Abstract

Ever since the Hatoyama's Cabinet came into being, one critical issue—which has been under a spate of criticism—is its perspectives for Japan's foreign policy towards the United States and Japan's positions vis-à-vis U.S.-Japan alliance and the East Asian community building. This article, which utilizes "major phases and actors in a negotiation cycle (MANC) theory," analyzed: (1) U.S. foreign policy towards Japan in 2009 with reference to the concept of smart power which has been used by the Obama administration; (2) Japan's foreign policy towards the United States under the Hatoyama's administration with a view towards "fraternal international relations"; (3) the relationship among negotiation processes between President Barack F. Obama and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama by focusing on the style of delivery and communication in negotiation settings and at a series of news conferences when the two leaders focused their comments on U.S.-Japan alliance issues. The findings showed that there was consistency in the style of communication delivery during the series of negotiations and the joint press conferences on the part of President Obama. He remained focused by maintaining "principled negotiation" and spoke with consistency and assurance when addressing U.S. foreign policy towards Japan and the important shared aspects of U.S.-Japan relations, including the American base issue in Okinawa. His rhetoric and the style of delivery in speech at Tokyo's Suntory Hall was not contradictory, but consistent without making a lurch, so-to speak. The gist of his speech, together with communication delivery, was interpreted as a very persuasive and candid. In contrast, Prime Minister Hatoyama's style of communication and delivery and logic was inconsistent and contradictory regarding many issues, including the relocation of Okinawa's U.S. base issue. His style of negotiation and negotiation behavior can be called fraternal-love-based "pendulous style"—a mixture of "wishing-washy style negotiation and volte face style negotiation"
It was highly contradictory for Prime Minister Hatoyama to call for the building of an East community while pledging to maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance as the major pillar of Japan's foreign policy. He was caught right in the middle between the United States and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) pertaining to the issue of the relocation of U.S. Futenma base to Henoko in Okinawa. But a controversy arose at a news conference on December 5 when he asserted in a news conference "Guam would be an appropriate location, and the people on Guam are counting on that." But after that, he again altered his positions several times like a pendulum before December 18 and postponed a decision on the future location of US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma out of consideration. Meanwhile, Japan, Russia, and the United States will again restart the tripartite alliance dialogue starting 2010 endorsed by the former Prime Minister Taro Aso last July. A series of talks between Japan and the United States, including an informal conversation which took place between Secretary Hillary Clinton and Prime Minister Hatoyama's over dinner regarding the Futenma base issue on December 17 in Copenhagen, were inconclusive at the end of December, 2009 leaving a strained relations between Washington and Tokyo. The gravity of situation did sink in for Prime Minister Hatoyama himself, the Democratic Party's Head, Ichiro Ozawa, and his entire administration at the end of 2009 and near the end Henceforth DPJ of May 2010. (December,31,2009).

Preface

On September 16, 2009, for the first time in 56 years Japan's Democratic Party (henceforth DPJ) took the helm of state. The LDP's crushing or one-sided defeat brought to an end its relationship with the bureaucracy. While in the Lower House election on August 30, 2009, the DPJ announced that it would: 1) build a close and equal alliance and relationship with the United States; 2) develop autonomous foreign policy strategies for Japan; and 3) propose a revision of U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement and move toward re-examining the realignment of U.S. military forces in Japan and the role of U.S. bases in Japan. While political observers maintain that a dramatic shift in foreign policy and security issues are unlikely to emerge as flash points, one big concern is Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's flip-flops on the prospects for Japan's refueling mission in support of U.S.-led anti-terrorism operations in and around Afganistan. The DPJ remained vague in its stance when it came to the question of the dispatch of Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) ships to the Indian Ocean asserting the logistical support for operations in Afganistan violated the war-renouncing Constitution.

One big concern of Washington is Mr. Hatoyama's long-held anti-American positions in contra to the pro-U.S. positions of the former government---a radical departure from Japan's heavy reliance on its
alliance with the United States. So far as the declarations, foreign policy perspectives and negotiation tactics(not strategies) of the Hatoyama administration go, quite a few foreign observers and, particularly, Japan-watchers point out a degree of inconsistency and ambivalence in Prime Minister Hatoyama and the main body of his administration.

In contrast, President Barack Obama's foreign policy towards Japan is based upon or derives from the concept of smart power. Its framework has carefully been examined, and it is also strategically oriented in line with the guiding philosophy of "a spirit of fraternity." Its framework also emphasizes preservation of the US preeminence as an agent for good; the struggle against terrorists and violent extremism; the replacement of the narrow lens focused on Iraq and terrorism with a broader one that looks at American goals and; influence in today's world; the investment in the global good—providing things that people and governments in all quarters of the world want but cannot attain in the absence of American leadership; and much greater investments in its soft power to build the framework it needs to tackle tough global challenges.

In our effort to come to grips with U.S. foreign policy towards Japan under the Obama administration and the Hatoyama administration's foreign policy towards the United States, it is imperative to scrutinize: (1) the meaning and the concept of "smart power" used by the Obama administration; (2) the role of Mr. John Roos, newly appointed Ambassador, intends to play and the reason why he was chosen for that post instead of Professor Joseph Nye Jr. of Harvard—the person who coined the terms "soft power" and "smart power."

But before doing so, let us briefly take a hard look at how the Democratic Party led by Prime Minister Hatoyama views(and has viewed) U.S.-Japan relations and their critical areas in 2009.

The DPJ's Views Towards U.S.-Japan Relations

Within the DPJ, the Social Democratic Party(the SDP) opposes the dispatch of MDSF ships for an antipiracy mission off Somalia. Whether the DPJ suspends the refueling mission or not is another critical issue for Japan and the United States.

One big concern of Washington is Mr. Hatoyama's long-held anti-America positions in contrast to the pro-U.S. positions of the former government—a radical departure from Japan's heavy reliance on its alliance with the United States.

So far as the declarations of the Hatoyama cabinet go, quite a few foreign observers point out a degree of inconsistency and the ambivalent nature of the Hatoyama cabinet. Fred Hiatt of the Washington
Post, for instance, cites the following: (1) resentment towards American high-handedness; (2) nervousness towards the expansion of Chinese power and North Korean nuclear weapons; (3) pride in their pacifist postpower constitution, (4) a desire for greater global leadership and respect. (Japan's Change Agenda)

Furthermore, there is another controversy or incoherence nature of Prime Minister Hatoyama's position when he himself cited Coudenhove-Kalergi as an inspiration for his foreign policy and also advocated the unity or integration of the East Asian countries.

Coudenhove-Kalergi was the proponent of European integration in the first half (first half) of the last century, and also he proposed a spirit of "fraternity" which he believed could take the world beyond socialism and capitalism—a very lofty ideal,

Considering a number of unknown factors within Hatoyama's new party, the aforementioned degree of inconsistency and incoherence does not come as a surprise to many Japan-watchers.

Obama-Hatoyama Bilateral Talks Did Not Raise Critical Points

During their 25-minute talk in New York on September 23, 2009, both President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama agreed to work together on issues vis-à-vis North Korea and Afganistan. They also agreed to continue pursuing policies aimed at moving the global economy in the right direction.

At a news conference both leaders reiterated that their alliance is the cornerstone of the two nation's security and economy.

The first bilateral talks, however, did not touch on the refueling of American warships in the Indian Ocean—which the Prime Minister insists should be stopped. Revising plans to realign American military bases in Japan including the relocation of the Futenma air base in Ginowan, Okinawa, to another site in Okinawa—was also passed over. To put it more specifically, during the meeting with President Obama, Prime Minister Hatoyama did not raise the main points of contention—the relocation of the U.S.-held Futenma air station in Okinawa and the decision not to refuel ships in the Indian Ocean-site, so the question of whether to shut down the marine air station and replace it with another in Okinawa or in Guam remains to be a critical issue in Tokyo in November 2009. Both leaders failed to make any headway on the sovereignty issue during the bilateral talks.

