THE INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR DILEMMA & NEGOTIATION

Major Hidden Factors led to the India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests '98
「インド・パキスタンの核問題のジレンマと交渉への道」

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概要

小稿では国際交渉による紛争解決の視点から、（1）インドとパキスタンが世界的に逆らってまでなぜ核実験を行ったのか、（2）また他の国際社会が両国の挑戦にいかに対応すべきなのか、（3）加えて他の米ロを含む五大核保有国がC T B T 著名問題や不核拡にどう対応するのかについて、元米国務長官であったヘンリー・キッシングジャーや他の外交交渉の専門家達の見解も含め、ナショナリズムにも照らし合わせながら若干の考察を加えてみたい。なお、2000年3月21日にニューデリーで行われた歴史的接近へのファースト・ステップといわれた「米印首脳会談」に関するインド・パキスタン戦略交渉史に関しては、昨年オランダの国際政治学会で発表した内容も含め、他の学会誌等で論陣を張ってみたい。

Preface

The series of nuclear tests carried out by India in May 1998 first created tension around the globe. Then it triggered the tit-for-tat nuclear tests by Pakistan. On the one hand, the open tests by both countries were no surprise to many political observers. But on the other hand, it holds true that a total of 10 nuclear tests conducted on the Indian subcontinent threw world-wide arms control arrangements into disarray.

These nuclear tests in May 1998 demonstrated first that both India and Pakistan would resort to mutual nuclear warfare in order to settle
old disputes over the forgotten region "Kashmir." (Both India and Pakistan lay claim to a united Kashmir.) Pakistan wants a vote held on both sides of the border to let Kashmir decide whether a united Kashmir join Pakistan or India. India, meanwhile, proclaims its half of Kashmir is nonnegotiable.

Secondly, many political observers in the world sensed that other nations looking for their own nuclear arsenals might follow in the footsteps of India and Pakistan. For example, such countries as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Egypt, and Latin American nations have been in the nuclear-weapons business for several years.

In response to the tests, the outside world must focus on two separate security problems in the Indian subcontinent. One security problem is the long historical confrontation between India and Pakistan which has caused a series of three religious wars since the two countries were separated 50 years ago. The world has paid little attention to settling the aforementioned "Kashmir dispute" in recent years, and a concerted effort is needed to find a lasting peace.

Another point that needs to be emphasized here is that the nuclear issue is a separate matter. What India and Pakistan demonstrated in May 1998 signifies that the five nuclear states—the United States, Russia, England, France, and China can no longer maintain their exclusive "nuclear club", while refusing to cut back on their own nuclear arsenals. As is often said, as long as China keeps its stature as a nuclear state in the world, India will not hold back. The only way to persuade outsiders not to join is for the insiders to launch, as the Financial Times put it, "a new comprehensive round of nuclear disarmament." That would be the best possible outcome from this latest dangerous turn of events.

The objectives of this article are to: (1) overview history of India and Pakistan in a cursory fashion; (2) investigate the psychological dimension of nations' motives for building nuclear weapons on the basis of
THE INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR DILEMMA & NEGOTIATION

observations made by Dr. Henry Kissinger and other diplomatic experts; (3) examine major factors which prompted India and Pakistan to build nuclear arsenals and weapons programs with reference to some of the issues associated with NPT (Nuclear Proliferation Treaty) and CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty); and. (4) offer suggestions for a negotiation settlement between India and Pakistan.

India

Historically speaking, Indian subcontinent has been home to advanced civilizations since before recorded history. Predecessors of the Hindus called the Aryans conquered most of the vast stretches of subcontinent before 1500 B.C. The Muslim Moghuls ruled much of India until the advent of the European invaders. It was the Portuguese who first arrived in India in 1489. Then French, Dutch, and English traders and merchants followed. The British East India Company became ascendant, ruling India from 1760 to 1858, when India was formally transferred to the British Crown.

After long years of struggle against British rule, India became an independent country on August 15, 1947. When the British left in 1947, British India was partitioned into primarily Hindu India and mostly Muslim Pakistan. The centuries-old antagonism between Hindus and Muslimshas erupted into open warfare between India and Pakistan three times since independence.

Pakistan

While the origin of the name “Pakistan” is not absolutely certain, legends has it that a group of expatriate students enrolled at Cambridge created the name as a sort of acronym. The initial letters of Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Sind were put together—with the ending Baluchistan to form “Pakistan.” It’s name was first used in 1933, and the
Pakistan nation was established as a separate Muslim state in 1947 during the British partition of India. However, the land that makes up the country has a history and cultural heritage more than 4,000 years old. Pakistan was historically known as “the land of the Indus” named for the Indus River, which originates in the Himalaya mountains flow through the country empty into the Arabian Sea.

