Hume’s System of the Passions
in the Second Book of the *Treatise* (Part 2)

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(The first seven sections are discussed in the preceding issues of Part 1, published in The Sapporo University Journal, No. 33 March 2012. The present issue of Part 2 includes the succeeding seven sections from Section 4 of Chapter 2 to Section 6 of Chapter 3.)
Chapter 2

4 The secondary cause of the passion: sympathy

After having established the hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas from which pride and humility arises, Hume claims that, beside these original causes of pride and humility, there is a secondary one in the opinions of others, such as our reputation, our character, our name, which has an equal influence on the affections, and maintains that even the original causes “have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others” (T2.1.11.1; SBN 316). The rest of his treatment of pride and humility is spent to show that the secondary cause is also explained by the double-relation hypothesis, though with the involvement of “sympathy”, the most powerful principle on which not only Hume’s system of the passions but also his system of morals depend on. Hume’s object in these sections is to introduce and to establish sympathy as the principle by which the passion arises. It is in his discussion of love and hatred in the next part that he illustrates fully why and how “the soul or animating principle of the [the passions] all is sympathy” (T2.2.5.15; SBN 363). “Sympathy” in Hume’s system is a technical or sophisticated notion, distinct from the ordinary one which is often used as a synonym of pity or compassion. For, it is meant to be a propensity that “we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments” (T2.1.11.2; SBN 316). Let us see why and how sympathy is necessary for the production of the passion by a secondary cause, e.g. the admiration of others.

We have seen that, according to Hume’s hypothesis, the production of my pride depends on a double correspondence of impressions and ideas established between the passion (P) and the cause (C), my success, which are constituted respectively of a set of two ingredients, viz. the pleasurable sensation (S), and the idea of myself (I). My pride may be identified as PS+PI whereas my success as CS+CI, both being the component of the two kinds of ingredients. To ask the origin of the passion is to ask the source of the two kinds of ingredients which compose the passion. My pride and my success are connected to each other by a double-fold connection: by the identity of PS and CS, both of which are pleasurable sensations on the one hand, and by the identity of PI and

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CI, both of which are the idea of myself on the other. This is how “[t]hat cause, which excites the
passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the
cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion” (T2.1.5.5; SBN 286). My pride
arises when by this double relation of ideas and impressions, the two ingredients which compose
my success are converted into, or replaced by, the two ingredients which compose the passion: “the
one idea is easily converted into its cor-relative; and the one impression into that, which resembles
and corresponds to it” (T2.1.5.5; SBN 286-7). This is how pride or humility is produced by the
original cause of the passion, as we have seen in the last section.

Let us see how the same method of reasoning is applicable to the circumstance in which
I feel proud of myself by my friend’s admiration. This circumstance is constituted of these two
items, viz. my pride (P) and my friend’s admiration (C). My pride is constituted of the pleasurable
sensation (S) and the idea of myself (I). The admiration is composed of the pleasurable sensation
(S) and the idea of myself (I), since the admiration is a pleasure which my friend feels about me,
and is directed to me. These two items are connected by a double-fold relation of impressions and
ideas which is established between PS and CS, and between PI and CI. This procedure seems so
far exactly the same with the case in which the passion arises from the original causes. We might
here conclude, just as we did in the last case, that my pride (PS+PI) is derived from the admiration
(CS+CI), as CS is converted into its correlative, PS, whereas CI into PI. This conclusion is
problematic, however, because CS does not correspondent exactly, precisely speaking, to PS in our
present case: the former is an idea whereas the latter is an impression. CS is an idea of a pleasurable
sensation which I can never feel directly, as it occurs in the mind of my friend in admiring me. How
could Hume hold that PS is derived from CS, then?

It is plain that the pleasure which is felt by my friend about me is different from the pleasure
which I receive from his admiration insofar as these two pleasures occur in different minds: the first
appears in my mind as an idea whereas the second as an impression. To ask the origin of pride is
for Hume to ask the source of the second pleasure, so that his main business is to explain how the
second pleasure is caused by the first pleasure. It is sympathy, he assumes, that makes this causal
connection between the first and the second pleasure possible. Thus Hume begins his discussion of
the secondary cause of pride with the illustration of the nature of sympathy in the following way:

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The admiration is a species of love, entertained by my friend, which is constituted of a pleasurable
sensation and the idea of the other self.
‘Tis indeed evident, that when we sympathize with the passions and sentiments of others, these movements appear at first in our mind as mere ideas, and are conceiv’d to belong to another person, as we conceive any other matter of fact. ‘Tis also evident, that the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent, and that the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them. (T.2.1.11.8; SBN 319)

Sympathy described above is a mechanism which consists of the two processes: in which we form the idea of the other person’s affection, and in which the idea is converted into the impression. Insofar as the first process is concerned, “sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operation of our understanding” (ibid.): we infer the reality of the affection of others by the relation of cause and effect just as we conceive any other matter of fact. In the second process, however, sympathy “contains something more surprising and even extraordinary” (ibid.): the idea of the affection of others is converted into the impression. The second process naturally follows the first as the relation of cause and effect, on which the first process depends, is “assisted by the relations of resemblance and contiguity” (ibid.). “Resemblance and contiguity are relations not to be neglected; especially, when, by an inference from cause and effect, and by the observation of external signs, we are informed of the real existence of the object, which is resembling or contiguous” (T.2.1.11.4; SBN 317-8), according to him.3 This assertion of Hume’s may well invite these three questions: (1) how the conversion of an idea into the impression takes place when these relations united together, (2) why the idea of the affection of another person “changes by degrees into a real impression” (T.2.2.4.7; SBN 354), and (3) what is entailed by the conversion of an idea into the impression. We can find Hume’s answer to the first question as follows:

And since these relations can entirely convert an idea into an impression, and convey the vivacity of the latter into the former, so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition, we may easily conceive how the relation of cause and effect alone may serve to strengthen and enliven an idea. In sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression.

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3 In the later section, (T.2.2.4.6; SBN 354), Hume mentions that there is the other way for the conversion of an idea into the impression to happen, which does not presuppose our remarking of relations between ourselves and the object.
This conversion arises from the relation of objects to ourselves. Ourself is always intimately present to us. (T2.1.11.8; SBN 320)

Two conditions are asserted above in order for the conversion of an idea into the impression to happen. First, the vivacity needs to be conveyed perfectly from the latter into the former. All the relations need to be united together in order to convey this vivacity “so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition”. Secondly, there must be the relation of the object to ourselves, by which “the impression or consciousness of our own person” is conveyed to enliven the relevant idea “in the strongest and most lively manner” (T2.1.11.6; SBN 318). That is to say, what is essential for the conversion is “the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person” (T2.1.11.5; SBN 318), because it is the ever-present and most lively vivacity. What satisfies these two conditions is the sentiments or passions of others, which are “favour’d by most circumstances” in virtue of “a great resemblance among all human creatures”.

For as the ideas of pleasure can have an influence only by means of their vivacity, which makes them approach impressions, ‘tis most natural those ideas shou’d have that influence, which are favour’d by most circumstances, and have a natural tendency to become strong and lively; such as our ideas of the passions and sensations of any human creature. Every human creature resembles ourselves, and, by that means, has an advantage above any other object in operating on the imagination. (T2.2.5.4; SBN 359)

The answer to the second question is given as this:

The different degrees of their force and vivacity are...the only particulars that distinguish them [ideas and impression]; and as this difference may be removed...’tis no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion may by this means be so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion. The lively idea of any objects always approaches it impression; and ‘tis certain we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination, and make a malady real by often thinking of it. But this is most remarkable in the opinions and affections; and ‘tis there principally that a lively idea is converted into an impression. (T2.1.11.7; SBN 318-9)
Hume insists in this quotation that, since ideas are the faint copies of impressions, the conversion of an idea into the impression is nothing but one of those cases, though “most remarkable”, in which the lively idea of any objects approaches its impression. Hume, however, is misleading here in two ways. First, by alluding abnormal cases such as feeling sickness or pain from the mere force of imagination, or making a malady real by often thinking of it. For, by this allusion, he might be taken to maintain that the conversion of an idea into the impression is the matter of how perfectly an idea is enlivened by the vivacity, in spite of that only those ideas which are enlivened by the vivacity of the impression of ourselves are converted into the impressions. Secondly, he is misleading by insisting that the lively idea of any objects always approaches its impression, because it is not the ideas of any objects, but virtually the ideas of sentiments or passions of others that are converted into the impressions, as he insists in the above passage.