While immediately after meeting with President Obama in New York, Prime Minister Hatoyama told reporters that "the Japan-U.S. alliance remains the foundation of Japan's security policy," President Obama also indicated he was hoping to strengthen ties with Japan and cooperate on the global financial
crisis, climate change and nuclear nonproliferation.

By the same token, President Obama stressed that the change of power in Japan provides “an opportunity to strengthen and renew a U.S.-Japan alliance that will be as strong in the 21st century as it was in the latter half of the 20th century.”

The Same Principled Stance of President Obama

Immediately after the bilateral meeting President Obama spoke at Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, N.Y. at 9:35 a.m. on September 23, 2009: his views on foreign policy towards Japan remained the same. The following represents the gist of his remarks:

I want to welcome the new Prime Minister of Japan, Prime Minister Hatoyama. I want to congratulate him for running an extraordinary campaign and his party for leading dramatic change in Japan. We had a very good preliminary discussion about the critical importance of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. It has been a cornerstone of the security of both nations as well as the economic prosperity of both nations for almost 50 years.

And we pledged that we wanted to strengthen and deepen that relationship. As the world’s two largest economies we recognize the importance of coordinating closely to continue to move beyond the current economic crisis and to focus our attention on how our economies are actually providing opportunity for ordinary citizens. And we also pledged to coordinate very closely together on a range of international threats -- everything from nuclear proliferation, the situation in North Korea, how we can help to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan, and how we address transnational issues like climate change.

So I’ve been very impressed with the knowledge and determination of Prime Minister Hatoyama. I know how it feels to have just been elected and form a government and suddenly you have to appear at a range of international summits; I went through it nine months ago. But I’m very confident that not only will the Prime Minister succeed in his efforts and his campaign commitments, but that this will give us an opportunity to strengthen and renew a U.S.-Japan alliance that will be as strong in the 21st century as it was in the latter half of the 20th century.

Appointment of New Ambassador-Designate by President Obama

President Obama’s aforementioned commitment is also reflected in his diplomatic ideals when he chose the New Ambassador to Japan, Mr. John V. Roos, and in the announcement entitled “Regarding John V. Roos, Ambassador-Designate to Japan,” made at 2:55 p.m. EDT on August 6, 2009 from the Oval Office in the White House.
I think many of you are aware that a partnership between the United States and Japan is one of tremendous interest. It's one of the cornerstones of both our security and economic well being. We have an extraordinarily close relationship based on shared values and shared interests. There is enormous respect between the people of Japan and the people of the United States.

And it's for that reason that my administration wants to get off on a strong footing diplomatically through our relationship. And I placed great importance in the selection of who would represent the United States as Ambassador to Japan. And after careful consideration I made the determination that the person who I thought could best do this is somebody with superb judgment, somebody with an outstanding intellect, somebody who is a very close friend of mine and a close advisor, somebody who has worked both in the private sector with cutting-edge technologies, but also is somebody who has a deep interest in public service. And that's my friend, John Roos.

He is somebody who I'm confident is going to be able to help to strengthen both the regional and the global relationship between the United States and Japan. He's somebody who will be able to advise me directly on issues that may arise and opportunities that may arise in the U.S.-Japanese relationship. He is somebody who is I know going to be working incredibly hard to make sure that he is listening to and understanding the full scope of Japanese concerns. And so I very much appreciate his willingness to take on those tasks.

He and his wife, Susie, and his family are prepared to -- and eager -- to travel to Japan. It's a sacrifice to, obviously, uproot yourself, but John has shown nothing but great enthusiasm for what is one of the most important diplomatic tasks that we have in the country. And I'm grateful for his service and confident that he is going to represent not only my administration, but the United States of America with extraordinary ability.

So thank you so much, John.

New Ambassador Roos shares the same views as his President

Mr. John B. Roos, newly appointed Ambassador to Japan, also shared the same views with President Obama on American foreign policy towards Japan and future U.S.-Japan relations. What Mr. Roos stated below is a reflection of President Obama's remarks: they clearly share much in common. Here is what Mr. Roos had to say on September 18, 2009 in Washington D.C. about his new appointment as Ambassador and his commitments:

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Committee,

I am deeply honored to appear before you today as President Obama's nominee to be U.S. Ambassador
to the great nation of Japan. I would first like to express my deep gratitude to the President and Secretary of State Clinton for their faith in me and to Senators Kerry and Bradley for their warm and generous remarks. I also would like to thank and acknowledge my family… my appreciation to two eminent American statesmen and former ambassadors to Japan, former Vice President Walter Mondale and former Speaker of the House Tom Foley, for being here with me today. I also am grateful to former Senator Howard Baker for his submission to this Committee on my behalf, and to former ambassadors Michael Armacost and Thomas Schieffer for their advice and support over the past several weeks.

Soon after taking office, President Obama received Japan's Prime Minister Aso in the White House, and Secretary Clinton made Tokyo the first stop on her first overseas trip as America's foremost diplomat. This early focus on relations with Japan emphasizes the special bond between our two countries—a bond that, if confirmed, I will devote myself to strengthening and expanding as we confront today's global challenges side by side. Although separated by many miles, our nations have innumerable interests in common, including promoting security and stability throughout Asia and, indeed, the rest of the world; fostering global economic recovery; and advancing democratic values and human rights. We also share a respect for the spirit of innovation and a passion for resourcefulness and problem solving.

I always have had tremendous admiration for Japan's people, government, and culture, and I believe that my background has prepared me well to serve as an effective representative of our nation to one of the most important and innovative countries in the world. Please allow me briefly to share with you something of my background and its relevance to the U.S.-Japan partnership.

If confirmed, I will work diligently with you, the President, and Members of Congress to further enhance the relationship between our two nations and advance our mutual goals and America's interests abroad.

In particular, I will strive to help strengthen the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. The 50th anniversary next year of our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is a chance to celebrate the many accomplishments of our alliance and consider opportunities to further expand our partnership in the years ahead.

If confirmed, I also pledge to work with Japan to address critical global challenges, including the security of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. I will continue close consultations on developments on the Korean Peninsula and work to foster good coordination in our relations with other Pacific powers, such as Australia, the Republic of Korea, China, and Russia.

While our bilateral relationship has stood the test of time, it must continue to evolve to meet
contemporary challenges. There is growing recognition in Japan and the United States of the opportunity our alliance presents to tackle nontraditional and transnational security threats, such as climate change, energy security, and pandemic diseases.

If confirmed, I also will seek to strengthen bilateral cooperation on the global economic crisis. I will support efforts to increase investment and trade between the U.S. and Japan—a flow that supports more than 600,000 high-paying U.S. jobs. In addition, I will work to further our mutual goal of promoting democratic values and human rights throughout the world. I also look forward to advancing a number of other initiatives, such as supporting educational and scientific exchanges between the U.S. and Japan and facilitating the use of the latest information technologies to enhance our dialogue with the tech-savvy younger generation. Last but certainly not least, I will do everything in my power to protect and enhance the well-being of the talented U.S. government employees stationed in Japan, as well as the many American citizens living in or visiting Japan.

If confirmed, I will be honored to represent the United States in one of the most vibrant parts of the world at a critical point in history, and I pledge to work closely with you to address the issues that lie ahead.

Prime Minister Hatoyama’s Statement in New York

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Hatoyama stated: (as translated) Well, President Obama has talked all about everything about our meeting, so I have nothing to add to what Mr. President has said. But I told during the meeting to Mr. President that I came across the Pacific Ocean to express my gratitude for President Obama and the American people for the American people to exert courage to select President Obama. That sentiment came across the Pacific Ocean to Japan, which brought about the change of government in Japan. And I expressed my gratitude for the change and that the American people have (inaudible) to the Japanese people. And I told President Obama that the Japan-U.S. alliance will continue to be the central pillar, key pillar of the security of Japan and Japanese foreign policy. And I expressed my ideas of our contribution to the issue of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and my ideas on the issue of North Korea. And we will proceed in dealing with these issues in a cooperative manner. And on other global issues, like global environment and nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, I highly approve of President Obama’s leadership in courageously (inaudible) nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. As the only country that suffered nuclear attacks, we will work together with the United States toward a world without nuclear weapons. And on the issue of climate change I made a speech yesterday, and on this issue, too, we would like to work closely together with the United States. And I confirmed these ideas with President Obama.
One thing was clear that both leaders are hoping to strengthen mutual interests and cooperate with each other on the global financial crisis, global warming, climate change and nuclear proliferation. However, Prime Minister Hatoyama's remarks on the relocation of the American base in Okinawa changed depending on circumstances—even during his bilateral talks with President Obama and in the joint press conference after the talks on November 13, 2009. Thus, his so-called flip-flop political stance and attitudes towards U.S.-Japan alliance issues and foreign policy have created tensions among many members of his administration and elsewhere.

