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Efficient Equilibrium Contracts in Two-Player Games
https://sapporo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/829
https://sapporo-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/82998951895-91e6-4b81-bb92-08e6ed8c8864
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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KJ00005185083.pdf (318.4 kB)
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Item type | 紀要論文(ELS) / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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公開日 | 2007-10-01 | |||||
タイトル | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
タイトル | Efficient Equilibrium Contracts in Two-Player Games | |||||
言語 | ||||||
言語 | eng | |||||
資源タイプ | ||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
ページ属性 | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | P | |||||
記事種別(日) | ||||||
値 | 研究ノート | |||||
記事種別(英) | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
値 | Note | |||||
論文名よみ | ||||||
その他のタイトル | Efficient Equilibrium Contracts in Two-Player Games | |||||
著者名(日) |
山田, 玲良
× 山田, 玲良 |
|||||
著者名よみ |
ヤマダ, アキラ
× ヤマダ, アキラ |
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著者名(英) |
Yamada, Akira
× Yamada, Akira |
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著者所属(日) | ||||||
値 | 札幌大学経済学部 | |||||
著者所属(英) | ||||||
言語 | en | |||||
値 | Sapporo University | |||||
抄録(英) | ||||||
内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
内容記述 | We analyze two-player two-stage games where players may make binding offers of schemes for side payment acceptance (or rejection) as well as those for side payments before choosing actions. Each agent's receipt scheme depends on the other's transfer scheme, but each agent's transfer scheme does not depend on the other's receipt scheme. We find that any set of efficient actions maximizing the total payoff is played on an equilibrium path of the two-stage game even with such partially interdependent bilateral side contracts, when players are only two and there is a pure Nash equilibrium in the underlying game (the second stage game without side contracts). | |||||
雑誌書誌ID | ||||||
収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
収録物識別子 | AN1055277X | |||||
書誌情報 |
札幌大学総合論叢 巻 24, p. 141-147, 発行日 2007-10 |