It is principally our ideas of the passions and sensations of any human creature, that could be converted into the impression, because these ideas have a natural tendency to become strong and lively. “Our affections depends more upon ourselves, and the internal operations of the mind, than any other impressions”, Hume observes, “for which reason they arise more naturally from the imagination, and from every idea we form of them” (T2.1.11.7; SBN 319). Thus sympathy is claimed to be the chief principle by which the passion is produced. But, what does is actually entailed by Hume’s assertion that the lively idea of any object “changes by degrees into a real impression; these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity” (T2.2.4.7; SBN 354)?

Now, concerning this last question, we must be careful not to repeat the following notorious misunderstanding which is typically seen in Glathe, and rehearsed by Passmore⁴. Glathe maintained that, according to Hume’s teaching, to sympathize with someone else’s toothache requires us to have a toothache as well. But Hume’s assertion of the conversion of an idea into the impression cannot be taken to mean that my sympathy with X’s toothache entails my own toothache, which is flatly contradictory to our experience. In order to avoid the misunderstanding, we need to distinguish between the ideas of X’s being in a toothache and the idea of a toothache itself, and to see that it is the former idea, not the latter, that is converted into the impression. The difference between these two kinds of ideas is crucial for the conversion to happen, because, insofar as the conversion arises from the relation of object to ourselves, it is the former idea that satisfies this requirement.

condition: the former, unlike the latter, contains the idea of the person who is affected. When Hume says that the idea of X’s toothache is converted into the impression, what he means is that a new passion, e.g. pity, arises from the communication of a painful sensation which constitutes X’s toothache. It is indeed this situation that is described by Hume to the effect that the idea is “converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion as an original affection” (T2.1.11.3; SBN 317). But, why does he need to explain this causal relation in terms of such a complicated process of the conversion of an idea into the impression?

Hume’s method of reasoning for the account of the causal relation between these two items, viz. my perception of X’s toothache and my feeling of pity, depends on the supposition that the first item is constituted of the idea of X and the idea of the painful sensation, and the second the idea of X and a painful sensation (an impression). His strategy is to hold, as we have seen, that there is a double-fold correspondence of impressions and ideas between these two sets of components, and that the first is converted into the latter, or that the second set of ingredients is derived from the second. The difficulty in holding an exact correspondence between the two sets of components is that a painful sensation in the first item is an idea whereas the one in the second is an impression. Hume’s solution is to claim that the idea of the painful sensation composing the first item is converted into the impression of the painful sensation composing the second item by being enlivened by the vivacity of the impression of myself. One and the same painful sensation thus appears in X mind, which is for me as an idea, and then in my mind as an impression. “As they are all present in the mind of one person, and afterwards appear in the mind of another; and as the manner of their appearance, first as an idea, then as an impression, is in every case the same, the transition must arise from the same principle”, as Hume puts it (T2.2.7.3; SBN 369-370). In this sense, “every distinct passion is communicated by a distant original quality, and is…derived from the general principle of sympathy above explained” (T2.2.7.3; SBN 369).

This method of reasoning may well be applied to the case in which my pride is produced by my friend’s admiration. “[T]he pleasure which we receive from admiring arise from a communication of sentiments” of others (T2.1.11.19; SBN 324), in the sense that the pleasurable sensation which I feel at the admiration (which is pride) is derived from the pleasurable sensation which my friend feels about me (which is love): one and the same pleasurable sensation arises first as an idea in the mind of my friend, and then as an impression in my mind, as Hume puts it. Although the pleasurable sensation which constitutes the admiration is not an impression but an idea as it occurs in
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the mind of others, this pleasure is fully qualified to be the source of the pleasurable sensation which composes my pride, when it is enlivened by the vivacity conveyed from the impression of myself. In this respect, “it is sympathy which is properly the cause of the affections” (T2.2.5.5; SBN 359).

By showing that the production of pride and humility depends on sympathy by which the sentiment of others are communicated, Hume has suggested that there is a close connection between the first subsystem relevant to pride and humility and the second relevant to love and hatred. Sympathy as the principle of communication of the sentiments between ourselves and others is assigned a crucial role to unite the two subsystems together, and to provide by that means the foundation of the system of the passions.

Chapter 3: The second subsystem relevant to love and hatred

The second subsystem relevant to love and hatred is the subject of Part 2 of Book II of the Treatise. If the first subsystem is meant to be “the true system” (T2.1.5.5; SBN 286) from which the passion is derived, the second one may be taken to be a ‘medium’, placed between the first and the third subsystems, and assigned a crucial task of connecting the two subsystems into such an active unity as to carry us to action. This may explain why Hume’s treatment of love and hatred consists of two procedures relevant to these two subjects, viz. the connection between the first and the second subsystem, and that between the second and the third one. It may be convenient to begin our discussion of the second subsystem by distinguishing its two aspects from each other, and to examine separately how Hume explains its connections to the other two subsystems, which depend on different principles, viz. the double relation of impressions and ideas, and the association of impressions.

The first aspect of this subsystem concerns the corroboration with the preceding subsystem relevant to pride and humility, upon which “the situation of the mind” is to be established. What provides the basis of this aspect is a “great resemblance” between love/hatred and pride/humility, and that “there is always requir’d a double relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect, in order to produce either love or hatred” (T2.2.4.2; SBN 352). All the observations which has been formed concerning the latter set of passions is equally applicable to the account of the former, Hume insists, in spite of that “the immediate object of pride and humility is self” whereas “the object of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions and sensations, we are not conscious” (T2.2.1.1; SBN 329).
The second aspect, on the other hand, is founded on the difference between the two sets of the indirect passions: “pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action”, whereas “love and hatred are not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion which they produce, but carry the mind to something further” (T2.2.6.3; SBN 367). The connection between the second and the third subsystem depends on the peculiarity of love and hatred, that they “are always followe’d by, or rather conjoin’d with benevolence and anger” (ibid.). It is by means of this natural connection between the indirect and the direct passions that we are carried to action.

1 The first aspect of the system

Hume establishes that it is by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas that love and hatred are produced and claiming that, insofar as this set of passions has “so great a resemblance to the other set of passions, viz. pride and humility, all the observations which he has formed concerning the latter are equally applicable to the former. The exact correspondence between the two subsystems relevant to the two sets of the indirect passions is essential for Hume’s theory, because “if love and esteem were not produced by the same qualities as pride, according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others, this method of proceeding would be very absurd; nor could men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person with those themselves have entertained” (T2.2.1.9; SBN 332). Although “few can form exact systems of the passions, or make reflexions on their general nature and resemblances”, he contends, “we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular”, as “we are sufficiently guided by common experience, as well as by a kind of presentation, which tell us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves” (ibid.). We do not need to worry about the so-called problem of other minds, he seems to suggest, as we know that “all the arguments that have been employ’d to prove that the causes of the former passions excite a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion, will be applicable with equal evidence to the cause of the latter (ibid.). It is true that “[n]o passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind” (T3.3.1.7; SBN 576), but we are fully justified to judge what will operate on others by what we feel immediately in ourselves since “the same qualities that produce pride or humility, cause love or hatred, according to Hume.5

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5 It is often pointed out that "Hume does not appear to recognize any epistemological problem
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cornering other selves" (Pitson, p. 266). Pitson argues, for instance, that "Hume's position in relation to our knowledge of other selves is ultimately inconsistent" (Pitson, p. 260), because "the existence of others as the subjects of mental states is presupposed both in Hume's discussion of the understanding in Book I of the Treatise, and also in his discussion of the passions—in particular, the indirect passions—in Book II" (Pitson 256). But, such a criticism as this fails to see the whereabouts of Hume's intention in his discussion of sympathy, as his notion of sympathy is intended as something more than a mere "attempt to explain how it is possible for us to be aware of the contents of other people's minds" (Pitson 256). Sympathy is for Hume one of those affective instances in which "the passions arise in conformity to the images" we form of the affections of others (T2.1.11.8; SBN 319).

Pitson is certainly well founded in suggesting that the existence of others as the subjects of mental states is presupposed in Hume's discussion of the understanding in Book I of the Treatise. In so far as Book I is concerned, Hume indeed had a reason for avoiding the involvement of the problem how we get the knowledge of other people's minds and for supposing that "we could see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions which constitutes his mind or thinking principle" (T1.4.6.18; SBN 260): in order to explain the operation of the understanding in terms of the unity of perceptions which constitute a mind, it is convenient to suppose that "the case is the same whether we consider ourselves or others" (T1.4.6.18; SBN 261).