"Yuai "Article & Its Controversy

Here let us first turn our attention to the controversial Yuai article which created a commotion on both sides of the Pacific Ocean, and then look into the primary reason why the article caused such controversies.

As the reader may recall, on August 27, 2009, the New York Times carried Hatoyama's translated article entitled "A New Path for Japan," met with a critical backlash in the United States. Its content created commotion on both sides of the Ocean. By the same token, a few other newspapers, including the Christian Science Monitor followed the same path taken by the New York Times.

Hatoyama's essay declared how American-led globalization and pursuit of capitalism have eroded human dignity, and he advocated to put an end to unrestrained market fundamentalism and financial capitalism that are void of morals or moderation." The formation of an East Asian community—similar to the European Community was also declared.

The notion of Yuai is said to have been rooted in the ideals of compassion and balance—a rather difficult philosophy for the public to understand. On the one hand, Mr. Hatoyama preaches that "if there is an excessive degree of equality, equality will be lost." On the other hand, with regard to foreign policy, the language of Yuai is similarly abstruse. In his world view, it means Japan can be a bridge or a mediator between the United States and China by limiting Washington's influence in the Asia Pacific region. This means "helping to manage China's ascension as a global power by keeping its military buildup in check.

The Prime Minister's futuristic or fantastic vision of an Asia—which is said to be integrated into a regional community just like the European Union by utilizing its own regional currency modeled upon Euro—has been under debate. One thing which puzzles the present author the how Prime Minister's promise to hold back the forces of globalization and the communitarian Japan of small shops, face-to-face neighborliness and humane decency can be translated into the reality of international politics or
international diplomacy.

The essay published by the International Herald Tribune and Christian Science Monitor. While Mr. Hatoyama apologetically defended himself by saying portions of the contents had been distorted. Indeed, if the entire essay is read, one can realize that no anti-American views were expressed. However, China and some other East Asian countries did not go along with the Prime Minister's declarations. For instance, while China is hoping to create an Eastern Asian Community as well, it has assumed a cautious posture towards Japan taking a leading role in its establishment. Moreover, we can foresee a number of unknown hurdles—for example, the vast differences in the size of the region's economies as well as in the political systems among the countries in East Asia—that stand in front of Asian countries trying to forge something like European community. In this connection, Newsweek wrote the following critical comment:

Mr. Hatoyama often fumbles to explain how "fraternal love" would apply to current, troublesome issues like North Korea's nuclear program. This communication failure had political consequences. As for the essay on Yuai, it raised a flurry of concern among American policy makers that Mr. Hatoyama was considering an overhaul of the U.S. alliance. "For instance, the excerpt included criticism of "U.S.-led globalization," but left out Hatoyama's acknowledgement that globalization is something the world cannot do without. Elsewhere, the excerpt made it sound as though Hatoyama was leaning toward China, and away from America, far more strongly than was suggested in the original(38 Newsweek Sept.28,2009.p.38)

Other critically difficult issues are, first and foremost, there is no common language to be shared by Asian nations—like the English language used as common language in the European Union. The second critical issue is the common currency—like the Euro used in the European Union. No one denies the Prime Minister's lofty ideals that are somewhat akin to a sort of utopian philosophy—similar to fantasy. But should we face the harsh reality, the establishment of an East Asian community has a long way to go.

Furthermore, there is another contradiction along these lines: that is Prime Minister Hatoyama advocating the East Asian integration that could protect Japan and other Asian countries from not only U.S. political and economic excesses, but also military threat posed by China.

As a whole, what Prime Minister Hatoyama needs is to find a way to balance his lofty ideals with world reality. Secondly, it is essential to draw up strategies and then articulate them in a way that makes sense not only to other political leaders, but also to the general public.
Guiding Principles of U.S. Foreign Policy & Smart Power

Here let us turn our attention to the guiding spirit and principles of U.S. foreign policy and the concept of "Smart Power" under the Obama administration.

Historically, since its foundation, the United States has been willing to fight for universal ideals of liberty, equality, and justice. This higher purpose, sustained by military and economic might, attracted people and governments to their side through two world wars and five decades of the Cold War. Allies accepted that American interests may not always align entirely with their own, but U.S. leadership was still critical to realizing a more peaceful and prosperous world.

There have been times, however, when America's sense of purpose has fallen out of step with the world. Since September 11, 2001's tragic incident, the United States has been exporting fear and anger rather than more traditional values of hope and optimism. Suspicions of American power have run deep. Even traditional allies have questioned whether America is hiding behind the righteousness of its ideals to pursue some other motive. But regardless of the September 11 incident, U.S. foreign policy has been based upon the three aforementioned ideals—which also gives rise to the concept of soft power and Smart power.

On the whole, the United States is pursuing the following basic ideas:

- Uphold the principles of freedom, the rule of law, and observance of fundamental human rights;
- Promote domestic prosperity;
- Protect the security of the nation and its institutions, as well as those of America's allies and friends;
- Contribute to a safer world by reaching equitable and verifiable arms reductions agreements with the Soviet Union;
- Assist the economic development of poorer nations; and
- Act in a manner consistent with its humanitarian instincts.

Thus U.S. foreign policy finds its roots and expression in these objectives.

Principles Guiding U.S. Foreign Policy & Smart Power

What, then, are the principles that should guide U.S. foreign policy in the next administration?

To find the answer to this, the present author analyzed the lecture material done by Secretary of the State, Hillary Clinton on July 17, 2007 and material provided by the U.S. State Department.

In the words of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States is on the road to becoming a smarter power by investing once again in the global good—providing things that people and governments in all quarters of the world want. But these cannot be attained in the absence of American
leadership. By complementing U.S. military and economic might with greater investments in its soft power, America believes it can build the framework it needs to tackle tough global challenges.

Specifically, in order to achieve that purpose, the Obama administration focuses on the following five critical areas:

- Alliances, partnerships, and institutions: Rebuilding the foundation to deal with global challenges;
- Global development: Developing a unified approach, starting with public health;
- Public diplomacy: Improving access to international knowledge and learning;
- Economic integration: Increasing the benefits of trade for all people;
- Technology and innovation: Addressing climate change and energy insecurity.

The Obama administration finds it essential to invest in the global good: it is not charity. It is called "smart foreign policy." America's allies look to the United States for ideas and solutions, not lectures. The goal of U.S. foreign policy, thus, is to prolong and preserve American preeminence as an agent for good. The United States is well aware of the fact that achieving this goal is impossible without strong and willing allies and partners who can help the United States to determine and act on priorities. America should have ambitions higher than just being popular, but foreign opinion matters to U.S. decision-making. A good reputation fosters goodwill and brings acceptance for unpopular ventures.

To do so, helping other nations and individuals achieve their aspirations is the best way to strengthen America's reputation abroad. But this approach will require a shift in how the U.S. government thinks about security. Resetting the military after six years of war is of critical importance. But bolstering American soft power makes America stronger. The U.S. government must develop the means to grow its soft power and harness the dynamism found within civil society and the private sector.

**Implementation of Soft Power**

Secretary of the State, Hillary Clinton also strongly believes that implementation of a smart power strategy requires a strategic reassessment of how the U.S. government is organized, coordinated, and budgeted.

In her opinion, the Obama administration must look for a number of creative solutions to maximize the administration's ability to organize for success, including the appointment of senior personnel who could reach across agencies to better align strategy and resources. One of the personnel is, for example, is John Roos, the newly appointed Ambassador to Tokyo who was strongly recommended by President Obama himself.