The Aryan tribes who invaded India over several centuries built up a sophisticated civilization long before the Greek and Roman empires. Kingdoms rose and fell topped by outside invaders. The Pakistan province of Sind was first occupied by Muslim invaders. As more and more Muslim invaders plunged into Pakistan, the entire subcontinent fell to the Mogul Empire in 1526. The Hindu population in what would become India failed to absorb the Islamic faith of their Mogul rulers. But in Pakistan, the majority of citizens accepted Islamic religion. Inasmuch as the European invaders started to arrive at Mogul, its supremacy fell before the technology of the Europeans. Then Pakistan became part of British-ruled India.

When the British promised independence to India after World War II, Muslim leaders became extremely fearful that the Muslim population would be subordinated to an numerous number of better-educated Hindus. As a result of this psychologically rooted notion, the Muslim leaders insisted on a separate, independent Muslim state. Despite opposition from a number of Hindu leaders, to say nothing of Mahatma Gahndi, Punjab and Bengal became Pakistan—the Domination within the British Common Wealth—on August 15, 1947. And as of March 23, 1956, Pakistan proclaimed itself a full-fledged independent republic. However, at independence Pakistan consisted of two separate regions—East Pakistan made up of mainly by the Muslim population and West Pakistan. This separation led to war in 1970 between the two states. Consequently, a little over one million East Pakistani were slain, and ten
million of them fled to India. This incident prompted India to step in and declared war in December 1971. Indian troops invaded East Pakistan and routed the West Pakistani occupation army. In the final analysis, East Pakistan became the independent nation of Bangladesh.

During the decade-long war in Afghanistan, Pakistan served as a conduit for massive U.S. military aid to the anti-Soviet Afghan rebels. With the end of the Soviet Union, the Soviet troops have left, and the people's attention in the world was shifted from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and approximately three million Afghan who sought refuge in Pakistan returned home. The failure of the scandal-ridden so-called Bank of Credit and Commerce International (B.C.C.I) was another severe blow to Pakistan, for its incident caused tremendous economic distress among Pakistanis both at home and abroad. The trouble was many, if not most, Pakistanis blamed the West for the failure of B.C.C.I. With the aforementioned historical background of India and Pakistan, let us move onto the meat of the subject starting with "What makes nations build nuclear weapons?"

What Makes Nations Build Nuclear Weapons?

As the former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has pointed out, Nations have several motives for building nuclear weapons.

The first case involves a nation that is desirous of becoming a world power, and which believes that a nation unable to defend itself against the full range of possible dangers cannot be a world power. Nations that fall into this category will both acquire nuclear weapons and strive for the capability to reach any potential adversary. They are likely to preserve their special status, and these states are least likely to engage in proliferation except, as in Russia, in the case of collapse of discipline. They are also least vulnerable to sanctions because they are woven into the global economy and other world powers value their cooperation on
other issues. India falls into this category.

The second case includes nations that are under pressure and threatened by neighbors with larger populations or greater resources. These nations are prone to view nuclear weapons as a means to pose unacceptable risks or to create a deterrent against threats to their survival. This becomes conspicuous if the powerful neighbor possesses nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Israel are in this category, for they could be prevented from developing nuclear weapons only through a credible guarantee from existing nuclear powers.

The third case encompasses nations that are determined to wreck the balance of power in their regions; they may look upon nuclear weapons as a means of threatening and intimidating their neighbors, and of discouraging outside intervention. Iraq and North Korea fit into this category. These are the three major motives for building nuclear weapons. Then what are the primary factors which gave rise to the open nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, despite the fact that they were condemned by international observers and their tests triggered the economic sanctions that the Clinton administration had imposed on them? Are there specific reasons for that? Here the author would like to point out what he considers to be primary factors which prompted both India and Pakistan to conduct the nuclear tests.

*Why the Open Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan?*

The first factor is closely tied in with India's rising nationalism. The first Indian bomb was, for instance, designed to reinforce secular nationalism. It was designed to show that India was a modern power capable of keeping up with the Chinese counterpart—a message of what secular India could counter against Chinese. In this connection, as Paul Bracken of Yale University once put it, one danger is the fact that nationalism is dangerously underrated by Western observers, who see it
as part of a primitive political past that a nation shed as economic progress leads to a more contended society. It is easy to forget the contemporary historical fact that nationalism did defeat Nazi Germany. People still remember with vividness of yesterday that the United States and the former Soviet Union drew on emotional fervor to mobilize their tremendous war efforts against Hitler. More recently, Vietnamese nationalism beat the strongest military power in the world, the United States. Even so-called topnotch policy makers under the Johnson administration and the Nixon administration never dreamed that North Vietnam could bear. Nationalism under the Carter administration drove the United States from its strategic position in Iran in 1979. The most important issue of the 21st century, according to Bracken is to come to grips with how nationalism combines with the newly destructive technologies appearing in Asia.