But, it is a mistake to suppose that "the existence of others as the subjects of mental states is presupposed also in his discussion of the passions in Book II. It is true that sympathy described as this is a mechanic process dependent on the causal relation between mental and physical events: "When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion as is presently converted into the passion itself" (T3.3.1.7; SBN 576). We might agree with Pitson who points out that Hume's notion of sympathy presupposes "the existence of other minds like our own" (Pitson 267), or that "Hume seems to endorse a constant conjunction between body and mind generally and not just in our own case" (Pitson 260). But, it is a mistake to judge that "Hume takes the existence of the human body for granted" (Pitson 259) upon the ground that his notion of sympathy depends on "a great resemblance among all human creatures" (T318). For, Humean sympathy is nothing but one of those instances in which the indirect passion arises from the double relation between the impressions and ideas. His assertion that our esteem for the rich, for instance, is virtually the reflection or "rebound" of his satisfaction does not presuppose our knowledge of the contents of his mind; it is meant to be the assertion that the ingredient which composes the passion is derived from the idea of his pleasure, as we have seen in the foregoing chapter.

In illustrating this aspect of the mind relevant to the understanding in Book I, Hume has restricted the subject of his inquiry to "the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of body" (T1.4.2.2; SBN 187/8) by claiming: "We may well ask, What causes induces us to believe in the existence of body? but it is in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is the point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." (T1.4.2.2; SBN 187). Here is plainly no room to suspect that he presupposes the existence of physical objects.

It is the same strategy, it seems to me, that is employed in Book II for the illustration of the affective aspect of the mind. His position regarding the second aspect may be put by the analogy
with the first in this way: ‘We may well ask, what causes induce us to believe in the existence of other people’s mind? But it is in vain to ask, Whether there be other minds or not? If this assimilation is adequate, what Hume finds it necessary to inquire in Book II is the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of other people’s minds rather than the existence of other minds itself. Needless to say, this inquiry does not presuppose ‘the existence of others as the subjects of mental states,’ nor mean that Hume does not recognise any epistemological problem concerning other selves.

Hume finds the key to his problem in this resemblance or correspondence between the two sets of the indirect passions, viz. pride and humility, love and hatred, by pointing out: “it is evident, that the very same qualities and circumstances, which are the causes of pride or self-esteem, are also the causes of vanity, or the desire or reputation” (T2.2.1.9; SBN 332). He insists on that “very same qualities and circumstances, which are the causes of pride and self-esteem, are also the causes of vanity, or the desire of reputation; and that we always put to view those particulars with which in ourselves we are best satisfied” (ibid.). Because, “if love and esteem were not produced by the same qualities as pride, according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others,” he reasons, “this method of proceeding would be very absurd; nor could men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person with those themselves have entertained” (ibid.). His primary concern in this part of his discussion is thus to show that “the same qualities that produce pride or humility cause love or hatred” (ibid.) through the demonstration how “all the arguments that have been employed to prove that the causes of the former passions excite a pain or pleasure independent of the passion, will be applicable with equal evidence to the causes of the latter” (ibid.).

All we need to do is therefore “to make reflections on their general nature and resemblance” (ibid.), and to establish such an “exact system” as to justify our belief produced “by common experience, as well as by a kind of presentation, which tells us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves” (ibid.).
In order to give “a full and decisive proof” of this reasoning, Hume makes eight experiments on the supposition that I am in company with someone, and that I have the natural and ultimate object of all the four passions placed before me: “Myself am the proper object of pride or humility; the other person of love or hatred” (T2.2.2.2; SBN 333). He calls our attention to this situation of the mind, by claiming that “here are the four affections, plac’d, as it were, in a square, or regular connection with, and distance from, each other” (T T2.2.2.3; SBN 333):

The passions of pride and humility, as well as those of love and hatred, are connected together by the identity of their object, which to the first set of passions is self, to the second some other person. These two lines of communication or connection form two opposite sides of the square. Again, pride and love are agreeable passions; hatred and humility uneasy. This similitude of sensation betwixt pride and love, and that betwixt humility and hatred, form a new connection, and may be considered as the other two sides of the square. Upon the whole, pride is connected with humility, love with hatred, by their objects or ideas; Pride with love, humility with hatred, by their sensations or impressions (ibid.)

In the eights experiments given on this situation constituted of the four affections placed in a form of square, Hume tries to show how any common object, e.g. “an ordinary stone” or virtue, once fallen in this situation, causes the affections wheel about the square, involving the transfusion into any other. It is indeed this “situation of the mind”, constituted of the four affections connected with

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6 What Hume here intends is an explicit demonstration of "the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects", which is strongly recommended by him in the Introduction to the Treatise. Hume was emphatic on the importance of "the science of man" as "the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on the experience and observation" (Introduction 7; SBN xvi), and on the necessity to "glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life" (Introduction 10; SBN xix). For, it is "where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared", he says, that "we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility, to any other of human comprehension" (ibid.).

7 "I have observed, that though self be the obect of the first set of passions [pride and humility], and some other person the second [love and hatred], yet these objects cannot alone be the causes of the passions as having each of them a relation to two contrary affections, which must from the very first moment destroy each other. Here then is the situation of the mind, as I have already described" (T2.2.11.6; SBN 396).
each other by the double-fold ties of impressions and ideas, that is intended to be the circumstance
in which the idea of the self or the other self arises. These two subsystems, by thus forming such
a definite situation, provide the foundation of Hume’s system of the passions. One long section is
employed to give “a full and decisive proof of these systems” through the demonstration that “these
two faculties of the passions and imagination are connected together, and that the relation of ideas
have an influence upon the affections”(T2.2.2.16; SBN 340).

In the first three experiments, Hume tries to show that “an object without a relation, or
with but one, never produces either of these passions”, pride or humility, love or hatred (T2.2.2.28;
SBN 347). In the first experiment, he invites us to suppose that where I am in company of a person
to whom I had so far no special feeling, there is presented an object, e.g. a stone, which belongs
to neither of us, and causes no emotion. It is plain that, so far as this object, which has no relation
either of impressions and ideas to any of the four passions, being out of the mental “square”, cannot
produce any of the affection. The first experiment is meant to show that “an object that wants
both these relations can never produce any passion”. The second experiment is intended for the
illustration that “a relation of ideas is not able alone to give rise to these affections”. For, where the
object belongs either to me or to my companion, the relation “bestows an equal impulse towards
the opposite passions of pride and humility, love and hatred, according to the object belongs to
ourselves or others”; this opposition “must destroy both, and leave the mind perfectly free from any
affection or emotion”, as he reasons. The third experiment is meant to show that an object, which
produces pleasure or uneasiness, but has no manner of connection either with ourselves or others,
may give such a turn to the disposition as that it may naturally fall into pride or love, humility or
hatred”(T2.2.2.6; SBN 335), in spite of that “the one impression be easily transfused into the other”
in the association of impressions where “the transition from the sensation to the affection is not
forwarded by any principle that produces a transition of ideas” (ibid.).

In the fourth experiment, Hume proves that “whatever has a double relation must
necessarily excite these passions”(T2.2.2.9; SBN 336). For this purpose, he chooses “vice or
virtue”, in the place of a stone, in order to show how the affection “wheels about” according as
the object changes its relation to myself or to others, or as it changes its impression from pain to
pleasure. Where the virtue, which causes a separate satisfaction, belongs to me, it produces pride
by this double relation: its idea is related to that of self, the object of the passion, and the sensation
it causes resembles the sensation of the passion. Where the virtue belongs to my companions, the
affections wheels about, leaving pride, where there is only one relation, viz. of impressions, falls to
the side of love, where they are attracted by a double relation of impressions and ideas. Repeating the same experiment by changing anew the relation of ideas, it is shown that the affections are brought back to pride, and again at love or kindness by a new repetition. The change of object from virtue to vice only makes it “run the circle of the passions in the same manner” of the change of their relation. On the foundation of this experiment, the rest of four experiments are made for the illustration how the imagination wheels about according to the “complicated attractions and relations”, giving rise to the passions.

In the fifth experiment, Hume considers more complicated cases in which not only the object of the passion, e.g. the vice or virtue of my son or brother, is closely related to me by a double relation of impressions and ideas, but also the cause of the passion acquires a double relation of impressions and ideas to this person. In that case, the affections produced by the first double relation would not “rest there”, but “transfuse themselves into any other impressions”. “The virtue or vice of a son or brother not only excites love or hatred, but, by a new transition from similar causes, gives rise to pride or humility”(T2.2.2.13; SBN 338), according to him.