In an effort to meet that need, she asserts that they must build on America's traditional sources of
strength in a principled and realistic fashion. With new energy and direction, the United States could use its power for even greater purposes and in the process preserve American values and interests far into the future.

One opinion poll that examined America's reputation, standing, and influence the world—showed them to be at all-time lows, and possibly sinking further. To rectify the world's negative image of the United States, the Obama administration came up with the following questions with regard to—how the world views America:

1. Is it that bad? Are negative views of America as prevalent and intense in all regions of the world?
2. Does it matter? Do negative views reflect a diminished American ability to achieve its national interests and uphold its values?
3. Can it be fixed? If American influence has waned, what are the main causes of its decline, and what are the main opportunities to reverse course?

America's reputation, standing and influence in the world do matter for the security and prosperity of the United States. There is no question that America's diminished standing abroad has meant that the United States has had increased difficulty in accomplishing its goals. America may be less well regarded today than at any time in its history, but Secretary Clinton does not think it is too late to reverse these trends, even in the Arab and Muslim world. She understands, however, that doing so requires a strategy that strikes a new balance between the use of hard and soft power and that integrates these elements into a smarter approach to the main challenges facing the United States and the global community.

· Reaction against globalization. Many abroad view the United States as the main promoter of globalization, blaming America for jobs lost and what they perceive as an assault on their traditions and culture.

· America's isolation from agreements and institutions with widespread international support. The United States has rejected a number of recent international initiatives that were popular abroad but lacked concerted support inside the United States, giving America the reputation of being rejectionist.

The Secretary of the State is of the opinion that the United States still enjoys a strong reputation in many parts of the world. People may not like America's current policies or leaders, but there is still a strong attraction to the idea of America, because the United States is still seen as a land of opportunity and as the nation that must lead if there are to be solutions to global problems.
Hard and Soft Power

The person who scrutinized the meaning of "power" and made it known to the public in book form was Kenneth E. Boulding.

The literature on the theme on power is enormous and goes back to a very long way. But the history of power, in Boulding's opinion, has been very little studied by comparison. One of the major problems in constructing a general theory of power is the taxonomic difficulties. Boulding distinguished three major categories of forms of power—threat power, economic power and integrative power. In other words they can be called "the stick," "the carrot," and "the hug." These are also related to another tripartite division: the power to destroy, the power to produce and exchange, and the power to integrate. This means that power can create such relationship as legitimacy, respect, love, and friendship and so on. Without legitimacy, both threat and riches are naked. The great fallacy of political thinking regarding power is to evaluate threat power to the position of dominance, which it does not possess. Failure to understand that is an enormous source of error in human decisions, both at the individual level and at the level of those who control organizations (Kenneth E. Boulding, 1990).

But according to Hillary Clinton's interpretation, power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get a desired outcome. Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. During the Bush administration, people heard the term "hard power" more frequently than the term "power." Hard power, in her opinion, enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want. The Pentagon's budget for FY2008 is more than $750 billion and growing, many times more than the nearest competitor. The United States has the world's largest economy, and more than a third of the top 500 global companies are American. There is no other global power, and yet American hard power does not always translate into influence, and it has been misinterpreted by many people in other parts of the world.

The effectiveness of any power resource depends first on context. Sources of strength change over time. Despite American technological advances that have made weapons more precise, they have also become more destructive, thereby increasing the political and social costs of using military force. Modern communications technology has diminished the fog of war, but also heightened and atomized political consciousness.

Trends such as these have made power less tangible and coercion less effective. Machiavelli said it was safer to be feared than to be loved. Today, in the global information age, it is better to be both.
Unlike hard power, "soft power" is the ability to attract people to our side without coercion. Legitimacy is central to soft power. If a people or nation believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead without using threats and bribes.

Legitimacy can also reduce opposition—and the costs—of using hard power when the situation demands. Appealing to others' values, interests and preferences can, in certain circumstances, replace the dependence on carrots and sticks. Cooperation is always a matter of degree, and it is profoundly influenced by attraction.

This is evident in the changing nature of conflict today, including in Iraq and against al Qaeda. In traditional conflict, once the enemy is vanquished militarily, he is likely to sue for peace. But many of the organizations against which we are fighting control no territory, hold few assets, and sprout new leaders for each one that is killed. Victory in the traditional sense is elusive.

Militaries are well suited to defeating states, but they are often poor instruments to fight ideas. Today, victory depends on attracting foreign populations to our side and helping them to build capable, democratic states. Soft power is essential to winning the peace. It is easier to attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic.

To ensure and promote soft power, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) --which was founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War—has provided strategist insights and policy solutions to decision makers in government, international institutions time of newly emerging global opportunities and challenges., the private sector, and civil society. CSIS is a bipartisan, independent, nonprofit organization located in Washington, D.C., and it conducts research and analysis to develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change.

CSIS was dedicated to finding ways for America to sustain its prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world's preeminent public policy institutions, with more than 200 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focused on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration. Therefore, U.S. foreign initiatives and policies have been shaped and influenced by CSIS's research outcomes.

What Is Smart Power?

The term smart power was coined by Joseph Nye, Jr. at Harvard University, and Hillary Clinton expanded its concept in the following way. According to her, smart power is neither hard nor soft—it is
the skillful combination of both. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action. Providing for the global good is central to this effort because it helps America reconcile its overwhelming power with the rest of the world's interests and values.

Elements of this approach exist today in U.S. foreign policy, they but lack a cohesive rationale and institutional grounding. But three main obstacles exist.

First, U.S. foreign policy has tended to over-rely on hard power, particularly, during the Bush administration. It is the most direct and visible source of American strength. The Pentagon is the best trained and best resourced arm of the federal government. By default, the military has had to step in to fill voids, even though the work would be better administered by civilian personnel. America must retain its military superiority, but in today's context, there are limits to what hard power can achieve on its own, particularly in tasks such as the reconstruction of states and societies after wars.

Second, U.S. foreign policy is still struggling to develop soft power instruments. Diplomatic tools and foreign assistance are often directed toward states, which increasingly compete for power with non-state actors within their borders. Diplomacy and foreign assistance are often underfunded and underused. These tools are neglected in part because of the difficulty of demonstrating their short-term impact on critical challenges. Civilian agencies have not been staffed or resourced for extraordinary missions.

It should come as no surprise that some of the best-funded and most appreciated soft power tools have been humanitarian operations carried out by the U.S. military such as tsunami relief in Asia and the earthquake response in Pakistan, since these operations produced results that were clear, measurable, and unassailable. Wielding soft power is especially difficult, however, because many of America's soft power resources lie outside of government in the private sector and civil society, in its bilateral alliances, or through its participation in multilateral institutions.

Third, U.S. foreign policy institutions and personnel are fractured and compartmentalized. There is little capacity for making trade-offs at the strategic level, and the various tools available to the U.S. government are spread among multiple agencies and bureaus. Coordination, where there is any, happens either at a relatively low level or else at the very highest levels of government—both typically in crisis settings that drive out long-range planning. Stovepiped institutional cultures inhibit joint action.
More thought should also be put into sequencing and integrating hard and soft power instruments, particularly in the same operating theater. Some elements of this approach are already occurring in the conduct of ongoing counterinsurgency, nation building, and counterterrorism operations—tasks that depend critically but only partially on hard power.

The United States has in its past wielded hard and soft power in concert, with each contributing a necessary component to a larger aim. They used hard power to deter the Soviet Union during the Cold War and soft power to rebuild Japan and Europe with the Marshall Plan and to establish institutions and norms that have become the core of international system. Today's context presents a unique set of challenges, however, and requires a new way of thinking about American power.

The twenty-first century presents a number of unique foreign policy challenges for today's decision makers. These challenges exist at an international, transnational, and global level. They include maintaining the durability of the current international order given the rise of new powers in Asia, ensuring that vectors of prosperity do not become vectors of instability, and addressing the potential consequences of nuclear proliferation and climate change.

