.2.28; SBN 346).
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When a person is heartily in love, the jealousies or quarrels give additional force to the prevailing passion: a solider advancing to the battle is naturally inspired with courage and confidence by the thought on his friends. Or, an opposition of passions, whether it arises from internal motives or external obstacles, commonly causes a new emotion in the spirits and produces more disorder than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force, because this new emotion is easily converted into the predominant passion, and increases its violence (T2.3.4.5-6; SBN 421). Uncertainty has the same influence as opposition, by producing all agitation of thought as well as the varieties of passions according to the different views, which transfuse themselves into the predominant passion” (T2.3.4.7; SBN 421). Other familiar experiences such as security, despair, obscurity, absence, are also explained by the same principle, according to Hume.

(2) Custom

Custom, or habit, is assigned an important role in Hume’s system of the mind, especially in Book 1 of the Treatise, chiefly as an acquired disposition that causes us to form beliefs about the unobserved. In his preceding discussion on love in Book 2, custom is mentioned together with acquaintance, as a factor which “facilitates the entrance and strengthens the conception of any object” (T2.2.4.5; SBN 353). It is not surprising to find Hume now discusses custom as a crucial factor which has a great influence on the will and passions, because in discussing the effects of the passions on belief, Hume has argued: “This emotion passes by an easy transition to the imagination; and diffusing itself over our idea of the affecting object, makes us form the idea with greater force and vivacity, and consequently assent to it” (T1.3.10.4; SBN 120). Now in the present discussion on the will, custom is claimed to have two “original effects” upon the mind, viz. to bestow “a facility in the performance of any action, or the conception of any object”, and “a tendency or inclination towards it” (T2.3.5.1; SBN 422). It is these two original effects that contribute to bestowing custom and repetition the greatest power to increase and diminish our passions, and even to convert pleasure into pain, or pain into pleasure.

Everything new or unfamiliar is most affecting as it agitates the spirits by causing their difficulty to move in their new direction. Surprise thus gives us either more pleasure or pain than what naturally belongs to it, according to Hume’s foregoing principle: “that every emotion which precedes or attends a passion is easily converted into it” (ibid.). But as the novelty wears off by its frequent returns upon the mind, one of the original effects of custom, viz. facility, operates, and converts pain into pleasure where the facility is moderate, or pleasure into pain where it is too great.
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The first conversion takes place according as the orderly motion of the spirits, which the pleasure of facility consists in, gives us a relish in time for what at first was most harsh and disagreeable. The second conversion happens when the facility destroys either the affections themselves or attending emotions by too frequent repetition, and renders the actions of the mind too faint and languid. The pleasures or pains produced by the facility are calm, because the conversion of pain into pleasure, or pleasure into pain, depends both on the diminish or decrease of the disorder or agitation of the spirits.

This effect of custom may not rest here, but be followed by the second effect, that custom, by bestowing tendency on the mind, takes off from the force of the passive habits by rendering the motion of the spirits faint and languid on the one hand, or increases all active ones by giving them new force on the other. When the spirits are sufficiently supported by themselves, the tendency of the mind gives them new force, and bends them more strongly to the action” (T2.3.5.5; SBN 424). Here is Hume’s explanation of why “when a passion has once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of the soul, it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation” (T2.3.4.1; SBN 418). “As repeated custom and its own force have made everything yield to it, it directs the actions and conduct without that opposition and emotion which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion” (T2.3.4.1; SBN 418).

The second factor of the increase or decrease of the force and violence of a passion is thus explained in terms of custom, by appealing to the same association of passions, or this “remarkable property of human nature, that any emotion which attends a passion is easily converted into it” (T2.3.4.2; SBN 419), as he discussed regarding the first factor.

(3) The influence of the imagination on the passions
The third factor to change the force and violence of a passion is asserted by Hume to be in “a close union of the imagination and affections” (T2.3.6.1; SBN 424). Since “nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the latter”(ibid.), a most effective way to increase the impulse of passion is “by exciting the imagination”. “Wherever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent, and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations”(ibid.). Here lies the reason why the same good or bad has more powerful influence on our passions when it is portrayed vividly or eloquently, than when it is pictured only vaguely or generally. Hume gives many instances to confirm this influence of the imagination upon the passions, and to show that the force and violence of our passions depends not merely
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on the greatness or quality of our pleasures or pains themselves, but on the way in which they are conceived.

A recent satisfaction produces a greater impulse of passion, and operates on the will with more violence than older ones, because “the memory in the first case assists the fancy, and gives an additional force and vigor to its conceptions” (T2.3.6.5; SBN 426). Or, in the story of the Athenians who rejected Themistocles’ design in the past Greece, Hume suggests, we can see clearly that “the more general and universal any of our ideas are, the less influence they have upon the imagination” (T2.3.6.3-4; SBN 425-6) and on the will and passions. Eloquence, which is a most typical instance to infuse passions into the mind by presenting objects in their strongest and most lively colours, teaches us how the mere acknowledgement of the value or merit of an object has but a feeble influence either on the will or the affections till an orator excites the imagination, and gives force to these ideas (T2.3.6.7; SBN 427). Sympathy is in effect a proof of this influence of the imagination upon the passions: such an extraordinary effect as the conversion of an idea into an impression takes place in sympathy by the force of the imagination.