The reverse case of this phenomenon is examined in the sixth experiment, in answering the question, why “the transition from pride or humility to love or hatred, is not so natural as from love or hatred to pride or humility”(T2.2.2.14; SBN 339). He explains this seemingly contradictory case by resorting to this maxim that “when self is the object of a passion, it is not natural to quit the consideration of it till the passion be exhausted, in which case the double relations of the impressions and ideas can no longer operate”(T2.2.2.17; SBN 341). “As we are at all times intimately conscious of ourselves, our sentiments and passions, their ideas must strike upon us with greater vivacity than the idea of the sentiments and passions of any other person”, “the passage is smooth and open from the consideration of any person related to us to that of ourself, of whom we are every moment conscious”, but “when the affections are once directed to ourself, the fancy passes not with the same facility from that object to any other person, how closely soever connected with us”(T2.2.2.16; SBN 339/340). In this view, the present case is “a clear proof” that “those two faculties of the mind, the imagination and passions, assist each other”, but also that “the transition of the passions is dependent entirely on the transition of the imagination”(ibid.).

The seventh and the eighth experiment are the “variations” of the foregoing principles, and spent for the solution of some seeming contradictions or exceptions to his system, e.g. “a violent passion produces more easily a feeble than that does a violent” in spite of that “the fancy passes with more facility from the less to the greater, than from the greater to the less”(T2.2.2.26; SBN 345).
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Or, Hume explains why “the original passion is pride or humility, whose object is self; and that this passion is transfused into love or hatred, whose object is some other person, notwithstanding the rule…that the imagination passes with difficulty from contiguous to remote”(T2.2.2.27; SBN 346). His intention is to show that “where the relation, by any particular instance, has not its usual effect of producing a transition either of ideas or of impressions, it ceases to operate upon the passions, and give rise neither to pride nor love, humility nor hatred”(T2.2.2.28; SBN 347). We here see not only that the production of the passion depends on an “emotional see-saws” established between the two kinds of association, viz. of impressions and of ideas, but also that no object, once caught by the network constituted by of the four affections, viz. pride and humility, and love and hatred, fails to produce one of the passions. Hume highlights this situation in the following way:

I have observ’d, that though self be the object of the first set of passions [pride and humility], and some other person of the second [love and hatred], yet these objects cannot alone be the causes of the passions, as having each of them a relation to two contrary affections, which must from the very first moment destroy each other. Here then is the situation of the mind, as I have already describ’d it. It has certain organs naturally fitted to produce a passion; that passion, when produc’d, naturally turns the view to a certain object. But this not being sufficient to produce the passion, there is requir’d some other emotion, which, by a double relation of impressions and ideas, may set these principles in action, and bestow on them their first impulse. (T T2.2.11.6; SBN 396)

Annette Baier characterizes this situation in terms of the “conflict” or “contrariety” of passions, and claims: “the outright contrariety between two totally opposed passions (or ideas), if they are of equal force or vivacity, would lead to their mutual destruction, leaving the soul ‘perfectly calm and indifferent’, passionless and ‘in reality nothing’, insofar as passions and their objects are needed to make it something. …The point of introducing the rather contrived life-and-death conflict between being proud and being ashamed of ‘ourselves’ is to persuade us of the double intentionality of pride and humility, their need for a ‘subject’ or ‘cause’, as well as an ‘object’, ourselves”. Thus Baier focuses on the “reflexivity, indirectness,
conflict” expressed as “the opening themes” of Book II of the *Treatise*, and suggests that “they are of importance for understanding Hume’s version of morality”.

Baier’s emphasis, however, seems not entirely convincing to me, in view of that what is essential to the situation of the mind is the identity or correspondence, rather than the “contrariety” or “conflict”, between the two sets of the indirect passions. It is the correspondence or parallelism, not the “mutually destructive potentials”, built between the two sets of the passions, that could provide a smooth passage for the imagination to move around. The situation of the mind must form a closed circle constituted of the two reciprocal set of passions, which are just like mirrors standing to one another, in order to function as the foundation of the affective mechanism by which the idea of the self arises.

2 The second aspect

If the task of the first aspect of the second subsystem is to establish the situation in which the idea of the self arises, the task of the second aspect is to explain the way by which we are carried further out of this closed situation. The first aspect concerns the situation of the mind upon the basis of the two reciprocal subsystems, which are united by the double-fold ties of impressions and ideas, and to show that any object, once fallen in this situation, never fails to produce one of the four passions, viz. pride, humility, love, hatred, and in its consequence, the idea of the self or of the other self. “On the appearance of such an object,” Hume observes, the mind “awakes, as it were, from a dream: The blood flows with a new tide: The heart is elevated: And the whole man acquires a vigour, which he cannot command in his solitary and calm moments” (T2.2.4.4; SBN 352). For, the mind of man is “insufficient of itself to its own entertainment, and naturally seeks after foreign objects which may produce a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits” (ibid.), according to him. What characterizes this situation is that it constitutes a sort of blind circle without any exist, along which the mind wheels about, according to complicated attractions and relations of the object to ourselves. This situation depends on the exact correspondence between pride/humility and love/hatred, as we have seen.

It is plain, however, that how lively we may become by exciting our spirits with the appearance of external objects, we remain still solitary so long as we are kept in a seclusion of a mind. There must be a way out of this situation, which allows us to be in touch with something further, and to make us enter so deep into the opinions and affections of others. Now, an exit from this situation is prepared in two ways, viz. in terms of sympathy, and in terms of this conjunction between the indirect

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10 Baier, ibid., p.134.
and the direct passions: “The passions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoin’d with benevolence and anger”(T2.2.6.3; SBN 367). The second aspect of the second subsystem is intended to illustrate the two ways by which we are carried out of the secluded situation, and to show how we are introduced into the third subsystem by which we are motivated for action. It therefore is no wonder that this aspect is founded on “so a remarkable” difference between the two sets of passions that, although “pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action”, “love and hatred are not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion which they produce, but carry the mind to something further”(ibid.). It is no wonder that “pride and hatred invigorate the soul, and love and humility enfeeble it”(T2.2.10.5; SBN 391).

But if “self is the object of a passion, it is not natural to quite the consideration of it till the passion be exhausted” so long as “the double relations of impressions and ideas operate”(T2.2.2.18; SBN 341), how could the conjunction of love and hatred with the direct passions of benevolence and anger help us to get out of the closed circle, and make us free from the dominant bandage of the double relation of impressions and ideas? Hume prepares his answer to this question in that “it is not the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure which determines the character of any passion, bu the whoe bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end”(T2.2.9.2; SBN 381). Since the indirect passions are determined to have self or the other self for their object, it is the association both of impressions and ideas that is relevant to them. What we have all along supposed in the preceding discussion of the double relation of impressions and ideas is the resemblance, that one impression is related to another when their sensations are resembling. But, there is another way by which one passion is connected to another: by means of a resemblance in the whole bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end of passions. It is this resemblance or correspondence of sensations and directions alone that is relevant to the direct passions. The two systems of the indirect and the direct passions thus depend on these two different principles, or rather by “two different causes, from which a transition of passion may arise, viz. a double relation of ideas and impressions, and, what is similar to it, a conformity in the tendency and direction of any two desires, which arise from different principles”(T2.2.9.12; SBN 385). In the rest of discussion in

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11 It is important to see that the second principle operates when there is a resemblance or correspondence between the two desires which arise from different systems of the indirect and the direct, viz. one relevant passions, and that the connection between the two systems of the two kinds of passions therefore depends entirely on the latter principle.
which the direct passions are treated, we must take the second principle into our consideration, and suppose the “principle of a parallel direction” operates in associating impressions with each other when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent. For, the two kinds of principles are involved in the account of the origin of love and hatred, owing to the “original and primary” connection with the direct passions of benevolence and anger, as we have seen, though they are irrelevant to pride and humility, which are, unlike love and hatred, “only pure sensations, without any direction or tendency to action” (T2.2.9.2; SBN 382). Hume’s discussion of the compound passions are intended for a full illustration of way by which the two kinds of principles corroborate with each other in producing the passions.

The second half of Hume’s treatment of love and hatred begins in Section iv of Part 2 of Book II with the question, “why several actions that cause a real pleasure or uneasiness excite not any degree, or but a small one, of the passion of love or hatred towards the actors” (T2.2.4.1; SBN 351). For, this phenomenon seems contradictory to his foregoing hypothesis of a double relation of impressions and ideas, which teaches us that, the passion of love or hatred must arise insofar as the actions supply the pleasurable or painful sensation which constitutes love or hated. The key to solve this difficulty is given in terms of the “relation of a different kind” in the following way:12

According to the preceding system, there is always requir’d a double relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect, in order to produce either love or hatred. But though this be universally true, ’tis remarkable that the passion of love may be excited by only one relation of a different kind, viz. betwixt ourselves and the object; or, more properly speaking, that this relation is always attended with both the others. (T2.2.4.2; SBN 351)

The pleasurable sensation which constitutes my love to, e.g. a bellboy is derived more from my relation to him rather than from the pleasure which I receive by his service. It is from the relation betwixt myself and the bellboy, Hume suggests, that provides the pleasurable sensation as the ingredient of my love. “Whoever is united to us by any connection is always sure of a share of our love, proportioned to the connexion, without inquiring into his other qualities”(ibid.), as he assures us. But, how could this relation have such a remarkable influence in the production of the passion?