The next administration, that is the Obama administration, needs a strategy that speaks to each of these challenges. Whatever specific approach it decides to take, two principles will be certain:

First, an extra appropriation on hard power will not necessarily bring an extra dollar's worth of security. It is difficult to know how to invest wisely when there is not a budget based on a strategy that specifies trade-offs among its instruments. Moreover, hard power capabilities are a necessary but insufficient guarantee of security in today's context.

Second, success and failure will turn on the ability to win new allies and strengthen old ones both in government and civil society. The key is not how many enemies the United States kills, but how many allies it grows.

States and non-state actors who improve their ability to draw in allies will gain competitive advantages in today's environment. Those who alienate potential friends will stand at greater risk. Terrorists, for instance, depend on their ability to attract support from the crowd at least as much as their ability to destroy the enemy's will to fight.

**How to Maintain Allies, Winning New Partners**

America is likely to remain the preponderant power in world politics after Iraq, but it will have to reengage other countries to share leadership. America's position as the lone global power is unlikely to last forever, and the United States must find ways of transforming its power into a moral consensus that
ensures the willing acceptance if not active promotion of our values over time. This will require combining hard and soft power into a smart power strategy of working for the global good. America must learn to do things that others want and cannot do themselves, and to do so in a cooperative fashion.

The Commission on Smart Power selected five main areas for its recommendations on potential ingredients of a smart power strategy. It is not designed to be a comprehensive national security strategy, but a set of policies that could help the United States become smarter and more secure by reinvesting in the global good. These are (1) Alliances, Partnerships, and Institution (Rebuilding the foundation to deal with global challenges); (2) Global Development (Developing a More Unified Approach, Starting with Public Health); (3) Public Diplomacy (Improving access to international knowledge and learning); (4) Economic Integration (Increasing the benefits of trade for all people); and (5) Technology and Innovation (Addressing climate change and energy insecurity). Out of the five components, the two new important aspects—Alliances, Partnerships, and Institutions and Public Diplomacy—will be singled out.

Alliances, Partnerships, and Institutions

The emphasis here is placed on rebuilding the foundation to deal with global challenges. Although the United States never relied entirely on treaties and institutions during the Cold War, American leaders tended to view them as extensions of U.S. influence. They were tools that helped the United States to engage and counter the Soviets on multiple levels and in multiple theaters, diminishing the risk of overreliance on any single facet of American power. In recent years, however, an increasing number of Americans have turned away a norms-based approach to global engagement. They have come to view international law as suggestive rather than binding, alliances as outdated and dispensable, and international institutions as decrepit or hostile. Some U.S. leaders have preferred to rely on coalitions of the willing to achieve American objectives rather than on formal alliance structures or multilateral approaches that depend upon UN sanction. In the short term, global norms and institutions allow the United States to address numerous hazards concurrently without having to build a consensus in response to every new challenge. Because of America's global interests and responsibilities, it often finds itself managing half a dozen crises simultaneously. Some of these challenges may be regional in nature and require regional institutions to address. Others may be transnational and require a multitude of state actors in concerted action over time—something only norms-based
internationalism can yield. In the long run, investing in institutions and global norms works to preserve U.S. ideas, values, and interests into the future. This is particularly important if the relative weight of non-Western powers was to increase in the years ahead and America was to become less able to assert itself internationally.

**Public Diplomacy**

Of the selected five main areas for its recommendations on potential ingredients of a smart power strategy, Public Diplomacy is one of the distinctive new schemes for the Obama administration.

Public Diplomacy pays most attention to improving access to international knowledge and learning. Effective public diplomacy is central to any discussions about American image and influence in the world today. The intent of public diplomacy is to communicate with the people, not the governments, of foreign countries. Governments traditionally use public diplomacy to exercise influence over individuals, groups, institutions, and public opinion abroad in support of its national objectives. Public diplomacy is broader, though, than the official activities of government. It is part-and-parcel of everything America does and says as a country and society. Every U.S. citizen serves as a diplomat, whether at home interacting with foreigners or when traveling abroad. Donna A. Welton, Consul General of the United States of America, Sapporo also introduced and enlarged upon the meaning of "Public Diplomacy" in her presentation in the fall of 2009. (Donna A. Welton).

Recent U.S. administrations have struggled to get public diplomacy right. More than public relations, effective public diplomacy moves both people and information and helps provide insight into the policies and values of the United States. It also improves Americans' awareness and understanding of the world beyond their shores. Despite past successes during the Cold War, a number of U.S. decision makers dismiss public diplomacy as ineffective or as mere propaganda. Although a number of independent commissions have criticized the U.S. government for problems implementing public diplomacy, it remains a critical part of U.S. smart power. The next administration should strengthen their resource commitment to public diplomacy and consider what institutional remedies—in addition to capable leadership—could help make U.S. government public diplomacy efforts work most effectively. Public diplomacy efforts go well beyond government efforts. An effective public diplomacy approach must include exchanges of ideas, peoples, and information through person-to-person educational and cultural exchanges, often referred to as citizen diplomacy.
Implementing a Smart Power Strategy

Is there a silver bullet for ensuring effective implementation of a smart power strategy? According to the Secretary of State, the answer is “No”. The Commission on Smart Power has purposefully sought to stay away from offering sweeping recommendations on government reorganization. Moving boxes around and building new ones is not always the right answer. Even still, the next president and the next Congress ought to undertake a strategic reassessment of government structures and readiness. Which tools work and which do not? Which require massive overhaul, and which merely call for new leadership and direction? How can coordination and integration between our military and civilian tools of national power be enhanced?

The forces of disintegration in their soft and hard power tool kit are strong. It will take a dedicated effort by the next administration and Congress to overcome these challenges. In some instances, the problems call for new institutions or renewed mandates for existing institutions. In other instances, the problem can best be addressed with leadership and accountability. Domestic politics and constituencies will also likely shape any reform process. The demands and pressures of America’s domestic politics will make far more difficult the development of a sophisticated foreign policy, and investment in tools required to carry it out.

They believe reform is possible, however. They suggest that the next administration should be guided by the following five principles:

1. A smart power strategy requires that we make strategic trade-offs among competing priorities.

2. We must elevate and integrate the unique dimensions of development, diplomacy and public diplomacy into a unified whole.

3. Congress must be a partner, and develop proper authorizing and appropriating structures to support a smart power strategy.

4. We must move more discretionary authority and resources into field organizations and hold them accountable for results.

5. The government must learn to tap into and harness the vast soft power resources in the private sector and civil society.

A Smarter, More Secure America

The Commission on Smart Power sent Commissioner Rick Barton and staff around the United States to be involved in a listening tour with the American people as part of this Commission's
effort:—it is referred to as “Dialogue with America.” While we have often heard the conventional wisdom in Washington of a tired and inward-looking electorate, instead the new administration put emphasis on a universal desire on the part of Americans to improve its image in the world and tap into its vast potential for good.

Hillary Clinton believes that there is a moment of opportunity today for their political leaders to strike off on a big idea that balances a wiser internationalism with the desire for protection at home. Washington may be increasingly divided, but Americans are unified in wanting their country to be a force for good. The United States would like to see the same hunger in other countries for a more balanced American approach and revitalized American interest in a broader range of issues than just terrorism. And we hear everywhere that every serious problem in the world demands U.S. involvement.

Military power is typically the bedrock of a nation’s power. It is understandable that during a time of war the United States places primary emphasis on military might. But the new administration has learned during the past five years that this is an inadequate basis for sustaining American power over time. America's power draws just as much from the size of its population and the strength of its economy as from the vitality of American civic culture and the excellence of American ideas. These other attributes of power become the more important dimensions.