The second factor is a lack of progress in arms-control after the Cold War, which allowed both India and Pakistan to hold the open nuclear tests. Throughout the Cold War, the knowledge that both the United States and the Soviet Union, for instance, had the means of destroying each other created a balance of restraint in their use.

The third factor is that for some years, the nuclear-weapons-issue has been resting on two questionable and very fragile assumptions, rather than assertions. For instance, nations with no immediately threatening enemies have paid little attention to countries which have been in the nuclear weapons business.

The fourth factor is that while the five nuclear states (henceforth Big 5) have advocated the Nonproliferation treaty (henceforth NPT) for many years, in reality the NPT is nothing but an instrument for the Big 5 to guarantee their nuclear monopoly in the eyes of India and Pakistan, to say nothing of other nonnuclear states. Their choice after the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1955 was not between progress (fewer nuclear
weapons) and the status quo. It was between progress and regress. In fact progress went down to zero for the existing nuclear powers and nuclear weapons spread to others.

The fifth factor is that there is a double standard in the Nonproliferation regime, as it has nonverbally tolerated nuclear weapons in Israel while condemning nuclear development in other countries. In connection with this, Ramesh Thuker, vice rector of the United Nations University points out in his article "Robbottling the Nuclear Genie '98" that "the whiff of hypocrisy in the statements of condemnation from those who have nuclear weapons robs their comments of any value for the one billion Indians and Pakistanis." In this regard, India and Pakistan have much better justification for going nuclear than England and France for staying nuclear.

As long as the United States insists on preserving its own nuclear weapons, Russia is unable to reduce its own stockpile of nuclear weapons to zero. By the same token, as long as both the United States and Russia maintain nuclear weapons, China will not eliminate its own stockpile. Inasmuch as China is the principal long-term security threat to India, India will never surrender the option of acquiring nuclear weapons. Unless India renounces its own nuclear weapons programs, Pakistan will never follow in India’s footsteps. The sixth factor, which is related to the fourth factor, is that the nuclear strategies of the five nuclear states have been irrational. This is because although the Big 5’s reaction to the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan was extremely emotional, behind the scenes the United States and France shared partly their nuclear know-how, technology, and materials with India; and Russia and China formalized their defense cooperation with Pakistan. Some argue that it is the Big 5 that are creating political distrust and insecurity with regard to global world order.

For instance, on September 26, 1998, the United States again conducted
a nuclear test in an underground tunnel—some 290 meters below the ground with 205 grams of plutonium and 2 kg of chemical explosives, designed to provide data related to the changes in the surface of plutonium under the impact of an explosion. The United States has carried out three subcritical tests since July 1997. While the United States proclaims that the subcritical test conducted this time (Sept. 26, 1998) does not violate the CTBT (the nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), because it did not involve a nuclear explosion, antinuclear groups argued that such tests run counter to the spirit of the CTBT as the main objective of the tests was to maintain the efficiency of nuclear weapons. India was also very critical of the test carried out by the United States, on the grounds that it represents a large obstacle in the progress of CTBT, and also to the process of nuclear arms abolition. Their contention was that the United States conducted the subcritical test even though it should be the nation in the global community most required to exercise nuclear restraint. K.R. Malkani, a spokesman for Vajpayee’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) indicated on May 14, 1999 that “The American position is hypocritical....They are sitting on a mountain of nuclear arms and they are pontificating to India and the world (“Facts on File, “May 14,’99). India has also long objected that the CTBT freezes the advantage the United States and the other four nuclear states have gained by decades of testing. The U.S. Energy Department argued that in subcritical tests, nuclear material does not reach the critical state at which a chain reaction occurs, and the tests were designed to acquire scientific data on the effects of aging on, and the behavior of, nuclear weapons material. However, their statement did not convince the world community.

The Circuit-breaker, CTBT & Negotiation Settlement

Who, then, should be the circuit-breaker in this countervailing nuclear-
r-weapons capability and what can be done? From the point of a nonproliferation policy and CTBT agreement, the following suggestions can be taken into consideration.

First, the U.N. Security Council can take the central role, since it is the only body capable of formulating the necessary measures to secure world peace. The Council is to act decisively to prevent the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Secondly, in view of the present state of affairs in international politics, the United States could prove that national security can be safeguarded without nuclear weapons, by eliminating its stockpile of nuclear weapons capability so that others follow. Potential proliferators would be struck by such a leveling down of the security field. Should the United States take the initial step, declaring the abolition of all its nuclear weapons, England, France, Russia, and China would follow. After that as Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee states in "Facts On File : News Services" dated May 14, 1998 "India would participate in nondiscriminatory and verifiable global disarmament measures." India was not a signatory to the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which had been signed by 149 nations.