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12 This relation was mentioned first in his discussion of sympathy at T2.1.1.6; SBN 318 as “a species of causation.”
This relation betwixt ourselves and the object was mentioned in Hume’s foregoing discussion as one of those principal relations relevant to sympathy (T2.1.11.6; SBN 318). This relation is “a species of causation”, he claimed, “tho’ not be so strong as that of causation, must still have a considerable influence”, as it conveys “the impression or consciousness of our own person” to the related ideas (ibid.). Since “the idea, or rather the impression of ourselves” is ever-present, and most vivacious perception, Hume reasoned, “whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception” (T2.1.11.4; SBN 317). Now in the present discussion, Hume reiterates that “[w]hatever is related to us is conceived in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object” (T2.2.4.5; SBN 353), and calls our attention to that the relation of ourselves with the object is parallel to our reasonings from cause and effect in that both concur in producing a lively and strong idea of any object. In this respect, custom, acquaintanceship, or education is parallel to it, as they all “facilitate[s] the entrance and strengthen the conception of any object” (ibid.). This is the only particular which is common to all these relations, he observes, and it is in this particular that they produce all their common effects, which include love or kindness (ibid.).

When we feel love towards a person, our love is constituted of two ingredients, viz. a pleasurable sensation and the idea of the person. Now, to ask the origin of our love is to ask whence the first ingredient, viz. a pleasurable sensation, is derived. The passion of love is produced by a foreign object insofar as it provides the source of the ingredient which constitutes our love, according to Hume’s double relation hypothesis. But, this method of reasoning is not useful for the account of some of our affective experiences: we do not always love a person even where he pleases us by his service or compliment, for instance. It is because, Hume reasons, the source of the pleasurable sensation in these exceptional cases is “the force and liveliness” with which we conceive the person, rather than the pleasurable sensation which is produced by his action, as his foregoing hypothesis teaches us. The force and liveliness of conception is fully entitled to be the source of the ingredient which composes the passion, because “such a conception is peculiarly agreeable” (ibid.). In this respect, the production of love by the relation between ourselves and the object is nothing but one of those instances in which the passion arises from the double relation of impressions and ideas, and “the relation of different kind, viz. betwixt ourselves and the object”, is nothing but one of those relations whose influencing quality lies in producing the easy transition of vivacity from ourselves to the related object.

Now, it may not be amiss to mention that “the relation of a different kind” therefore
entails *sympathy* as the presence of “a rational and thinking Being like ourselves”, owing to a great resemblance between ourselves and others, and that “sympathy is nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression” (T2.2.9.13; SBN 385). This resemblance makes the affective phenomenon special in the following two respects. In the first place, an idea of the sentiment of another person which is enlivened by the vivacity of the impression of ourselves is conceived “with a like vivacity of conception”, and consequently becomes “the very sentiment or passion”. “In that case resemblance converts the idea into an impression” (T2.2.4.7; SBN 354), as Hume puts it. In the second place, the easy transition of vivacity from ourselves to another person does not necessarily presuppose the recognition of the relation. Where we remark the resemblance between ourselves and others, the relation “operates after the manner of a relation, by producing a connection of ideas” (T2.2.4.6; SBN 354). But even where we do not remark the relation, the easy transition from ourselves to others takes place “by the natural course of the disposition, and by a certain sympathy which always arises betwixt similar characters”, and converts the idea into the impression more easily (ibid.). The instantaneousness or primitiveness of the latter conversion is emphasized by him in the following notoriously metaphorical expression:

This lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression; these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity. But this change must be produced with the greater ease, that our natural temper gives us a propensity to the same impression which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion. In that case resemblance converts the idea into an impression, not only by means of the relation, and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea; but also by presenting such materials as to take fire from the least spark. (T2.2.4.7; SBN 354). Where we remark the resemblance, it operates after the manner of a relation, but where we do not remark it, “it operates by some other principle” (T2.2.4.6; SBN 354). The conversion of an idea into the impression happens in the latter case as if those sentiments which we find in the minds of others arise immediately in my mind as impressions rather than ideas. The ideas of resembling objects are just like such materials as to take fire from the least spark, as they change into the impressions on the right spot. But, the two principles by which the conversions happens are “similar” with each other, Hume insists, which “must be received as a confirmation of the foregoing reasoning” (ibid.).
3 Sympathy: the principal cause of love

“Our esteem for the rich and powerful” is chosen as the subject to illustrate that the relation of betwixt ourselves and the object entails sympathy, or rather a lively idea converted into an impression. The rest of his treatment of love and hatred is spent for the illustration of the origin of the compound passions, and is meant for the demonstration that ‘tis sympathy, which is properly the cause of the affection” (T2.2.5.5; SBN 359). “Whatever other passions we may be actuated by”, he maintains, “pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge or lust; the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy”(T2.2.5.15; SBN 363). We owe to sympathy even the sense of beauty, according to Hume, as, “tho’ our first object be some senseless inanimate piece of matter, ‘tis seldom we rest there, and carry not our view to its influence on sensible and rational creatures” (ibid.).

To ask the origin of an affection is for Hume to ask the source of the ingredient, viz. a pleasurable or painful sensation, which composes it, according to his method of reasoning. Thus Hume begins his inquiry into the origin of esteem for a rich man by asking which could be the source of a pleasurable sensation among these three possible candidates, viz. the objects he possess, our expectation of advantage from him, sympathy, and specifies the third one to be more powerful and universal than the other two in producing the passion. For, he reasons,

however the ideas of the pleasant wines, music, or gardens, which the rich man enjoys, may become lively and agreeable, the fancy the fancy will not confine itself to them, but will carry its view to the related objects; and in particular, to the person, who possesses them. And this is the more natural, that the pleasant idea or image produces here a passion towards the person, by means of his relation to the object; so that ‘tis unavoidable but he must enter into the original conception, since he makes the object of the derivative passion. But if he enters into the original conception, and is consider’d as enjoying these agreeable objects, ‘tis sympathy, which is properly the cause of the affection; and the third principle is

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13 The second principle, viz. the agreeable expectation of advantage, cannot have much force in procuring the passion, because we often respect the rich and powerful even where they show no inclination to serve us, or because we have such instances of "disinterested esteem" for prisoners of war or the dead, a man of birth and quality, according to Hume.
14 An avaricious man is respected for his money, though he scarce is possessed of a power of employing it in the acquisition of his pleasure and conveniences of life, ao Hume points out. We must therefore "receive his sentiments by sympathy, ne enerst before we can have a strong intense idea of these enjoyments, or esteem him upon account of them” (ibid.).
more powerful and universal than the first”. (T2.2.5.5; SBN 359)

When the pleasant idea of the agreeable objects produces love toward the proprietor by the double relation of impressions and ideas, the proprietor unavoidably enters into the original conception, because he is the object of love. To consider him enjoying these agreeable objects is to have an idea of his satisfaction. This idea of his sentiment or satisfaction is converted into the affection, viz. esteem, owing to the resemblance between ourselves and the person: a pleasurable sensation which we receive from the liveliness of my conceiving the person provides the ingredient, viz. a pleasurable sensation, to compose the passion, as we have seen. In this respect, our esteem for a rich man is nothing but a lively idea of his sentiment which is so enlivened by the vivacity of the impression of myself as to be converted into the impression. “Thus the pleasure which a rich man received from his possessions, being thrown upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and esteem”, Hume writes, “which sentiments again being perceived and sympathized with, increase the pleasure of the possessor, and, being once more reflected, become a new foundation for pleasure and esteem in the beholder”(T2.2.5.20; SBN 365). It is this reflective feature of our affective experience that is highlighted by Hume in terms of this famous metaphor: “the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each other’s emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments, and opinions, may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees”(ibid.). By sympathy “we enter into the sentiments of rich and poor and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness” in the sense that the original satisfaction in riches derived from that power provides the source of all the passions which arise from them (T2.2.5.14; SBN 362).

It must be noted that the production of our esteem consists of two processes which depends on these two principles, viz. the double relation of impressions and ideas, and the relation of ourselves and others.