There is nothing weak about this approach. It is pragmatic, optimistic, and quite frankly, American. Americans were twice victims on 9/11. Initially the United States was victimized by the terrorists who flew airplanes into buildings and killed American citizens and foreigners resident in this country. But Americans victimized themselves the second time by losing their national confidence and optimism. The values inherent in our Constitution, educational institutions, economic system, and role as respected leader on the world stage are too widely admired for emerging leaders abroad to turn away for good. By becoming a smarter power, Hillary Clinton believes that the United States could bring them back sooner, and help build a more secure country and global community. ("Smart Power & the U.S. Statement for Security on Post-9/11 World, Nov.7,2007 at Center for Strategic & International Studies)

Obama- Hatoyma Talks in Japan 2009

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyma and U.S. President Barack Obama met for the first time on Friday November 13,2009. On the surface, the two leaders made references to general and long-term goals of shared mutual interests----the bilateral alliance and cooperation on such pressing global issues as climate change and nuclear disarmament, how to contain North Korea’s atomic threat and the world
without nuclear weapons. But they avoided bringing up touchy diplomatic issues. They refrained from sharing views on the sensitive issue of the relocation of American Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa—which has cast a shadow on U.S.-Japan bilateral relations.

During the November 13th joint news conference Prime Minister Hatoyama and President Obama attached importance to the implementation of the 2006 accord. Furthermore, President Obama mentioned that. "The working group will focus on the implementation of the agreement that our two governments reached with respect to the restructuring of the U.S. forces in Okinawa and we hope to complete this work expeditiously." "Our goal remains the same and that is to provide for the defense of Japan with minimal intrusion on the lives of the people who share the space.—the latter referring to people in Okinawa. So as we have seen, a wide gap still exists between the two countries as far as the security issue is concerned while the United States is to enact its defense appropriations for 2010 by the year's end, lawmakers are just wondering when and in way the Prime Minister will handle the issue. Time has already run out to resolve the Okinawa's base issue. The actions taken by the government are always caught up in the gap between public sentiment and bilateral relations with other countries. The 2009 US-Japan bilateral relationship is no exception. (Federal News Service July 23,2009(419 Dirksen Senate office Bldg. Washington,DC)

How do some of the observers like Okinawa Governor and foreign correspondents interpret the first bilateral Tokyo talks between the two leaders?

The Governor of Okinawa Hirokazu Nakaiwa voiced disappointment with their remarks for lacking an-in-depth reference to the major issue of the air base in Giowan, Okinawa. According to the bilateral agreement of 2006, the flight operation of the Futenma base are to be moved to the less densely populated area of Nago City in Northern Okinawa by 2014. The argument is that on the one hand, the Hatoyama cabinet, which got under way in September this year(2009), has promised to review the realignment plan, but on the other hand, the United States maintains that Japan should abide by the originally agreed bilateral accord.

One sticking point is that in 2006 the LDP signed a bilateral agreement with the United States to move the Futenma base flight operations in Ginnowan to U.S. Marine Corps Camp Schwab in Nago City by 2014, but Hatoyama's administration, which assumed its office in September, has promised that the base be moved out of Okinawa or outside Japan—which was their campaign promise.

While both the United States and Japan have agreed to set up a high-level working group to discuss the issue, Prime Minster Hatoyama made no mention of any concrete promises regarding the formation of the working group, but just said that the working group would reach a conclusion sooner or later.
(Nakaima Upset : Naha Okinawa Pref. Kyodo Nov.16,2009). In order to resolve the Okinawa base issue by the end of 2009, Prime Minister Hatoyama assured President Obama by saying “Trust me!” inasmuch as the United States is Japan's important ally.(Asahi Newspaper “The relocation of Futenma Base on the drift,” Dec.5,2009.) His assurance in turn prompted President Obama to speak out publicly on November 14 at Tokyo's Suntory Hall “the two of us have not only reaffirmed our alliance—we have agreed to deepen it. We have agreed to move expeditiously through a joint working group to implement the agreement that our two governments reached on restructuring U.S. forces in Okinawa.”

His promise was taken seriously and fulfilled the expectations of the Obama administration. But on December 4, 2009, Prime Minister Hatoyama once again changed his political stance and told the press reporters that he would revise the accord in order to transfer the base to Guam—which created another political controversy on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. At the same time, although the Obama administration pushed for a quick decision, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano mentioned that failure to reach a bilateral agreement would not mean that everything was over. He also stressed that he never indicated that the Futenma base issue must be resolved within the year(2009), adding that the Prime Minister shares the same view.” (Ibid, Asahi Newspaper, Dec.5, 2009)

Prime Minister Hatoyama has been caught in the middle between the United States and the Social Democratic Party (the SDP) on the issue of relocation of the U.S. Futenma base to Gionan. But another controversy arose at a news conference on December 5 when he said “Guam would be an appropriate location, and the people on Guam are counting on that.”

The SDP's President Mizuho Fukushima indicated on December 4 that the SDP might leave the Democratic Party of Japan if the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma base remained in Okinawa—which put a lot of unknown pressure on Prime Minister Hatoyama's decision on the relocation issue by the end of December this year. Another worry for the Hatoyama administration is that the SDP is considering placing ads in American newspapers with regard to the issue. The SDP in collaboration with U.S. environmental organizations is to kick off a campaign in the United States—“Save the coastal area wildlife in Hekono.” Ms. Fukushima also asserted that her party will have to make a grave decision if a base is built in Henoko as agreed in the 2006 accord. Having made such a statement, she was satisfied that talks would not be rushed to reach a conclusion in December. Prime Minister Hatoyama also indicated that talks with the U.S. will not end within the year, but he later expressed on December 12 that another new plan might emerge before the December 18th deadline on the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Camp in Hekono to another site—which not merely irked but upset the American government and even many members within the Hatoyama administration and others as well. Although
Mr. Hatoyama cited the need for working together for a consensus with the SDP as a rationale for waiting until 2010, U.S. officials dis not buy the idea.

**Negotiating Behavior of the Two Leaders**

In this short article, the author has focused his attention on investigating U.S. foreign policy towards Japan in 2009 with reference to the concept of soft power and smart power and Japan's foreign policy towards the United States under Hatoyama's government within a framework of international negotiation by applying "Major phases & Actors Negotiation Cycle theory(MANC)."

Before making some final remarks, the author would like to elaborate on the notion of Fraternal-Love-based "Pendulum Style Negotiation(FLPS)

Fraternal-Love-based Pendulum Style Negotiation(FLPS)—a mixture of "wishy-washy style negotiation" and "volte face style negotiation"—is made up of the following three components:

I . Vexatious Delay Style Negotiation,"

"Vexatious Delay Style Negotiation" is a type of negotiation that employs tactics such as the use of ambiguous forms of interpersonal communication, together with time manipulation which includes stalling for time on deals or haggling, stonewalling, and making flip-flop comments, and using time limits to one's advantage in negotiation settings. But it undoubtedly irritates the opponent who might later become critically vocal about the content of negotiation with displeasure. For example, when Prime Minister Hatoyama requested President Obama another round of U.S.-Japan summit talks at the COP 15 conference in Copenhagen on December 18 in order to get U.S.-Japan negotiations going again, his comment automatically upset and irritated President Obama's spokes-person at the White House: he turned down Prime Minister Hatoyama's request by saying "we did that like a couple of weeks ago. We have an agreement with the previous administration in Japan. We set up a working group to discuss the implementation of that agreement." as has been reported at the news conference on December 9.

Another case in point is that when Mr. Roos, ambassador to Japan, reiterated the need for a sweeping resolution of the base issue in Okinawa by saying the existing proposal was the only feasible option, Mr. Hatoyama was unsure where to go from there, and he delayed the answer. It worked against his promise to President Obama. Then, the negotiation came to a total deadlock.
II. Volte Face Style Negotiation

The main feature of Volte Face Style Negotiation is that a negotiator does not mind changing his/her position, even a 180 degree change or transformation. is acceptable A negotiator has an ability to switch overnight from one conviction or viewpoint to the other extreme. Russian negotiators, according to international political scientists such as Hiroshi Kimura, they are quite adept at using this tactic. But unlike Prime Minister Hatoyama's slow type "stalling and volte-face negotiation" tactics, which were not strategically oriented, Russians ordinarily test the strength and determination of the other side at the negotiation table. They are extremely good at adopting a flexible negotiating position reacting to any change in the situation with the idea of "correlations of forces."