All these examples to show that “lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination” are meant for Hume to be the demonstration of how “the force of the passion depends as much on the temper of the person as the nature or situation of the object” (T2.3.6.9; SBN 427). This unity of the imagination and the passions makes the core of Hume’s system of the will and passions not only in that “it is from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object” (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414), but also in that the impulse of passion depends on the vivacity with which the pain or pleasure are conceived: we are carried to action as the emotions of aversion or propensity extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object. “This vivacity is a requisite circumstance [not only] to the exciting all our passions” (T2.3.6.10; SBN 427) but also to the increase of their impulse, as Hume teaches us. Since “belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression” as he reminds us, “a mere fiction of the imagination has no considerable influence upon either of them”: “It is too weak to take any hold of the mind, or be attended with emotion” (ibid.).

It cannot be overlooked that Hume here connects his discussion on the will and passions in the present section, “Of the influence of the imagination on the passions”, to his former one on belief in Book I’s sections, especially to the section, “Of the influence of belief”, by referring back to his former issue, that “belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions, and so the passions in their turn are very favourable to belief” (T1.3.10.4; SBN 120). Hume’s concern in
the present section is to reinforce this reciprocal relation between the imagination and the passions through the illustration that the impulse of passion depends on the vivacity with which good or evil is conceived. Annette Baier urges our attention to the importance of the connection of these two sections, and refers to Deleuze’s view that “the fixing of ‘les rapports’ between passion and imagination is what constitutes the originality of Hume’s theory of the passions”. Since no one else than Hume has ever attempted to account for the will and passions in terms of the close union of the imagination and the passions, Hume has good reason to be proud of his originality, and to write in the Abstract to Books 1 and 2 of the Treatise that his theory of the passions “contains opinions, that are altogether as new and extraordinary” (TA30; SBN 659). So far as Treatise is intended for the demonstration that “the subject of the understanding and passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves” (Txii) as Hume writes in his Advertisement, it is not surprising that “the core of [Hume’s] problem is to be found in the relations between the passions and the imagination”.19

But “what is the simple relation between the imagination and the passions which will permit the latter to develop inside the former a complex effect?”20 In order to answer this question, we need to reflect that Hume’s present object is to explain how we are carried by aversion or propensity to avoid or embrace what will give us pain or pleasure, according as the emotions of aversion or propensity extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience. It is the emotion of aversion or propensity, on the one hand, that summons up reason as a navigator to show its way to develop, by “making us cast our view on every side, comprehend whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect” (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414), as we have seen. For, “[w]here the objects themselves do not affect us, their connection can never give them any influence”; as “reason is nothing but the discovery of this connection, it cannot by its means that the objects are able to affect us” (ibid.). But this impulse of passion depends on reasoning, on the other hand, which discovers this relation by the principles of association, and thus “according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation” (ibid.).

19 Deleuze, ibid. p.62.
It is this reciprocal relation between the imagination and the passions that Hume attempts to explain in his discussion of the situation of the object which renders a passion either calm or violent. Deleuze highlights the interdependence of the imagination and the passions, by observing that “the modes of association give the ideas possible reciprocal relations, while the qualities of the passions give the relations a direction and a sense”.\(^{21}\) “Association links ideas in the imagination; the passions give a sense to these relations, and thus they provide the imagination with tendency”.\(^{22}\)

For, it is “in virtue of a goal, an intention or a purpose” that ideas get associated, and it is only the passions that can confer motives upon human activity,\(^{23}\) as Deleuze points out. Here lies “a mutual implication between the passions and the association of ideas”: “the passions need somehow the association of ideas, and conversely…the association presuppose the passions”.\(^{24}\)

Hume seems to suggest that this reciprocal relation of the imagination and the passions entails their “close union” together owing to the concurrence of both associations of ideas and of passions. Hume says: “Whether this [close union] proceeds from the principle above mentioned, that “any attendant emotion is easily converted into the predominant, I shall not determine” (T.2.3.6.1; SBN 424). It is not necessary to determine it here, as he comments, because he has already established it in his former discussion on pride and humility in terms of the double relation of impressions and ideas to this effect: “An easy transition of ideas, which, of itself, causes no emotion, can never be necessary, or even useful to the passions, but by forwarding the transition betwixt some related impressions. Not to mention that the same object causes a greater or smaller degree of pride, not only in proportion to the increase or decrease of its qualities, but also to the distance or nearness of the relation, which is a clear argument for the transition of affections along the relation of ideas, since every change in the relation produces a proportionable change in the passion” (T.2.1.9.5; SBN 306). We may here learn not only that the unity of the imagination and affections constitutes the core of Hume’s system as Deleuze points out, but also that the last stage of Hume’s treatment of the will and direct passions has a direct connection to his core issue he has established regarding the indirect passion, and gives a unity to his system.

\(^{21}\) Ibid. p.63.

\(^{22}\) Ibid. p.63.

\(^{23}\) “Unless nature had given some original qualities to the mind, it cou’d never have any secondary ones; because in that case it cou’d have no foundation for action, nor cou’d ever begin to exert itself”(T1.2.3.3; SBN 280), as we have seen.

\(^{24}\) Deleuze, ibid. p.62.