Riches give satisfaction to their possessor; and this satisfaction is convey’d to the beholder by the imagination, which produces an idea resembling the original impression in force and vivacity. This agreeable idea or impression is connected with love, which is an agreeable passion. It proceeds from a thinking conscious being, which is the very object of love. From this relation of impressions, and identity of ideas, the passion arises, according to my hypothesis. (T2.2.5.14; SBN 362)
(1) The passion of love is produced, to begin with, by the relation between ourselves and the object, viz. the rich man. (2) The idea of the satisfaction of the proprietor is converted into the impression, by being enlivened by the vivacity of the impression of ourselves. This happens by sympathy, which depends on the resemblance between ourselves and the person. Now, (3) “this agreeable idea or impression” of the sentiment of the proprietor is connected with love, which is an agreeable passion, by the double relation of impressions and ideas. Hence comes Hume’s assertion that “where we esteem a person upon account of his riches, we must enter into this sentiment of the proprietor, and that, without such a sympathy, the idea of the agreeable objects, which they give him the power to produce, would have a feeble influence upon us” (ibid.). All these three processes depend on this simple fact that every human creature resembles ourselves. It is this resemblance that pulls the trigger of “our natural temper [which] gives us a propensity to the same impression, which we observe in others, and makes it arise upon any slight occasion” (T2.2.4.7; SBN 354). It may arise even without presupposing the recognition of the relation as the outcome of the conversion owing to “the natural course of the disposition”, or to “a certain sympathy which always arise betwixt similar characters” (T2.2.4.6; SBN 354). This is how one and the same sensations come and go between two minds like the reflection between the two mirrors: “first present in the mind of one person, and afterwards appear in the mind of another; and as the manner of their appearance first as an idea, then as an impression” (T2.2.7.3; SBN 369/370).

4 The principle of comparison

In the rest of five sections of Part 2 of Book II, Hume examines the origin of those passions which are compound of the indirect and the direct passions, e.g. pity, malice, respect, contempt, the amorous passion. In this respect, it is not surprising that pity is treated by some critics as the indirect passions, whereas by others as the direct\(^\text{15}\). His last task in the treatment of love and hatred is to explain the connection between the two systems of the indirect and the direct passions, which depend on the different principles, viz. the double relation of impressions and ideas, and the association of impressions. Although, Hume admits, this subject rather complicated or “delicate”,

\(^{15}\) This is the reason why the compound passions, e.g. pity, are regarded by some critics as the indirect passions, whereas as the direct passions by otherse.g. Rico Vitz, Hume and the limits of benevolence, *Hume Studies*, Vol 28, No 2, 2002, pp.271-295. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Love and benevolence in Hutcheson’s and Hume’s theories of the passions, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 12 (4) 2004:631-653.
his argument only departs a little from that simplicity, which has been hitherto its principal force and beauty”(T2.2.6.2; SBN 366/7).

Before entering into the discussion of the origin of the compound passions, Hume dismisses the general misunderstanding that love is nothing but the desire of happiness to another person, and hatred that of misery. For, this distinction between these two passions is essential for his system, as they are passions of different kinds, viz. the indirect and the direct. It is a mistake to suppose, he insists, that the desire and aversion are “absolutely essential to love and hatred” (T2.2.6.5; SBN 367), constituting the very nature of love and hatred, or that they are not only inseparable, but the same. By this, Hume establishes that that “benevolence and anger are passions different from love and hatred, and only conjoin’d with them, by the original constitution of the mind”(T2.2.6.6; SBN 368). “According as we are possessed with love or hatred, the correspondent desire of the happiness or misery of the person who is the object of these passions, arises in the mind, and varies with each variation of these opposite passions”(ibid.). There is nothing extraordinary in this “original and primary” connection between these indirect and direct passions, he writes, in view of that this is one of those cases in which nature has proceeded in the same manner with the mind as with the body to which she has given certain appetites and inclinations, and increases, diminishes, or changes them according to the situation of the fluids or solids (ibid.). It is in terms of this “natural and original quality” of the mind by which benevolence and anger are connected with love (T2.2.9.3; SBN 382) that he is accounting for those “ingredients which are capable of uniting with love and hatred”, as we shall see below.

Hume defines pity as “a desire of happiness or misery” of others, and malice as “the contrary appetite” (T2.2.7.1; SBN 368). Does he mean that pity and malice are the direct passions as other desires are? Although these passions are often treated by critics as the direct passions, Hume does not intend them to be the direct passions: they are “secondary ones, arising from original affections, which are varied by some particular turn of thought and imagination” (ibid.). This difference between a desire of happiness and aversion as a secondary affection, and that as an original one is fundamental for Hume’s system. For, his system is founded on the position which holds that “these qualities, which we must consider as original, are such as are most inseparable from the soul, and can be resolved into no other”(T2.1.3.3; SBN 280). “Unless nature had given some original qualities to the mind”, he reasons, “it cou’d never have any secondary ones; because, in that case it wou’d have no foundation for action, nor cou’d ever begin to exert itself”(ibid.). It follows from this position that pity and malice are distinct from the desire of the happiness or misery of others in
that the latter is “an arbitrary and original instinct implanted in our nature” because it arises from love or hatred, whereas the former is a secondary affection, or an “imitation” of the latter affection because it arises from “secondary principles”, viz. sympathy(T2.2.7.1; SBN 369). In other words, pity or malice is a desire of the happiness or misery of others, but only as a “counterfeited” one, so that it is distinct from an original desire which arises from love or hatred. “Pity is a concern for, and malice a joy in, the misery of others”, but this concern has no “friendship or enmity to occasion this concern or joy” (ibid.), according to him, because this concern arises neither from love or hatred nor from any original pain or pleasure, but only from a sympathized or communicated impression.

Hume divides his discussion of the origin of pity and malice into two procedures. In the first procedure, he explains what he calls “the first foundations” of pity and malice, employing the principle of sympathy or “the principle of comparison”. In the second procedure, he examines how other “ingredients” are afterwards confounded with the first foundations, by claiming that “there is always a mixture of love or tenderness with pity, and of hatred or anger with malice” (T2.2.9.1; SBN 381).

The first foundation of pity is explained by Hume from the precedent reasoning concerning sympathy, and proved to be “a sympathy with the pain” or “the converted idea of the pain of others” (T2.2.7.1; SBN 368). But, the first foundation of malice requires a more complicated account, as malice is a phenomenon in which “the misery of another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness, and his happiness of our misery”, and therefore seems contradictory to his system (T2.2.8.8; SBN 375). Hume reconciles this contradictory phenomenon, by appealing to this “original quality of the soul” that people “always judge more of objects by comparison than from their intrinsic worth and value” (T2.2.8.2; SBN 372). This quality of the mind is “similar” to our experiences of our bodies, which depend on the disposition of the different organs, such that to have heat one hand and cool the other makes the same water at the same time seem both hot and cold (ibid.). But, “the question with regard to our ideas and objects is, how the same impression and the same idea we can form such different judgments concerning the same object, and at one time admire its bulk, and as another despise its littleness”(ibid.). For, “the variation in our judgments must certainly proceed from a variation in some perception”, he reasons, “but as the variation lies not in the immediate impression or idea of the object, it must like in some other impression, that accompanies it” (ibid.).

Hume solves this question by resorting to the following two principles. The first principle is mentioned as “our adherence to general rules” to this effect: “When an object is found by
experience to be always accompany’d with another; whenever the first object appears, tho’ chang’d in very material circumstances; we naturally fly to the conception of the manner, and form an idea of it in as lively and strong a manner, as if we had infer’d its existence by the justest and most authentic conclusion of our understanding”(T2.2.8.5; SBN 374). The second principle is then introduces as this new maxim: “no object is presented to the senses, nor image form’d in the fancy, but what is accompan’d with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion’d to it; and however custom may make us insensible of this sensations, and cause us to confound it with the object or idea, ‘twill be easy, by careful and exact experiments, to separate and distinguish them” (T2.2.8.4; SBN 373). From these two principles, Hume draws this “very short and decisive” conclusion: “Every object is attended with some emotions proportion’d to it; a great object with a great emotions, as small object with a small emotion”(T2.2.8.6; SBN 374). His present question is explained by “this new discovery of an impression” to this effect: “A great object, therefore, succeeding a small one makes a great emotion succeed a small one. Now a great emotion succeeding a small one becomes still greater, and rises beyond its ordinary proportion. But as there is a certain degree of an emotion, which commonly attends every magnitude of an object; object has likewise encreas’d. The effect conveys our view to its usual cause, a certain degree of emotion to a certain magnitude of the object; nor do we consider, that comparison may change the emotion without changing any thing in the object”(ibid.). This is how “we transfer the judgments and conclusions of the understanding to the senses”(T2.2.8.6; SBN 374/5), according to Hume.