Once they notice that they are unable to attain their own goals in negotiation settings, they shift their positions from time to time. This style of negotiation tactic is diametrically different from the tactics or style adopted by Prime Minister Hatoyama: his manipulation of both a "vexatious delay style" and "stalling and insecure volte faces style" or "fraternal- love-based style," and the way he manipulates a mixture of three styles took many people on both sides of the Pacific Ocean by surprise. (Mitarai, Global Negotiation :The Age of Global Negotiation & Mediation in Business and Public Diplomacy).

III. Fraternal-Love-based Style Negotiation

Fraternal-Love-based Style Negotiation contains the following five separate, yet interwoven aspects:

(1) "Fraternal-Love-based Style Negotiation" is one type of negotiation amply demonstrated by Prime Minister Hatoyama. Its guiding spirit is based on fraternal love----if a negotiator maintains cordial associations or intimate relations, and common purposes with any opponent, every conflict, vexatious matter and troublesome issue can be settled or resolved peacefully. That is what Prime Minister Hatoyam tried to do at the U.S.-Japan summit talk on November 13th when he had occasion to discuss the relocation of the controversil Futenma U.S. Air base to a less populated area in Okinawa with President Obama: Hatoyama gave Obama about assurance implementation of the 2006 agreement by saying "Trust me!"

The trouble is that the DPJ's Ms. Mizuho Fukushima publicly opposed the realignment plans. Then, splits surfaced in the Hatoyama administration, with some calling for major revisions to the Futenma's plan while others endorsed the existing plan.

A critical point is that thereafter, Prime Minister Hatoyama changed his position again like a pendulum and went along with Ms. Fukushima plan ---- the Futenma airbase was to be removed to a new site outside of Okinawa. As Hatoyama's statement sent a negative signal, the Obama administration
viewed this message with displeasure.

(2) Every issue can be resolved as long as two negotiators (or more parties) maintain “trust” and “friendship” that later can be transformed into a dialogue based on “fraternal love”—a dialogue without having an argument, and then, a mutually satisfying consensus will emerge between the two leaders (parties).

(3) Its method is not based upon a dialectic method of reaching an agreement. As the reader is aware, conflict is a direct result of the dialectic method of decision-making. In “fraternal love-based negotiation,” a negotiator has a firm belief that a negotiated agreement can be made without having an argument on any issue being discussed with the other party. In the final analysis, a consensus will emerge between or among the parties.

(4) In “Fraternal Love-based Negotiation,” tacit understanding and utopian type optimism come into play during the process of negotiation. By the same token, the vagueness of language is one element that enables negotiators across the table to maintain a high degree of friendly and harmonious relationships, and so that in the end, both parties come up with mutually satisfying outcomes and shared lofty ideals without having a harsh argument or western-type dialectics. Prime Minister Hatoyama's desire to avoid friction and debate was observed every time he was engaged in a series of negotiations with President Obama both in the United States and in Tokyo.

(5) The notion of “Yuai” (fraternal love), according to Mr. Hatoyama’s philosophy, has been rooted in the ideals of compassion and balance—rather difficult ideology to grasp and comprehend. It is his belief that the “fraternal love” ideal can be applied to even current destabilizing issues like North Korea’s nuclear program. (See PP.139-140)

Here it should be added that Prime Minister Hatoyama has held a strong political view (or some may call it his “personal fantasy”) when it comes to Japan's national security issue and global security issues, particularly, in connection with the Okinawa base. In his personal opinion, Okinawa Prefecture should be a neutral zone without military bases, and Japan's security can be protected as long as the U.S. keeps military bases located in some other part of the Asia Pacific region besides Japan. But in reality, from a geo-political standpoint, people in the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan, have a stake now: what takes place or happens in one region has a direct effect on our lives. We need to recognize that an escalating nuclear arms race in the Asia-Pacific region would determine prosperity and growth in the future. As President Obama stated during his visit to Tokyo, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a strong nuclear deterrent that guarantees the defense of its allies, and Japan is one of them.
Therefore, Okiwana's base issue should be tackled and reviewed from the standpoint of the national security issue by Japan's Prime Minister. Mr. Hatoyama must now put himself in a position to face the harsh reality of international politics and the national security issue. Thus, from time to time, Prime Minister Hatoyama has been saying all along that the US-Japan alliance and the base relocation issues can be resolved when time ripens as long as both governments continue to keep negotiations going this year and into 2010.

V. Pendulum Style of Negotiation

One conspicuous characteristic found in “Pendulum Style of Negotiation” is a negotiator who is always oscillating, vacillating and swinging back and forth by changing his positions from time to time. In other words, the “Pendulum Style of Negotiation” can also be referred to as the “wissy-wassy style of negotiation” and a wissy-wassy negotiator is a person who is considered feeble and who also lacks in decisiveness and strength. A wissy-wassy type negotiator has a tendency to talk around the point, rather than talking straight to the point when engaged in negotiations.

"Major phases & Actors Negotiation Cycle theory(MANC)"

Now let us take a brief look at MANC, which encompasses the following concept:

MANC theory emphasizes that the best strategy is to start with “small” (hence politically less cumbersome) agreements and to build on their ratchet effects rather than to struggle for big, sweeping (and eternally elusive) agreements. A series of negotiations between Washington and Tokyo first got started with framework agreement (1), but Prime Minister Hatoyama's evasive and "Vexatious Delay style" of negotiation behavior and communication, together with the SDP's anti-slogan for revising the 2006 accord to transfer the American base outside Okinawa, have prevented President Obama and the Americans from moving right into Phase 2 of Rule-Making & Monitoring, although Washington pushed for a quick decision.

Framework Agreement (1) Phase of Agenda-setting & Issue Consolidation

     (2) Phase of Rule-Making & Monitoring
Protocols

(3) Phase of Capacity Building (for laggards)

[ I ] Agenda-setting ——> Issues Networks:

     Proponents vs. Opponents

[ II ] Treaty making ——> State Governments (Washington and Tokyo, for example)
Capacity building ——> International (treaty) organizations(-or two or more countries)

It is still vivid in our memory that the two leaders smiled and shared a friendly and firm handshake on at the summit talk held in Tokyo on November 13.

While President Obama decided to tackle complex bilateral political issues, environmental issues, nuclear disarmament, to say nothing of nonproliferation and global warming, and the Okinawa base issues, Prime Minister Hatoyama avoided the most pressing issue of the relocation of U.S Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa—which had been already agreed to by both governments in the 2006 accord.

But more importantly one distinctive difference was also found in the style of communication and rhetoric when they delved into foreign policy issues such as security issues—especially, Okinawa base issue. These distinctively different features were highlighted when the two leaders entered into a series of negotiations and at a series of press conferences.

President Obama has all along emphasized the same themes in American foreign policy towards Japan. He has made it crystal clear that the importance of U.S.-Japan ties by stressing “a partnership between U.S.—Japan is one of the tremendous interests. It is the cornerstones of the security and economic well-being” in the Asia Pacific region and in the entire world as well.

He has consistently harped on or talked about the same subjects in U.S. Policy towards Japan, including the American relocation base issue. He remained focused and spoke with consistency—even when addressing the aforementioned subjects not only at the inaugural address for the new Ambassador to Tokyo, Mr. John B. Roos on August 6, but also during his bilateral talks with Prime Minister Hatoyama on September 23 in New York, and in Japan on November 13 and elsewhere.

For instance, upon his arrival at Tokyo on November 13, President Obama reiterated at a news conference that “our goal remains the same—and that is to provide for the defense with minimal intrusion on the lives of the people who share the space.”

To put it differently, in any negotiation setting and at a news conference, President Obama remained focused and straightforward when addressing U.S. foreign policy towards Japan and the important shared aspects of U.S.-Japan relations, including the American base issue in Okinawa. President Obama's rhetoric, the style of delivery and logic in his speech at Tokyo's Suntory Hall when he spoke on the importance of U.S-Japan bilateral relations as well as the growth of multilateral organizations in the Pacific Asia to advance security and prosperity, and how power does not need to be a zero-sum in negotiations and in international relations—was not contradictory, but consistent. The gist of his
speech was interpreted as being very persuasive and candid.