Why then India did not become a signatory? The reason is quite clear: India claimed that the CTBT was discriminatory in favor of declared nuclear powers. According to India, it set no time table for the five declared nuclear states (the Big 5) to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Furthermore, all of the five nuclear states had rejected such a provision. Third, while in an effort to reduce tensions in India and Pakistan, the world's leading industrial nations (G8) urged both countries to halt further nuclear tests and refrain from building nuclear weapons, the argument of such countries as South Africa, Ukraine, and some of the Latin American countries might be more effective. These countries used to possess nuclear weapons but rejected nuclear option, and are in a
much more advantageous position to voice their opinions and mount an international rescue effort to persuade not only India and Pakistan, but also the Big 5 and other rogue nations, to set an example to halt the chain reaction in the deployment of nuclear weapons.

On February 21st 1999 in Lahore, Pakistan, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif—-the leaders of the world’s two newest nuclear-armed nations—ended a two-day summit meeting. It is noteworthy that the summit talk represented a vital first step for the two countries towards cutting, if not ending, the risk of war. Most of the measures adopted by them were aimed at lending a measure of predictability to a dangerous and undefined nuclear standoff. However, it should be kept in mind that neither of them has yet developed rigorous and comprehensive safeguards for its nuclear weapons, nor have the two countries developed sufficient procedures to defuse tensions in a time of major crisis. At the same time, it should be remembered that both prime ministers made little progress on the central issue regarding Kashmir’s territorial dispute which remains the main obstacle to peace.

The recent missile tests conducted by India and Pakistan in April, 1999 again caused many world leaders to express a fear that another confrontation could escalate, because those tests went against the interests of nonproliferation and disarmament. For the past two months, both Indian and Pakistani forces have waged a blistering campaign in Kashmir. The joint statement after Prime Minister Sharif’s visit to Washington on July 6 indicated that they agreed that it was essential for the peace of South Asia that the Line of Control in Kashmir be respected by both parties in accordance with their 1972 Simla Accord. But the best thing about the Indian-Pakistan relationship is that the two leaders convinced each other that India and Pakistan needed no longer be enemies and decided to keep negotiations going between the two countries; now they must convince their countrymen, people throughout
the world and the United Nations as well. Nobody is against a series of
productiv enegotiations.

"One thing which concerns the present author is the nationalistic
feelin9s on the part of the Indians who are not well informed about the
after effect of nuclear weapons. For example, it is unlikely that many
Indians know: (1) The blasts measured were the equivalent of 55
kilotons of dynamite, according to an Indian seismic institute; and (2)
that was about four times as powerful as the atomic bomb that the
United States dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. The Times of India spells
out, 91 percent of more than 1,000 people surveyed in six of the
country’s largest cities approved the first series of tests. It was not
reported that the Vajpayee administration had conducted the nuclear
tests in order to increase its popular support and win a parliamentary
majority in the future election. To gain popular support, Prime Minister
Vajpayee reiterated that "We have come to understand that we will be
denied aid, credit and other assistance, but in the event of such steps, the
country will have to face them squarely. If the path ahead is a difficult
one, we will not shy away from it." One method to prevent the Indians
from increasing their nationalist feelings and attitudes toward the use of
atomic forces in retaliation against Pakistan or China, would be for the
United Nations to approve the global CTBT, the five nuclear states to
ratify the CTBT treaty, and for Russia to ratify the START 2 arms
control agreement in consultation with the United States.

Postscript

A long series of international conference to review nuclear
nonproliferation was concluded at the United Nations on May 21, 2000.
187 signatories to the nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) approved an
entirely new agenda constituted a major step toward a new clear-free
world. However, once we take a hard look at the content of the agenda, the U.N sponsored conference is interminably long on platitudes and critically short on promise of time-bound action. The Hindu, for example, wrote that "The U.N. sponsored conference, in which nearly 190 members participated, was again witness to the unwillingness of the nuclear powers—the United States, Russia, China, France and England—to go beyond talk of disarmament. They argue that the Five nations repeatedly made a meaningless pledge to accomplish the total ban of their nuclear arsenal but refused to accept a timetable to achieve this. It is true that what has been implicit has now become implicit, but as Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi states that the final document has failed to fully reflect the current international situation, nor does it call for the removal of fundamental obstacles to nuclear disarmament. In the absence of the time table, the promise to disarm remains hollow and the paucity of the credibility on which the global effort needs to be founded. In that sense the conference was out of success—coming amid increasing signs of a return of Cold War rhetoric and confirmed a dangerous side toward insecurity and instability.

But taken as a whole, as the nuclear have-nots which are made up of a majority of nations succeeded in persuading the five nuclear nations to make an unequivocal commitment to eliminate their arsenals for the first time, a very vital single step on which to build a nuclear weapon-free world was made.

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