On the basis of this general maxim that “objects appear greater or less by a comparison with others” (T2.2.8.7; SBN 375), Hume establishes this “principle of comparison”: that “in all kinds of comparison an object makes us always receive from another, to which it is compar’d, a sensation contrary to what arise from itself in its direct and immediate survey”(T2.2.8.9; SBN 375). For, “according as we observe a greater or less share of happiness or misery in others, we must make an estimate of our own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure”(T2.2.8.8; SBN 375). From this principle, he derives this maxim: while “the direct survey of another’s pleasure naturally gives us pleasure, and therefore produces pain when compar’d with our own”, “his pain, consider’d in itself, is painful to us, but augments the idea of our own happiness, and gives us pleasure” (T2.2.8.9; SBN 376).16

16 It merits our notice that the principle of comparison, thus asserted by Hume, does not opposes sympathy, but rather presupposes it, because we must first receive the sentiments of another in order that this comparison be possible at all.
When we consider directly the sentiments of others, and enters deep into them, we become sensible of all the passions we survey, but in a particular manner of grief or sorrow, whereas when we compare the sentiments of others to our own, we feel a sensation directly opposite to the original one, viz. a joy from the grief of others, and a grief from their joy, according to Hume. “But these are only the first foundations of pity and malice”, he insists, as “[o]ther passions are afterwards confounded with them” (ibid.). For, pity is “a mixture of love or tenderness” whereas malice “a mixture of hatred or anger” with these first foundations. Hume’s next task is to explain how these mixture is possible at all.

5 The principle of a parallel direction

Pity or malice is the compound of the indirect and the direct passions as “[t]here is always a mixture of love or tenderness with pity, and of hatred or anger with malice” (T2.2.9.1; SBN 381). Hume explains in terms of the following chain of passions how love is connected or confounded with the first foundation of pity, which is the effect of “a sympathy with another’s pain”. The first tie which constitutes this chain is “a natural and original” connection between these two different kinds of passions, viz. benevolence and love, the former of which is the direct whereas the latter indirect. The second tie is the connection between these two direct passions, benevolence and “a desire of the happiness of the person belov’d, and an aversion to his misery”, the latter of which constitutes the essence of the former. The third tie is found in the correspondence between a desire of the happiness of the person beloved, and an aversion to his misery, which is involved by benevolence, and the similar desire which constitutes pity, as “pity is a desire of happiness to another, and aversion to his misery”(T2.2.9.3; SBN 382), though counterfeited one. Here then is established this chain of passions: love—benevolence—a desire of the happiness of the person beloved, —pity. Thus pity is related first to benevolence by the correspondence between pity as the desire of happiness to another on the one hand, and the same desire which is involved by benevolence on the other. In short, pity is connected with love via benevolence (ibid.). This is how pity is connected with benevolence, and by that means to love. In other words, the passion of pity arises when benevolence and consequently love are confounded with the first foundation of pity (which is a communicated impression of another’s pain). The connection between malice and hatred is explained in the same way.

17 In this respect, the compound passions are distinct from the indirect or direct passions.
But, this mixture of love or tenderness with pity, and of hatred or anger with malice, Hume admits, seems contradictory to Hume’s system, because “pity is an uneasiness, and malice a joy, arising from the misery of others, pity should naturally, as in all other cases, produce hatred, and malice, love” (T2.2.9.1; SBN 381). This contradiction is solved, he suggests, by understanding that “it is not the present sensation or momentary pain or pleasure which determines the character of any passion, but the general bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end” (ibid.). The principle which dominates Hume’s preceding discussion has been that one impression is related to another when their sensations are resembling, as it is this principle which his hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas depends on. To this, he now adds this new principle: impressions are related to each other “when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent” (ibid.).

In illustrating how this new principle operates, Hume takes an example of two cases in which the advantage or loss of one person becomes immediately the advantages or loss of his partner, and in which whatever is for the interest of one person is contrary to that of his rival, and so vice versa (T2.2.9.6; SBN 383). It is plain, he observes, that love and hatred to my partner “arise not from the double relations of impressions and ideas, if we regard only the present sensation” (T2.2.9.7; SBN 383), because I always hate my rival and love my partner whether the fortune of a rival or partner be good or bad. He also calls our attention to that “this love of a partner cannot proceed from the relation or connection betwixt us; in the same manner as I love a brother or countryman”, because “a rival has almost as close a relation to me as a partner” (T2.2.9.8; SBN 383). Since just as the pleasure of my partner causes my pleasure, and his pain my pain, so the pleasure of my rival causes my pain, and his pain my pleasure, he points out, “the connexion, then, of cause and effect is the same in both cases” (T2.2.9.8; SBN 384), as he reasons. Hume there mentions “the principle of a parallel direction” as the only explication of this phenomenon, by claiming:

Our concern for our own interest gives us a pleasure in the pleasure, and a pain in the pain of a partner, after the same manner as by sympathy we feel a sensation correspondent to those, which appear in any person, who is present with us. On the other hand, the same concern for our interest makes us feel a pain in the pleasure, and a pleasure in the pain of a rival; and in short the same contrariety of sentiments as arise from comparison and malice. Since, therefore, a parallel direction of the affections, proceeding from interest, can give
rise to benevolence or anger, no wonder the same parallel direction, deriv’d from sympathy
and from comparison, shou’d have the same effect. (T2.2.9.9; SBN 384)

From a sympathy with another’s pain arises hatred by the foregoing principle of the double relation
of impressions and ideas. Now, when this communicated impression of pain gives rise to our
concern with his fortune, good or bad, this concern for his happiness, and aversion to his misery
produces benevolence by the principle of a parallel direction owing to the similarity of the tendency
of this concern with that of benevolence, and consequently love by the original conjunction
between benevolence and love. The same object may cause contrary passions, according to these
“two different causes from which a transition of passion may arise, viz. a double relation of ideas
and impressions, and, what is similar to it, a conformity in the tendency and direction of any two
desires, which arise from different principles” (T2.2.9.12; SBN 384). It is by the former cause
or principle that power and riches, or poverty and meanness, give rise to love or hatred in his
preceding discussion. It is the latter cause that produces love from pity or a sympathy with another’s
pain. Hume’s next task is to explain why does the former principle hold good in the first case, and
not in the second, or why does it not prevail throughout.

Hume solves this difficulty in terms of “different kinds of sympathy”, viz. a weak or strong
sympathy, a limited or extended sympathy, by claiming: “when a sympathy with uneasiness is weak,
it produces hatred or contempt by the former cause; when strong, it produces love or tenderness by
the latter”(ibid.). “The extensive or limited sympathy depends upon the force of the first sympathy”,
as “[a] strong impression, when communicated, gives a double tendency of the passions, which is
related to benevolence and love by a similarity of direction, however painful the first impression
might have been”(ibid.). A sympathy is strong or extended where the force of the first sympathy
produced by the former cause, viz. the double relation of impressions and ideas, communicates “a
strong impression”, and produces, in the consequence of it, the second sympathy by the latter cause,
viz. a conformity in the tendency and direction of two desires. A strong or extended sympathy thus
gives rise to a “double tendency of the passions”, and consequently benevolence and love by a
conformity in the direction.

On the contrary, a sympathy is weak or limited sympathy when another’s misery is presented
in such a feeble manner, communicating only a weak impression that this sympathy would not
involve the second sympathy which arise between two similar directions. Where the first sympathy
which depends on the former cause, viz. the double relation of impressions and ideas, is insufficient
to produce the second sympathy, and to pull the trigger of the latter cause, viz. the principle of the parallel direction, we sympathize only with one impression, viz. a painful one, which is related to anger and to hatred, upon account of the uneasiness it conveys to us. Since “[T]he same object causes contrary passions, according to its different degrees”, the key to the production of this “double sympathy” is “the force and liveliness of conception” of the person we sympathize with (T2.2.9.15; SBN 387). Benevolence “arises from a great degree of misery, or any degree strongly sympathiz’d with: Hatred or contempt from a small degree, or one weakly sympathiz’d with”(ibid.). Here lies the reason why a lively and strong conception is peculiarly agreeable, and makes us have an affectionate regard for everything that produces it, when the proper object of kindness and goodwill”, as we have seen (T2.2.1.5; SBN 353). This is how “the double sympathy, and its tendency to cause love, may contribute to the production of the kindness which we naturally bear our relations and acquaintance” (T2.2.9.20; SBN 389). In this view, it is not surprising that custom and relation have the same effect, and “make us enter deeply into the sentiments of others; and whatever fortune we suppose to attend them, is rendered present to us by the imagination, and operates as if originally our own”(ibid.). It is indeed “merely from the force of sympathy”, Hume assures us, that we come to rejoice in their pleasures, and grieve for their sorrow (ibid.).