On the contrary, Prime Minister Hatoyama's style of communication and negotiation was inconsistent and contradictory regarding the relocation of Okinawa's American base. The nature of the outcome was not expected one: it was highly contradictory for Prime Minister Hatoyama to call for the building of an East Asian community while pledging to maintain the U.S.-Japan alliance as the major pillar of Japan's foreign policy. He has changed his positions time and again particularly when it comes to the American base relocation issue—on one day agreeing to stick to the 2006 accord between Washington and Tokyo to relocate Futenma's U.S. aircraft operations to a new airstrip to be built at Camp Schwab in Henoko—the deal which had already been signed by the Democratic Party, and reconfirmed at the U.S. bilateral talks held in Tokyo on November 13, 2009. But later on December 5, 2009 Prime Minister Hatoyama and his administration called for moving the base out of Okinawa Prefecture to somewhere else like Guam. He was caught right in the middle between the United States and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) on the issue of the U.S. Futenma base relocation when he said “Guam would be an appropriate location, and the people on Guam are counting on that.” But another controversy arose at a news conference on December 5 and December 16 when he remarked that Guam was not an appropriate location. Thus, another location in Japan besides Guam be singled out by the working group.

But after that, he again altered his positions several times like a pendulum before December 18 and postponed a decision on the future location of US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma out of consideration. Meanwhile, Japan, Russia, and the United States will again restart the tripartite alliance talks starting 2010.

Taken as a whole, Prime Minister Hatoyama's style of communication and his delivery skill was inconsistent and contradictory when addressing and dealing with pressing and urgent issues, including the relocation of Okinawa's American base. When Prime Minister Hatoyama finds himself involved in a series of conversations and negotiations, his statements or his way of explanation was (or has been) oscillating swinging back and forth like a pendulum—in some cases it can be construed as wishy-washy: it appears to be vexatious, stalling and insecure, thus his negotiating behavior is also labeled as “Fraternally Love-based Pendulum Style” (FLPS).

Final Remarks

If more time were allotted for negotiations between the two leaders and between Washington and Tokyo, the context of the talks might have produced more positive outcomes and more positive impact
on the achievement of foreign policy agreements. A series of talks between Japan and the United States regarding the Futenma base issue, including an informal conversation took place between Secretary Hillary Clinton and Prime Minister Hatoyama over dinner on December 17 in Copenhagen were inconclusive at the end of December 2009 leaving strained relations between Tokyo and Washington. At the end of 2009, the gravity of the situation finally sank in for Prime Minister, the Secretary General, Ichiro Ozawa, and his entire administration.

Figuratively speaking, Prime Minister Hatoyama, in the final analysis, was driven to the last ditch without reaching out and touching President Obama even at the COP 15 conference held in Copenhagen in the middle of December.

Finally, as Ambassador Roos mentioned in effect that at last when we envision the future course of U.S.-Japan relations, the U.S-Japan bilateral relationship in 2009 has stood the test of time, but it must continue to strive to meet contemporary challenges.

Life is very short and there is no time for fighting and fussing. But one thing is clear in this day and age of globalization: we can find growing concern and recognition across the Pacific of the opportunity our alliance presents to tackle nontraditional and transnational security threats, such as climate change, energy security, new Green concerns and pandemic diseases.

As we recall, on November 14 at Tokyo's Suntory Hall President Obama as the first Pacific U.S. President reiterated and emphasized the importance of U.S.-Japan relations and the growth of multilateral organizations that can advance the security and prosperity of the Asia Pacific region.

In addition to this, he enlarged on the theme by saying "we look to rising powers with the view that in the 21st century, the national security and economic growth of one country need not come at the expense of another." (President Obama's Speech at Tokyo's Suntory Hall, Nov.14,2009). In his opinion, in an interwoven global society, power does not need to be a zero-sum game in international negotiations and in international relations. There is no need for nations to fear the success of another. By the same token, he emphasized that the United States would not seek to contain China even when they would not agree with every issue. A deeper relationship with China does not necessarily mean a weakening bilateral alliance between the two nations.

Should China and the United States cultivate spheres of cooperation instead of competing spheres of influence, it can lead to progress in the Asia Pacific. In conclusion, as America's first Pacific President, he promised the Japanese audience that the Pacific nation has potential to strengthen and sustain mutual leadership in this vitally important part of the world. In an effort to meet these challenges, the United States are looking to strengthen old alliances and renew partnerships with nations in this region. To
achieve this goal, he chose Japan as his first leg on his Asia Pacific tour because Japan—which shares fundamental democratic values with the United States—is one of the old treaty alliances for the United States.

Since the end of the World War II, the U.S.-Japan alliance has long been an anchor of the U.S. security role in East Asia. The alliance has put forward the deployment of about 53,000 U.S. troops and other U.S. military assets in the Asia-Pacific. It has undergirded U.S. national security strategy in the Asia Pacific region.

It holds true that the alliance and the U.S. nuclear umbrella have provided Japan with maneuvering room in dealing with its neighbors such as China and North Korea.

On the one hand, most of the left-of-center DPJ members have supported the U.S.-Japan alliance in the party. On the other hand, the general thrust of Japanese foreign policy has questioned and voted against several features of the alliance, to say nothing of base realignment and Japan's financial appropriations for U.S. forces stationed in Japan. The Party has also put forward a foreign policy vision that spells out more equality in Japan's relations with the United States through deeper engagement with Asia and a more United Nations-oriented diplomacy.

But, bilateral tensions have come to the fore over the desire of some members of the DPJ like Ms. Mizuho Fukushima of Hatoyama's Cabinet to convert a 2006 U.S.-Japan agreement to relocate the controversial Futenma Marine Air Station to a less populated and environmentally safe area or locations.

Meanwhile, the tripartite National Security Dialogue among Japan, the United States, and Russia will once again get underway effective next spring, 2010—the idea was endorsed by the former Prime Minister Taro Asoh in his talks with the Russian President last July at the Summit Talk held in Italy. The triple alliance was formed for security reasons in the Asia Pacific region in 1994 and lasted until 1998. A series of joint military operations and exercises have been conducted between Japan and Russia, and among the three nations. The revival of the triple alliance is a matter of great concern and interest to many political observers around the world. China and North Korea, however, may have mixed reactions towards the restart of the tripartite Dialogue and the Triple alliance.

In conclusion, the author would like to finish this short article with the following note:

Whether U.S.-Japan relations will stay the same or strengthen is still open to discussion, and it can be speculated that Okinawa's Futenma base issue will remain unresolved into 2010. But one thing is crystal clear that both the United States and Japan will have to work out together first to settle the current issues expeditiously while it may not be resolved in a short period of time.

As we may recall, U.S. Ambassador John V. Roos urged that the relocation issue be resolved quickly
and next year marks the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, so attention should be
turned to broader topics. He also stressed that it is the United States' full hope and expectation to work
together to resolve the current base issue, and more important work is ahead of the two countries in
2010. (NHK News and see other major newspapers on December 5 and 6,2009)

It will be vitally important for Japan and the United States to focus on broader issues for the next 50
years. There is more work to be done the two countries working closely together in such fields as new
technology, environment, business and economy, education, medicare and cross-cultural interchange.
The United States needs Japan's technology to create a sustainable society—even when constructing
super railway systems. For the United States, Japan is the second largest trading partners.

The State of Oregon, for instance, has made a deal with Nissan to import Nissan's electric cars to
Oregon for environmental reasons. People in the State kicked off a "keeping Oregon No.1 Greenest
State in the United States" campaign. The Governor of Oregon and other state officials drive Japanese
hybrid automobiles. The Obama administration is in need of Japan's technology for the construction of
a new railway system for American style bullet trains on the American continent.

So new breakthroughs in many fields and areas can bring more jobs and economic and industrial
viability on both sides of the Pacific. At the same time, people in the Asia Pacific region are looking not
only for growth that is sustainable, but also global security---not political instability, environmental
degradation, and nuclear threats. (December 31, 2009)

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