6 The diagonal relations between the two sets of passions

Hume begins his discussion of respect and contempt in the next section, by observing that “there now remains only to explain the passions of respect and contempt, along with the amorous

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18 Hume tells us that whether our sympathy with another’s pain be extended or not "depends on a great measure upon our sense of his present condition"(T2.2.9.14; SBN 386), and explains this situation in the following way. "When the present misery of another has any strong influence upon me, the vivacity of the conception is not confin’d merely to its immediate object, but diffuses its influence over all the related ideas, and gives me a lively notion of all the circumstances of that person, whether past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain. By means of this lively notion I am interested in them; take part with them, to whatever I imagine in his. If I diminish the vivacity, as pipes can convey no more water than what arises at the fountain. By this diminution I destroy the future prospect, which is necessary to interest me perfectly in the fortune of another. I may feel the present impression, but carry my sympathy no farther, and never transfuse the force of the first conception into my ideas of the related object. If it be another’s misery, which is presented in his feeble manner, I receive it by communication, and am affected with all the passions related to it: But as I am not so much interested as to concern myself in his good fortune, as well as his bad, I never feel the extensive sympathy, nor the passions related to it”(T2.2.9.14; SBN 386).
affection, in order to understand all the passions which have any mixture of love or hatred” (T2.2.10.1; SBN 389). But, why does he examine the same passions which he has discussed in his former section as “our esteem for the rich and contempt for the poor”? This puzzle may be solved in the following way. Since the compound passions are derived from “the double sympathy” or two kinds of sympathy, Hume intends to explain the first sympathy in his former discussion whereas the second in the present discussion. Although he has shown how these two kinds of sympathy is integrated into the double sympathy in the last section through the discussion of the origin of pity and malice, he needs to show how the mixture of other passions with love or hatred depends on “the qualities and circumstances of others”, or on “the proportion” of the object to ourselves. In this respect, the compound passions “arise from the imagination, according to the light in which it places its object”, as he puts it (T2.2.9.1; SBN 381). Hume’s object in this section is to illustrate the relation between the affections and those qualities and circumstances of others in terms of which we survey the object.

There are three ways, Hume points out, by which we consider the qualities and circumstances of others: “we may either regard them as they really are in themselves; or may make a comparison betwixt them and our qualities and circumstances; or may join these two methods of consideration” (T2.2.10.1; SBN 390). From these three different viewpoints, there arise those different consequences: “The good qualities of others, from the first point of view, produce love; from the second, humility; and from the third, respect; which is a mixture of these two passions” (ibid.). “The bad qualities, after the same manner, causes either hatred, or pride, or contempt, according to the light in which we survey them” (ibid.). “The same man may cause either respect, love or contempt by his condition and talents, according as the person, who considers him, from his inferior becomes his equal or superior”(T2.2.10.2; SBN 390). “In changing the point of view, tho’ the object may remain the same, its proportion to ourselves entirely alters which is the cause of an alteration in the passions”, which must therefore “arise from our observing the proportion; that is, from a comparison”(ibid.). But, the question is, how could this relation between the change of the point of view and its consequent affection enter into Hume’s system, and be explained by means of his system?

It may here be recalled that Hume’s system of the passions depends on the resemblance or exact correspondence between pride and humility, love and hatred, on the one hand. “The situation of the mind” in which the idea of the self arises depends on the symmetrical or parallel connections, as we remember, between the two sets of the indirect passions which are connected by the two-
Hume's System of the Passions in the Second Book of the Treatise (Part 2)

fold ties of the impressions and ideas. We have also seen, on the other hand, that the way out of this situation, which is constituted of the four “affections, plac’d as it were, in a square” (T2.2.2.3; SBN 333), is the difference between the two sets of the passions: love and hatred are always attended by benevolence and anger, whereas pride and humility are not. It is this connection between the indirect and the direct passions, viz. love and benevolence, hatred and anger, that prepares the way by which we are carried to action. Now, what Hume highlights in the present discussion is the diagonal relation which is established between the parallel sets of the passions, viz. pride and humility, love and hatred: respect is the mixture of love with humility, whereas contempt the mixture of hatred with pride. The diagonal connections are insisted in terms of this similarity between these two sets of affections, viz. pride and hatred, and humility and love: the former set of affections “invigorate the soul”, and the latter set “enfeeble it” (T2.2.10.6; SBN 391). On the other hand, Hume urges our attention to the “differences” or even “contrarieties” between the other two sets of passions, viz. pride and love, humility and hatred, by claiming “the two agreeable as well as the two painful passions have some differences, and even contrarieties, which distinguish them” (ibid.). This assertion may well be found rather remarkable in view of that the similarity between the two agreeable or painful passions has been insisted to be the foundation of Hume’s system of the passions. We may learn from his assertion that in Hume’s system the association of impressions depends not only on the resemblance of the sensations as we have assumed in the foregoing discussion, but also on the similarity of some other properties which make an affection as it is. The situation of the mind as the foundation of his system is thus strengthened by adding the diagonal connections between the two symmetrical sets of the indirect passions.

The difficulty then is to explain why these diagonal connection operates in some case, but not always, or why “any objects ever cause pure love or hatred, and produce not always the mixed passions of respect and contempt” (T2.2.10.5; SBN 390). Hume solves this puzzle by resorting to his former maxim that “objects always produce by comparison a sensation directly contrary to their original one” (T2.2.10.8; SBN 392). “No quality in another gives rise to humility by comparison, unless it wou’d have produc’d pride by being plac’d in ourselves; and vice versa, no object excites pride by comparison, unless it wou’d have produc’d humility by the direct survey” (ibid.), as we have seen. From this maxim, he draws this answer: “Suppose, therefore, an object to be presented, which is peculiarly fitted to produce love, but imperfectly to excite pride; this object, belonging to another, gives rise directly to a great degree of love, but to a small one of humility by comparison; and consequently that latter passion is scare felt in the compound, nor is able to convert the love
into respect” (ibid.). This is the case with good nature, good humour, facility, generosity, beauty, and many other qualities (ibid.), according to him. Since these qualities “have a peculiar aptitude to produce love in others, but not so great a tendency to excite pride in ourselves”, it is no wonder that “the view of them, as belonging to another person, produces pure love, with but a small mixture of humility and respect” (ibid.). This is the explanation why this mixture takes place only in some cases, and appear not on every occasion, which can easily be applied to the opposite passions.

7 The confirmation of his system: the love betwixt the sexes

Among all the compound passions which proceed from a mixture of love and hatred with other affections, Hume observes, the amorous passion or love betwixt the sexes serves best to illustrate his system. For, this love [is composed of these three different affections,] viz. the sense of beauty, bodily appetite, benevolence, [whose] conjunction depends not only [on] the relation of the affections, but also on the relation of ideas (T2.2.11.4; SBN 395). [These three affections, being all pleasurable sensations with similar tendencies, are connected together by] these two relations, viz. resemblance and a parallel direction, “in a manner inseparable” (ibid.). Although it is indifferent which of them advance first, he points out, the most common species of love arises first from beauty, and afterwards diffuses itself into kindness, and into the bodily appetite. In this view, the sense of beauty is “placed in a just medium” betwixt them, as it is so singularly fitted to produce both because it “partakes of both their natures” (ibid.), according to him. It is evident in this case that the conjunction of the three components by the relation of affections is not sufficient to produce the love, as “[I]t is likewise necessary there should be a relation of ideas” (T2.2.11.6; SBN 396).

For, “[t]he beauty of one person never inspires us with love for another” (ibid.) unless it does not involve sympathy, viz. an lively idea converted into the impression. Even it is true that sex is not only the object but also the cause of the appetite, but it still requires such an impulse that could pull the trigger of the passion. what plays the role of this impulse; that is, the beauty of the person or the bodily appetite for generation thus arises from a double relation of impressions and ideas (ibid.). Here lies “a sensible is the proof of the double relation of impressions and ideas” or of the situation of the mind, which he has already described as follows:

19 "Most kinds of beauty are derived from this origin [=sympathy]; and though our ist object be some senseless inanimate piece of matter, it is seldom we rest there and carry not our view to its influence on sensible and rational creatures” (T2.2.5.16; SBN 363).
Hume's System of the Passions in the Second Book of the *Treatise* (Part 2)

It has certain organs naturally fitted to produce a passion; that passion, when produc'd, naturally turns the view to a certain object. But this not being sufficient to produce the passion, there requir'd some other emotion, which by a double relation of impressions and ideas may set these principles in action, and bestow on them their first impulse. (ibid.)